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Heather C. Ohaneson 
 
In this dissertation, I investigate five forms of play with reference to freedom and 
constraint in order first to ascertain what relationship holds between play and liberty 
and then to see how the activity of play—and the attitude of playfulness—might 
contribute to a full and flourishing human life. To do so, I turn to an interdisciplinary set 
of figures, including Erik Erikson, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Blaise Pascal, Plato, and the 
contemporary scholars of improvisation Gary Peters and Danielle Goldman. It is my 
contention that the dialectical interrelation of liberty and limitation constitutes the 
essence of play and that the free engagement of constraints is a proper feature of 
eudaimonistic ethics. Instead of being regarded as a dispensable disposition, then, 
playfulness should be upheld alongside traditional virtues as a trait worthy of deliberate 
cultivation in adulthood.  
Seeking to enact the claim that boundaries give rise to expansive possibility, I 
provide a firm structure for this study and organize my analysis according to Søren 
Kierkegaard’s conceptions of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious spheres of existence. 
Liberty and limitation appear differently under each of these categories. Further, their 
forms change depending on whether they are viewed in light of children’s play, 
videogames, gambling, puppetry, or improvisation, the iterations of play and playful 
identity under consideration in this study. Learning about the apprehension, 
negotiation, and appreciation of boundaries that occurs in play grants us a more 
nuanced understanding of play as a fundamental component of a good life. At the same 
time, this project affords the chance to reconsider the nature of freedom and constraint, 






“I run in the path of your commands,  
for you have set my heart free.”  
—Psalm 119:32 
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One definition of play posits that it, like religion, is simultaneously separate from 
the everyday—we play but then we return to work—yet pervasive in our lives, histories, 
and cultures—the more we look, the more we see play: in ancient Greece and modern 
China, in children’s education, in artistic creativity, in movies, in the sports psychology 
of “flow,” in electronic games that we play in stolen moments on a host of technological 
devices, in animals, in the interpersonal dynamics of love and politics (“power plays”), 
and in our conflicting desires to maintain and lose control. Somehow play has seeped 
out, blurring its neat borders. In this, it resonates with common understandings of 
religion. Insofar as it is characterized as holy, religion delineates separate times and 
spaces for its exercise. Yet religion in its intensity can claim to be much more than an 
activity and can make demands on our attention and very selves. Religion and play may 
also on occasion be dismissed for similar reasons—they are criticized or rejected as too 
concerned with fantasy, merely escapist, not productive enough, corrupted in violent 
forms, or simply things we grow out of with age.  
I am not concerned here to delineate the shortcomings of the phenomena of play 
and religion or even to offer a sustained discussion of the ways in which they overlap. 
Rather, in this dissertation I wish to engage the question of how the activity of play and 
the attitude of playfulness contribute to the well-lived human life. It is my contention 
that the concept of play has value for ethics, broadly construed as the discipline 
concerned with how we ought to live. Play is ethically instructive because experiences of 
play offer opportunities not only to find freedom from constraint but also, more 
strongly, to find freedom in constraint. Undergoing a theoretical investigation into the 
nature of play contributes to this effort of clarifying how play and playfulness may 
qualify as a eudaimonistic good and a virtue. Thus, I set out in what follows to provide a 
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dialectical treatment of play, showing how the dynamic interrelation of liberty and 
limitation constitutes a variety of games and amusements. Play, in this reading, is 
interplay, the back and forth of expansiveness and constriction.  
Taking the existential categories of the nineteenth-century Christian Danish 
philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, I examine the concept of play as it might appear in 
aesthetic, ethical, and religious dimensions. The movement between these three areas—
according to their Kierkegaardian conception1—corresponds roughly to a progression 
from (1) an immature freedom that eschews regulation to (2) a commitment to abiding 
by rules at the expense of that first sense of freedom to (3) the growing coincidence of 
the two, seemingly opposed elements of openness and confinement. At its height, the 
third stage of play is the moment of balance, harmonious resolution, or synthesis insofar 
as it allows for liberty within limitation. According to this view, the most robust form of 
freedom does not need to do away with regulation in order to show itself as such. 
Instead, the height of freedom is the power to transcend boundaries from within them. 
At the end of the play dialectic, one realizes that one is at liberty not in spite of the 
confines of rules but through them. One has power not only when one plays around 
with limits, gerrymandering them, but when one can play within them, demonstrating 
admirable skill in managing impediments.  
A player may say that she is free when she plays because she can subvert the 
rules by cheating or because she can leave the game whenever she wants. She may also 
locate freedom in the pleasure of relative consequences. If the game is not one that she is 
invested in winning, she can engage the rules while being at ease psychologically, 
knowing that the instructions have a bearing for the time of the game alone. This 
attitude finds freedom in detachment. Upon reflection, a person may also acknowledge 
the freedom of freely choosing to submit to rules. Such a player knows herself to be free 
                                                




because she realizes that she enters into the boundaries of play voluntarily. She does not 
have to be autonomous (in the sense of giving the nomos, law, of the game to herself) in 
order to be free; she can abide by the rules established by the game designer(s), and so 
willingly obey another. 
This sampling of several different possible expressions of the freedom of play 
shows that the definition of freedom is also at stake in the progression of play forms. In 
the second movement in which play is considered under “ethical” qualifications, for 
example, the willingness to lose one type of freedom—the nominal freedom of doing 
whatever one wants—is regarded as essential to acquiring a truer liberty. 
Simultaneously, the comprehension of limitation is transformed as one moves through 
the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages of play. Through their practices of play, people 
may cease to regard regulations negatively as what foreclose options. Instead, by 
playing differently, they may come to appreciate how structure opens possibility. This 
reappraisal of boundaries may apply to structures imposed externally. Even if players 
do not begin to embrace constraint as such—even if there is good cause to decry rigid 
borders—at the apex of their development players are able to respond masterfully to the 
force of boundaries. Thus, within the scope of this study, liberty and constraint are not 
seen as having a stable meaning that holds for all types of play. The understanding of 
freedom and limitation is itself dynamic in nature, and subject to transformation.  
Players, too, may be seen to develop across these stages. It is not only that people 
may come to be better qua players, improving a game skill or mastering a game, by 
spending time at play. Playfulness—which I am taking to be the trait that enables the 
negotiation of the liberty-limitation tension in games—might take hold more deeply in 
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players qua people and become increasingly manifest in other areas of their lives, where 
they encounter all sorts of resistance, rules, and disappointments.2  
To test this idea and trace the shifting relationship between the desire to break 
free from rules and the inclination to look to rules or other constraints as sources of 
freedom, I studied five play forms in conjunction with an interdisciplinary set of 
classical and contemporary thinkers. These figures include Erik Erikson, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Blaise Pascal, Plato, and the contemporary scholars of improvisation 
Gary Peters and Danielle Goldman. Kierkegaard informs this writing structurally; at no 
time do I address his ideas on play, however. Furthermore, the seminal play theorists3—
and especially the play theologians4—stand in the background, informing my 
understanding of play as, on the one hand, an inner-teleological activity set apart from 
work and rest, and as, on the other hand, a theological good.  
                                                
2 In associating negotiation with play, I acknowledge effort as an important element of play, 
which distinguishes play from sheer rest. For, according to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), 
“negotiate” signifies the negation of otium, Latin for “leisure,” “freedom from business,” “ease.” 
  
3 The giants in the field are—within anthropology and sociology—Johan Huizinga (Homo Ludens: 
A Study of the Play Element in Culture, published in 1938), Roger Caillois (Man, Play and Games, 
published in French in 1958), and now, with his Religion in Human Evolution (2011), Robert Bellah. 
More than any other source from the play literature, Caillois’ shaped my thinking. In particular, I 
was influenced by his categories of agon, or competitive play, alea, or the play of chance, mimesis, 
or the play of imitation, and ilinx, or the play of radical movement. Within philosophy, the 
predominant figures are Friedrich Schiller (On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters, 
from 1793), Hans-Georg Gadamer (Truth and Method, 1960), and Jacques Derrida (“Structure, Sign 
and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” in Writing and Difference, 1966). The expert in 
the areas of education and children’s psychology is Brian Sutton-Smith (The Ambiguity of Play, 
1997).  
   
4 The leaders of the theology of play movement of the 1970s were Jürgen Moltmann and Karl 
Rahner. Centered on Moltmann’s piece “The First Liberated Men in Creation,” the collection The 
Theology of Play came out in 1972. Hugo Rahner’s Thomist-inspired essays, including a piece on 
Aristotle’s notion of eutrapelia, were gathered under the title Man at Play and published that year. 
Other notable authors in this area include Harvey Cox (The Feast of Fools: A Theological Essay on 
Festivity and Fantasy, 1969), Robert E. Neale (In Praise of Play, 1969), David L. Miller (Gods and 
Games: Toward a Theology of Play, 1970), and Sam Keen (To a Dancing God, 1970). Without being 
able to stipulate its significance, I will note that the rise of the theology of play movement 
coincides with the emergence of video games. On the latter’s development, see the Brief Timeline 
of Video Game History (xvii-xxi) and “Arcade Games of the 1970s” (Chapter 6) of Mark J.P. 
Wolf’s The Video Game Explosion: A History from PONG to PlayStation® and Beyond. Current-day 
interest in the theological significance of play seems to be focused primarily although not 
exclusively on improvisation. See, for example, Jeremy Begbie (Theology, Music and Time, 2000), 
Samuel Wells (Improvisation: The Drama of Christian Ethics, 2004), and Nimi Wariboko (The 




In looking to the specific forms of play, games, and play-based identities that I 
do—these are: children’s play, online role-playing games, a wager on Christian theism, 
divine puppets, and improvisation—I only proffer examples of aesthetic, ethical, and 
religious play. I intend to use these instantiations of play in very circumscribed ways. I 
neither think that the progression from the aesthetic to the religious is the 
developmental path through which all players pass, nor do I think that it is possible to 
classify all types of play under Kierkegaard’s categories. Every individual may begin to 
play as a child but not every player ends an improviser; one does not move along this 
trajectory necessarily or as a matter of course. Further, it is not immediately obvious 
how to categorize other games and play experiences in this framework. Where would 
the simple pastime of crossword puzzles fit, or sports games? The schematizing 
limitation is unproblematic insofar as I am not setting out to account for all types of play 
but to hit the narrower target of theorizing play as, in its best moments, a confining-yet-
freeing activity through which one may express and cultivate the disposition of 
playfulness—a good valuable for life. To stress: this project is an extended exercise in 
experimental thinking. The examples of play that I have chosen are, like play, variable, 
and the aesthetic, ethical, and religious categories of Kierkegaard’s that I employ are to 
be regarded more as paradigms of play than as progressive stages. 
I will proceed to outline the arguments of each of my five chapters (in Part I), 
leaving a “thick description” of Kierkegaard’s categories for the next section of this 
introduction (Part II). Following the statement of the definitive marks of aesthetic, 
ethical, and religious ways of life that will set the boundaries for my investigation, I will 







I. CHAPTER DESCRIPTIONS 
 
In chapter 1, I draw on the work of several twentieth-century psychologists 
(including Melanie Klein, Erik Erikson, and D.W. Winnicott) to examine children’s play. 
My argument with respect to children and play in short is that play is a developmental 
good which, paradoxically, must be pursued for its own sake in order for its benefits to 
be realized. Broaching children’s play instrumentally ruins its rewards. I would 
maintain that this facet of necessary indirectness applies to the advantageousness of 
adult play, as well.5 Indeed, one of the reasons it is important for me to start this project 
with a statement in chapter 1 of the developmental function of play is that I want to 
claim that play proves salutary to selfhood throughout life—and that I want to maintain this 
while “protecting” play from being appropriated as a tool for individual improvement in areas 
like morality and education. Typically, as young children we play and through our play 
find mastery or training in physical and psychic arenas. With age, we are able to 
cultivate ourselves in further dimensions, including those of cognition and morality, by 
playing. If we let it, the fruitfulness of engaging in purposively non-purposive activities 
extends well beyond adolescence. This hinges on the delicate task of honoring the nature 
of play as intrinsically valuable, refusing the temptation to treat play as something it is 
not. In short, the conditions for children’s development in play teach us to trust that 
there are positive effects of adult play that come secondarily, as by-products.   
In chapter 2, I use views of Phantasie, or fantasy, from works of the nineteenth-
century German Romantic philosopher and famed Protestant theologian Friedrich 
Schleiermacher as a framework for theorizing World of Warcraft. (This is an unusual 
move and, to my knowledge, a completely unprecedented application of 
                                                
5 A striking parallel with an aspect of religious ritual bears mentioning. The Christian tradition 
broadly construed understands worship to be advantageous for human beings. Worshippers 
should praise God for God’s sake, however; if they seek to win something for themselves by 




Schleiermacher’s notion of fantasy.) World of Warcraft, or WoW, is a particular instance of 
a videogame genre known as Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games 
(MMORPGs). A type of play belonging distinctively to the computer age, MMORPGs 
involve acting out highly imaginative roles in settings that are large, virtual, and social. 
Player agency in these make-believe worlds is mediated by avatars, which are images or 
characters (often very stylized in nature) that represent the players onscreen.  
Taking fantasy and the interrelation of avatars and agency as the chief points of 
interest in chapter 2, I set out to make two arguments. The first is that the complicated 
relationship between agency and avatars in WoW mirrors the interstitiality that is 
characteristic of the free play of the mind in acts of fantasizing generally. In (offline 
exercises of) fantasy, the mind is free to combine images and ideas that do not normally 
go together. The mind, however, is not entirely self-directed in this process. The “I” is 
somehow both in control and subject to a loss of control in fantasizing. Similarly, players 
of WoW are free to express, explore, and leave behind aspects of their identity while they 
are in the game world; this is the case even as players stand, potentially, to be 
overpowered by their avatar roles.  
That first argument about interstitiality leads to the second stance that I take up 
in chapter 2, which is that games such as WoW are imperfectly escapist. To be sure, 
players of all games remain tethered to reality to some degree. What is of interest is the 
way that WoW reproduces and reaffirms reality. The fantasy world of WoW widely 
differs from the ordinary sphere of life, of course, but the presence of some unreality 
does not prevent the game from reinforcing aspects of our shared world. In fact, the 
fantasy world of this MMORPG exhibits numerous features of reality, including the 
replication of work-like tasks! A perhaps less trivial point about escapism and fantasy is 
that seeking to live out of one’s mind is an imperfect or incomplete strategy for dealing 
with real-life difficulties. Spending vast amounts of time in the immersive, highly 
sensory environments of online games does not guarantee a transformation of one’s 
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inner character—for good or ill. Even if we set aside our worries about the typically 
violent features of MMORPGs and grant that MMORPGs are pastimes that serve as 
harmless, even helpful, escape-valves from the social, ethical, and professional pressures 
of one’s everyday, real life, we can point to the need to go beyond their play form 
“existentially.” Insofar as they only enable you to live better virtually, MMORPGs offer a 
shallow or immature freedom, which does not reliably extend to the real world. To this 
extent, MMORPGs are inadequate as guides for lives of embodied, actual commitment 
and constraint.6 And so I pivot from the aesthetic part of the dissertation, composed of 
chapters 1 and 2, to the part on ethics.  
In chapter 3, the sole chapter in the section of the dissertation on ethics, I 
consider game playing in terms of decision-making. Blaise Pascal’s “Wager” argument, 
§418 of the Lafuma edition of the Pensées, serves as a model for an anti-escapist game in 
that the effect of gambling on the existence of God is a serious confrontation with 
oneself. Making this decision requires that one face who one really is. In this thought 
fragment, officially titled “Infini – Rien,” infinity – nothing, Pascal strips away the 
illusory and delusional connotations of ludus (game), unmasking his interlocutors’ actual 
investments: This is a game in which they do have a stake. Taking up Pascal’s point of 
view, we might say that it is incumbent on the believer to reveal to an agnostic that 
abstaining from decision is itself a decision. The apologist is only urging the 
noncommittal libertine to make an explicit choice for or against God.  
Turning to the short, four-page text of “Infini – Rien” in chapter 3 effects a shift in 
method as well as in subject matter. By taking up this famous bit of Pascal’s work, I not 
only step into a moment in early modern philosophy as it is being carried out in 
seventeenth-century France in the debates surrounding the religious community of Port-
                                                
6 To be sure, World of Warcraft and games of its ilk may be regarded in a variety of ways; they do 
not merely lend themselves to being considered aesthetically and when they do admit of 




Royal. I also change the form of my analysis to that of a close reading. Thus, the 
substance of chapter 3 is a six-fold interpretation of the Wager. Alongside the theme of 
freedom, which is critical as the through-line of this dissertation, my reading affords 
attention to the issues of reason, immediacy, passion, totality, and certainty. I argue that 
these features appear in Pascal’s apology as paradoxes and polarities. These points may 
be announced simply as follows: (1) Pascal insists that this wager is a forced game; (2) 
reason has an enormous role in the making of this bet, even though the capacity of 
reason is presented as severely limited and in need of being transcended; (3) the quality 
of immediacy, which is frequently although not universally associated with gambling, is 
undone in the thinking of eternity; (4) passion, which was once an obstacle to belief in 
God, is transformed through embodied rituals into an aid for a faithful way of life; (5) in 
retrospect, the totality of the stakes wagered will seem as nothing; and (6) in the course 
of risking his life on God, the libertine will find absolute security. 
Overlaying these specific points of interpretation are my claims that Pascal 
redeems play by responding to (or replacing) the divertissement of his libertine 
interlocutor with a game that saves, and that insofar as Pascal’s argument is a game, it is 
one that he rigs to win. 
Chapters 4 and 5 comprise the third and final section of the dissertation, which is 
on religion (not as defined by contemporary scholars but, again, as construed by 
Kierkegaard). In chapter 4, I give an account of Plato’s claims about play in three 
passages from the Laws (4.715e-716d, 1.644d-645c, and 7.803a-804c), the last of which 
contains the well-known injunction that “man should spend his whole life at ‘play’—
sacrificing, singing, and dancing …” (803e, Saunders’s translation). Chapter 4 builds off 
of the work of textual analysis of the Wager to some degree and extends the personal 
sense of play. That is, the idea in Pascal’s argument was that a decision on whether or 
not to believe in God is necessitated by our specifically human existence: being human 
leads us to play a game about, if not with, God. By contrast, Plato represents human 
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nature as fundamentally toylike. In the Laws, human beings are—minimally—players in 
god’s game or—more strongly—toy-artifacts made by god.7 As puppets, we are moved 
to act according to the interplay of our desires and reason. The cords of the passions are 
multiple and intransigently rigid; they are always liable to be in tension with reason, a 
singular cord that is made of the more valuable and pliable metal of gold, which is why 
we need the help of god and the laws. In order that we have the golden string “win” in 
the battle with the passions, and so act in the right way, we must be willing to be pulled 
along. This willingness is akin to lowliness, both as a position (we are guided from 
above) and a disposition (we do wrong to think of ourselves immoderately, as having 
the properties of god).8  
Being a puppet means having a two-fold identity, and entails behaving in a 
certain way. My exposition of the three passages from the Laws shows how the values of 
lowliness and rationality are mutually moderating in Plato’s argument. One maintains 
modesty as one follows divine and civil laws, and obeys the dictates of reason. Thus, the 
wonder of one’s religious identity as a divine toything is balanced by the duty of 
obedience. Similarly, the offensive sense that one is being ridiculed in being considered a 
puppet is leveled by the dignity of the golden cord of reason by which the puppet, with 
the help of god and the laws, is moved. Thinking about who we are in quintessentially 
playful terms changes how we live. Being toys leads us to obey and to play. Freedom 
and limitation are evinced in this conjunction of levity and obedience.  
                                                
7 Plato’s theology is complicated. At times he writes of a singular god, ho theos, in a way that 
identifies the deity metaphysically with the Form of the Good. Scholars such as Michael Bordt 
also discuss, largely on the basis of the Timaeus, the possibility that Plato holds a view of “weak 
monotheism.” According to the stance of weak monotheism, there are many sub-gods in addition 
to the one main god (Sattler, Bryn Mawr Classical Review). Perhaps the clearest, most important 
thing to note is that Plato did not think of the gods as having traits of the Olympian gods, who 
would have needed to be entertained by human beings. To capture some of this complexity, I will 
primarily use “god” in the singular, lower-case form in the discussion of Plato and play. The 
places where it is appropriate to write in the plural, of gods, I will. For another project, this 
slippage may be a faulty imprecision. It seems permissible for this work, however, given the 
context of the discussion of puppetry. 
 




In chapter 5, I supplant the image of puppetry with improvisation as a model for 
how to make one’s way in the world. It is not so much that the field of play has 
expanded—I am not contending that all of life is a game; to whatever degree this 
sentiment is found in the discussion of Plato in chapter 4, it is overcome in the last sub-
strata—as that particular practices of play, such as jazz, comedy, and contact (dance) 
improvisation are powerful enough to extend to the way one understands and conducts 
oneself in one’s non-play life. The playfulness of improvisation is powerful enough to 
affect or even reconstitute the non-playing self. Improvisation sets the grounds for 
freedom and grace to meet through the promise of redeemability, on the one hand, and 
the liminal nature of the endeavor, on the other. That is, even as they engage in 
contestation, improvisers have the capacity to redeem the gestures offered up in their 
play. Moreover, play, like the celebrated Christian notion of grace, is neither fully active 
nor fully passive. Improvisation therefore approximates grace as a strenuous but 
unstriving work that, being its own pleasure, refuses orientation to products and 
rewards. Improvisation is the height of play insofar as it exemplifies play’s inner-
teleological nature as well as the joyful coherence of constraint and freedom. 
 After making the case that a dialectic of freedom and constraint unfurls within 
and between the five iterations of play that I have identified across three spheres—
namely, those of childhood play and Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games 
(under aesthetic play), a Pascalian wager on God’s existence (under an ethical 
qualification of play), puppetry that illustrates the stature of human beings and leads to 
practices of play, and graceful, power-filled exercises in improvisation (under play 
marked by the religious)—I turn to the conclusion of the dissertation. I bring “Free to 
Play” to an end with a brief engagement of the question of virtue. How might the 
foregoing study contribute to the field of virtue ethics? What would it mean to consider 




II. KIERKEGAARD’S SPHERES OF EXISTENCE 
 
A prolific author who wrote (geographically) at the margin of German society 
and (generically) from within the limen of literature and philosophy, Søren Kierkegaard 
(May 05, 1813 – November 11, 1855) gave expression to notions of subjectivity and faith 
that informed twentieth-century thought in profound ways through the figures of Franz 
Rosenzweig, Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Lévinas, Paul Tillich, and others. Aside from 
his intellectual legacy, Kierkegaard is marked in my mind by what he shares with 
Dostoevsky and Pascal—a sort of ideological temperament, which exhibits artistry, 
faithfulness to Christ, concern for the conditions of existence, and an astute awareness of 
human psychology.9  
In his works of literary philosophy, Kierkegaard gives voice to imaginary figures 
as a way of portraying and analyzing different ways of life, the predominant spheres of 
selfhood being the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. Thus, the pseudonymous 
author of Fear and Trembling Johannes de Silentio exemplifies the point of view of 
someone in search of faith. The opinions of Anti-Climacus in Sickness unto Death and 
Practice in Christianity as one who “consider himself to be a Christian on an 
extraordinarily high level” serve as a response to the humbler perspective of the non-
Christian Johannes Climacus in Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript (Kierkegaard, JP VI 6433; Pap. X1, A 517; quoted in Hong and Hong, 
“Historical Introduction,” Philosophical Fragments, x). According to the discrepancy in 
their beliefs, Anti-Climacus and Johannes Climacus model existence differently. Apart 
from pseudonymous authors, Kierkegaard uses various characters within his works to 
represent contradictory life stances. Thus, Judge William offers a counterpoint to the 
                                                
9 For more on Kierkegaard’s life, see Joakim Garff’s magisterial biography (2005). For an 
introduction to Kierkegaard’s thought, one may consult M. Jamie Ferreira’s guide in the 




aesthete in Either/Or. I give these flashes of examples and perspectives as a way of 
making the general point that Kierkegaard’s famously indirect exposition of ways of 
being in the world pervades his philosophical writing, with particular works 
highlighting particular forms of life. Such writing is a non-digital instance, perhaps, of 
role-playing.10 
Although it is hard to identify a single book in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre that presents 
a balanced, unified portrait of the three spheres—even Stages on Life’s Way foregrounds 
the ethical and the religious to the relative neglect of the aesthetic—there are a few lines 
and passages that address the spheres in their conjunction. The most concise, explicit 
naming occurs in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript: “There are three existence-
spheres: the esthetic, the ethical, the religious” (501). Later in that same work Climacus 
states: 
If in himself the individual is undialectical and has his dialectic outside himself, 
then we have the esthetic interpretations. If the individual is dialectically turned 
inward in self-assertion in such a way that the ultimate foundation does not in 
itself become dialectical, since the underlying self is used to surmount and assert 
itself, then we have the ethical interpretation. If the individual is defined as 
dialectically turned inward in self-annihilation before God, then we have 
Religiousness A. If the individual is paradoxical-dialectical, every remnant of 
original immanence annihilated, and all connection cut away, and the individual 
situated at the edge of existence, then we have the paradoxical-religious. This 
paradoxical inwardness is the greatest possible, because even the most dialectical 
qualification, if it is still within immanence, has, as it were, a possibility of an 
escape, of a shifting away, of a withdrawal into the eternal behind it; it is as if 
everything were not actually at stake. But the break makes the inwardness the 
greatest possible. (CUP, 572, original emphasis) 
 
It is worth underscoring that Climacus refrains from using the term “Christianity” in 
this passage. Rather, he refers to the Christian tradition as the paradoxical-religious. He 
addresses this choice to abstain from naming Christianity in a rare footnote, stating 
“According to this plan, one will be able to orient oneself and, without being disturbed 
by anyone’s use of Christ’s name and the whole Christian terminology in an esthetic 
                                                
10 I am indebted to Mark C. Taylor for the insight that Kierkegaard allows his readers to imagine 
themselves into different modes of being in a role-playing way. His pseudonymous authors may 




discourse, will be able to look only at the categories” (ibid.). Its turn to inwardness and 
its embodiment of paradox are what distinguish Christianity from the form(s) of religion 
represented by Religiousness A. 
Before turning to the spheres, I would do well to announce these additional 
preliminary points: First, the aesthetic-ethical-religious progression is dialectical. The 
aesthetic and the ethical are retained in the religious, even as sensuousness, fantasy, 
choice, and moderate humility are sublimated in improvisation. “If you cannot manage 
to see the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious as the three great allies, if you do not 
know how to preserve the unity of the different manifestations everything gains in these 
different spheres, then life is without meaning …” (Either/Or, II, 147). There is hope in 
maintaining the possibility of preserving the unity of difference. Second, although I am 
not employing the categories for crossing between spheres, I should acknowledge that 
Climacus presents “irony [as] the confinium [border territory] between the esthetic and 
the ethical” and “humor [as] the confinium between the ethical and the religious” (CUP, 
501-502). According to the Kierkegaard scholar C. Stephen Evans, Climacus sees irony 
and humor as what make possible the growth of the individual (Kierkegaard’s 
“Fragments” and “Postscript,” 188-189). Third, it is worth noting the 2-1-2 structure of the 
spheres. Both the aesthetic and the religious moments have two poles, whereas the 
ethical is undivided. The first figure representative of aestheticism, Aesthete A, is 
reflected at least in the title in the first pole of the final stage: Religiousness A. Perhaps, 
then, Kierkegaard attributes two aspects to the religious in order to emphasize that the 
aesthetic is recovered in its fullness. Kierkegaard’s presentation of Christianity as a 






Aesthetic: Sensuous Immediacy 
 
There are two poles to the aesthetic sphere, that of sensuous immediacy and that 
of over-reflection. These are portrayed in the first volume of Either/Or (Aut/Aut in 
Danish), a remarkable work that contains a number of genres, including aphorisms, 
essays on aesthetic theory, letters, a diary (that of a seducer), and a sermon (Walsh, 
“Kierkegaard,” 64).  
It takes multiple characters in Either/Or for Kierkegaard to accomplish his usual 
pseudonymous distancing. There is an anonymous aesthete, referred to simply as “A”—
whose papers constitute the first volume, which corresponds to the “Either” of the title. 
The second volume, “Or,” is the letter written to A by the character Judge William. This 
second figure has a respectable job and a wife—and, what is more, a name. The 
anonymity of the aesthete fits in well with the aesthetic way of life. Lacking full-fledged 
subjectivity, aesthetes obey a herd mentality. They are easily lost in the crowd. The third 
pseudonymous figure behind Either/Or is the editor Victor Eremita, who ties the 
writings of “A” and “B” together. (Eremita refers to the judge on occasion as “B.”) I 
draw attention to these names of “A” and “B” in order to recall the recuperation of the 
aesthetic in the religious sphere. As noted above, the final sphere of Kierkegaard’s 
schema also has two poles, those of Religiousness A and the paradox of Religiousness B. 
To be clear, though, the character of the Judge stands in for the sphere of ethics. Whether 
or not he is referred to as “B,” Judge William does not represent the second element 
within the aesthetic, but the second stage of life. 
 Evidently, sensuousness and immediacy are the two traits to which to attend in 
describing the first pole of the aesthetic sphere. These are bound together—the desires of 
sensuousness demand immediate fulfillment—and are related to other qualities like 
abstraction and inauthenticity. Although the notions of abstraction and inauthenticity 
pertain in interesting ways to Kierkegaard’s treatment of the crowd, which in turn 
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relates to the idea that children in their youth are defined by the people who surround 
them, I will focus on the elements of desire and time in the brief description that follows. 
The sensuous immediacy definitive of the aesthetic in its earliest, least developed 
moment finds expression in erotic love, music, and poetry, but also in the life of a child. 
Evans conjoins the aesthetic with recognizable aspects of childhood and childishness, 
writing: 
The aesthetic stage is the natural life-stance of a child; it is the place where 
human existence begins. The aesthete is characterized in various ways: as 
someone who lives “for the moment”, as someone who lives for pleasure, 
happiness, or satisfaction. The aesthete lives a life dominated by “immediacy” in 
the sense that the purpose of life seems to be simply to satisfy as many desires as 
possible. (Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love (KEL), 45) 
 
Immediacy may be taken to mean “right away and without delay” in a child’s impatient 
cry, “I want this now!” As “not mediated,” immediacy may also signify something like 
what is automatic.11 In this register, immediacy relates to the child’s direct—untrained 
and unrestrained—approach to life, which Evans frames in terms of a “natural life-
stance.” This framing of the process of becoming a self in the developmental terms of 
childhood congrues with my choice of subject matter—play and childhood 
development—for chapter 1. 
Like a child, the aesthete lives in a discontinuous series of “here and now” 
moments. (Keep in mind that Kierkegaard is not glorifying this experience of “being in 
the now” in the way that post-modern Westerners tend to uphold Zen thinking.) To the 
extent that the aesthete lives out of his sensuousness, he is determined by his fleeting 
desires and is dependent on his external circumstances. He looks to what is outside of 
himself for the ground of his identity, and so exhibits what George Pattison terms 
                                                
11 Thus, the judge states that “the esthetic in a person is that by which he spontaneously and 
immediately is what he is; the ethical is that by which he becomes what he becomes” (Either/Or, 




“existential inauthenticity” (“Art in an Age of Reflection,” 77).12 Unable or unwilling to 
make use of reflection, the aesthete is not free. He is left to chase his selfish whims, 
which are by definition momentary.  
Sounds are as quick to flee as desires are to dissipate. One may look to music, 
then, as an art form that exhibits the continually successive ephemerality that is 
definitive of sensuous immediacy. “Music always expresses the immediate in its 
immediacy” (Either/Or, I, 70) and “[s]ensuous immediacy has its absolute medium in 
music …” (71) and “the elemental originality of the sensuous is music’s essential theme 
…” are claims that aesthete A puts forth in the piece “The Immediate Erotic Stages or 
The Musical-Erotic.” In these assertions, which link sensuousness and immediacy to 
music, music seems to be nothing more than the wordless performance of sound after 
sound. Note follows note in a relentless rush of “nows.”13 
Beyond discussing it relative to the artistic medium of music, aesthete A analyzes 
sensuous immediacy as it appears in the central figure of Mozart’s masterpiece Don 
Giovanni. 
Don Giovanni is absolutely musical. He desires sensuously; he seduces with the 
demonic power of the sensuous; he seduces all. Words, lines, are not suitable for 
him, for then he immediately becomes a reflective individual. He does not have 
that kind of continuance at all but hurries on in an eternal vanishing, just like the 
music, which is over as soon as the sound has stopped and comes into existence 
again only when it sounds once again. (102, emphasis mine) 
 
                                                
12 Another relevant binary, and one that maps on to the eternal/historical in important ways, is 
the abstract/concrete. I take inauthenticity to align with abstraction or the failure to find concrete 
expression in the historical. See Either/Or, I, 55. 
 
13 “[S]ensuousness in its elemental originality is the absolute theme of music. The sensuous in its 
essential nature is absolutely lyrical, and in music it erupts in all its lyrical impatience. That is, it 
is qualified by spirit and therefore is power, life, movement, continual unrest, continual 
succession. But this unrest, this succession, does not enrich it; it continually remains the same; it 
does not unfold but incessantly rushes forward as if in a single breath. If I were to describe this 
lyricism with a single predicate, I would have to say: It sounds—and with this I come back again 
to the elemental originality of the sensuous as that which in its immediacy manifests itself 
musically” (Either/Or, I, 71). Here, a “lyrical impatience” reminiscent of the impatience of the 




Aesthete A advances his analysis here by introducing the comparison of a reflective 
individual (which is indicative of the second pole of the aesthetic sphere). Sensuousness 
may be understood not only “positively,” as physical desire, but also “negatively,” 
according to what it lacks: In the stage of sensuous immediacy, reflection and language 
are absent (71), as is a distinction between one’s environment and oneself. The 
distinction between subject and object, and the deferral of gratification, come to pass 
with the emergence of reflection. Thus, immediacy accounts for the idea that “[m]usic 
consistently excludes word” (Taylor, Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship (KPA), 159) 
as well as the claim that the self is unaware of others (158).  
Wanting occurs instantaneously under this form of life, which is to say both that 
under the earliest sphere of existence we want things at every instant and that we want 
our wishes to be met instantly. Speaking takes the time of thought, however.14 As 
opposed to the inherent fragmentation of sensuous immediacy, continuity marks 
reflection. The cognitive capacity of reflection offers a way to bind the self, making it 
cohesive. Too much oscillation occurs, as it were, between the first and the second poles 
of the aesthetic. By the next phase of the first stage, the problem will not be a lack of 
reflection but too much thinking. Furthermore, in extreme occupation with the past or 
excessive anticipation of the future, reflection neglects the present. 
 The above passage describes the seductive activity of Don Giovanni, but aesthete 
A is careful to qualify his statement so as to avoid an inconsistency.     
[O]ne must apply the word “seducer” to Don Giovanni very cautiously. This is 
not because Don Giovanni is so perfect, but because he does not fall within 
ethical categories at all. … To be a seducer always takes a certain reflection and 
consciousness, and as soon as this is present, it can be appropriate to speak of 
craftiness and machinations and subtle wiles. Don Giovanni lacks this 
consciousness. Therefore, he does not seduce. He desires … (Either/Or, I, 98-99) 
                                                
14 Pattison explains that music is not sufficiently like language to share in the relation that 
language has with spirit: “Music, like language, addresses itself to the ear, has time as its element, 
and, thus far, involves the negation of the immediate sensuousness. Yet if music stands closest to 
language in the hierarchy of media, it is not language and it is not party to the complete 





Don Giovanni’s existence is completely sensual in that it is based on the incessant rising 
and passing away of desires. What makes Don Giovanni an appropriate model for pure 
musicality disqualifies him from undertaking amorous quests. (Imagine the frustration, 
always desiring but incapable of ever being satisfied!) The essential characteristics of 
sensuous immediacy stand in contradiction to the skills of seduction. In particular, there 
is a conflict with respect to time:  
He [Don Giovanni] lacks the time to be a seducer, the time beforehand in which 
to lay his plan and the time afterward in which to become conscious of his act. A 
seducer, therefore, ought to possess a power that Don Giovanni does not have, 
however well equipped he is otherwise: the power of words. As soon as we give 
him the power of words, he ceases to be musical, and the esthetic interest 
becomes a different one. (99) 
 
Strictly speaking, Don Giovanni does not count as a proper seducer because he does not 
have the time, self-awareness, or verbal resources necessary for planning romantic 
conquests. As long as he is stuck in the sphere of sensuousness, he lives immediately—
not reflectively.15 When language and reflection arise, however, a person’s relation to 
time changes. One can live in the past or the future, in addition to being in the moment. 
Now on the cusp of the transition to the second pole of the aesthetic sphere, we spot 
Don Juan. Unlike Don Giovanni, Don Juan is “a seducer [who] readily becomes so 
reflective that he ceases to be absolutely musical” (116; cf. 108). Insisting on the 
incompatibility of total sensuous immediacy and reflection, aesthete A asserts that the 
presence of the power of speech cancels a completely musical identity that is abstract. 
(Elsewhere, he states quite directly that “[r]eflection is fatal to the immediate” (70).) Don 
                                                
15 Again, Pattison offers helpful explication. Referring to the relationship between sense and 
spirit, and highlighting the trait of anxiety, he writes: “Though outside the realm of reflection, 
Don Giovanni, as the passionate sensuousness excluded and therefore posited by Christianity, 
does have a certain relation to spirit. … Don Giovanni’s anxiety is not ‘subjective’ because he is 
not anxious for himself or aware of himself as anxiety; it is ‘substantial’ because it belongs to the 
objectivity of his life situation. Anxiety is the reflection in his personality of the claims of a 
freedom, a spiritual life, that he does not, subjectively, acknowledge but Christianity declares to 
be a human being’s ultimate goal” (83). I also cite this passage here because it looks ahead to the 




Juan, who epitomizes the art of seduction, points to another character of Either/Or, the 
imperfect seducer who over-excels at plotting.  
 
Aesthetic: Over-reflection  
 
The two sides of the aesthetic stand in opposition to one another, even as the 
aesthetic sphere is defined over against the ethical. That is, we may form an 
understanding of what the aesthetic sphere is as a whole by considering how it differs 
from the ethical way of life. Similarly, it is possible to describe the pre-reflective 
character of sensuous immediacy as it is countered in the second iteration of the 
aesthetic by over-reflection. As Evans states, “The reflective aesthete seems to lack 
immediacy; he has learned to enjoy life by stepping back from life and taking its events 
as raw materials for aesthetic reflection and creation. Even the story of seduction told in 
the Diary reflects this ambiguous relation to actuality” (KEL, 46). It is worth turning to 
“The Seducer’s Diary,” the last piece of Volume I of Either/Or, to see what it means for 
an aesthete’s mind to go into overdrive.  
The conceit of the text is that the editor Victor Eremita has stumbled across the 
papers of a seducer (303). The symbolic gesture of this—finding excerpts on loose 
pages—is not lost on the reader. Like the aesthete’s incomplete self, the traces of an 
aesthete’s life are fragmentary and discontinuous. It is left to the editor to piece the story 
together, discovering what happened or failed to happen between Johannes and his love 
interest Cordelia. Here is a telling sample from Johannes’s reflections: 
The thirtieth 
 
Everywhere our paths cross. Today I met her three times. I know about her every 
little outing, when and where I shall come across her, but I do not use this 
knowledge to contrive an encounter with her—on the contrary, I am prodigal on 
a frightful scale. A meeting that often has cost me several hours of waiting is 
wasted as if it were a bagatelle. I do not approach her, I merely skirt the 
periphery of her existence. If I know that she is going to Mrs. Jansen’s, I prefer 
not to encounter her unless it is important for me to make a particular 
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observation. I prefer to come to Mrs. Jansen’s a littler early and, if possible, to 
pass her at the door as she is coming and I am going, or on the steps, where I 
nonchalantly pass by her. … (341) 
 
The passage goes on in this tortured vein for some length. This is only one entry among 
the collection; the length of the whole section (at about 150 pages) is noticeably drawn 
out.  
In thinking too much, the second, more cognitively developed aesthete loses his 
relationship with immediacy and actuality. Having a spectacularly detailed fantasy life 
deprives him of real-life commitments. This unwillingness to pursue a life project 
faithfully on the level of our communal, everyday existence is the flaw for which he is 
chided by Judge William in Volume II of Either/Or. (One can hear here contemporary 
criticisms of the extreme videogamer who shifts so much of his existence to online 
spheres of play that his normal relationships and work commitments suffer.) 
Desperately attached to the possibilities of his mind, the seducer-aesthete foregoes 
acting in the here and now.    
The second pole of the aesthetic is not considered merely in terms of erotic efforts 
gone awry. The same problem of deliberation at the expense of action is represented in 
an example of avoiding an ecclesiastical calling. Judge William writes critically to the 
aesthete of the aesthete’s constant deferral:  
Yes, if deliberating were the task for human life, then you would be close to 
perfection. I shall illustrate. To be appropriate to you, the alternatives must 
naturally be bold: either a pastor—or an actor. Here is the dilemma. Now all 
your passionate energy is aroused; reflection with its hundred arms seizes the 
idea of becoming a pastor. You find no rest; day and night you think about it; 
you read all the books you can find, go to church three times every Sunday, 
make the acquaintance of pastors, write sermons yourself, deliver them to 
yourself, and for half a year you are dead to the whole world. Now you are 
ready; you can speak with more insight and seemingly with more experience 
about being a pastor than many a one who has been a pastor for twenty years. 
When you meet them, it arouses your exasperation that they do not know how to 
expectorate with a completely different eloquence. You say: Is this enthusiasm? 
Compared with them, I, who am not a pastor, who have not dedicated myself to 
being a pastor, I speak with the voice of angels. That may very well be true, but you 




The comic but also tragic nature of such situations further comes to light in this passage. 
An either/or choice is on the table. The alternatives that Judge William contrives for the 
aesthete—pastor or actor—differ considerably from one another. In this illustration, the 
aesthete goes to extreme lengths—even delivering sermons to himself!—as he 
contemplates what it would be like to be a pastor.16 The aesthete who suffers from over-
reflection is intellectually active, moving in thought in the direction of one of the two life 
scenarios without taking one concrete step toward actualizing this possibility. The Judge deals 
with the aesthete in a pointed manner in order to reveal something about his life 
situation to him. This is not unlike how Pascal treats the libertine to whom he writes. 
The aesthete stands on the brink of becoming an ethical subject. What would it 
take to tip him over to a form of life that privileges choice and commitment? Existential 
progress occurs when a person realizes the limitations of one sphere and pushes 
forward to a new way of life. To recapitulate: Within the aesthetic sphere, sensuous 
immediacy eventually gave rise to speech and reflection. Deliberation took the shape of 
an “enormous mental activity” (Either/Or, II, 165), though. Because the needle swung 
from no thinking to too much thinking, the aesthete became trapped in his mind. 
Having sought freedom in total possibility, he now finds himself unfree (179). At this 
point, the aesthetic way of life may be seen to be inadequate. The over-reflection is not 
simply “over,” it is infinite. Such unending reflection “can be stopped only by the 
engagement of the will in decision” (Taylor, KPA, 165). This activation of the will entails 
the appearance of ethics; it constitutes the movement beyond the aesthetic. Choice—




                                                






Decision for Kierkegaard is a matter of ethics and selfhood, almost definitively 
so. In being characterized by an individual’s capacity for making choices, the second 
stage of existence represents an advance over the aesthetic way of life. It is distinguished 
by having the exact property that lives characterized by immediacy or fantastic over-
reflection lack. The central figure of the second volume of Either/Or is a man who, by his 
very vocation and standing in life, represents an ethical way of being in the world. As a 
judge (not a poet) and a husband (not a seducer), William is an exemplar of decision and 
commitment. He makes the essential link shared by decision and the category of the 
ethical clear in writing that “[o]n the whole, to choose is an intrinsic and stringent term 
for the ethical. Wherever in the stricter sense there is a question of an Either/Or, one can 
always be sure that the ethical has something to do with it” (Either/Or, II, 166). The slash 
mark between Either/Or indicates an “absolute” gap—the separation of the aesthetic 
from the ethical, the difference between not-choosing and choosing (177).17 Whereas the 
aesthete, dedicated to leaving his every option open, continually defers choice (and so 
defers selfhood), the ethical individual is a person of commitment. No matter how much 
he ages physically, the aesthete remains immature. He retains a non-admirable inner 
childlikeness. Refusing to take steps that would leave any trace, he never grows into a 
fully-existing man. By contrast, someone who lives in the ethical sphere takes a step 
toward forming his very self in the choices he makes (163).  
Thus, there stands a significant relation between decision and selfhood, the 
features of which are personal and paradoxical. It may seem unnecessary to mention the 
personal nature of selfhood. It is worth lifting this point out, however, as a way of 
showing the sad state of the aesthete. The decisions that I make give shape to my own 
                                                




self because they are my decisions. To paraphrase Judge William, if I do not follow the 
choices of others (that is, if I make a genuine choice), I become myself and not another 
(177). An aesthete not only fails to make choices, he may make “false” choices in 
adopting the decisions of others. It is as if in living by someone else’s direction, he takes 
on someone else’s self—his end state being impersonal, imposterous. Beyond signifying 
immaturity, this refusal of agency—the “assumption of a passive or fatalistic attitude 
toward one’s existence”—results in despair (Kosch, 143).  
Using the language of youth and age, childhood and ripeness, the Judge 
differentiates these two senses of choice: 
I think of my early youth, when without really comprehending what it is to make 
a choice in life I listened with childish trust to the talk of my elders, and the 
moment of choice became a very solemn and momentous matter, although in 
choosing, I only followed someone else’s directions. I think of moments later in 
life when I stood at the crossroads, when my soul was made ripe in the hour of 
decision. (Either/Or, II, 157) 
 
Early in life, circumstances determine one’s identity. Choices are made at adults’ behest. 
Despite carrying a serious air, these moments do not involve choices in the strongest 
sense. And, tautologically, because they do not demand real “Choices,” they do not 
produce maturity. Instead, it is the crossroads that signifies the brink of maturity.18 At 
the crossroads, one decides one’s self. It is a place one goes alone in the “midnight hour” 
way sung about in gospel choruses.  
When around one everything has become silent, solemn as a clear, starlit night, 
when the soul comes to be alone in the whole world, then before one there 
appears, not an extraordinary human being, but the eternal power itself, then the 
heavens seem to open, and the I chooses itself or, more correctly, receives itself. 
… He does not become someone other than he was before, but he becomes 
himself. (177) 
 
                                                
18 One might wonder whether a person could fail to cross over into maturity depending on the 
choice she makes at the point of decision. Judge William goes some way to assuaging this worry 
in writing, “[n]o, I only want to bring you to the point where this choice truly has meaning for 
you. It is on this that everything turns. As soon as a person can be brought to stand at the 
crossroads in such a way that there is no way out for him except to choose, he will choose the 
right thing” (168). This distinction (between a decision that is good merely by being made and a 





And so the transition into a mature, ethical way of living that occurs at the crossroads of 
decision is personal insofar as one makes the decision alone, in isolation (240),19 and 
insofar as the content of one’s choice is one’s own self.  
It would behoove us to keep the second sphere of existence in tension with what 
precedes and follows it: The ethical is robustly subjective relative to the aesthetic but not 
to the religious. In other words, we should keep in view the personal aspect of an ethical 
way of life in addition to the impersonal, universal dimension of duty. We may turn to 
Fear and Trembling as well as Either/Or for a portrait of this sphere to see why the ethical 
does not constitute the ultimate telos of existence in Kierkegaard’s account. Ethics is 
supplanted by religiousness in Kierkegaard’s schema because of how the ethical 
individual, as Kierkegaard describes him, privileges the infinite at the expense of earthly 
finitude. To Kierkegaard, it is not enough to escape into the ether of the ethical-eternal. 
At the heart of Fear and Trembling stand two knights who personify the ethical 
and the religious. The ethical way of life, which is grounded in a system of universal 
laws, is represented by the knight of infinite resignation. This paradigm is superseded 
by the religious, radically individual way of life of the knight of faith. In short, there is a 
“teleological suspension of the ethical,” and the Absolute—or the absurd—is the telos 
that relativizes the greatness of ethics. The miracle of the knight of faith is that he, unlike 
the knight of infinite resignation, is at home in the everyday. Not by his own strength 
but by virtue of the absurd has he recuperated in the second movement (that of faith) 
what he has lost in the first movement (that of resignation). He has not only achieved the 
movement from the finite to infinity. He has accomplished the infinitely harder task of 
                                                
19 On being a lonely wayfarer, Taylor writes: “But over against what he believes to be the 
tendency of Hegelian philosophy and modern Christendom to dissipate concrete individuality in 
abstract universality, or to lose self in the crowd, Kierkegaard resolutely maintains that ‘the 
individual as the individual is higher than the universal, is justified over against it, is not 
subordinate but superior. … This position cannot be mediated, for all mediation comes about 
precisely by virtue of the universal; it is and remains to all eternity a paradox.’ The birth of such 
spiritual individuality requires severing the umbilical cord of sociality through the difficult labor 
of differentiating self and other. The one who undertakes this spiritual pilgrimage ever remains a 




moving from the infinite back to the finite. Thus, the inadequacy of operating in the 
realm of shared, effable ethics (as the knight of infinite resignation does) balances the 
admiration that is owed to Judge William for the qualities he has, that the aesthete lacks. 
Curiously, however, religiousness B represents a return to the wordlessness of sensuous 
immediacy, as the knight of faith has no language to express the absurdity of his belief.  
Having addressed the personal, let us turn to the paradoxical element of 
decision’s interplay with selfhood. The paradox of selfhood arises in the receiving—in 
choosing myself, I receive myself. At first glance, this idea of reception with its 
connotations of passivity counters the sense of rigorous self-building that Judge William 
has been advocating. After all, how does receiving a self differ from allowing adults to 
make choices on a child’s behalf? In that instance, the values being sought would belong 
to the agent from whom one receives the self, rather than the developing individual. An 
explanation of this difficulty of the distance between self-determination and the decision 
out of which an ethical self arises comes from the Judge’s distinction between creation 
and choice. His clarification itself is rooted in the concept of contradiction: 
The choice here makes two dialectical movements simultaneously—that which is 
chosen does not exist and comes into existence through the choice—and that 
which is chosen exists; otherwise it was not a choice. In other words, if what I 
chose did not exist but came into existence absolutely through the choice, then I 
did not choose—then I created. But I do not create myself—I choose myself. 
Therefore, whereas nature is created from nothing, whereas I myself as 
immediate personality am created from nothing, I as free spirit am born out of 
the principle of contradiction or am born through my choosing myself. 
(Either/Or, II, 215-216) 
 
In pointing to the simultaneity of the act, it is as if the Judge is saying, “I decide the 
decision that decides itself” or, as he does indeed write, “I choose the absolute that 
chooses me” (213).20 And so the content of the decision one discovers at the 
“crossroads”—the “either … or” moment that represents the brink of maturity—is one’s 
entire, already-existing self.   
                                                




Kierkegaard’s depictions of growing into ethical existence relate to Pascal’s 
approach in his argument for choosing to be a Christian self, a self that, theologically, 
may be described as already existing in Christ before being taken up in or by the person 
converting. It is for this reason, as well as for the shared interest in eternal happiness, 
that chapter 3 is devoted to the text “Infini – rien.” “Infinity – nothing” is Pascal’s 
argument in §418 of the Pensées for believing in God’s existence. It is more commonly 
called “the Wager.”   
Gambling is an apt illustration for this transformation in selfhood because 
making a bet is a commitment to a particular decision. Although it is possible to hedge 
bets, one cannot put money down on an unspecified horse or place one’s chips on an 
indeterminate hand any more than one can genuinely choose a general self. More 
starkly, though, gambling is pertinent on account of the possibility of “going all in.” In 
the risky forms of play classified as gambling, not every wager is a total one, but the 
most thrilling and consequential ones are, and the choice to stake one’s eternal 
happiness on God absolutely is. Whereas in Kierkegaard’s scheme an ethical person 
presents herself in radical openness and extreme vulnerability to totality, the aesthete 
closes himself off from the world to his own detriment (Either/Or, II, 322). He always 
holds some part of his self back and so loses out on the reward of actuality. If he were 
Pascal’s libertine interlocutor, the aesthete would eschew commitment and refuse to 
place a bet. He would therefore end the game prematurely and himself remain pre-
mature. 
 I have also alluded to the theme shared between Kierkegaard and Pascal of 
eternal happiness. Pascal’s argument directs the wagerer to make a bet on God as a way 
of securing an infinity of infinite happiness. The gamble, if taken seriously, will have 
consequences for how a person lives in this life, but the overarching interest is an eternal 
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one. Again, this focus on infinity accords with defining aspects of the ethical as 
Kierkegaard sets the sphere forth.21  
 Lastly, before turning to attributes of the third sphere of the religious, I will raise 
a potential problem for chapter 3 and a provisional solution to that problem. A worry I 
have had in selecting the Wager as the text to stand in for my discussion of play through 
the lens of Kierkegaardian ethics is that the Wager’s content introduces theism too early 
in my analysis. That is, it may seem that Pascal’s recommendation of Christianity as a 
way of life would supply material that belongs more to the third section of the 
dissertation, which addresses the sphere of religious selfhood. The following quotation 
from C. Stephen Evans’s Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love helps to assuage this fear, however: 
“Kierkegaard’s ethicists typically see their ethical duties as divine commands, and 
Kierkegaard does not think this is a mistake on their part. The difference between the 
ethical and religious spheres therefore has little to do with belief or lack of belief in God” 
(49). To this Evans adds the insight that ethics sees general rules, not individual callings 
(ibid.). It may be, then, that making a decision to believe in the God of Christianity as 
part of a reason-governed quest for unending happiness does not signal the moment of 
arrival at fully realized subjectivity but constitutes a step in the journey to selfhood. By 
Kierkegaard’s lights, it would be necessary to build on the formal decision that Pascal’s 
interlocutor makes on the basis of universal reason through the continual cultivation of 
aspects of individual existence like authenticity and passion.   
 
Religious: Religiousness A, or the Propaedeutic to Christianity 
 
As the final mode of existence before proper Christianity, Religiousness A is the 
penultimate stage in the development of an individual. Its overall defining mark is that 
                                                
21 To take one example, Climacus distinguishes between historical and ahistorical sources of 




it points to the highest level of being, “the paradoxical-religious.” Religiousness A is 
identified with both non-Christian religions and non-Christian practices of Christianity.  
Thus, to Evans’s description of Religiousness A as “a kind of humanistic stance that does 
not require belief in [the Christian] God” (KEL, 49), it is worth adding that Religiousness 
A is also found in Christendom among the culturally easy, non-subjective adoption of 
Christianity.22 
 Of Kierkegaard’s five stages and sub-stages on the pathway to full selfhood, 
Religiousness A is the hardest to define precisely. One challenge in offering a coherent 
account of the sphere derives from the style of the texts in which it is represented. At the 
end of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, for example, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous 
author Johannes Climacus produces a treatment of Religiousness A by parodying 
Hegel’s language. Clarity is sacrificed there, it seems to me, to the airing—or 
performance—of an intellectual disagreement. Another cause of confusion is the degree 
to which Religiousness A alternately resembles and represents a regression from the 
ethical sphere. At points, Religiousness A blends into the ethical. So, for example, one 
wonders whether in withdrawing into the eternal the knight of infinite resignation from 
Fear and Trembling corresponds to the ethical moment or the first stage of the religious. 
To this end, Calvin O. Schrag writes in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity that “one speaks 
properly of religiousness A as a conjugated ‘ethico-religious sphere’ … it moves within 
the bounds of moral consciousness …” (8). At other times, Kierkegaard seems to muddle 
his own developmental framework for existence by ascribing qualities to Religiousness 
A that would appear to fall even below the threshold of the ethical. Here I have in mind 
                                                
22 “The essentially Christian is also distinguished by its category, and wherever this is not present 
or is used maunderingly the essentially Christian is not present, unless it is assumed that 
mentioning Christ’s name, even taking Christ’s name in vain, is Christianity” (CUP, 535). Simply 
having the name “Christian,” does not make someone or something so. Furthermore, 
“Religiousness A can be present in paganism, and in Christianity it can be the religiousness of 





the role of decisiveness for both stages.23 In short, Kierkegaard may be criticized for 
failing to provide an understanding of how Religiousness A demonstrates an 
improvement on the way of life that is defined by universal, impersonal ethical 
commitments. For this reason, I take some latitude in the type of play I assign to chapter 
4 of this dissertation. For me, it is worth foregrounding the choice of author over and 
above the qualities of play, and so I address Plato’s Laws in the chapter that correlates to 
Religiousness A. This is a fitting choice on account of Plato’s rough alignment with 
pagan, pre-Christian philosophy more than because of any relation between puppetry, 
which is the form of playful identity presented in the Laws, and facets of Religiousness A 
like guilt-consciousness and imperviousness to decisions in time.24 
Despite these problems of clear delineation, there are a few characteristics that 
mark Religiousness A to which we may point. These primarily revolve around its 
relation to time and to Christianity. (In keeping with Kierkegaard’s practice of referring 
to Christianity as Religiousness B and the paradoxical-religious, I will alternate between 
these expressions.) In what follows in this sub-section, I will address the focus on 
immortality, alongside the interest in the eternal and the perception of universal 
humanity, within Religiousness A. Then, I will turn to the ways in which Religiousness 
A contrasts with and is a prelude to the paradox of Christianity. These two facets (of 
time and orientation toward future faith) conjoin in the teaching and figure of Socrates. 
For, Socrates’ doctrine of anamnesis, or recollection, presupposes the immortality of the 
                                                
23 In this I am in agreement with Mark C. Taylor, who draws out this concern in Kierkegaard’s 
Pseudonymous Authorship. “Religion A does not view time and decision as having final 
significance for the self. The essential interest of the self is an immortal soul that is thought to be 
unaffected by decisions in time … Religion A’s conviction of the soul’s immortality manifests a 
failure to recognize that decisions are thoroughly definitive of the self, or that the self is what it 
becomes through its decisions” (285; cf. KPA, 255). Was not this—making a decision in time—one 
of the important gains achieved under the ethical qualification? How then does Kierkegaard’s 
treatment of Religiousness A as coming after the ethical square with his description of the ethical 
itself? 
  
24 It is worth mentioning Kierkegaard’s investment in separating Socrates from Plato. Regarding 
the issue of immortality, he spares Socrates criticism but lays blame on Plato. One is mindful that 




soul. Additionally, at least according to some Christian thinkers, Socrates’ life 
foreshadows that of Christ. For example, in his privileging of oral teaching over written 
production, as well as in his personal charisma, less than beautiful appearance, poverty, 
death, and willingness to attribute immorality to ignorance, Socrates anticipates the 
person of Christ. From Kierkegaard’s point of view, Plato’s philosophy, indebted as it is 
to Socrates, may be a propaedeutic to Christianity—paralleling the way that 
Religiousness A prepares the path for the paradoxical-religious. Insufficient in itself to 
realize blessedness in its fullest form, Plato’s philosophy is nevertheless valuable in 
pointing the way to the life defined by difficult faith.25 Relating this to the content of 
chapters 4 and 5, we may say that the consideration of human beings as the puppets of 
god offers a religious identity but not a strategy for how to make it through the day; the 
improvisational manner of playing points to rich theological notions, namely those of 
grace and redemption, which can guide one’s entire conduct and leave one with 
resources for dealing with the unwanted and unexpected.  
To tease out the connection between the immortal, eternal, and infinite within 
Religiousness A, it is helpful to reiterate at least cursorily Socrates’ stance on learning as 
it is conveyed in the Meno (80a-86c). (Note that this is the passage that Climacus 
addresses at the start of Philosophical Fragments.) What enables Socrates to hold that 
learning is recollection is the conviction that knowledge is innate to the soul. It is always 
already there: “As the soul is immortal, has been born often and has seen all things here 
and in the underworld, there is nothing which it has not learned; so it is in no way 
surprising that it can recollect the things it knew before, both about virtue and other 
things” (81c-d).26 Congruent with the eternality of truth is the immortality of the soul. 
                                                
25 On the association of Religiousness A with Socrates, see Taylor, KPA, 251-ff.  
 
26 These lines find an echo in the Republic in Socrates’ statement “Then education is the craft 
concerned with … turning around … It isn’t the craft of putting sight into the soul. Education 
takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn’t turned the right way or looking where it ought 




One implication of the idea that knowledge is located in the soul is that the soul is the 
point of contact with God (Taylor, KPA, 254). A further consequence of this 
understanding is that learning recovers something from the past. The deficit of this 
orientation to what lies behind is that it precludes the acceptance of Christ’s bursting 
into the present. 
These and related observations are succinctly captured in William McDonald’s 
entry on Kierkegaard in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, where McDonald writes:  
According to Johannes Climacus, faith is a miracle, a gift from God whereby 
eternal truth enters time in the instant. This Christian conception of the relation 
between (eternal) truth and time is distinct from the Socratic notion that (eternal) 
truth is always already within us—it just needs to be recovered by means of 
recollection (anamnesis). The condition for realizing (eternal) truth for the 
Christian is a gift (Gave) from God, but its realization is a task (Opgave) which 
must be repeatedly performed by the individual believer. Whereas Socratic 
recollection is a recuperation of the past, Christian repetition is a “recollection 
forwards”—so that the eternal (future) truth is captured in time. (SEP, 
“Kierkegaard,” 2012 revision, accessed 03/16/2013) 
 
The difference between Socratic and Christian ways of thinking about truth is explained 
here in terms not only of time but also of externality. For the Christian, salvation breaks 
into human temporality. But for just this reason the Christian is also broken. “The 
consciousness of sin is the paradox, and about this the paradox is again very consistent, 
that the existing person does not discover it by himself but gets to know it from outside. 
The identity is therefore broken” (CUP, 534). The healing of salvation comes from 
without, it comes from above, it comes from God. And even though salvation is freely 
given—as a gift—it is a gift that is opened through “a task.” It requires continual re-
acceptance. The ongoing reappropriation of truth somehow also entails singular 
interiority. The Christian self is always going inward.    
A person whose life occurs under the mode of Religiousness A “relates himself to 
the eternal,” which “is everywhere” (CUP, 570, 584). Concomitantly, such a person has 
universal views of humanity. He “sympathize[s] with every human being qua human 
being” (585). Although we may take such broad sympathy to be a positive trait, 
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Johannes Climacus treats this as a flaw to be overcome in the highest stage of selfhood, 
that of faith. Seeing recourse to the eternal as incompatible with existence, which is 
irreducibly individual, Climacus presents Religiousness A as self-annihilating.27 At this 
juncture, we should remember that Climacus has earlier and at length praised truth as 
subjectivity and inwardness (CUP, Part Two, Section II, Chapter II). The interiority and 
particularity of faith stand in contrast, therefore, with the objective generality of 
Religiousness A and of the ethical, which operates by universal and universalizable 
laws.  
Additional key features of Religiousness B may be anticipated by highlighting 
the connection that holds between the particularity of faith and the historical. The 
particularity of the historical means that it exists at certain moments in certain places.28 
The historical is therefore dissimilar to the eternal, which is taken to be ubiquitous. 
Understanding the opposing nature of these features is essential, given that their 
opposition accounts for the paradox of Christianity, which revolves around the belief—
which is to be made one’s own—that the immortal God entered the world in time.29    
“… In Religiousness A there is no historical point of departure. Only in the realm of time 
does the individual discover that he must presuppose himself to be eternal. The moment 
in time is therefore eo ipso swallowed by the eternal. In time, the individual reflects upon 
his being eternal. This contradiction is only within immanence” (CUP, 573). Again, the 
                                                
27 “If the individual is defined as dialectically turned inward in self-annihilation before God, then 
we have Religiousness A” (CUP, 572). The person of Religiousness A and the person of 
Religiousness B are both turned inward, but the person of Religiousness A is turned inward in a 
self-annihilating way. 
 
28 “An existing person cannot be in two places at the same time, cannot be subject-object. When 
he is closest to being in two places at the same time, he is in passion; but passion is only 
momentary, and passion is the highest pitch of subjectivity” (CUP, 199). It strikes me that this 
notion of the passion of the proximity of being in two places at once relates to the assertion that 
under the paradoxical-religious, i.e. Christianity, the individual stands “at the edge of existence” 
(CUP, 572, emphasis mine). 
 
29 “How does the paradox emerge? By placing the eternal, essential truth together with existing. 
Consequently, if we place it together in the truth itself, the truth becomes a paradox. The eternal 




sub-stages of a sphere may be understood in their combination. What is annihilated or 
subsumed in Religiousness A finds proper expression in Religiousness B as the 
transcendent is recognized in immanence. The paradox of Christianity is given 
expression repeatedly in the Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript in variants on the formulation that a person of faith bases his eternal happiness 
on historical knowledge (see, for example, CUP, 575). Among the other contradictions 
that Christianity synthesizes—the inner and the outer, possibility and actuality, freedom 
and necessity, finitude and infinity—is that of the temporal and the eternal.  
A significant point of shortcoming in Religiousness A from the perspective of the 
paradoxical-religious is the way that the propaedeutic sphere to Christianity fails to see 
the sinfulness of the self (Taylor, KPA, 280). Religiousness A offers guilt-consciousness, 
which necessarily precedes the sin-consciousness that is found in Christianity.30 Let us 
turn again to Schrag, who maintains that “Religiousness A is not simply morality with a 
touch of religious fervor” (8). Schrag explains the progress beyond the ethical sphere in 
this way: “Specifically, what religiousness A brings to the ethical situatedness of the 
existing subject in the process of becoming subjective is the determinant of guilt. … 
Proceeding in tandem with this guilt-consciousness is a problematization of the moral 
self-assurance in the ethical; a recognition of the insufficiency of the subject’s moral 
efforts towards rectifying its misdeeds; and a questioning of the power of the human 
will to do that which it ought” (8-9). I should be forthcoming and state that I do not see 
this as according tightly with the message of the Laws. Plato, by way of the character of 
the Athenian Stranger, will point the reader’s attention to god (theos) and to the good of 
practicing obedience to reason. However, I am unaware of any treatment of guilt in the 
text. I suppose this means that my use of the Laws in tandem with Religiousness A falls 
mostly on the ethical side of the ethico-religious conjunction. But for Kierkegaard, 
                                                
30 There is a possible parallel with the way guilt is treated from within the first pole of the 
aesthetic stage. A relevant text for considering this idea is the piece “The Tragic in Ancient 
Drama” in Volume I of Either/Or (pp. 137-164).  
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Religiousness A in its more extensive sense is a steppingstone to true belief because it 
calls forth the “infinite passion of need” (CUP, 201). Showing us our moral inadequacy, 
it pushes us to a higher goal. The chain of guilt becomes a harness (like the strings of a 
divine puppet?) that ultimately attaches the person to eternal happiness (534). 
Paradoxically, the harness of guilt becomes a source of freedom; the freedom of the 
aesthetic is redefined: 
Call this recollecting of guilt a chain and say that it is never removed from the 
prisoner, and you will describe only one side of the matter, because a chain is 
most closely connected only with the idea of the loss of freedom, but the eternal 
recollecting of guilt is also a burden that must be dragged along from place to 
place in time. Therefore, rather call this eternal recollecting of guilt a harness and 
say of the prisoner: He will never be unharnessed. His consciousness is that he is 
decisively changed, although the subject’s identity is still that it is he himself who 
becomes conscious of guilt by joining the guilt together with the relation to an 
eternal happiness. But he still relates himself to an eternal happiness, and guilt 
consciousness is a higher expression than suffering. Moreover, in the suffering of 
guilt-consciousness, the guilt at one and the same time alleviates and festers, 
alleviates because it is an expression of freedom, as this can be in the ethical-
religious sphere, where the positive is distinguished by the negative, freedom by 
guilt, and not distinguished esthetically directly: freedom distinguished by 
freedom. (533-534) 
 
After tarrying in the ethical sphere, a person may come to see a terrifying inconsistency 
between who she is and who she ought to be. Furthermore, this fracture may cause her 
to look outside of the self for a solution to immorality, despair, and sin. This leads to the 
possibility of what Climacus refers to as “the break.” Again, the issue of time proves 
decisive. 
Kierkegaard seems much less concerned with Christ’s involvement in the 
establishment of time, its “realization” in the course of creation, than in Christ’s 
paradoxical intersection with it in his incarnate life (CUP, 596). Appreciating the 
directionality of this relation between the eternal and the existing is crucial for 
maintaining a proper comprehension of the final stage of the final sphere. It is one aspect 
that differentiates Religiousness B from Religiousness A. Whereas in Religiousness A, 
the eternal is diffused in its pervasive immanence, in Religiousness B, the eternal is 
present in a directed manner, focused in the historical and particul
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Christ. Thus, because of her view of the immanence of eternity, a person at the stage of 
existence of Religiousness A assumes immortality for herself. The person living under 
Religiousness B, however, becomes immortal in the moment(s) of deciding faith—the 
response to the particularity of Christ’s historical incarnation.31 This conclusion is 
distinct from but not incommensurate with the contemporary scholar Jeremy Begbie’s 
position that accepting the bounded nature of time leads Christians to a gracious God. 
 
Religious: Religiousness B, the Paradox of Faith, or Christianity 
 
We now arrive fully (and not simply by comparison) at the form of life that 
Kierkegaard deems highest.  
The absoluteness of the absolute paradox of Christianity—or, more specifically, 
of Christ’s identity as the “God-man”—comes for Kierkegaard from the absolute 
difference between God and the world. Writing of Kierkegaard’s view of transcendence, 
which stands in contrast to Hegel’s preference for divine immanence, Mark C. Taylor 
states, “Because God and the world are totally different and are not implicitly identical, 
it is, Kierkegaard argues, absolutely paradoxical to believe that a particular individual 
within the world is at the same time God” (KPA, 294). If the distance between God and 
humanity were not so great—if God were like the world and already immanent in it—it 
would not be absurd to believe in a further step of immanence such as the 
“enfleshment” of the divine Spirit in a human person. In other words, there is a link 
between divine immanence and comprehensibility and, conversely, between God’s total 
Otherness and God’s absolute incomprehensibility to human beings. That is why 
                                                
31 What I find particularly interesting is how these concepts re-arise in Harvey Cox’s 
interpretation of the death of God. Cox writes: “The death of God is an experience of man. It has 
occurred in the life of modern industrial man because he has lost his capacity to live at once in history 
and in eternity, and to affirm all the dimensions of time as his friends” (Feast of Fools, 43, emphasis 




Kierkegaard not only writes about believing in the absurd but also believing by virtue of 
the absurd. It is incongruous to approach the absurd rationally.32 But why entertain an 
engagement with the absurd at all? Why not remain in the realm of the rational? As 
Taylor explains, it is because of our sin that we must not abandon the absurd. Our 
imperfection compels us to seek the eternal blessing of reprieve, a forgiveness that arises 
through God’s movement towards us in Christ (KPA, 316). The appropriate response to 
Christianity, therefore, is a faith that is upheld by the strength of the absurd itself. This 
recalls the stance Kierkegaard describes as “a paradoxical relation to the paradox” (CUP, 
323).   
 In addition to his paradoxical status as the God-man, Christ embodies a paradox 
of time, bringing the temporal together with the eternal. Christ, being God and therefore 
holding all of the marks of divinity including various dimensions of infinitude, enters 
the world as a particular individual at a particular moment (KPA, 295). This paradoxical 
collision of time lays down the standard for a peculiar way of life for Christ’s followers, 
who find it possible to develop as authentic individuals through commitment to the eternal. 
Keeping in mind a conception of the eternal as external, otherworldly, and “far away,” 
we can appreciate the oddity of the Christian pattern of life. For, it is in exercising a 
universal commitment that people of faith cultivate their particularities and become 
more rooted in the ordinary and everyday. This is because, as Kierkegaard posits, the 
bond to the Absolute must be formed subjectively, out of the core of one’s own 
existence. It cannot be generically, passively, or vicariously assumed. What I want to 
suggest, then, is that (mysteriously) the necessarily individual and personal quality of 
the decision to relate absolutely to the Absolute serves as a protection against escapism, 
the signature condition and fatal flaw of the reflective aesthete examined in terms of 
                                                
32 For more on the nature of the absurd, see Fear and Trembling, 75. “The absurd is not one 
distinction among others embraced by understanding. It is not the same as the improbable, the 
unexpected, the unforeseen. …” (Hannay translation). 
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videogames in chapter 2 of this dissertation. Although—or what is more difficult to 
comprehend, because—a Christian’s ultimate relation in life is to a radically 
transcendent Being, she exists in time in a visibly undifferentiated but thoroughly 
present way. She does her grocery shopping, she takes trips to the amusement park, she 
pays her taxes like everyone else (like the knight of faith she is unrecognizable, like 
Christ she lives by incognito), and yet she is more truly “present” in living out these 
quotidian tasks than the aesthete and the ethicist.33,34 For this reason, Christianity 
deserves to be called the stage of second immediacy. The first aesthete’s relation to time is, 
in good dialectical fashion, cancelled yet elevated. In having a paradoxical relation with 
time, the Christian imitates Christ and foretells what it is like to live peaceably with 
time. Beyond the parallel to experiences of simultaneously belonging inside and outside 
of time in improvisational performances, there is a possible relation to the ludic paradox 
of experiencing limitations as sources of liberty. 
 Having touched briefly on the ideas of absoluteness, absurdity, paradox, and the 
eternal—essential to Kierkegaard’s depiction of Religiousness B—let me now move on to 
equilibrium and open blessing.  
 Throughout this examination, there are different ways I want to discuss the 
phenomenon of play. In one sense, play is a realm of slackening—a place of literal and 
metaphorical wiggle-room. The phrase “play of a rope” conveys this relaxation or 
easement of tensions nicely, particularly in its contradistinction with taut or overly-rigid 
spheres committed to rationality and control (of self and world) to the extreme. As will 
be seen in more detail in chapter 5, these characterizations also invite consideration of 
                                                
33 In his essay “Relational Transcendence in Divine Agency,” Paul Sponheim addresses the issue 
of relatedness by drawing on a weighty statement from the Practice in Christianity that links the 
disguised nature of Christ with freedom and resolution. “The coming about of this incarnate 
relatedness is rooted in the freedom of transcendence for ‘it was Christ’s free resolve from 
eternity to want to be incognito’ (PC, 138-139)” (53). 
 
34 It is worth asking what it is about lacking an absolute commitment to the Absolute that makes 





play as graceful movement such as dancers make—sheer difficulty transformed into 
appearances of effortlessness. Additionally, and the point over which I wish to hover 
here, play may be associated with aperture. This is true insofar as workers are closed to 
distraction and risk, and players are open to chance and the unknown. Kierkegaard’s 
presentation of Christianity opens up another sense of openness, though. This openness 
is from the side of God, when God grants forgiveness. 
 There are a number of characteristics that set Christianity apart from the 
aesthetic, ethical, and Religiousness A stages of existence. Two distinguishing marks in 
particular are the achievement of equilibrium and the recognition of the self’s sinfulness: 
only in Christianity is there a balance between the elements of the self (such as the body 
and soul, sensuousness and reflection, and necessity and possibility) on the one hand, 
and the coming to terms with a need for a mediator to the divine, on the other (Bertung, 
56; Taylor, KPA, 268). Whereas the former is a claim about the end of anxiety and 
despair (equilibrium marks victory both over the refusal of a person to be a self and over 
defiant expressions of existence), the latter claim about sin and the need for a bridge to 
God is a claim about closed-off-edness: our sin bars us from entering God’s presence 
(sometimes by closing us in on ourselves in a state of “shut-upness,” KPA, 286-287). 
God’s forgiveness is an opening and potentially playful move in that it discloses the 
blessings of living before God. “Because the self’s eternal blessedness is contingent upon 
such a proper relation to God, the possibility of eternal blessedness is reopened by God’s 
act in Christ” (KPA, 291).  
 What of equilibrium, then? More pointedly—how might the absence of 
equilibrium affect openness? Interestingly, Taylor shows that the imbalance of the 
preceding stages is more than a shortcoming of selfhood; it is the very sinfulness that 
closes one off from the goodness of immortality. In the following passage, Taylor begins 
with a statement of contrast to the viewpoint of Religiousness A on the enduring nature 
of the self. Then, having reaffirmed the connection between the ideas of the eternal and 
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possibility, he goes further by drawing a consequential relation between equilibrium 
and eternity on the one hand, and disequilibrium and damnation on the other. Note that 
these are relations of openness and closed-ness (or, what is the same thing as closed-
ness, openness unto cessation). Taylor writes: “Kierkegaard does not think that the self 
is immortal or that it inherently possess eternal blessedness. Eternal blessedness is a 
possibility that can be realized by the self’s maintenance of a balance among its 
components. The failure to achieve an equilibrium is sin. … [T]he actuality of the self’s 
sinfulness closes the possibility of eternal blessedness and opens the possibility of 
eternal damnation (i.e., the total obliteration of the self)” (323-324). It is important to 
grasp this point because the quest for the possibility of blessedness that sin has made 
impossible is what motivates a person to countenance the paradox of faith. That is, it 
takes an absurd faith to provide an impossible possibility. Only through belief in the 
God-man does a road forward into eternity remain open. 
 This brings us to the idea of double grace, or a person’s application of grace—an 
attitude, I would posit, of neither total work nor total rest—in the acceptance of God’s 
grace. By providing a way back to Godself, God shows grace to all of humankind. One 
might say that engaging in paradox is the “cost” for God of opening eternity to 
humanity: the possibility of salvation comes to people through the Absolute’s 
willingness to undergo the reversal of the incarnation, even the subjection of the 
immortality and infinitude of divinity to mortality and the finitude of death. One might 
add, echoing Max Weber, that there is an intellectual sacrifice on the part of believers in 
choosing religion (“Science as Vocation,” 155). For Kierkegaard, the appropriate 
response to God is faith, which is not knowledge. Such faith refuses every proclivity for 
epistemology and each insistence on comprehensibility.  
All of this is to say that God’s grace does not preclude human works. While not 
dependent on good works, salvation nevertheless involves working, but working of a peculiar sort. 
This is what it means to respond to God’s grace with grace: to refuse to take God’s work 
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for granted by living a spiritually lazy and morally-lax life, and, at the same time, to 
spurn the opposite inclination toward a life of overwork with its accompanying 
mentality of “works-righteousness” (and boasting). Keeping Taylor’s discussion of 
equilibrium in mind, we may say that Christians seek to maintain a balanced way of life. 
Blessing is found in active receiving, in what may perhaps be described as play.  
Drawing from Kierkegaard’s journals and papers, Robert C. Roberts shows how 
strenuousness and rest from anxiety are combined alongside earnestness and jest in the 
sub-stage of Religiousness B. Beginning and ending this passage with a quotation from 
Kierkegaard, he writes:    
“Although it is the utmost strenuousness, imitation [of Christ]—that is, striving 
for righteousness should be like a jest, a childlike act—if it is to mean something 
in earnest, that is, be of any value before God—the Atonement is the earnestness. 
It is detestable, however, for a man to want to use grace, ‘since all is grace,’ to 
avoid all striving.” So the atonement—the central Christian fact—holds out the 
possibility for a human life to be a synthesis of the deepest seriousness and the 
lightest touch. The seriousness and the jest are mutually supportive. For the 
humor and its attendant joy cannot be deep without the seriousness; and without 
the “distance” afforded by the atonement the seriousness is “transformed into 
agonizing anxiety in which a man is burned up, so to speak, and less than ever 
begins to strive” [Journals and Papers, No. 1909 in volume 2]. (“Smiling with 
God,” 173) 
 
There is an apparent consistency across the paradoxes of Christianity. Christ is the God-
man who grants a righteousness that must be appropriated in earnest jest. Grace 
balances grace. Having an attitude of grace towards God’s grace thus leads to a rigorous 
way of being in which one’s actions are regarded as tremendously important but 
nevertheless non-salvific. They are meaningful actions but they are free because they do 
not proceed from the necessity of attaining salvation. Failure is possible because success 
in the most important things is assured, having already been secured externally by 
God.35 As much as an improviser’s, then, an authentic Christian’s deeds are non-
                                                
35 It is not only that Christians no longer have to worry about succeeding, thanks to the belief that 
God succeeded for humankind, in our place. (This “positive” substitution is usually expressed in 
the idea the Jesus lived a perfect, sinless life, the victorious and virtuous status of which he is 
willing to give away.) To this standard theological position, I would like to contribute the 
possibility that Christians benefit from the reverse side, too. That is, Christians also may find 
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working works. Restated, having an attitude of grace towards God’s grace is the twofold 
realization that in the economy of salvation, it is only God’s work that matters, and that 
in respecting God’s “major,” salvific work, one is called to a life of good, “minor” works 
that are free in their relative smallness.   
 
III. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: FREEDOM AND FAILURE 
 
“Freedom” cannot avoid combining, in a unity that has only its own generosity 
as an index, the values of impulse, chance, luck, the unforeseen, the decided, the 
game, the discovery, conclusion, dazzlement, syncope, courage, reflection, 
rupture, terror, suture, abandonment, hope, caprice, rigor, the arbitrary. Also: 
laughter, tears, scream, word, rapture, chill, shock, energy, sweetness. …  
Freedom is also wild freedom, the freedom of indifference, the freedom of choice, 
availability, the free game, freedom of comportment, of air, of love, or of a free 
time where time begins again. It frees each of these possibilities, each of these 





 I wish to end this introduction by disclosing a few of the intuitions that motivate 
this project. While I am not setting out to prove these points, I do think it is fair to 
advertise them here at the beginning. The shadow of my contention that a flourishing 
life includes play is the stance that the inability to play is somehow wrong—a character 
flaw or moral weakness of sorts.37 A person who is unable on occasion to relax, let go, go 
loose, or loosen up is overbound by seriousness. She is unfree. Whatever outer 
circumstance (like too much work) or inner state (like too much pride or a dour 
disposition), therefore, that would make an individual reluctant to goof around with 
children, join a game at which she has no skill, or enter into other situations in which she 
                                                
relief that God failed in the place of humankind. God took on the ultimate accomplishment and 
the ultimate failure and, thus, individuals no longer have to worry about failing that badly. There 
is, as I state in the chapter on improvisation, the freedom to fail. 
 
36 The Experience of Freedom, 56-57, original ellipses, emphasis mine. 
 
37 Rahner writes of a similar stance in Aquinas. “[U]nmitigated seriousness betokens a lack of 




is liable to play the fool is a condition in need of correcting. In short, it strikes me as 
unhealthy to be unable to cede control at least for a time.38  
The concern about pride, overseriousness, and undue solemnity gives us a 
reason not to ignore the place of play in the good life. But there is a related viewpoint 
that I hold very strongly, which provides a positive motivation to seek play. This second 
assumption concerns failure. I take it that one of the moral goods that games and other 
experiences of play offer is the possibility of embracing failure. It is not only that play is 
valuable because it teaches people perseverance (although this is a fine character trait 
that many games do bring about and that game designers purposefully aim to cultivate 
on occasion by structuring games so as to encourage players to try again after losing or 
messing up). It is also that play provides rare opportunities to leave the framework of 
success behind. There is something wonderful about “the play’s the thing” attitude that 
cancels concern for outcome. When play takes precedence over consequences—when 
one becomes more wrapped up in the play itself than in its payoff—one has achieved 
another form of freedom. It seems to me that improvisers have an extremely high, if not 
the highest, commitment to valuing play itself over the quality of play, although sheer 
joy in playing may surely be found to various extents in other play forms as well.  
With these introductory notes dispensed, we may now turn to the aesthetic 
significance of children’s play. 
 
 
                                                

































The Value of Children’s Play: More than a Developmental Good 
 
The physical, emotional, and social processes of maturation that most 
individuals undergo in the course of infancy and early childhood may be understood in 
terms of the interplay of freedom and constraint. In general, as they age, children lose 
certain freedoms (for example, permitted uninhibitedness) and embody particular 
constraints to a greater extent (like gaining responsibilities and conforming to social 
regulations) and this often but not exclusively occurs in play. Such development is not 
unidirectional, to be sure: kids make positive gains in independence, displaying 
increased mastery, making more decisions intentionally, and exercising self-discipline, 
even as they abide within the ever-tightening confines of adult expectations and societal 
norms. It is my task in this chapter, then, to trace a few of the interlocking steps of 
liberty and limitation, demonstrating how the young begin to work out their individual 
identities through play, and suggesting how the meaning of play develops in turn 
throughout this and subsequent stages of life.   
Looking at three areas, I will argue that children enact freedom in their play 
physically on account of the external provision of their material needs; psychologically in 
the initial absence of repression and even self-awareness; and intellectually to the degree 
that they can manipulate the world around them with increased precision, controlling its 
objects and images to ends of their own willing. As I have indicated, these are not 
freestanding freedoms. The constraints with which they are intertwined—their physical, 
psychological, and intellectual converses and consequences—may be expressed as a 
variety of restrictions. These include dependency, (dis)ability, circumstance, desire, 
discontinuity, accountability, and imitation. The dualistic quality of being something 
opening and binding indicates that difference is at the heart of diversion: even as it 
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offers the possibility of consolation, play confronts young people with the challenge of 
new borders. In other words, play may be defined as a dynamic and evolving 
phenomenon through which children discover and deal with boundaries.  
Gaining a general sense of the what and why of children’s play is relevant to 
contemporary concerns; working toward a comprehension of amusement among pre-
adolescents will enable us to counter some of the distressing aspects of Western, twenty-
first century practices of bringing up girls and boys (especially the trend toward the 
rigid structuring, oversight, and determination of their toys, time, and space). 
Furthermore, an examination of childhood play serves my larger interest, viz. 
understanding and justifying the place of playfulness in the ethical and religious lives of 
flourishing, adult selves. How ought we to play as children in order to become adults? 
How ought we to play as adults in order to revive elements of our childhood? We may 
come to form an opinion of the value of play and its roles throughout our lives by seeing 
physical, psychological, and intellectual aspects of the paradoxical activity in which 
freedom, necessity, pleasure, and purpose conjoin.  
 
I. INTRODUCTORY CONCERNS 
 
There is a small set of preliminary matters to which I need to attend before 
turning squarely to the co-presence of freedom and constraint in this, the first pole of the 
aesthetic stage of the play dialectic. And while a large body of research stands behind 
each one of these issues, I will keep my remarks in line with the brevity appropriate to 
an introduction. In short, I wish to acknowledge that childhood as a notion should not 
be taken for granted; to stipulate the stages of development as I intend to use them; and 
to express the difficulty of the very task of seeing what constitutes children’s play. 
Under the cultural context in which I am writing, the first years of life are 
normally set apart as a special phase in a person’s formation. Consequently, there are 
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laws and customs that ensure that any boy or girl is nurtured, protected, and given 
opportunities to grow. This lasts for a relatively extended period, until a morally 
responsible and viably self-sustaining person begins to appear. By and large, in twenty-
first-century America we expect the young to be physically and emotionally indulged 
and sheltered, and we have an abundance of toy stores, playgrounds, child labor laws, 
vaccinations, early start programs, and television and game ratings to prove it. 
However, in other times and places, such as medieval Europe or Puritan New England, 
people were more liable to be treated in adult-like ways from an early age. Under these 
circumstances, youths were sent to work and given hefty responsibilities to shoulder. 
The Romantic category and celebration of “childhood” was simply not available or 
operative as it is now (which does not mean that infantile behavior was lacking or that 
other conceptions of early life were absent).39 This intellectual history notwithstanding, I 
will broach the first phase of an individual’s life as a fruitful and determinative period, 
which deserves its own conventions and cares.   
Non-specialists in children’s psychology like myself may find the array, overlap, 
and dissension of classifications of human development dizzying. For the sake of 
simplicity, I will rely primarily on the framework employed by Erik Erikson in Childhood 
and Society (1963) and The Life Cycle Completed (1998). For further elucidation of terms 
and descriptions of capabilities, I will draw from the more recent anthology edited by 
Fromberg and Bergen, Play from Birth to Twelve: Contexts, Perspectives, and Meanings 
(2006). As I discovered, what is at base important to know is that “childhood” refers to 
the period that spans from the first days of life to the age of twelve. It covers half of the 
stages of the life cycle, namely infancy (birth to eighteen months), early childhood 
                                                
39 The scholarly debate over the shifts in the status of childhood in history may be traced across a 
number of books, including Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life (1965) by Philippe 
Ariès, Melvin Konner’s The Evolution of Childhood: Relationships, Emotion, Mind (2010), Steven 
Ozment’s Ancestors: The Loving Family in Old Europe (2001), Shulamith Shahar’s Childhood in the 




(eighteen months to three years), play or preschool age (three to five years), and school 
age (six to twelve)—and is followed by adolescence (twelve to eighteen), young 
adulthood (eighteen to thirty-five), middle adulthood (thirty-five to fifty-five or sixty-
five), and maturity (fifty-five or sixty-five to death). Within the activity of playing, there 
are also developmental expectations. Children are seen as typically moving through an 
object-motor-social-symbolic progression in how they play. While I will address this 
spectrum, including the movement toward abstraction that is consistent with imaginary 
play, I will especially heed the importance of the physical—and sense-based—character 
of play in the earliest stages of childhood. This also aligns with Kierkegaard’s treatment 
of the first of the two aesthetic ways of life as tied to sensuous immediacy. 
Having set forth some of the elemental divisions of development, the 
surprisingly vexing question of what should count as children’s play may now be raised. 
This problem poses itself, for example, in the following characterization: “Simple 
exchanges of vocalization are the first games babies play with parents. By 6 weeks 
infants respond to these overtures with smiles and coos” (Garner and Bergen, 6). What 
are the grounds for categorizing cooing as game playing? Is it the exchange of sounds 
that allows for play and transforms cooing into something more than mere vocalization, 
or is it the apparent joyfulness and aimlessness of babies as they utter non-sensical 
syllables? The “cooing problem,” as I will refer to it, represents a larger puzzle, 
extending beyond a literal interpretation to the characterization of the actions of older 
children capable of self-expression. In other words, the cooing problem is not only about 
cooing, it is about the general difficulty of identifying play among babies, toddlers, and 
preschool-aged children. What definition is adequate for capturing this set of 
phenomena? Is it playful when a five-year-old runs through a house making loud 
noises, or when a two-year-old gleefully throws her food on the floor while she is 
eating? Does reading a bedtime story to a child count as play? Where does play stop and 
something else begin—and what is that other occurrence? Is it work? Is it plain 
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experience? This problem stems, I believe, from the nearly intuitive association people 
(grown people!) draw between play and children. All of a sudden, the unreflective 
definition of children’s play is nothing other than what children do, including making 
the sound of “coo.” But what if a lot of the assumptions about what counts as play in the 
birth-to-twelve age group were negotiable? What if the proper range of play activities in 
the young were much narrower than what we routinely take it to be?40 My goal here is 
not to provide an answer. On the contrary, I am happy simply to illuminate that we lack 
an intellectual baseline for determining what childhood play is. I propose that we not 
seek to respond to the error of drawing too many links between childhood and play by 
importing a concept of play grounded entirely in theorized adult behavior. In short, it 
would behoove us to see that it is not in play’s nature to remain static and instead to 
leave room for the meaning of play to develop throughout the maturing process, as if 
play had its own life span. It is worth keeping this definitional flexibility in mind as we 
turn to the physical, emotional, psychological, and cognitive gateways of growth that 
will expand and contract in the course of childhood.   
 
II. CONSTRAINED TO PLAY BUT FREE TO EXPLORE: BIOLOGICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND 
PHYSICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The constraint first worth noting in children’s play is the determined quality of 
play as a basic human tendency. It is as if children are constrained to play by virtue of 
being children and that this constraint reaches back to the earliest months of life. At the 
                                                
40 Brian Sutton-Smith also points to this confusion, acknowledging that “the ambiguities in this 
part of the field of play owe much to the assumed parallel of forms between play’s own skill 
development and other kinds of nonplay skill development. Analogies here are frequently 
passed off as causes” (The Ambiguity of Play, 51). In his study The Genesis of Animal Play, Gordon 
Burghardt affords brief consideration to the meaning of children’s play. In particular, he alludes 
to the work of Cindy Clark and Peggy Miller, who provide as the four criteria for children’s play 
nonliterality, intrinsic motivation, positive affect, and process flexibility. This standard of 




beginning of the play progression, when babies explore their bodies, interact with their 
mothers in certain ways while feeding, and make pleasant little sounds for no reason at 
all, and later, as they exert themselves by leaping and jumping, or enjoy themselves by 
telling stories and engaging in make-believe, they are being driven not by choice as 
much as by biology. They are exercising what Schiller described in his Letters on the 
Aesthetic Education of Man as Spieltrieb: the deeply human play-instinct or ludic-drive that 
cuts between sense and reason. And while the Spieltrieb is profoundly linked to freedom, 
it itself seems to arise from necessity. Alison Gopnik makes a similar point with regard 
to the specific play capacity of fantasy when she asserts: “children aren’t wild pretenders 
because they are consciously trying to learn about the world or other people. They are 
wild pretenders because they are children and that’s what children do. It’s only from the 
broader evolutionary perspective that their uninhibited useless pretense turns out to be 
among the most deeply functional human activities” (The Philosophical Baby, 73). 
Children become who they will be by being who they are. How they play is affected by 
numerous cultural, historical, familial, and even biological contingencies, but that they 
want to play is a biological guarantee, an organic certainty. As Philip of Novare enjoined 
in the thirteenth century, “[c]hildren should be allowed to play since nature demands 
it.”41  
Numerous studies support this claim, that in the juvenile period play comes 
naturally and serves natural purposes.42 Rather than rehearse the findings of leading 
scholars, I will point to repetition as a crucial mechanism within the play-develop-play 
process. Sensorimotor skills necessary for survival (and acculturation) are refined 
through the practice that playful situations afford—and then re-afford, which is to say 
                                                
41 My attention was drawn to this line of Philip of Novare in Maurice Keen’s “The Birth of 
Childhood,” which appeared in the New York Review of Books on June 13, 1991.  
 
42 I refer the reader to Peter K. Smith, Children and Play (2010), Gordon Burghardt, The Genesis of 




that the play cycle itself is on repeat. With the attaining of new heights, play does not 
cease but continues in youths’ unintentional quest for more, and more impressive, 
talents. As Walter Benjamin, Freud, and nearly all caretakers have noted, children 
delight in repetition.43 For them, the game must be played again, the movie must be 
watched again, the story must be read again. But children must also practice physical 
maneuvers repeatedly until they have overcome the intransigence of their own bodies. 
Through exploratory acts and a repetitiveness that cannot be neatly separated from that 
of play, children come to possess control over their physical selves and bodily impulses. 
Thus, they master a host of practical skills, and these capacities contribute to their future 
independence and potential for self-care as much as to their being “civilized.” As they 
figure out how to crawl and walk, learn how to hold writing implements and use 
silverware, and acquire the dexterity for tying shoelaces and buttoning buttons, children 
face challenges but they do not experience drudgery.  
Curiously, not only is repetition biologically useful as a training device; the 
delight that repetition brings is also beneficial. That is, nature seems to take advantage of 
play’s pleasure as a way of motivating the cultivation of traits needed for the 
preservation and enhancement of life. “Programming” certain animals to seek play is a 
way to ensure that adaptive behaviors are acquired. Or, to paraphrase the Soviet 
                                                
43 We might take for granted the correlation between repetition and mastery, but we would do 
well to pay attention to Benjamin’s observation of the pleasurable intensity that repetition lends 
to children’s play. “We know that for a child repetition is the soul of play, that nothing gives him 
greater pleasure than to ‘Do it again!’ … ‘All things would be resolved in a trice/ If we could only 
do them twice.’ Children act on this proverb of Goethe’s. Except that the child is not satisfied 
with twice, but wants the same thing again and again, a hundred or even a thousand times. This 
is not only the way to master frightening fundamental experiences—by deadening one’s own 
response, by arbitrarily conjuring up experiences, or through parody; it also means enjoying 
one’s victories and triumphs over and over again, with total intensity. … A child creates the 
entire event anew and starts again right from the beginning” (“Toys and Play,” 120, quoted in 
Virno, 9). Notably, we are likely to attach a quality of innocence to children’s experience of 
repetition in play, which distinguishes it from the adult player’s drive for repetition (in gambling 
or videogame mania, for example). Although both groups locate intense pleasure in it, adult 
players seem to have more to lose in compulsively repetitive play, while children stand to benefit 





psychologist Lev Vygotsky, by doing what they most want to do, children do what they 
most need to do (“Play and Its Role in the Mental Development of the Child,” 13). One 
wonders what would happen without the cloak of pleasure: would uselessness prove so 
useful if it were not enjoyable—and hidden? 
In this cursory treatment of the biological drive to play, we have seen that the 
process of doing amusing things, succeeding or failing, tweaking behavior, and then 
trying again that occurs under predominantly safe conditions is significant because of 
the underlying growth in fundamental physical capabilities, like the coordination of 
one’s movements. Following Pellegrini, Dupius, and Smith, I would go further and 
contend that the environment in which a child carries out such instinctive activity is 
marked by freedom (“Play in Evolution and Development”). The reason that the 
immature are able to develop new behaviors and strategies with minimal stress, risk, or 
cost is that they are being protected and otherwise supported. Imagine that the young 
were not so vulnerable. If they were charged with the responsibility of meeting their 
own needs or contributing to their family’s sustenance, they would not have the luxury 
to be playful. As it is, play generally takes place in the context of material abundance 
and security—gifted to children by adults who strive and sweat. Under this light, the 
playfulness of children is an acquired, not automatic, freedom. It is purchased by the 
work of others; the realization of the drive to play is not entirely inevitable but is 
somewhat susceptible to circumstance. The impulse is there but it must be met 
favorably. Thus, without capable and generous providers, individuals would be 
unlikely to experience a playful childhood, regardless of the biological impetus to act 
non-seriously.   
A particularly cherished reward of the luxury of play is the ability to face life 
creatively. Constantly facing new situations and not yet familiar with the rules of 
physics or ethics, toddlers and young children are left to improvise. They figure things 
out as they go along and, importantly, when they mess up, they keep on going. Such 
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perseverance is possible in the march to adulthood in part because, on the occasions that 
kids do fail, loving grown-ups are (usually) around and (usually) inclined to cover over 
their mistakes. The security needed for playful growth—novel responses to novelty—
includes emotional as well as physical resources, then. Referring to Marek Spinka’s 
hypothesis about “training for the unexpected,” Pellegrini, Dupius, and Smith elaborate 
on the special relation that holds between play and this desirable power of innovation: 
[I]n the safe context of play, animals appear to place themselves into 
unconventional and often disorienting positions. These novel behavioral 
situations afford opportunity for them to experiment with a variety of routines in 
relatively safe circumstances and generate novel, and possibly adaptive, 
responses. With practice in play, individuals become facile at enlisting these 
processes and thus they become more accessible in times of need, such as during 
an emergency. (269) 
 
Their status as provided-for-beings allows children to spend their energy on play, and 
this proves to be a boon to them developmentally—in the short term as well as the 
long—as they are able to test themselves, experiment with a number of maneuvers, try 
out social roles, and develop a sense of self. They adopt attitudes of levity, given the low 
stakes. Or, put another way, children can afford to expend their energy because they are 
acting from a place of excess rather than attempting to cling to bare necessities. Here, I 
intend “excess” rather simply as the opposite of “deficiency.” In short, the state of 
surplus is a state of freedom. And that freedom engenders further freedom by bringing 
about mastery.44 
For the young, mastery—the hard fought and gradually won ability to do—is a 
source of pride and a way of being free in the world. Conquering even small things is a 
sign of maturity, evidence of the waxing of kids’ power and the corresponding waning 
of their dependency. Erik Erikson proposes that a little girl or boy who has learned to 
take steps on her or his own grows in self-esteem, having internalized the identity of 
“one who can walk” (Childhood and Society, 235). Although it is not accurate to attribute 
                                                
44 Indeed, it is Freud who brings attention to the economy of play and its “yield of pleasure.” See 




the growth of mastery solely to a child’s play, pastimes do accord people the chance to 
get better at doing things until they perform them well with regularity. Aside from the 
taste of autonomy and the corresponding new identity that it offers, mastery is the 
power of predictability, the erasure of the fear of the unexpected. It is surely a relief to be 
released from experiencing objects as factors that predominate over one. For example, 
when the bicycle responds to my command, I am somehow freer than when it was an 
unwieldy force to which I was subjected. The same holds for situations. In cases in 
which mastery refers not to sovereignty over action but circumstance, play may turn 
symbolic in form. 
 I have noted how adults can encourage children’s play by establishing conditions 
that free them physically to play; there is a flipside to dependency, however. Whatever 
figures (parental or otherwise) are raising a child, they nurture play indirectly by 
supplying food and shelter—opening up energy for expenditure in frivolous, yet 
preparatory, pursuits—and directly by the material objects that they choose for their 
young as toys. Adults also provide an emotional environment friendly to play by being 
playful themselves. These two aspects—the types of playthings supplied and the 
individual character of the adults—return us to the constricting side of the play 
equation. Children who are by and large consigned to spend their youths in the families 
into which they were born are dependent beings in that their identities are 
circumscribed by their immediate settings.  
The sensible fact, which is normally unremarkable but worth making explicit 
here, is that the physical circumstance of people’s upbringing bears significantly on their 
play experiences and their play futures. If girls and boys live in homes surrounded by 
woods, they will have the opportunity to play with natural objects. If they live in urban 
areas, they will have access to city streets, stoops, and (in the summertime) spraying fire 
hydrants. If they live in war-torn regions, they will be confined to the home or, if they 
are able to venture out, will have extraordinarily dangerous play objects at their disposal 
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in the debris. If children grow up in an era of highly developed technology and if they 
are given electronic gadgets and videogames, they may be tempted to stay indoors to 
play. And while mastering some singular ludic experience in the woods, streets, or 
living room is feasible, it is difficult to envision children of a certain age having the 
power to extend the boundaries of their play spheres by themselves. This is not to deny 
that children exercise a degree of choice within the settings in which they find 
themselves—which paths to take outdoors, which creatures to pick up and which to 
leave alone, what image or thing to represent with the broken tree branch—but to insist 
that, at the outer level, the place of their play and the range of their toys is outside of 
kids’ control. They may be free in their play in that they are afforded safety and a 
surplus of goods, but they are physically constrained relative to their own abilities as 
well as their physical locales. Children’s exposure to toys, games, and other players 
early in life sets play pathways, determining to an unquantifiable yet presumably large 
extent the forms of play and leisure they will seek out and enjoy as adults (Freysinger, 
59). If their play proclivities are to change in their adulthood, it will be by deliberate 
intervention.  
 
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS:  
DISCOVERING SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS ON SELF, MAKING EMOTIONAL WIGGLE ROOM 
 
I do not want to err by attributing too much power to the role of parents and 
caretakers in the shaping of children’s identities, and therefore neglect the tremendous 
influence peers have on each other in their youth as well as the multitude of ways 
children subvert adult intentions in their amusements.45 Nevertheless, I do want to 
                                                
45 Sutton-Smith and Chudacoff make these points splendidly. See especially, “Child Power and 
Identity” in The Ambiguity of Play and Children at Play, pp. 12, 147-150, and 208-211. The authors’ 




highlight the significance of adults’ personalities in bringing about—or barring—play. 
As adults are responsible for the physical conditions of children’s upbringing, so do they 
establish the emotional atmospheres in which kids are raised. Playful adults model, at 
least on occasion, what it is to have a good time and do something purposelessly. More 
importantly, they give children the permission—the emotional expanse—to play. This 
affirmation of the value of a spirit of adult playfulness and non-purposiveness echoes a 
tenet of the psychotherapist D.W. Winnicott.  
Famous for his theory of toys as transitional objects, Winnicott writes in Playing 
and Reality of the intertwining of adults’ and children’s emotional freedom. The freedom 
to play goes both ways: Adults encourage children’s play by valuing playfulness and 
being playful themselves. At the same time, children help adults enter into play, 
welcoming them into their quintessentially playful way of being, reminding them of the 
pleasure of non-instrumentality, and sanctioning their goofiness. Winnicott recalls a 
personal experience—in this case, not of using play as a therapeutic tool but of 
interacting lightheartedly with the five-year-old daughter of a patient—and states: “In 
the playing that Diana and I did together, playing without therapeutics in it, I felt free to 
be playful” (43, emphasis mine). Notably, Winnicott is concerned here to include a 
description of his own freedom. Focusing on one side of the relationship, we could say 
that the child’s condition is linked to, if not predicated on, the grownup’s state. Thus, 
Winnicott goes on to make the crucial observation that “[c]hildren play when the other 
person is able and free to be playful” (43-44). In finding that adult rigidity suppresses 
the ability to play in children, we encounter a perhaps surprising condition of paidia.46 
Kids are free to kid around to the degree that their friends and family members embody 
a willing spirit, an unencumbered play-drive, an abiding childlikeness. Play, which 
thrives on a certain looseness, suffers when adults are too uptight. This tautness or 
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strictness on the part of adults threatens to stifle kids’ inclinations for fun. The capacity 
for self-consciousness grows along with the self. Inhibition lurks.  
Let us continue by considering the theory of a child’s inner, or psychic, 
development in slightly more detail, looking particularly to the interplay of perception 
of the world, experience of time, and the epiphenomenon of selfhood. Here I maintain 
that the younger children are the more psychologically free they are to express their 
desires and to enact anything in their play, without self-censorship or even self-
awareness. This freedom of sensuous immediacy declines, however, with the refining of 
children’s understanding of the world and their corresponding ability to make sense of 
time. Curiously, there is an inverse relation between fragmentation of time and unity of 
self. That is, at first a baby is unified with the whole of what surrounds her and yet she 
experiences each splice of time as a singular, ongoing unit, an unending (and 
incomprehensible) now. As she ages, she carves her “self” out from the world; this 
separation of self from other seems to correspond to her ability to knit together discrete 
moments into a continuous whole. It also significantly relates to the deferral of desires. 
Not until there is a self can there be self-repression.  
In Childhood and Society, Erik Erikson describes the improvement in children’s 
cognition of what constitutes the world. Initially, infants are unified with their 
circumstances; they cannot differentiate between themselves and what is around them, 
which is one way of explaining why a baby’s crying intensifies when she hears another 
baby wail (Piaget, Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood, 7-8). Thus, infants first find 
themselves in an “autocosmos”—a world of self and immediate desire. Over time, as 
they make distinctions between what is inner and outer, their selves change. Here, they 
see themselves as inhabiting a “microsphere”—a slightly larger world that includes a 
few objects and a few other individuals whose rival desires warrant consideration. 
Eventually, they recognize a “macrosphere,” which is simply the shared world of many 
people (Childhood and Society, 220-221).  
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This process of growth may be interpreted not only as the erection of boundaries 
but also as the expansion of rules: more and more regulations apply to individuals’ 
conduct as the spheres widen and as engagement with others multiplies. After reaching 
the level of the macrosphere, children have obligations; they are required to make room 
for the different and often contrary desires of other people. Rather than being the center 
of attention all of the time, they are expected to adapt to others’ preferences. This takes a 
number of forms of behavior, including maintaining silence while others speak and 
waiting patiently for their turn. In the case that children do mistreat others—grabbing 
what does not belong to them or kicking somebody when they do not get their way, 
say—they are held accountable. Punishment ensues. And so experiencing the world as 
limited to oneself ceases to be permissible as a child ages, enters adolescence, and 
eventually becomes an adult. This is seen clearly in the diagnosis of an egocentric person 
as narcissistic: she has failed to grow out of the autocosmos. That the narcissist is frozen 
in immaturity is evinced by the smallness of the sphere in which she seeks gratification: 
herself. 
Alan Bass, a psychoanalyst who is known for his translations of Derrida, writes 
that “the relation to the thing is the possibility of the relation to the world” (165). 
Presumably, the corollary is true as well: how children see themselves vis-à-vis the 
world has implications for how they interact with objects. Thus, an especially pertinent 
detail in Erikson’s account is that the function and identity of toys change with each 
stage of the trajectory of growth. During the autocosmos phase, there is nothing except a 
child’s own body to serve as a toy. (The mother’s body might count as an object of play 
but only insofar as it is viewed as an extension of a baby’s self.) In the microsphere, with 
the child’s ability to acknowledge the existence of independent entities, external things 
such as rattles, dolls, and balls become instruments of fun. Toys have a peculiarly fragile 
status at this point of development, however, because they abide by the laws of the 
“thing-world.” Partially outside of the child’s control, they may inexplicably break to 
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pieces or be confiscated (Childhood and Society, 221). In the outer reaches of the 
macrosphere, attained around nursery-school age, the content of play becomes more 
social because it is communicable and representable to others. As they mature, children 
are better able to respond to social codes and to decipher increasingly complex 
instructions. Furthermore, in the games they play with each other, they prove capable of 
giving themselves rules and acting as referees. Children are known to enforce the 
boundaries of their pretense, for example, by chiding their fellow players when they 
break character. In sum, children progress over time from exploring and playing with 
themselves to interacting with physical objects in a solitary fashion to experiencing play 
non-materially, collectively, and in a structure of regulation and responsibility.  
Erikson’s explanation of the constriction of the self in conjunction with the 
widening of external spheres is one way to account for changes to the arrangement of a 
person’s psyche during childhood. We have seen that the self shrinks as it faces the 
limitations of social reality, and this affects a child’s engagement with objects as toys. To 
Erikson’s view we might add that of D.W. Winnicott, who works out the idea of 
differentiation and its implications for development through a theory of transitional 
objects. An infant comes to have and use her “first not-me possession” usually 
somewhere between the fourth and twelfth month (Playing and Reality, 1, 4). This 
accomplishment is predicated on the separation of self and object. The transitional 
object, as transitional, exists in the in between: it is neither in the infant’s “inner psychic 
reality” nor in the “external world as perceived by two persons in common” (5). In this 
way, the transitional object is the substance of illusion—and illusion is, at root, a ludic 
condition. (In addition to this telling etymology, keep in mind Winnicott’s claim that 
illusory experiences carry over into adulthood in the forms of art and religion (3).) While 
the transitional object corresponds to the transition between “the thumb and the teddy 
bear” (2), it might at the same time be the thumb or stuffed animal. As Winnicott makes 
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clear from the start, he cares less about the nature or identity of the things, which serve 
as transitional objects, than in their use (xii, 3). 
Whereas the mother’s breast represented a subjective object for the infant—an 
object that the infant related to subjectively and even somehow identified with as an 
extension of his own body—the infant who has developed to the point of having a 
particular organization of the ego is able to relate to an object as separate from his self 
(80). He does this on the basis of a change to the reality principle. That is, as he sacrifices 
his fantasy of omnipotence, he gains access to things that objectively exist in the world. 
By alienating things that he takes to be part of himself—“subjective objects” he projects 
onto the world—he transforms them into objects with potential use-value. Winnicott 
insists on a set of transitional objects and phenomena in between these relation and use 
stages. He describes this maturation in terms of destruction and survival: according to 
him, “after ‘subject relates to object’ comes ‘subject destroys object’ (as it becomes 
external); and then may come ‘object survives destruction by the subject’” (90, original 
emphasis). It is only after finding that objects exist after being destroyed—i.e., after 
being “placed outside the area of omnipotent control” (ibid.)—that the infant can 
interact with them as useful things.47 Here then is one site of expansion through 
constriction. A young person gains access to greater power through objects in the 
narrowing of her or his self.  
While from an external position we might regard infants as inhabiting a carefree 
world of constant provision, subjectively, babies are limited to their environments—or, 
more simply, are their environments—to the extent that they have not yet distinguished 
self from other. Their nascent selfhood is not only dictated by their physical 
circumstance. Until they can mediate them, they are determined by their desires. Despite 
whatever inclinations we might have to treat nunc stans experiences as unequivocally 
                                                




wonderful in a mystical sort of way, let us imagine how frustrating it might be for 
infants to experience life as a series of eternal nows. Babies who have no other recourse 
than crying when they want to be fed, cleansed, or held are vulnerable in their 
dependency on others. Locked in a state of non-comprehension, they are likely to face 
each moment of being hungry, dirty, or alone as an unending one—until the pain of 
dissatisfaction is abruptly undone and a new fragment of time starts.  
The decline in immediacy as a way of experiencing life occurs gradually in the 
course of childhood, and with considerable adult aid and socializing force. Although 
play is one field in which children are apt to assert themselves and practice autonomy, 
maturing entails the compulsion to conform to norms in nearly all spheres of behavior. 
Writing explicitly in terms of freedom, function, and purpose, Lawrence K. Frank 
addresses the process by which an infant is transformed into a participant in the social 
order. His account, at length, reads: 
Adults expect, and may coerce him [the newborn infant], if necessary, to 
transform these organic needs and functional capacities into goal-seeking, 
purposive conduct addressed to deferred or symbolic consummations, thereby 
establishing new ways of relating himself to the world by a reciprocal, circular 
process. … The baby thereby surrenders some of his physiological autonomy and 
self-regulation, becoming increasingly responsive in his functional processes to 
the external world and its requirements as he transforms organic needs into 
purposive strivings. His eating is regulated, not by his changing blood sugar 
level, but by family meals; his elimination is governed, not by pressures 
internally, but by the designated place and time; his sleep by parental schedules. 
Thus the child is freed from coercion by his own organic needs and can 
increasingly replace early patterns by more mature patterns that enable him to 
cope with the world purposefully. …  
In these transformations of organic needs and functionings, this 
relinquishing of organic autonomy to accept social patterning and regulations of 
his physiological functioning, we may observe the first steps in the process of 
maturation … (576-577) 
 
Frank slips in this passage between describing the newborn’s state as free and coerced. 
On the one hand, the infant who abides by patterns dictated by social norms is freed 
from the coercion of bodily needs. Being out of diapers certainly has its advantages. On 
the other hand, the baby relinquishes his physiological autonomy in accepting the 
requirements of the external, striving world. He is more regulated than before, when he 
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was merely responsive to his instantaneous desires. Notably, we also see Frank define 
maturity as the acquisition of purposiveness, which is an essential quality of work, not 
play.  
As they age and run up more and more against the restrictions of reality, the 
young will have to cope with unmet needs. They are liable to turn to play as one of the 
means of self-cure—to the extent that they may be said to have a “self”—once they can 
no longer get by with living immediately. In other words, separation (of self and world) 
accompanies ego-synthesis; deferral of desires trails the internal division of the psyche; 
and these partitions and transformations affect children’s relationship to both time and 
play (and to time through play). Among its other traits, maturity means having an 
increasingly continuous sense of oneself over time and having the ability to interact with 
other people and things in instrumental and instrumentally non-instrumental manners. 
“No one has met a child under three who wanted to do something a few days 
hence.” That comical insight of Vygotsky captures this characteristic of the very young, 
namely that they want what they want without delay. Over and above reason or rational 
discourse, children make recourse to play when the realization of their desires is 
interrupted or altogether stunted. This remedy is itself, of course, unplanned. Thus, in 
his treatment of play, pain, and planning, Vygotsky stresses the spontaneity of the play 
solution:  
At preschool age special needs and incentives arise that are very important for 
the whole of the child’s development and that are spontaneously expressed in 
play. In essence, there arise in a child of this age many unrealizable tendencies 
and immediately unrealizable desires. A very young child tends to gratify his 
desires at once. Any delay in fulfilling them is hard for him and is acceptable 
only within certain narrow limits; no one has met a child under three who 
wanted to do something a few days hence. Ordinarily, the interval between the 
motive and its realization is extremely short. I think that if there were no 
development in preschool years of needs that cannot be realized immediately, 
there would be no play. (2-3) 
 
Temper tantrums provide ample evidence of the difficulty children experience in 
accepting that their desires go unfulfilled, even for a short interval. Their ability to 
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countenance answers like “no” or “wait” increases with time. (Everyday life will afford 
toddlers plenty of “practice” at not getting their way. A related fact of development is 
that time will have to be set aside for their amusement. I.e., eventually, once they inhabit 
the workaday world, they will have to plan to play.) Whether or not Vygotsky is 
justified in thinking that play would not exist without immediately unrealizable needs, 
play does prove to be a moderating force. What grownups, desperate for peace and 
quiet, sometimes do as a deliberate move—providing disruptive kids with toys as tools 
for distraction—children may readily seek out for themselves. Play is a naturally arising 
way to temper the angry disappointment of unmet desire.48 It is the language of 
children’s feelings and a safe means of total self-expression (Landreth et al., 47). 
Whereas adults may turn to the free and desultory exploration of ideas in talk 
therapy, children of a certain age are liable to work out traumatic occurrences by acting 
upon toys. Replaying events allows children to deal with scenarios that they are 
incapable of processing otherwise, either because they lack the words to express 
themselves or because the reality is too threatening to be confronted directly. In 
representing situations with toys, children externalize their feelings (49). It is the 
disguise, the dissimulation, that makes this expression safe. Rather than reenact 
something exactly as it happened, kids may choose to imagine alternate outcomes, 
which would have been more pleasing to them. Whether a faithful or creative 
reproduction of fact, the play’s overall effect is to give children space for their 
sentiments—newfound emotional wiggle room. Play is, as Freud would have it, a 
venting mechanism. It offers an escape valve for impulses that exceed the confines of 
reality (Rubin, 702).   
                                                
48 It is not as if an infant waiting to be fed decides to distract herself from hunger by playing a 
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frustrated desires in play. Vygotsky places this level of ability at the time of preschool, or around 




A famous example of reli(e)ving pain in play is that of Freud’s grandson, Ernst, 
who at one-and-a-half repeats a game of his own invention. Memorialized as the fort/da 
(“gone/there”) case in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the little boy deals with his mother’s 
absence by playing with a spindle (BPP, 13-17). Playing with an object that he can 
physically control—sending the bobbin away (while making the sound “o-o-o-o” rather 
than pronouncing the actual word “fort”) and bringing the bobbin back at will (uttering 
a joyful “da” on its return)—enables him to cope with the emotional fallout of a reality 
he could not determine, that is, a mother with a schedule of her own.49 As Erikson says, 
“[W]ith the use of a full-length mirror, [the boy] plays ‘going away’ from himself and 
returning to himself. He is now both the person who is being left and the person who 
leaves” (Childhood and Society, 217). This unconscious and multivalent symbolism is a 
display of power. Beyond the physical control he wields over the literal toy object, Ernst 
asserts himself as he represents the situation, determining when to make the spindle 
leave and when to allow it to return. At the same time, he gets to exchange places and 
experience the autonomous pleasure of being the one to leave and come back. The child 
is not alone in trying to make sense of the matter, though. The multiple interpretations 
of this scene, which Freud wagers and then rejects, point to a further plane of play. As 
Derrida illuminates, “[Freud’s] own writing, his own deportment in this text is doing 
fort/da” (The Ear of the Other, 70). The hide-and-seek of Freud’s hermeneutic efforts as 
they are applied to his grandson’s game is, in Derrida’s thought, play without limit.  
Play helps to shape children’s identities; it also reflects children’s inner lives, 
particularly in difficult moments. Over and above these roles, play proves to be a means 
of refiguring the self, not only in childhood but throughout an individual’s development. I 
therefore maintain that what psychologists say with respect to the young—that “[p]lay 
can be viewed as the process through which the total self of the child is created, expressed, 
                                                




and recreated”—holds for adults as well (Landreth et al., 48, emphasis mine). I am surely 
not the first to point out that re-creation is possible through recreation.50 
Hannah Arendt’s concept of natality, or the freedom to begin anew, resembles 
the ever-unfinished growth experienced in psychoanalysis. In the volume of Female 
Genius devoted to the originator of the psychoanalytic play technique Melanie Klein, 
Julia Kristeva addresses the play of forces at work in play and therapy. Expounding at 
length on freedom and rebirth, Kristeva writes: 
In Winnicott’s writings, the adjective free is used as a synonym for an ‘inner life 
that must be perpetually re-created,’ one that operates in tandem with an 
external life that must always be internalized. In Freud, the word free essentially 
signifies a resistance to the twin tyrants of external reality and the desires of the 
drives. After Klein and Winnicott, the term has come to mean something else: free 
means to internalize the outside, provided that this outside (the mother, to begin 
with), allows for play and allows itself to play. In sum, at the end of the analysis 
that has been terminated but that remains infinite, and because we have revealed 
freedom at the cost of our desires, we find ourselves not only mortal but ‘full of 
birth,’ to come back again to Hannah Arendt’s idea, in the sense that we are 
capable of creating a psychic inner life that is to be forever replenished. (185) 
 
Growing up means continuously adjusting one’s self-conception to the Heraclitean 
reality of the surrounding world. The sheer flux of time and energy requires 
synthesizing acts of selfhood. Thus, an adult is made in adulteration: as desires are 
mixed with duties, pure sensuous immediacy is shed. A person in middle age as much 
as in youth is used to incorporating what is apposite until it is his own, seeking to join 
with what he cannot beat only provided it is beatable, which is to say playable. This 
delicate harmonizing of inner being with outer circumstance takes a variety of forms. 
What Kristeva specifies, though, is that playfulness is the sine qua non of this freedom. A 
person is only free in internalizing what is outside when that external element itself 
allows for play. What perhaps follows from this is the claim that being without play is a 
fettered way of life. Forces that are hostile to play ought to be resisted. Reflexively, one 
may turn back to play (as in play therapy) as a means of this resistance. 
                                                




What I have attempted to show in this section on play and psychological and 
emotional development is that a sacrifice of one type of freedom makes room for the 
expression of other, more potent forms, which are more adequate to the world as it 
really is. A child displays control in deftly interacting with external objects; furthermore, 
when she internalizes outside forces, she engages in acts of self re-creation. She grows in 
power physically and psychologically, and while this growth comes at the cost of the 
immediate fulfillment of desire and the fragmentation of self, it brings enhancements. 
Namely, development in these arenas allows for a sense of continuity over time, greater 
independence, and the more sophisticated play accorded in the manipulation of 
concepts. 
 
IV. INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND DIVERSION:  
THE CONSTRAINT OF ACCOMMODATION AND THE FREEDOM OF ASSIMILATION 
 
We may slide into this section on cognitive play quite easily given the extent to 
which the emotional and intellectual expressions of play are intertwined. Children like 
Freud’s grandson may find emotional release in play acts but in doing so they draw 
from the developing capacities of their minds, specifically their ability to represent the 
world symbolically. As they move away from the sensorimotor period of development 
and as they grow in representational intelligence, they are less tied to the “here-and-
now.” They can reflect about the past and project onto the future (Harwood et al., 244). 
Whether for sheer fun or the remedying of pain, children have considerable freedom in 
how they exercise their imaginations. With expanded brain functioning, they are 
increasingly able to play around with concepts and actively manipulate symbols. They 
have by and large passed through the stage of accommodating their understanding to 
external truths; they are ready to make ideas serve them, assimilating them to their 
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purposes. Even as children slowly move away from being determined by desires, 
however, they face the constraint of their “conceptual circumstances.”   
Children are “bound” to imitate the people they face on a consistent basis and 
this is a matter of intellectual, as well as physical, determination. While at particular 
moments babies certainly do refrain from copying the mannerisms of those around 
them, and although it is more than plausible that children are idiosyncratic because of 
the unique ways they assemble the factors that they adopt, mimicry as an element of their 
formation appears to be an inescapable fact. Regardless of whether it is automatic or 
learned, imitation is a developmental technique and, Piaget says, the prelude to (actual) 
play.51 According to his theory of accommodation and assimilation, children develop as 
they bring their thinking in line with reality—altering their concepts—and as they 
manipulate the world around them—acting on things as their mind dictates. This 
admixture of adjustment and exertion, of response and innovation, turns out to be a 
balancing of imitation and jeu.   
 Is it characteristic of play for it to be mimetic, or is play, as Piaget maintains, 
distinct from and somehow beyond imitation? The now famous play scholar Brian 
Sutton-Smith shows in his 1966 article critiquing Piaget what is at stake in this 
(supposed) separation. According to Sutton-Smith, who favors a view in which play is 
intellectually generative, Piaget’s theory falls short by relying on a copyist notion of 
imitation. That is, Piaget situates (symbolic) play after the stage of imitation; by doing 
so, he presents play as limited to or constrained by the images already attained through 
children’s accommodation to—or copying of—reality. Sutton-Smith writes that for 
Piaget “the encapsulated images derived from accommodation determine the character 
of the activity. Play merely diversifies the symbols” (“Piaget on Play: A Critique,” 106). 
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Sutton-Smith decries the related point in Piaget’s theory that children grow out of play 
as they are socialized (Sutton-Smith, 108; Piaget, Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood, 
168). Thus, he not only takes issue with the status of play relative to imitation but calls 
into question the place attributed to play in the course of an individual’s overall 
development within Piaget’s schema. 
What is Sutton-Smith’s position?  While he makes clear that his aim is not to 
provide a different theoretical framework in which to consider play, Sutton-Smith does 
convey his esteem for play as a constructive faculty (110). One senses that out of a deep 
respect for play Sutton-Smith wants to elevate it and see it upheld as a robust capacity 
independent of other faculties. Like Johan Huizinga and Winnicott, he views play as 
carrying cultural and psychological significance throughout a person’s life. Rather than 
being supplanted by reason, play takes on new forms in the stage of adulthood. With 
age, people play differently from the way they did as children, but they still play. They 
play at festivals. They play at communication. They play at sex. In Sutton-Smith’s eyes, 
play is one of life’s lasting features—and not another transient phase (109).  
In his response to Sutton-Smith’s critique, Piaget seeks to clarify his own 
position, insisting that he does not regard play as subordinate to imitation. In short, he 
disavows holding the ideas that Sutton-Smith attributes to him. To correct the 
misunderstanding, Piaget rehearses his stance that symbolic play occurs among children 
one-and-a-half to two years in age, which follows the period of their sensorimotor 
activities and play. This is relevant given the relation between symbols and concepts and 
between concepts and imitation. And so he writes that “[m]ental imagery in particular is 
the product of interiorized imitation” (“Response to Brian Sutton-Smith,” 112). When 
children “interiorize” imitation, they engage in representation. This mental process is 
activated at a further stage of development when they rely on the concepts of imitation 
in their play. Piaget’s refutation of Sutton-Smith’s interpretation of his work may 
therefore come through more clearly in this statement: “[because play as the assimilation 
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of reality to the self] is symbolic it needs signifiers, and it borrows them either from 
language or from the only other source of symbols, that is to say, gestural or interiorized 
imitation” (ibid.). Assimilation—the “deformation and subordination of reality to the 
desires of the self”—involves language or imitation, but this does not make language or 
imitation secondary to play (ibid.). For Piaget, subsequence in order does not equate 
subordination in rank. 
Is the copyist view of play as imitation, like Sutton-Smith suggests, 
problematically deterministic in that it prevents the unhindered exercise of children’s 
wishes and ideas? Is his framework by contrast liberating in that it allows play an 
independently constructive role? Touching upon the debate between Piaget and Sutton-
Smith opens up a range of questions about the nature of the limitation of imitation. If 
children begin their play lives by mimicking the gestures, words, and attitudes of the 
others around them, are they unfree? How could children be expected at an early stage 
of development to do genuinely and thoroughly new things, however open, unafraid, 
and non-self-censoring children may be? With what resources would they play around, 
what materials would they manipulate in their play, except those already available to 
them in their immediate circumstances, in the examples of the lives of the adults and 
other children they know? And is there any indication that this setup changes in 
adulthood? Are adults able to break free of everyday concepts in their play any more 
than children? Perhaps, then, the practice of imitation is not a dire limitation but one 
that is consistent with the experience of new and limitless possibilities. It is not 
necessary to worry about an impoverishing of the play-drive on this basis, given 
children’s creative potential to combine the raw resources at hand in wildly innovative 






V. CONCLUSION:  
CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS AND THE DANGERS OF INSTRUMENTALIZING PLAY 
 
This chapter has been premised on the hope that understanding the deep worth 
that play holds for children will extend to the reevaluation of the place and purpose of 
play in adulthood. In coming to recognize several specific ways in which play is a 
developmental good, we open ourselves to the importance of deliberately seeking play 
as an element in the ongoing shaping of our adult selves. The gathering and recollection 
of insights from classic developmental psychologists may also better position us to 
rethink the ways in which we encourage play in children today. To many, modern 
trends in the culture and commercialization of children’s play are dismaying. Numerous 
factors contribute to the transformation that psychologists and others observe in the play 
patterns of the majority of twenty-first-century American children. These include 
smaller and less extended families, the lack of access to outdoor space that is deemed 
sufficiently safe for independent play, toys that are too complex, and time that is too 
structured.  
 A combination of anecdotal evidence, scholarly studies, and journalistic reports 
suggest that children’s play is becoming largely overdetermined in nature. It is less 
imaginative, less simple, less spontaneous. In short, it is less free. The diminution in 
“free play” (used here as a technical term for unstructured play) is occurring while—or 
because—kids are surrounded by an abundance of toys and games with educational 
justification and operational constraint. What happened to toys that come without 
instructions? Children may prefer the boxes for expensive toys to the toys themselves 
because a cardboard box can become many things, while the toy is programmed for only 
one purpose (Tim Brown, “Tales of Creativity and Play,” 9:20).  
There is a sad irony here. Well-meaning family members, friends, and educators 
want to give children every advantage and so they supply them with highly purposed 
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activities and things. These gestures are self-undermining because they stifle 
opportunities for purposeless play, the experience of which proves hugely beneficial. 
Evidence and first-hand testimonies suggest that children might be better off playing 
self-regulated pickup games of soccer in neighborhood streets than attending adult-
organized league practices, to take one example. Melinda Wenner, drawing on the 
expertise of David Elkind, writes, “Parents should let children be children—not just 
because it should be fun to be a child but because denying youth’s unfettered joys keeps 
kids from developing into inquisitive, creative creatures …” (“The Serious Need for 
Play,” 29). Following the course that Elkind recommends would require that adults 
esteem the intrinsic goodness of purposeless play and trust that play’s secondary 
rewards (the fostering of emotional intelligence, problem-solving skills, self-regulation, 
etc.) will eventually be manifested in their children’s character. 
Recognizing the difficulty of measuring and qualifying the occurrence of play 
among adults, it is nevertheless possible to speculate that the decline in their experience 
of unstructured time is partially responsible for the over-programming of their 
children’s lives. As we saw, Winnicott explains that children benefit from the implicit 
permission to play that playful parents provide. Mothers and fathers, aunts and uncles, 
cousins, neighbors, teachers, and loving friends who are themselves playful encourage 
the experience of freedom in the youth of the community. This freedom is a nurturing 
freedom that brings about a multitude of good things—like creativity and cooperation—
in the long run. Adult figures are doing something harmful, however, when they 
continuously anchor play activities to learning objectives, schedule too many organized 
and adult-supervised games, and deprive kids the room and unfettered hours for 
spontaneous, self-directed, and risky fun. Again, such trends may belie adults’ own 
anxieties about things like status and accomplishment, intelligence and earning-
potential. They reveal the adult inability to allow children’s play to be anything other 
than functional (Erikson, TR, 214), the way that “the older generation has [in general] 
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always wanted play to be rational so that it will lead a child to some beneficial end such 
as wisdom and proficiency” (Chudacoff, 13). Perhaps if adults were more comfortable 
with the pleasures of play for themselves, they would not have to instrumentalize play 
in the young. It seems, then, that another motivation for thoughtfully cultivating playful 
attitudes and experiences well into adulthood is to be reminded of the inherent value of 
play. We can take joy in letting children experience purposelessness entirely for its own 
sake. Rather than preclude them, this preserves the benefit of secondary traits of play. 
Treading the paradox that productive outcomes are best found when they are not 
sought at all is a precarious balance to strike. 
In sum, we have seen that children experience freedom and constraint in various 
ways as they mature physically, psychologically, and intellectually. Play both affects and 
is affected by the shifting relationship between being fettered and being free. Kids may 
discover rules by repeated playing and they may rely on play to break out of displeasing 
rules. Their engagement in amusing activities may be conditioned by freedom, as in the 
free provision of resources, at the same time that it is determined by necessity, as in the 
circumscriptions of their settings. It is not as simple as saying that the liberties children 
find in play lead to new limitations or that constrictions are consistently accompanied by 
the loosening of necessity. Freedom and constraint go hand in hand. They are neither 
strictly causal nor correlative but rather are traits that are co-determined and 
interpenetrating. The following chapter further evinces the dialectical relationship that 
holds within—and between—movements of play. There, I will step forward from the 
symbolic stage in the trajectory of youths’ play development and turn to adult and 
youth engagement in fantasy. Taking online role-playing games as representative of the 
over-reflective pole of aestheticism, I will analyze the freedom of acting as an avatar as 






Avatars, Agency, and the Limited Possibility of Fantasy  
 
One of the traditional understandings of freedom takes freedom to be the 
absence of constraint. Recall Hobbes’ paradigmatic case of water, unhindered by rocks 
or dams, which is free to flow (Leviathan, II.21, pp. 139-140). There is a certain intuitive 
sensibility to this stance that freedom is freedom from impediments. Turning from a 
natural substance such as water to human subjects, we could easily admit that people 
who are physically locked up—or people who are somehow psychologically blocked—
suffer from impaired wills.  
Holding these or similar presuppositions about limitation, we may be inclined to 
broach virtual worlds as worlds of unparalleled freedom. Open and expanding, online 
space admits of actions unsupported in the real world. The constraints of natural laws—
the limitations on what we can do physically—as well as the strictures of social mores—
the limitations on what we can do ethically—seem to be loosened in electronic spheres. 
Beyond heightened or altered agency, there are questions of identity to explore. Digitally 
mediated play allows for personal experimentation through the creation of avatars. By 
divorcing who you “are” online from physical reality, electronic forms of play enable 
selfhood to take new shapes and meanings. Often, this occurs without the constraints of 
commitment. Online, change comes easily.  
Whether by virtue of fantasy or Internet capabilities, a game such as World of 
Warcraft may appear to offer the freedom of infinite possibility. I think this would be a 
mistaken view, however, on two counts. One misapprehension concerns freedom. It is 
not that freedom is found in infinite possibility. Rather, it is the lack of any boundaries at 
all, the total absence of impossibility, that is constraining. Having no rules in place 
prevents game play. The second point needing correction concerns the impossibility of 
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total possibility. Fantasies are always tethered to reality not least because the people 
doing the fantasizing are real: even virtual play does not severe this tie. Marks of 
actuality are bound to appear and to place a limit on the very thinking of what is 
possible. For this reason, I will treat World of Warcraft as a form of entertainment that is, 
at least partially, reality-based and—what is more interesting—reality-replicating.  
In this chapter I will seek to locate specific iterations of freedom in such a 
contemporary play form and to assess its adequacy and potency for a life of flourishing. 
To those ends, I will consider the relation between fantasy, freedom, and escapism. Is 
fantasy the means of escapism? Is escapism an incomplete freedom? Is escapism what 
people are seeking in the first place through World of Warcraft? What would it mean to 
be successful in experiencing escape in that pastime? In trying on new roles through 
online persona and in delimiting spheres of action of relative consequence, are players 
enjoying a weak freedom apart from real life? Or could we affirm gaming alongside or 
in place of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic milieu in which to confront and challenge the 
self? As they gather in these realms in droves and devote hours and hours to cultivating 
these imaginary spaces, often over years and years, are gamers reshaping reality and 
thus exerting a particular power—the freedom of influence or resistance, say? Could we 
say more strongly that by participating in this online activity, they are contributing to 
the improvement of reality (not merely changing the “normal” world but making it 
better)? On the one hand, it would be morally significant if they were developing our 
shared, everyday world in positive ways through their play. Such a finding might move 
us to advocate for the fostering of the faculty of fantasy in general and this virtual way 
of exercising fantasy in particular. It might also cause us to reevaluate practices of 
fantasy as capable of freeing us from the deleterious factors and constraints of the 
(outside-the-game) world. On the other hand, it might not matter if people’s role-
playing engagements do not intersect with a moral mission. That is, it may be that the 
entertainment offered by World of Warcraft fulfills its purpose best when it functions as a 
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release and not as a social or individual improvement-mechanism. Why burden this 
sphere with positive, ethical duties?52   
In what follows I will make the argument that the Massively Multiplayer Online 
Role-Playing Game (MMORPG) of World of Warcraft allows players to begin to process 
difficulties of our shared, actual world through two means: avatars and in-game agency. 
Furthermore, this particular enactment of fantasy displays an interstitiality similar to 
that of the mental activity of fantasy. What I mean is that the indeterminacy of action, 
which marks a person’s relationship to her online character or avatar, parallels the non-
specifiable, partially free and partially controlled process by which ideas or images 
combine within the space of free association. Thus, people may expect to find a degree 
of freedom as they engage in fantasy and send their imaginations into overdrive. 
Through play a person is free to renounce, for a time, her responsibilities and to act 
wildly, as an adventurer. An individual is free to forget the perhaps painful ways in 
which his identity is ordinarily circumscribed, breaking out of a wheelchair, say, by 
visiting in his mind’s eye a world in which he can run, jump, and fly (Johnson, 267). 
These are necessarily partial and unsustainable freedoms, however, in that experiences 
of fantasy offer limited agency for a limited time. Return to the real world is always 
imminent. Which “you” returns is of no trivial concern. It matters not only how online 
gaming might fail to shape selves but also how it might prove to reshape selves. In 
principle, there is no guarantee that entertaining virtual fantasies will preserve or 
pervert the individuals who play (through) the avatars. The possibility that digitally-
                                                
52 A class of games under the acronym ARG—which stands for “alternate reality game”—is 
emerging. The author, game designer, and ARG-advocate Jane McGonigal defines this play set 
simply but forcefully as the “antiescapist game” (Reality is Broken, 125, original emphasis). The 
proposition at the core of the ARG movement is that the world can be improved through gaming. 
When the traditional structure of games is imposed on real-life issues, for example in applying 
arbitrary limits to the completion of a task, problem-solving becomes more fun—and more 
possible. The pleasure of the ludically-formulated challenge attracts players whose energy is then 
leveraged for good. This occurs in a range of social settings, at home in games like “Chore Wars” 
and in public in games like “Cruel 2 B Kind (C2BK).” ARGs are deliberately designed to reinvent 





mediated fantasies will yield no change or that they will bring about bad change is part 
of the limitation of play at this second pole of the aesthetic stage.  
Insofar as players “escape” accountability—as long as their actions are 
constrained to have significance primarily for the virtual world—the freedom, which 
World of Warcraft offers, is relatively weak. The moral development of a person is 
truncated when an online space becomes what Douglas Hedley calls a “substitute 
domain for the empirical world” (74). For ethical selfhood to emerge in the robust 
Kierkegaardian sense, a person must act in the local, everyday, embodied sphere of the 
real. This will push us to consider the further hypothesis, which will be taken up in 
chapter 3, that there is an intrinsic relationship between freedom and ethics—not only in 
the Kantian sense that a person must be free in order to be held morally responsible but 
in the stance expressed by Judge Wilhelm in Either/Or that a person is not free until she 
is an ethical self with grounding commitments. Limiting oneself to the universal rules of 
morality in fully embodied and socially embedded actions is more freedom-enhancing 
than withdrawing into the world of one’s mind, whatever scope of possibilities is 
possible there.    
This chapter unfolds as follow. In the first section I offer an introduction to the 
concept of fantasy that stresses its status as a free mental activity. Although my 
understanding of fantasy is informed by Aristotle’s notion of phantasia and Kant’s 
account of the free play of the imagination, I frame the discussion by foregrounding the 
ideas of the nineteenth-century German philosopher and Protestant theologian Friedrich 
Schleiermacher. I choose to focus on Schleiermacher in part because of his esteem for 
fantasy and because he affords fantasy a substantive role in the formation of the self. His 
philosophy gives us a way of thinking about imaginative sense perception that is 
connected to infinite possibility alongside world building. In addition to setting up a 
basis for understanding the online activities of modern players, this presentation of 
fantasy as a mental capacity serves to align the chapter’s discussion with the second pole 
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of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic category, that of over-reflection. As both Kierkegaard and his 
expositors set forth, the notion of the reflective aesthetic entails the free play of the 
imagination to the detriment of decisive action (Kierkegaard, CUP, 253, and Taylor, 
KPA, 169-170). A second introductory section describes the MMORPG genre broadly. 
From there, I move to a description and two-tiered analysis of the specific MMORPG 
World of Warcraft. In examining the themes of avatars and agency, I consider the 
relationship between rules and reality and I highlight the status of rules vis-à-vis 
possibility. The conclusion offers a final look at how this contemporary form of fantasy 
role-playing may or may not prove to be escapist and whether, to the extent that it is 
escapist, it is unhealthily so. 
 
I. A PHILOSOPHICAL SENSE OF FANTASY 
 
 The following brief review of the notion and function of fantasy (Phantasie) in 
several of Schleiermacher’s works will provide a basic philosophical grounding for the 
subsequent discussion of MMORPGs and virtual play.53 By referencing a few key 
passages in On Human Freedom (1793), Speeches on Religion (1799, the first edition), and 
the Monologen (1800), I will set forth a working definition of Phantasie that includes its 
own interplay of liberty and law. Moreover, I will make connections between Phantasie, 
ideation, individuality, and infinity, which will prove helpful for the analysis of the 
limitations and appeal of the virtual space of World of Warcraft. Lastly, this section on 
Schleiermacher’s use of Phantasie will serve to reinforce the caveat that, while I am 
treating fantasy with respect to the aesthetic, fantasy does not relate exclusively to that 
sphere but has relevance in psychological, ethical, and religious areas as well.54  
                                                
53 Phantasie is to be distinguished from Einbildungskraft, the term for “imagination” that includes 




 To begin, let us turn to On Human Freedom, where Schleiermacher defines fantasy 
in terms of cognitive action and the association of ideas. He gives a relatively clear sense 
of what fantasy is when he writes at the end of Part I: “Through fantasy, upon which 
every association of ideas depends, even the particular actions of our cognitive powers 
are enhanced” (26). This description of fantasy—as what enables every association of 
ideas on the one hand and as what enhances particular mental actions on the other—
belongs to a section of the text in which Schleiermacher is concerned to account for the 
particularization of cognitive acts. In showing that individual minds take individual 
pathways, he turns to the notion of desire. It is true, he maintains, that fantasy has 
within its grasp the “whole of present representations,” and yet through fantasy we do 
not re-present all of the images available to ourselves at once. Rather, impulse 
determines the singular combination of ideas at which a person arrives (ibid.). Here 
Schleiermacher seems to be thinking quite broadly about fantasy as a faculty of the 
mind, making reference to the differences in people’s memories, the types of 
investigations into which people enter, and the way people interpret and respond to 
propositions. Why, he wonders, does one person plunge into religious investigations 
while another person does not? Why do people derive different conclusions from the 
same premises? In short, out of the many possible courses of action that the mind may 
take, why does one in particular emerge? His response is that affording attention to “the 
completion of a train of representations, to the exclusion of all others at that particular 
time” is a reaction to desire (27, emphasis mine). It is as if the specificity of a 
representation and the specificity of an impulse tie together the faculties of fantasy and 
                                                
54 In her work on psychoanalysis and creativity, the scholar Lois Oppenheim is careful to draw 
attention to the connections between therapy and art. In the introduction to Imagination from 
Fantasy to Delusion, she claims that the expression of the imagination “may or may not be 
aesthetic.” Continuing, she writes that “[f]antasy in art (art as fantasy) entails the externalizing of 
emotion, desire, and conflict, conscious and unconscious. So, too, does psychoanalysis, with its 
foundation in the fantasy of both transference and, in its overlap with memory, reconstruction” 
(xii). It seems, then, that the notions of fantasy and the aesthetic (in its usual, i.e. non-




desire. In this view, fantasy is an irreducibly individual phenomenon. It is not 
experienced collectively. It is not shared. The unique direction one’s mind takes in 
exercising the power of fantasy shows something, then, about the current nature of 
individual selfhood even apart from the self’s future cultivation and its harmonious 
interaction with others.55 
 We may couple this explanation about the associative spontaneity of fantasy 
with a claim about its lawfulness, which falls in Part IV of On Freedom. Fantasy does not 
escape regulation altogether but “[acts] according to laws peculiar to itself” (134). It is as 
if the internal laws of fantasy bind its activity so that fantasy “does not extend its 
associations beyond itself” (ibid.). In short, there is freedom within fantasy to combine 
different ideas—as evinced in the spontaneity of association—but this freedom is itself 
contained.56 Fantasy thus abides by its own rules in a self-constraining fashion. By 
presenting fantasy as a faculty that is in control of itself, Schleiermacher departs from 
the view of Kant, who in §28 of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View describes 
Phantasie as the involuntary use of the imagination.  
Schleiermacher in this section of On Freedom approaches freedom under one 
aspect—that of ideal particular actions (as opposed to the aspect of real particular 
actions). In his discussion of mental actions, he addresses the issue of appearance and 
draws a connection between fantasy and indirect images, or images that are distinct 
from what actually appears before one’s eyes. The faculty of the understanding initiates 
a linking of appearances, which stands in contrast to the “work of fantasy.” The series 
that fantasy creates “consist not even of actual appearances but only of images of 
appearances” (ibid.). The concept of phantasia, as first named by Aristotle, is suggestive 
                                                
55 An implication of the individual quality of fantasy is that, like intuition, fantasy resists 
systematization.   
 
56 Galen Strawson in his article “Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaneity” (2003) 
advocates for the converse understanding, taking spontaneity to be a mark of the involuntariness 
of thoughts. As he notes, Philo made the point in the first century C.E. in this way: “[A] man’s 




of appearance—albeit appearance of a certain sort.57 Trading in images of appearances 
rather than in direct perception, fantasy is removed from what really appears by one 
degree (and from what really is by two degrees, to complete the thought Platonically). 
These are basic features of fantasy but are nonetheless worth drawing out: Fantasy 
represents images to the mind that are absent, and fantasy remains related to reality in 
combining images that are derived from the real world in unseen ways. In presencing 
what is not actually present, fantasy nears mimesis or imitation, dissimulation, make-
believe, pretense, and even delusion and escapism.58  
The mind is active in both perceiving and processing images. It is not simply that 
the mind takes snapshots of phenomena that exist out in the world; the mind also allows 
for, if not completely directs, the interplay of its inner pictures. The Schleiermacher 
scholar Albert Blackwell emphasizes these dual aspects of mind and activity as he 
explains that fantasy is directed toward ideal actions, or “the activity of our mental 
world” (Introduction, On Freedom, xxxi).59 The faculty of fantasy acts upon images in 
melding and moving them. Furthermore, it is through such actions of the mind that we 
come to act on the external world, affecting other subjects. Regarding causality in this 
way harkens back to Schleiermacher’s striking claim in Part I that “we cannot affect 
others except through representations” (27), while challenging the idea mentioned above 
that fantasy’s freedom does not spill out of its realm. This mirrors, I believe, the 
discrepancy between the qualities that Schleiermacher wishes to attribute to intuition. 
                                                
57 Jessica Moss’s thorough and careful study Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, 
Thought, and Desire (2012) provides the following definition of phantasia, founded on textual 
evidence from Aristotle’s On the Soul, On Dreams, and On Memory: “phantasia is essentially the 
capacity to have an experience very like the perception of some x but which is not directly caused 
by perceptual contact with any actual x (where x is a proper, common, or incidental perceptible – 
e.g. pinkness, roundness, a pig). It is a capacity for making present to the mind something one 
has perceived before” (53). 
 
58 Douglas Hedley suggests a tripartite division between imagination, fancy, and fantasy. Of the 
three, he places fantasy closest to delusion and escapism. See Living Forms of the Imagination, 52. 
 
59 Here I will note without upholding Strawson’s wish to keep the terminology of mental activity 




As Wayne Proudfoot indicates, there is inconsistency in Schleiermacher’s treatment of 
intuition as both independent and interpretive, that is, as conceptually apprehended 
(“Intuition and Fantasy in ‘On Religion,’” 91-92; 98). Without being able to point to the 
exact nature of the interrelation of the imaginary, ideational, and active aspects of 
fantasy, we may nevertheless affirm that fantasy involves the manipulation of sense 
perception. It concerns the sense of sight, in particular, and includes the activity of the 
intellect in the willful, innovative, and unifying transformation of images. Combining 
the insights of Schleiermacher and Kant, we might posit that there is some degree to 
which the mind directs fantasy, and some degree to which fantasy directs the mind. This 
is the interstitial quality that may mirror the relationship between players and avatars in 
online games. People may for a time control the images of themselves online only to find 
that they are overpowered by them, their own creations, later on. One contemporary 
player attests to this tension in virtual agency, writing that his Second Life avatar was “a 
machine I drove, but which also drove me” (Meadows, 124). 
 Schleiermacher builds upon his views in the second speech of On Religion when 
he states that fantasy creates your world for you. Given that religion is the subject matter 
of his speeches, it should come as no surprise that Schleiermacher is concerned with the 
relationship between fantasy and proper religiousness, the essence of which lies in the 
intuition of the universe. Thus, Schleiermacher boldly claims that “you can have no God 
without the world” and that it is the direction of your fantasy—the “highest and most 
original element” in a person—which determines your world (53). Besides the high 
estimation afforded to Phantasie, what is instructive for us is the world-creating capacity 
of fantasy. World of Warcraft is a world after all.60 The implications of this function remain 
to be seen, however it is worth wondering if the creation of a world that fantasy brings 
                                                
60 Albert Blackwell situates this “romantic exaltation” of Phantasie within the context of 
Schleiermacher’s biography. See Schleiermacher’s Philosophy of Life: Determinism, Freedom, and 
Phantasy, pp. 213-214. On the connection between fantasy and the divine creation of the world, 




about is deeply personal, driving one inward, or if there is an externality to world-
creation that enables social relations and that ultimately connects one to the wider realm 
of the real. Does a player of World of Warcraft have more or less of a world than someone 
whose play occurs offline or whose play, wherever it is based, is not centered in fantasy? 
In brief, how external is the world that connects you (for Schleiermacher) to the divine, 
or (for us) to the normal sphere of action?  
Going further, Schleiermacher aligns freedom with fantasy and interiority in the 
Monologen, his partially autobiographical treatise on the Bildung (cultivation) of the self. 
In a particularly powerful passage from the second section of the text entitled Prüfungen 
(“Soundings” or “Probings”), he states that fantasy gives proof of human freedom 
because it is through fantasy that an individual can envisage and choose a multitude of 
actions. Blackwell translates this passage as follows, referring to the faculty of Phantasie 
as “imagination”:  
Whenever I now act in keeping with my own spirit and disposition, my 
imagination gives me the clearest proof that I do so by free, individual choice, in 
suggesting to me a thousand other ways of acting in a different spirit, yet all also 
consistent with the universal laws of humanity. I project myself into a thousand 
different likenesses in order to behold my own more clearly. (33)  
 
The freedom of fantasy is quite simply the freedom of choice. This is not a merely 
individualistic or isolating liberty, though. Whereas fantasy was presented in On Human 
Freedom according to the unique particularity of desire, it is marked here by a 
commonality. A person who is both unique and radically free in her individuality comes 
to behold—and Schleiermacher is thoroughly visual in his metaphors—the whole of 
humanity in herself. The harmonies between self and other, unity and difference, and 
the individual and the whole that Schleiermacher espouses parallel the paradoxical 
congruity of inwardness and externality, on the one hand, and freedom and necessity, 
on the other. And while it is possible to bring these seemingly opposite facets together, 
such union must be achieved through one side of the dichotomy: that of inward 
freedom. That is, Schleiermacher maintains that a person whose identity is based on 
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external reality has not truly cultivated her self. To connect this with the above claim 
from On Religion, we may posit that this person exemplifies a (negative) paradox: 
although she founds her sense of self on the external, she is world-less. Such an 
“individual” is encumbered and divided. By contrast, a person who intentionally 
nourishes her (internal) uniqueness unexpectedly unites with the (external) whole. In 
developing her inner self and grounding her life on the free activity of her own mind, 
she merges with what is outside of herself. This position reinforces the importance of 
fantasy as a powerful mental faculty capable of yielding benefits for society as a whole 
and for the individual self that fantasizes.  
Schleiermacher amplifies his claims about the freedom of fantasy in the 
characterization of self-development, which he offers in Aussicht (“Prospect”), the fourth 
section of the Monologen. There he insists that the well-developed person armed with a 
powerful will is immune to the terror of fate and outward circumstance; having chosen 
her identity, she is radically free in that she is able to cultivate her self regardless of 
external reality. She can present to her mind what is absent from her surroundings. 
Because “imagination supplies what reality withholds,” she transcends the narrow 
confines of actuality (82). Having inner peace, an individual can say that “the 
development of the spirit is not confined within the narrow limits of the external” (83, 
emphasis mine). The inner play of the mind is freeing in that it releases an individual 
from the dictates of outer circumstance. Fantasy appears as the antidote to fact. Leaving 
behind the real world is not cast in a negative light in the Monologen; instead, fantasy is 
portrayed as a crucial component in the building up of the self.61  
From this brief foray into Schleiermacher’s writings, which has allowed us to 
identify several of the chief elements and effects of fantasy—including freedom of 
association and freedom of expansion, world creation, unity, and individuality—it is 
                                                
61 On Sockness’s criticism of the compensatory role of fantasy in Schleiermacher’s Monologen, see 




worth entering into a consideration of World of Warcraft. In what follows, I will describe 
basic features of this postmodern play form and seek to make clear how it encompasses 
mental acts of fantasy.  
 
II. DEFINING MMORPGS 
 
Regardless of their disciplinary backgrounds, humanities scholars have a reason 
to take interest in Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs) if 
only because MMORPGs are cousins to the impending Massive Open Online Courses 
(MOOCs). Rather than providing strictly educational content, though, MMORPGs afford 
adolescents and adults social experiences of fantasy in a particularly networked and 
globalized fashion. At any time of day in almost any part of the world, people may go 
online and find worlds of fantasy awaiting them.62   
These games are immersive environments that are powerful in their ability to 
attract and addict. While the gamer profile has stereotypically been (perhaps somewhat 
troubled or alienated) young white males, the demographics are changing as the 
industry expands. Even if they escape notice, women and older adults, retirees and 
“homemakers,” increasingly figure among the play participants.63 The wide range of the 
appeal of this form of play is due in part to the style in which the worlds are 
represented. MMORPGs are routinely if not categorically designed with graphics that 
captivate the senses.64 By activating one’s imagination, they can absorb one’s attention 
                                                
62 “Persistent worlds” are defined as those that exist independently of the players; that is, they are 
maintained even when a player stops playing. This trait lends them an aura of objectivity, if not 
reality. 
 
63 See, for example, Jesper Juul’s recent study Casual Revolution (2010). 
 
64 In her comparative discussion of narrative and ludic pleasures, Marie-Laure Ryan addresses 
the five dimensions of mental—as opposed to corporeal—immersion: “A complete fusion of game 
and story should be able to combine both types of experience. Such a combination would fuse a 
ludic, partly corporeal immersion in the fictional world, which is an intense absorption in a 
specific task, comparable to the concentration of a violinist performing a concerto, with a more 
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and consume one’s time: an oft-cited 2006 study reports that it is not uncommon for 
people who undertake these pastimes to spend twenty or more hours per week on 
them—the equivalent of a part-time job—with super gamers logging on extreme 
amounts of time (Yee, 316).  
In what follows, I will introduce each of the defining MMORPG characteristics—
that they are (1) massive, (2) multi-player, (3) online, (4) role-playing, (5) games—in 
turn. The mimetic feature of this class of play bears particular significance as role-
playing is what gives rise both to the formation of avatars and to the occurrence of 
fantasy.   
MMORPGs are distinguished from single-player computer games in that they 
involve large numbers of players who react to each other and affect each other’s play 
experiences. In a single-player online role-playing game such as Final Fantasy, one goes 
at the play alone, encountering only “non-player” or computer-generated characters in 
the course of action.65 In multi-player games, by contrast, as many as 2,000 users may 
play together at once in one of many parallel worlds, all the while communicating with 
each other through typing and speech (Yee, 310-311). For this reason, action in this 
sphere is always interaction. The multiplicity of MMORPGs has important implications 
for the meaning of players’ in-game choices, the players’ sense of community, and the 
collective responsibility they may feel for what they—or their avatars—do online. Note, 
too, that MMORPGs are defined not simply as multiplayer games but as massively 
                                                
properly narrative and more purely mental immersion, which is an engagement of the 
imagination in the construction and contemplation of a concrete story world populated by 
intelligent creatures. … This second kind of immersion can take at least … five forms—spatial, 
epistemic, temporal, emotional, and social—which present variable degrees of compatibility with 
the physically active stance of the first type” (170). Notice the way that Ryan’s association of the 
imagination with mental states (with regard to the role of the imagination in constructing and 
contemplating a story world) accords with Schleiermacher’s characterization of the work of 
fantasy as a mental activity. It seems that engaging narrative involves the mind in passive and 
active, receptive and spontaneous, ways. Further, the dimensions of mental immersion are not 
altogether separate from the physical acts that make gameplay corporeally captivating. 
 




multiplayer games. Being set online, they are liable to be significantly larger in scale 
than the in-person multiplayer role-playing games from which they originated. In place 
of physical playing space, the capacity of computer servers becomes their limiting factor.  
The role-playing and game qualities of MMORPGs are equally important to 
review. Professionally and often artfully designed, graphically sophisticated, 
accompanied by sound, narrative in nature, and evolving in real time, these virtual 
worlds are the electronic descendants of one fantasy role-playing game in particular, 
Dungeons & Dragons. Created in the 1970s by Dave Arneson and E. Gary Gygax, 
Dungeons & Dragons emerged from the practice of strategic war games that sought to 
simulate historical battles. The element of high fantasy countered whatever degree of 
realism was lent to the game by the players’ interest in those historical feats. J.R.R. 
Tolkein’s The Lord of the Rings, widely acclaimed as the greatest work in fantasy 
literature, influenced Dungeons & Dragons to a sizeable extent, without inspiring the 
macabre features of the new play genre. 
Performativity is a notable difference between the pastimes of reading and role-
playing (and between movie watching and playing online), however. A reader who is 
able to enact a story in her mind by visualizing orcs and other fantastic creatures, by 
imaginatively representing fanciful things to herself, stands apart from a participant in a 
role-playing game such as Dungeons & Dragons who envisions herself in a role as part of 
a story that she helps to create alongside other player-characters (Salen and 
Zimmerman, 406; cf. Mackay, 7). Practically speaking, Dungeons & Dragons gamers enter 
these states of alternate selfhood verbally—and collectively (hence the title of Gary Alan 
Fine’s study, Shared Fantasy). Players experience the action individually, in their minds, 
and together, in their story-crafting. When people gather to play Dungeons & Dragons, 
they neither read from predetermined scripts nor depict scenarios as actors. Instead, in a 
nearly improvisatory manner, they describe—but do not physically enact—the 
movements and decisions of their characters, whose traits are randomly established 
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through rolls of dice (Fine, 7; Waskul, 336).66 Embodied actions as well as disembodied 
thoughts give way to speech acts, as players inhabit their fantasy roles in words.67 
Both fantasy stories and fantasy games may fit within the Kierkegaardian 
category of aesthetic over-reflection as I am employing it. Nevertheless, the distinction 
between the amusements’ means of pretense raises questions regarding the selfhood of 
players and readers. A reader no less than a gamer may escape into an imagined world 
and reenter the real world changed, for better or worse. By temporarily and vicariously 
inhabiting a fictional setting, she may have cause to reflect on who she is in reality. 
Furthermore, a sole reader may “identify with” a character in a story—and this may 
occur apart from the opportunity to portray the character’s role in deeds or speech 
among other readers and without having the ability to direct the character’s actions. 
Through the sheer imagination of the mind, a reader may come to relate strongly to a 
figure in a story and find herself invested in that character’s development.  
Does a role-playing game, precisely as an activity that is shared, have the capacity 
to involve the self in a more potent way than literary play that is passively and 
individually consumed? Against the view that being alone causes the individual reader 
to cultivate the faculty of fantasy to a greater extent (because she cannot rely on other 
people’s creativity to amplify details in the story, for example) is the position that the 
presence of other people enhances the pretense of play. In co-play, more creative 
possibilities are possible; through the interactions of multiple minds, the combination of 
spontaneous associations increases.68 Additionally, having fellow players who frown 
                                                
66 The improvisatory sense of fantasy accords with fantasia as a musical genre (Randel, 306-308). 
 
67 In the 1990s, the work of the psychologist, scholar of virtual culture, and MIT professor Sherry 
Turkle focused on Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs), an intermediate form of play between 
“traditional” role-playing games like Dungeons & Dragons and MMORPGs. See Life on the Screen, 
pp. 180-209.   
 
68 Notably, the freedom found in the collective enlargement of the sphere of fantasy is compatible 
with limitation: The presence of other players gives rise to greater innovation but also 




upon the intrusion of too much realism can help to maintain the aura of fantasy. Perhaps 
the collective nature of play, then, coupled with the player’s power to represent and 
control the action of her character, leads to the transformation of a person’s real-world 
self in a more effective way. Is building a character character building?69  
The phenomenon of MMORPGs brings together role-playing and fantasy, on the 
one hand, and role-playing and avatars, on the other. What ties the first pair together 
chiefly is the unrealistic quality of the worlds in which the play is imaginatively set. 
Quite simply and generally, when people play MMORPGs, they are not taking up the 
roles of recognizable or realistic figures like bankers and teachers but are pretending to 
be fanciful, hybrid, or otherworldly creatures like gnomes and wizards. The second 
connection, which I specified, places the notion of “avatar” at the center of the online 
role-playing genre. To clarify this relation, it is worth briefly tracing the trajectory of the 
adoption of roles in in-person fantasy games to the representation of online characters, 
or avatars, in MMORPGs. 
The authors of the modern classic in game design Rules of Play, Katie Salen and 
Eric Zimmerman find three levels of identity operative in contemporary games of 
simulation (454). In separating the person from the player from the character, they 
follow Gary Alan Fine, the author of a sociological account of older (analog) fantasy 
role-playing games. Distinguishing between these levels of meaning, Fine writes that 
people participate in role-playing games, as any other activity, under a primary 
framework of reality. Qua players, however, they participate in gaming according to the 
game’s conventions. Whereas, on the level of the primary framework, physical capacity 
is what constrains action, on the second plane of the players, the set of game rules 
determines what is and is not possible. Players restrict themselves to a smaller field of 
                                                
69 It will be important in the remainder of the chapter to keep separate the question of how 
playing avatars changes a person from the question of whether playing avatars should affect an 




action than what they are able to accomplish because they respect the arbitrary rules of 
the game that make the play, play. The constriction of permissibility contrasts with the 
expanded sense of what is possible under the dictates of fantasy. A player may have to 
refrain from speaking at certain times or prevent himself from using vocabulary that 
does not accord with the fantasy setting. Within these limits, though, he is free to 
“make” his character do unbelievable feats like overcome magical enemies and slay 
dragons. And, despite the existence of lengthy rulebooks that delineate game protocols 
with great specificity, players acknowledge a strong undercurrent of freedom, which is 
captured in the statement “there are no rules that require us to obey the rules” (Carse, 
§9; quoted in Waskul, 340).  
If the first level, the primary framework, is the outermost layer encompassing the 
play experience—the shell—one finds the heart of play in the third level. Located there 
is the character. The parts that are being played are what give life to the game, but the 
players animate the roles. In other words, the game does not exist without the roles, but 
the roles do not exist apart from the human players. Fine explains the conflation of 
identities as follows: “[T]his gaming world is keyed in that the players not only 
manipulate the characters; they are characters.” At the same time, he affirms the opposite 
relation. 
The character identity is separate from the player identity. In this, fantasy gaming 
is distinct from other games. It makes no sense in chess to speak of “black” as 
being distinct from Karpov the player … The pieces in chess (“black”) have no 
more or less knowledge than their animator. However, Sir Ralph the Rash, the 
doughty knight, lacks some information that his player has (for example, about 
characteristics of other characters, and spheres of game knowledge outside his 
ken such as clerical miracles) … Likewise, the character must know only that 
information which is available within the game frame and not what the player or 
the person knows. The character is supposed to operate under the constraints of 
a closed awareness context with regard to his animator, although this of course is 
a pretense. Because player, person, and character share a brain, this separation of 
knowledge on occasion is ignored. (186-187, original emphasis) 
 
Appealing to the category of knowledge, Fine maintains here that a character is not like 
a game piece. There is no slippage in subjectivity, as it were, between the chess piece and 
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the player who moves because the game piece is an object. A crack in identity does seem 
to exist between the player and the fantasy character, though, insofar as the fantasy 
character—through pretense—is meant to have knowledge and act out of certain tracts 
of information. In sum, Fine sees the character roles that a player undertakes in offline 
fantasy gaming as differing from and yet inextricably linked to real identity. It is one 
figure, after all, who is the person, player, and character. The person who enters into the 
game never fully leaves the real world (the “primary framework”), however much she 
suspends her sense of ordinary reality in the course of acting (or speaking) out fantasies. 
Physical limitations are good markers of this tie. If, for instance, the person playing the 
character mentioned above Sir Ralph the Rash has a cold, then the character’s voice will 
not sound anything other than raspy. And yet it is possible to distinguish what takes 
place between characters within the game frame and what transpires, socially for 
example, between the people—their animators—while they play. This is evinced in the 
expectation that people will not be held accountable outside of the game for comments 
made “in-character” within the span of the fantasy.  
To what extent do these insights from offline role-playing games carry over into 
MMORPGs? Do the same types of relationship roughly hold between analog characters 
(rarely, if ever, referred to as “avatars”) and digital avatars (that are also sometimes 
called “characters” and even “protagonists”)?70 In general, what makes an avatar in an 
MMORPG, an avatar?   
Rather than thinking of avatars as virtual entities that have knowledge 
independent of their animators in the way that Fine regards offline role-playing game 
characters, I see the online avatar identity as splitting apart from the person-player 
identity through the element of visualization. Under this interpretation, avatars are 
                                                
70 In The Art of Failure (2013), Jesper Juul uses “protagonist” in his descriptions of certain 
videogame characters. To my mind, this choice of terminology underscores the narrative element 




conceived as coming to have the semblance of autonomous agency through their 
appearance. In their onscreen portrayal they bear marks of strength and powers that 
certainly do not—cannot—belong to the human beings playing them. These powers 
approximate supernatural abilities and relate to the sheen of divinity surrounding avatar 
characters.   
 Popularized by the 2009 James Cameron movie of the same title, the word 
“avatar” had already entered the gaming parlance in 1985 through the computer game 
Ultima IV: Quest of the Avatar. It began to take hold more strongly in 1986 when F. 
Randall Farmer and Chip Morningstar, the creators of the networked game Lucasfilm 
Habitat, used it to refer to one’s online persona. In choosing the word, Morningstar 
likened the player to a deity. As Farmer recounted to the wordsmith journalist Aaron 
Britt, “‘back then, pre-Internet, you had to call a number with your telephone and then 
set it back into the cradle. You were reaching out into this game quite literally through a 
silver strand. The avatar was the incarnation of a deity, the player, in the online world. 
We liked the idea of the puppet master controlling his puppet, but instead of using 
strings, he was using a telephone line’” (Britt, “Avatar”). The incarnational sense of the 
word “avatar” comes from its Sanskrit meaning. In Hindu myth, avatra refers to a god’s 
descent and earthly manifestation, particularly that of Vishnu (OED; Britt, “Avatar”). 
Taking on the identity of a virtual avatar is, by contrast, de-carnational. Adopting an 
avatar is how players virtualize themselves. If taking on flesh is how a deity can appear 
on earth, being en-avatared is how a person shows up online, sans material body.71  
                                                
71 “The computer game enforces on players a mechanization of the body in which their 
movements and their self-image as alter-ego provide both a physical and a simulated picture of 
the fragmented, allegorized and reified self under the conditions of capital” (Stallabrass, 87). We 
might build on Stallabrass’s assertion by noting that representing oneself in de-materialized form 
can involve the mechanization of the (real-life) body in another sense: the repeated physical 
motions that one performs in gaming may recondition the self by improving dexterity or causing 




Avatars are essential components for how people participate in MMORPGs, 
then, because they are the means by which people appear to other players.72 Over and 
above this significance is the power that avatars hold as a symbol of freedom. Building 
an avatar is how an individual chooses her online identity. It is what allows her to 
escape from her everyday persona and its incumbent roles and responsibilities—she sets 
her self aside—while also making superpowers available to her—she enhances her self. 
Nonhuman attributes like flying or becoming invincible bring about a world of 
possibilities. As we will see in the description of World of Warcraft, the player does not 
even have to wait until the game is over in order to re-invent her character. She can re-
create her digital alter ego during the game, in medium ludum, electing abilities anew and 
tweaking her image according to her desired game-playing experience. 
To bring this section to a conclusion, we may turn to the fifth quality and ask in 
what sense Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games count as games. I 
propose that MMORPGs exhibit a gamelikeness primarily on the basis of their inclusion 
of rules. What is the nature of rules in MMORPGs given that they are electronic games? 
How do the roles that players take up relate to the rules by which they abide? And how 
do rules relate to reality? Is fantasy reality by other rules?73 Are there ways to resist 
constraints in digitally-mediated play, and what are the implications of cheating? Is it 
not play itself that offers experiences of freedom but the breaking of the rules of the 
game? 
As in Schleiermacher’s treatment of fantasy, here too we may note a perhaps 
surprising correspondence between being rule-bound and being free. Regulations give 
fantasies a wide—but not total—space in which to unfold. And so one finds that the 
                                                
72 This is the case for “third-person games,” in which a character is seen on the screen, as opposed 
to first-person games, in which a player looks out on to the gamescape directly. 
 
73 As Herald writes in Fluent in Fantasy: The Next Generation, “Like science fiction and horror, 




spheres of MMORPGs are regulated worlds; they are structured by prohibitions and 
principles, which are imposed by the game designers, as well as by the expectations that 
arise from one’s fellow players. Garry Young and Monica Whitty eloquently express this 
point when they state, “The fundamental essence of play is the freedom and license to be 
creative, and to be set apart from ordinary life. Yet play also depends on rules and other 
factors contingently related to a given space and time. Consequently, an interesting 
paradox arises in which freedom within play is created only through constraint” 
(“Games Without Frontiers,” 1231). Note the location of this freedom. Freedom is 
brought about within the game world by forbidding certain types of actions. It should not 
be taken for granted that such freedom extends to the world outside of the game. 
On the one hand, many videogames distinguish themselves from older forms of 
play like board games by demanding regulatory exploration on the part of the players 
rather than announcing the “dos and don’ts” from the outset of play. The challenge, and 
a good portion of the pleasure of gameplay in the postmodern era, comes from figuring 
out the rules and even the objectives of the game as it unfolds. On the other hand, the 
rules of MMORPGs could not be clearer in that they are programmed: it is the coding 
that sets the parameters of play, and players are relatively helpless in establishing their 
own structures for the game. For example, gamers respond to the choices for quests that 
the game designers make available to them (Grey, 43; 165-166). Gamers may or may not 
accomplish their goals, but the endpoints themselves are out of their power—and 
quitting appears to be the most effective form of resistance (McKenzie, 25-26; cf. Young 
and Whitty, 1231). Curiously, it is precisely in the mixture of pre-determination and self-
determination that fantasy games approximate reality. 
The videogame researcher Jesper Juul similarly argues that games inhabit a 
paradoxical territory between the reality of rules and the make-believe of fictional 
worlds. Like the process of fantasizing, games are not rule-based to the exclusion of 
fiction or fictional to the exclusion of rules. On the contrary, games involve both reality 
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and make-believe in the forms of their structure and imaginary representations (Half-
Real, 12). That is, rules and physical implements like keyboards—together, players’ 
umbilical cord to the real world—combine with imaginary worlds in which possibility 
reigns.  
What brings playful or fantastic possibility about is action grounded in reality. 
This dual signification—of what holds for the person playing and what holds for the 
avatar being played—forms a meta-rule of play, which is to say that games depend on 
the interstitiality of symbolism. Juul writes: “If we play a board game such as Axis & 
Allies (Nova Game Design 1984), all our actions have a double meaning. We move a 
piece around a board, but this also means we are invading Scandinavia with our troops. 
In Tomb Raider (Core Design Ltd. 1996), we click the keys on the keyboard, but we are 
also moving Lara Croft” (Half-Real, 141, original emphasis). This notion of double 
meaning, which may bring to mind Bateson’s idea of the metacommunication that 
occurs in play, underlines but also advances the paradoxical nature of games that Juul 
points out in the beginning of his project. It is not only that the interaction of simple rules 
results in complex (and therefore satisfying) gameplay. It is also, I believe, that however 
simple we may take play to be as a phenomenon—even children do it!—play proves to 
be undergirded by complex intuitions, intuitions that children—and animals—may 
share. Not unlike Bateson’s nipping dogs,74 players show that they tacitly recognize the 
“thirdness” of the game sphere when they treat their actions as both mattering and not 
mattering. People pounding away on keys to make characters shoot in time or jump to a 
certain level or swerve their car in the right way know that their movements are 
simultaneously without much meaning (in the real world) and of potentially deep 
                                                
74 “This message [‘this is play’] contains those elements which necessarily generate a paradox of 
the Russellian or Epimenides type—a negative statement containing an implicit negative 
metastatement. Expanded, the statement ‘This is play’ looks something like this: ‘These actions in 
which we now engage do not denote what those actions for which they stand would denote.’ … 





consequence (to the game). Nevertheless, their play proceeds without having to make this 
explicit.   
Keeping in mind Juul’s theory of the half-real, half-fictional quality of game 
rules, we may turn to another scholar’s analysis to see what allows for the 
representation of deeds in another realm. If the avatar is what mediates the person’s 
online presence, what is the middle factor connecting the outside to the networked 
world? The way in is no longer, as in Morningstar and Farmville’s early experience, the 
phone line. In her article “From Playfields to Fictional Worlds,” Marie-Laure Ryan 
analyzes the symbolic transference between worlds in terms of computer coding. She 
writes:  
Thanks to the procedural (in other words, code-driven) nature of the computer, 
strategic game-space could be mapped onto a mimetic narrative space that 
represents a world. Within the real world, the player hits keys, types text, or 
manipulates controls; within the fictional worlds, these gestures count as moving 
through a landscape, climbing walls, shooting enemies, picking up objects, or 
driving a vehicle—all actions that can be put in the service of the kind of goals 
that people may want to pursue, if not in real life, at least in their fantasies: 
escaping from jail, rescuing princesses, establishing civilizations, or saving the 
earth from invading space aliens. Code mediates between these two levels by 
interpreting the player’s real world actions as fictional actions, by computing their 
effects on the game world—a world represented for the computer by numerical 
values—and by projecting on the screen an image of both the actions and their 
effects. (166, emphasis mine) 
 
In some sense, namely, in their reliance on the game designers and coders, players are 
starkly limited in how they can affect the game world. Before a person’s actions are 
played out on the screen as the avatar’s movements, they are processed numerically. 
Thus, insofar as actions are read through the texts of the game code, interpretation 
becomes computation. The projection of one’s idealized or altered self occurs only 
through the computer-mediated projection of images. Fantasy is represented outside of 
the mind, on the screen. Zeros and ones reign.  
Thus far, I have been stressing the way that rules provide a framework in which 
the mind may roam free. Rather than being upheld as the condition for the possibility of 
free play, though, rules may be seen as the stifling of liberty and independent will. How 
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does a gamer respond affectively or practically when the action he wants his onscreen 
image to make is forbidden by the game? How can a player escape the rules when the 
rules are locked in computer code? And is this breaking of the rules a breaking free? In 
short, what does it mean to cheat at fantasy? Is it possible or, more strongly, necessary to 
escape from one’s escape? 
Rules are enforceable to various degrees depending on the nature of the game to 
which they belong. Whereas the regulations governing players’ actions in a game like 
baseball are subjectively enforced by umpires, rules are executed in a somewhat more 
objective fashion in computer games because they are coded. The rightfulness of game 
actions is uniformly, rigidly upheld to the extent that the programming allows. Human 
beings have the capacity to discern when to enforce and when to suspend rules, but 
machines must follow their programming across all similar circumstances. This seems 
noteworthy in speaking to what is a potentially essential feature of humanity. By virtue 
of being human, we have the frailty but also the freedom of flexibility. Knowing when it 
is appropriate (or simply advantageous) for particular rules to supervene on other rules, 
we can adjust our decisions. Our peculiar desires can come into play as we interpret or 
ignore the rules. One may observe the inclination to bend the rules in traditional, non-
computer-generated games. To take a simple example, someone playing the card game 
solitaire by hand may make recourse to reshuffling the deck, whereas an online player of 
the same game may not. This does not mean that cheating is impossible in the virtual 
form, but that its mechanism changes. Gary Alan Fine writes about the almost normative 
nature of cheating in older role-playing games such as Dungeons & Dragons. It was a 
routine—and social—feature of play to reroll dice or ignore their numbers, allowing 
players to adopt more desirable qualities for their characters or undertake more 
favorable actions. When a player of an MMORPG wants to evade the rules, however, 
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she must do so while remaining within the domain of the programming. This requires 
knowledge of the code itself.75 
Because game coding is unambiguous, it is not subject to interpretation the way 
conventional rules are, but only to exploitation. Familiarity with the game’s 
programming is advantageous, then; it offers a key not only to winning but also to 
unlocking additional layers of possibility within the virtual world. As Alex Galloway of 
the NYU Game Center writes, “To play the game means to play the code of the game. To 
win means to know the system” (Gaming, 90-91, quoted in Franklin, 165). However strict 
a baseball umpire or Dungeons & Dragons gamemaster is, a computer is more exacting. 
“Video games don’t attempt to hide informatic control; they flaunt it” (ibid.). Thus it is 
by going into the code that a player can get out from under its control.   
If winning is knowing the game system in its programmed form, cheating is 
making weaknesses in the code work to your advantage. It is finding “alongside rules 
and structure,” play that “runs free amongst the rigid protocols of the game engine” 
(Franklin, 170, emphasis mine). A hole in the computer code becomes open space for 
unexpectedly free movement. Seb Franklin’s analysis of the exploitation of weak spots in 
game codes—in experimental, innovative, and counterintuitive play practices like 
speedrunning—takes a Derridean turn when he writes of the possibility of playing 
games against themselves. Speedrunning is a way of racing through a game. Playing a 
                                                
75 Franklin, responding to comments made on the gaming site 1up.com regarding the practice of 
speedrunning, differentiates between the enforcement of rules by human beings and by 
machines: “What Benjamin Turner fails to highlight in comparing game playing to athletics is the 
distinction in terms of rules. The reason athletes do not cut across the grass is that the rules, as 
upheld by a human agent with powers of interpretation, forbid it, and to do so would result in 
disqualification. In games, as the paradigmatic medium of the control society, the rules are 
limited only by code. If something is possible, within the coded parameters of the game, then the 
game will allow you to do it, regardless of how it relates to the intended gameplay” (171-172). 
Ludic actions mean different things according to the nature of the sphere in which they are 
performed. There is something about human presence and sociability that discourages certain 
behaviors—during track races, for example. In computer games, however, frivolous actions—
actions that do not advance the project of winning—may occur apart from the intention of the 
game designers. If a player wants to stretch the possibility of play for the sheer joy of it, or keep 
the play experience going even after a victory, she can. This gives us a picture of what we might 




game as quickly as possible is not a practice for a casual player but for a hardcore gamer, 
who has the requisite expertise and interest to engage the game at its limits of 
possibility.  Franklin thus states: “This machinic nature of code is demonstrated most 
clearly when we try to explore the possibilities within a game. While it is possible to 
ignore the obvious rules that govern the progression through the game, to instead try 
and find ways to play it against itself, this can only be possible through an extension of its 
coded logic” (165, emphasis mine). What Franklin describes here is perhaps the ludic 
analogue to immanent criticism. It is an ability to play, which bespeaks a deep and hard 
won familiarity with the game’s inner workings. Accordingly, the solidity of the logic 
remains. Players who seek to escape the constraints of the code do so by extending, not 
breaking, what is internal to the code (cf. Salen and Zimmerman, chapter 21). 
To recapitulate, MMORPGs are collective experiences of fantasy that are entered 
into online by adopting avatars. Shared among sizeable groups of people, they revolve 
around the activity of creative role-playing. Rules, which are difficult but not impossible 
to break, apply to these roles and determine the range of possible in-game behavior. The 
extent varies to which gamers do—or want to—apply moral rules, which belong to the 
outer sphere of real life, to the deeds of their contrived characters (Brey, quoted in 
Young and Whitty, 1231).  
 
III. AVATARS AND AGENCY IN WORLD OF WARCRAFT 
 
Two of the most well known MMORPGs are EverQuest (released in 1999), which 
may be accessed online for free, and World of Warcraft (released in 2004), which requires 
a monthly subscription payment of about $15. In what follows, I will focus on World of 
Warcraft (WoW). Owned by the company Blizzard Entertainment and designed by Rob 
Pardo, Jeffrey Kaplan, and Tom Chilton (Bartle, 36), WoW stands as an impressive Web 
presence and one of most popular MMORPGs in the Western world, if not the 
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popular one (Juul, A Casual Revolution, 59). A few years ago at its height, WoW boasted a 
subscription base of at least twelve million people (Hill, “MMO Subscriber 
Populations”). Admittedly, it is unclear what the division was within that figure 
between paid subscribers, individuals with multiple accounts, and those who logged on 
under a free trial period. Nevertheless, the potential for substantial revenue is evident. 
Videogames do not rival Hollywood earnings; they surpass them. It is not only the 
movie industry that has taken notice of this entertainment trend. The New York Times 
now has regular videogame reviews for, one would conjecture, more than aesthetic 
reasons.76 Videogames have even found their way into the collection of the Museum of 
Modern Art. The MoMA’s 2013-2014 installation “Applied Design” puts fourteen 
videogames on display (“Exhibitions: Applied Design,” 
http://www.moma.org/visit/calendar/exhibitions/1353, accessed 03/27/2013).     
These facts and financial interests aside, what is the game of WoW and how does 
one play it? According to the statement provided on its website, “World of Warcraft is an 
online game where players from around the world assume the roles of heroic fantasy 
characters and explore a virtual world full of mystery, magic, and endless adventure” 
(WoW, Screen: “What is World of Warcraft,” http://us.battle.net/wow/en/game/guide, 
accessed 08/23/2012).77 This official sketch of the game makes explicit use of the 
language of fantasy in describing the roles that people will enact in the course of play. 
Magic aligns closely with the aspect of fantasy: the superhuman powers of the 
characters are essential to the representation of the made-up game land, Azeroth. Or, as 
Nana Asfour describes it, the WoW game graphics are “almost childishly fantastical” (“A 
                                                
76 As early as 1993, commentators were addressing the intertwining of entertainment forms: “If 
part of the pleasure of cinematic spectacle is an identification with the protagonist on the screen, 
involving an imaginative replay of the action, then computer games seek to make this act 
palpable. … [T]hese games, while posing as first-order simulations of reality, are in fact second-
order simulations of scenarios dreamt up in Hollywood” (Stallabrass, 86). 
 
77 Technically, there are four modes of play. In two of these, (“Normal” (Player versus Enemies) 
and “PvP” (or Player versus Player)), role-playing is optional. Screen: “Getting Started,” 




War Zone I Can’t Escape”). Through their avatars’ magical features, players are able to 
imagine and inhabit a mysterious, colorfully enchanted world, which differs 
substantially from our own. The unrealistic traits are central to the gameplay in that they 
are necessary for navigating the four continents of Azeroth and surviving the dangerous 
adventures that take place there.  
Exploration occurs at multiple levels within WoW. Beyond the attempt to carry 
out adventuresome quests, it takes the shape of the incremental discovery of the game’s 
rules. As in many online games—and this is an even culturally significant departure 
from a number of traditional forms of play like sports and board games—players come 
to learn what constitutes proper play in WoW by pushing up against its boundaries. A 
method of trial and error thus replaces the clear pronouncement of which actions will 
succeed from the outset. Each plane of discovery—of the magical world and of the 
rules—seems to contribute to the dynamism and enjoyment of the play experience. 
Gamers report finding the challenge of determining what the right sequence of moves is 
satisfying. Frustration is not altogether separate from this satisfaction, either: mastering 
stages almost necessarily entails repeated effort. Recurrent failure is dialectically 
entwined with the pleasure of victory.  
Underlying this MMORPG is a narrative about two groups, called the Alliance 
and the Horde. Not unexpectedly, the conflict between them is set in legendary terms as 
the struggle between light and darkness or good and evil. The official introduction to 
WoW continues: 
World of Warcraft thrusts you into a central role of an ever-changing story. You 
and your friends will be active participants in events that are steeped in the rich 
lore of this fantasy universe. Fight for either the Alliance or the Horde, and 
experience a fully-realized fantasy world. (ibid.) 
 
Passing over the confused description of the fantasy world as “fully-realized,” we may 
say that this game is, in short, story-driven and conflict-ridden. Only a minimal 
familiarity with the “pre-history” of the Alliance and the Horde groups is necessary. For 
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some players, delving into the details of WoW mythology contributes to the release that 
the game world offers. It is possible to get caught up in the “rich lore” of the game. To a 
general extent, though, characters’ actions play out against a generic background of 
warring factions. The way that the present conflict between players gives shape to the 
story is what matters.  
Overlaying the established structure is narrative flexibility. What course the plot 
takes through the players’ actions is genuinely open; if one team or side had to win or if 
it were necessary to enact a particular storyline, WoW would cease to be a game. 
(Uncertainty is one of the defining qualities of a game. A player should not know at the 
outset what the outcome of the game will be.) Furthermore, it may be said that the 
malleability of the story of WoW gives players authorial agency. In addition to being 
characters in the world of Azeroth, they have the power to be co-authors of its story 
through their actions, much as participants in Dungeons & Dragons could exercise ludic 




Building an avatar and adopting it as a role are essential aspects to playing WoW. 
The process of representing himself online requires the gamer to make decisions, the 
ethical and psychological implications of which may be unclear to him. Abstracting, we 
may say that avatars can reveal us to others online even as they hide us from ourselves. 
At the same time, however, it may be the case that avatars provide the cover necessary 
to make our “real” identity known to ourselves and others. The ambiguity of play means 
that a gamer may delve more deeply into selfhood, gaining a better sense of who he is, 
for having escaped into the imagined sphere of WoW. A further incongruity is found in 
the liability of the balance of power to tip between an avatar and its animator. When this 
occurs, boundaries break and Frankenstein-like transformations result: what was once 
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under control and contained in the game world seeps out into the real world in 
undesirable ways in a counter-escape, as it were. Sometimes we play the roles and 
sometimes the roles play us. We get played. 
The “both/and” nature of MMORPGs asserts itself yet again as these enterprises 
are seen to be both salutary and harmful. Over and against the danger of deleterious 
real-world effects are the numerous pleasures that adopting an avatar can offer during 
the play. An avatar may hold the promise of anonymity—“Once Peter creates his 
character, that is his only identity in the game” (Turkle, “Constructions and 
Reconstructions,” 212)—as well as the appeal of autonomy—“When someone slips into 
an avatar, [he] slip[s] into the ability to be competent …” (Meadows, 86). In short, the 
elements I care to highlight in the following description and analysis of WoW avatars are 
choice, flexibility of identity, and ambiguity of change.  
After providing data and dollars by logging on and signing up, a person is ready 
to craft her online, in-game self. The first choice that a WoW gamer has to exercise in 
creating an avatar is the group to which she will belong. This is significant but not final. 
On the one hand, being a member of the Alliance opens up some possibilities but 
forecloses others. There are certain traits and tasks that belong exclusively to the 
Alliance and, conversely, some that are available only to the Horde. On the other hand, 
this determination of attributes does not have to feel restrictive because players can have 
multiple avatars. That is, a player does not have to commit to any single option but can 
experience the game from a range of avatar perspectives. As the game guide states: 
Your character is your avatar in World of Warcraft. You’re not limited to one 
character, though; you’re free to create dozens of characters if you want to 
experience all the different race and class combinations. Many players refer to 
their most frequently played character as their “main” and all other characters as 
their “alts.” Why create more than one character? Since each class plays 
differently, it’s fun to experiment with other styles of gameplay. (WoW, “Chapter 





One must select for gender (male or female), race (for which there are eight options, or, 
in the expanded edition of the game, twelve), and class (for which there are eleven 
possibilities). Later, after having accumulated points, one exercises choice in how to 
apply the reward tokens to the increase in avatar talents, that is, in deciding which areas 
to assign new strengths (O’Dwyer, 3:20).78 That this process of building an avatar 
involves customization seems very much in line with contemporary consumer 
expectations. You are not constrained to play a role that someone else determines for 
you: it is up to you to select which features and facilities—orc or human, goblin or 
gnome, warrior or warlock, e.g.—are yours, unless you would prefer otherwise. Even the 
option of opting out of customization is accounted for. “If you’re in a hurry, you can use 
the ‘randomize’ button to have the game generate a few random configurations until 
you see one you like …” (WoW, “Chapter I: Getting Started”). The WoW designers 
understand that, like work schedules, our leisure time may be harried. 
The flexibility of identity in WoW is striking. This is not to deny that people may 
form emotional attachments to their avatars or that they may choose to play one role 
consistently. Indeed, studies report people’s serious investment in characters that are 
carefully developed. It is even common for someone who plays a single character 
repeatedly over a long period to express grief when the character meets demise and the 
role comes to an end. But it is worth pausing and reflecting on the significance of the 
possible fluidity of identity in this game world. As a player, you do not have to “limit” 
yourself to one avatar; you may experiment with the many different character 
possibilities at your disposal. If one avatar ceases to excite or please you, switch to 
another!  
                                                
78 There are two types of avatar accessories. In game worlds, there are things that help achieve 
goals and “maximize what liberty the rules offer. But in social worlds, like Second Life and Gaia, 
the primary accessories are decorative, things that help achieve social status and maximize the 
relationships with other avatars” (Meadows, 63). Even decorative objects have a function. Their 




Is this facet of WoW liberating because we feel relatively locked into our 
identities in the sphere of the everyday where—because the choices we have made and 
the circumstances into which we are born commit us to particular ways of life—we 
cannot shift what we take to be defining aspects of ourselves so easily? Is this element of 
WoW appealing because of the low cost of change? Reinvention of self is possible in the 
ordinary world, but it is risky. To change in a radical way in real life is to risk real 
consequences, but consequences in game worlds do not seem all that consequential. If 
you make a mistake or use poor judgement in shaping one avatar, there is an almost 
endless stream of “alts” waiting. Additionally, the ready forgiveness of rebirth is 
available. 
In its unreality, the environment of WoW may be a pathway to psychological 
growth, offering a safe space in which a person can reconstruct her identity. A person 
may give himself qualities by first attributing them to his online self. Advocating for this 
non-escapist view of gaming, Turkle writes in “Constructions and Reconstructions of the 
Self in Virtual Reality”: 
Another popular image, and one that has been supported by some academics 
writing on role-playing games, turns them into places of escape. Players are seen 
as leaving their “real” lives and problems behind to lose themselves in the game 
space. Julee’s story [of working through a traumatic family situation through an 
RPG] belies both stereotypes. For her the game is psychologically constructive 
rather than destructive, and she uses it not for escape but as a vehicle for 
engaging in a significant dialogue with important events and relationships in her 
“real” life. Role-playing games are able to serve in this evocative capacity precisely 
because they are not simple escapes from the real to the unreal, but because they stand 
betwixt and between, both in and not in real life. (210, emphasis mine)  
 
Turkle here looks to the advantage of the realism contained within fantasy. It is not 
simply a fact that reality is finally inescapable in play; the connection, which a game 
retains to the primary sphere of life, proves personally useful because that space of 
overlap is where the potential of psychological healing lies. If a game character were 
completely unrelated to the real self of the gamer, a kind of “transference” would be 
impossible: one could not translate the positive traits learned in the game to one’s 
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everyday self. Interestingly, this psychological claim forms the counterpoint to Juul’s 
analysis in Half-Real of the paradoxical way in which games physically operate. Like the 
telephone cord in the early days of online games, physical devices (whether joysticks, 
keyboards, or headsets) are the implements by which one enters a fantasy world and 
connects with others. Concrete actions move inward, as it were. Being symbolized, they 
become available for others to see on the screen. The abstract qualities that Turkle 
mentions move in the opposite direction. The extent of the parity of fantasy and real-life 
realms would explain, or allow for, a parity of selves. A gamer’s onscreen image could 
work back on him, shaping his actions. A valiant avatar may a courageous man make.   
Of course, such positive engagement of virtually mediated selfhood is not 
everyone’s experience. Individuals are apt to suffer adverse effects from gaming when 
the world of the game proves to be disappointingly disparate from their regular 
(embodied) way of life. Pointing to the likelihood that admirable alterations to a gamer’s 
self-concept will not survive the shift in context, Young and Whitty state: “the 
psychological discrepancy between offline-self and avatar is made salient every time the 
gamer leaves the gamespace. In other words, the player does not simply experience a 
lack of these qualities, offline; rather, and importantly, they are experienced as 
something suddenly lost, only recoverable in gamespace” (1234, original emphasis). 
MMORPGs are not training grounds for how to act in real life. They are, at best, 
temporary releases from ordinary pressures; they neither serve as nor set out to be 
models for living. If taken too seriously, a person’s virtual experiences may cause her 
everyday world to seem bleaker. It is evident that, to the extent that this pattern of 
disempowerment holds, escaping into spheres of pretense proves existentially 
unhelpful, even debilitating.     
Numerous sources attest to the problematic crossing over of spheres. To take one 
case reported by ABC News online, a woman was arrested in 2008 for allegedly 
attempting to kidnap a man who had been her boyfriend in the virtual play space Second 
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Life. In his article, Scott Michels quotes a police offer’s explanation that the suspect “‘had 
difficulty distinguishing between the virtual relationship and a real-life relationship.’” 
As the boundaries between the worlds became increasingly blurred, an extraordinary 
power of the virtual took hold. Instead of dictating its actions, the player came to be 
affected by the online character. Meadows describes the transition this way: “As people 
become more involved in the roles and rules of their avatar, they can also lose control of 
their alternative personality they have invented for that system. The alternative 
personality can become predominant and begin to take over the primary, daily one” 





After establishing what your WoW character will look like, who its allies will be, 
which skill set it will have (e.g., that of a warrior, rogue, or priest), and even what its 
unique name will be, it is time to begin play—or work.79 The core of the game is formed 
by thousands of different quests, which are goal-oriented tasks assigned to the avatars 
by Non-Player Characters (NPCs). Azeroth, however magical a realm, is a very 
organized space. The classification of quests exemplifies this orderliness. Quests are 
divided among these categories: normal, group, dungeon, heroic, raid, player vs. player, 
and daily (WoW, “How to Play,” http://us.battle.net/wow/en/game/guide/how-to-
                                                
79 In Gamer Theory, Ken Wark illuminates the confusion of work and leisure—in each direction—
and the inclusion of boredom in both: “No wonder people find their leisure as dull as their 
work—leisure is work. … The free time available for education, culture, sport, even faith was 
once the hard-won fruit of labor’s struggle to liberate time from work. This free time gave rise to 
heterotopias of sport and art that at least held the intoxicating illusion of autonomy from the 
necessity of work. Now art and sport become work disguised as games, or is it games disguised 
as work? The sporting metaphors migrate from leisure to work and back again” (¶156, original 
emphasis). Having written of the disguised coincidence of work and games, he asserts the 





play, accessed 02/02/2013). Some of the quests like finding, collecting, and distributing 
objects are more tedious and time-consuming than adventurous and fulfilling, which is 
what gave rise to the disturbing and strange outsourcing of play referred to as “gold 
farming.”80 What to gamers will be an obvious aspect of play is necessary, for outsiders 
like myself, to call explicit attention to, namely that competition, violence, and behavior 
that may be thought of as “dark” mark these in-game activities to various degrees. To 
wit, one may restore one’s (avatar) health by cannibalizing one’s victims (Young and 
Whitty, 1230). War is as central to World of Warcraft as the notion of an imaginative 
world. 
Among the range of objectives of quests are the search for honor and the search 
for rewards, or income. Acquisitive desire, then, is in large part what drives the game. 
As Danny O’Dwyer states in a video that provides an unofficial summary explanation of 
WoW, “the game system of reward encourages you to take on just one more quest” 
(6:42). A quest leads to a reward, which leads to the improvement of an avatar that can 
consequently undertake better, more-rewarding quests. The addictive potential of this 
self-enforcing loop—and the “just one more quest” attitude embedded in it—begins to 
take clear shape.81  
Not incidentally, the opportunity to socialize is one of the chief features that 
draws players repeatedly back to the game. On the one hand, there is the issue of real-
life emotional fulfillment. If your meetings with others revolve around the game, by 
                                                
80 Julian Dibbell gives an account of the phenomenon of Chinese gold farming in the feature 
article of the 06/17/2007 New York Times Magazine.  
 
81 Analyzing the computer game as a simulacrum of work, Stallabrass writes: “There is a marked 
liberal individualist ethic behind such games in which the character develops through 
intrinsically unrewarding labor” (87-88). Stressing that games are a simulacrum of work, and not 
real work, he further claims: “It is signs of labour that are apparent in computer gaming, not real 
work, for the physical strain of heavy, repetitive tasks is replaced by the digital twitching 
demanded by the control system. Because of the media’s intrinsic paucity, emotional attachment 
to the game is established through labour, emerging out of the Sisyphean nature of the player’s 
task. The arcade, evoking gambling and sex, is actually a furtive simulacrum of the sweatshop” 




leaving the game you lose the chance to spend time (even electronically) with those with 
whom you are close. On the other hand, there is the issue of the competitive advantage 
of playing with others. WoW is structured so as to encourage collaboration, even 
friendship. In the discussion of the social character of role-playing games in the last 
section, it was noted that the fantasy experience may be enriched by being shared with 
others: more can be imagined with more people. Here, it appears that more can be 
accomplished with more people. Because of the impossibility of reaching certain levels by 
playing independently, players must band together in parties (groups of five) and in 
group raids (consisting of up to twenty-five players). A successful play experience 
depends on the division of parts, or roles, and the coordination of actions, which calls 
for leadership, initiative, and even commitment.  
Behind the avatars, people in the real world are doing the strategic “work” of 
identifying, organizing, directing, and carrying out the steps that are necessary for a 
victorious raid. And whereas parties and raids may casually come and go, guilds are 
serious alliances in their persistence.82 Individual players are accountable to one another 
for the roles they play within the group. More than who they are, they feel responsible 
for what they do; they do not want to make costly missteps that will aversely affect the 
guild as a whole. In the emerging body of secondary literature on WoW, a great deal is 
made about the collective side of play. However much the game may isolate a person 
from real life, it offers experiences of community, and these may be deeply felt. 
Furthermore, social bonds forged in Azeroth may carry over to America and the other 
countries in which the game is accessed, having significant personal impact there. 
People who begin offline as friends may decide to play together online as avatars, but 
                                                
82 Notably, these groups may be organized by the players themselves—think of real world friends 
who want to play together and of people who want to partner with each other because they have 
become friends through the game. Conversely, the groups may be provided automatically for 




the influence can run equally in the other direction: people who meet as avatars online 
may enter into even transnational relationships as actual persons outside of the game. 
The intensity of in-game action for individuals stems from the interrelation 
between being and doing. It is not simply that a player relates to his avatar, it is that he 
identifies with his avatar by controlling the avatar’s motions within the game. From a 
peculiar perspective it is possible to say that the avatar depends on the player. Thus, a 
player may let his fellow players down in making a wrong move, but he may also fail 
his avatar by letting his attention lapse or be being maladroit on the controls or 
keyboard. Turkle, in her analysis of videogaming in Second Self, writes, “When you play 
a video game you … have to do more than identify with a character on the screen. You 
must act for it. Identification through action has a special kind of hold. Like playing a 
sport, it puts people into a highly focused, and highly charged state of mind” (82, 
emphasis mine).83 Fantasy worlds may turn into high-pressured environments by 
demanding that players act proficiently (and, what is more, in concert). Time is of the 
essence as “[p]layers experience their every movement as instantly translated into game 
action. The game is relentless in its demand that all other time stop and in its demand 
that the player take full responsibility for every act, a point that players often sum up by 
the phrase ‘One false move and you’re dead” (ibid.). Of course, by concentrating on 
inconsequential challenges as characters, players are “free” for a time from having to 
attend to the real life problems they face as persons. As long as their mental energy is 
consumed in meeting the needs immediate to the game world, their earthly 
circumstances pleasurably fade from view. 
There are a number of other interesting details about WoW gameplay but the 
final point of salience to address here is how the game comes to an end. In what does 
victory consist? After incrementally refining their skills by completing quests, players 
                                                




may reach the highest, most demanding stages of play. This explains the terminology of 
“leveling up”: play ceases when the final level is mastered. Initially, there were sixty 
levels to WoW but the latest expansion of the game, the fourth, offers a total of ninety 
(WoWWiki, http://www.wowwiki.com/Level, accessed 02/06/2013). According to a 
WoW forum, around 150 hours are required to reach and conquer the ninetieth level 
(http://eu.battle.net/wow/en/forum/topic/5493111009, accessed 02/07/2013). 
Comments offered on the discussion board illuminate player expectations of intense 
involvement in a striking way. One contributor, “Cattlebruisr,” refers matter-of-factly to 
the need to play eight to twelve hours a day to accomplish the feat, whereas another 
writer, “Gráinne,” suggests playing four to five hours a day to finish all ninety levels, 
adding that “[y]ou can surely do it faster if you’re experienced and focused.” Such 
gamers, who are dedicated enough to participate in the online discussion board, are 
committed to seeing the game through—to completing it—and to doing so efficiently, 
maybe even wholeheartedly, to the degree that they are willing to sacrifice significant 
portions of the routines and responsibilities of their everyday, embodied lives. 
The enormous number of available avatar combinations is matched it seems by 
the number of quests that a player may encounter. But is this massiveness of Massively 
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, which we might call the massiveness of 
possibility, welcomed? One user conveys her exasperation over the seemingly endless 
extent of play, writing:   
Uncle – we give up, Blizzard. There are too many things in this game for a sane 
player to accomplish on a regular basis! You’ve driven completionists to utter 
distraction, forcing us to pick and choose the things we’ll list and farm and 
research and grind. At the same time, because anyone can dabble in any aspect of 
the game, players have become more accepting of playstyles that differ from 
their own. While we’re all funneled to 90 and its panoply of activities, true, 
there’s no longer “one true endgame” in Azeroth. (Poisso) 
 
The flexibility of player choice over which tasks to undertake, in combination with the 
commercial impetus for expansion, threatens to make the game unsatisfyingly 
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amorphous.84 Why would it be problematic if there were more than one, final way to 
win? Would discontent arise because a plurality of victories takes away bragging rights? 
Players who derive pleasure and meaning from completing an ultimate and shared goal 
(those whom Poisso calls “completionists”) are deprived of a sense of an ending. Such 
players are forced to take an instrumentalist approach to the game. This provides 
another piece of evidence for the view that attitudes, if not experiences, of play and 
work merge in games, especially those conducted at extreme levels.85,86  
The (not infinite, but) ever-extending possibility of play is not only in service to 
the expansion of the imagination. Additionally, it is a function of the game company’s 
drive toward the concrete goal of greater and greater revenue. At the same time, it 
mirrors the psychological striving that marks so much of real life, the unending and 
individual quest to be slightly better—and then better still. In “Just Gaming: Allegory 
and Economy in Computer Games,” Stallabrass couches the significance of stretching 
out play in these capitalistic and existential terms. “The operation of desire in these 
games is simply an acute form of the normal procedure of the market in a fashion-driven 
culture: there is always a sense of something beyond the present experience, of some 
unused potential within the machine, of a task never quite finished, of a realism not 
quite complete” (101). Though written in 1993 before the advent of WoW, these lines are 
prescient in understanding why the game resists closure. From the game company’s 
perspective, there is evermore profit to squeeze from the consumer-player; from the 
                                                
84 Golumbia astutely notes that gamemakers “find a variety of means to extend the player’s 
interaction, no doubt largely because of the danger of a player’s finishing the game, which can’t 
be allowed” (195).  
 
85 I thank Peter Wicks for his observation on the language used to describe leaving MMORPGs. It 
is telling that players speak of quitting a videogame as one quits a job. 
 
86 On the connection between continuously expanding online game worlds and Ludovico 
Ariosto’s poem, Orland Furioso, see Ryan, 170. On the existential threat that final victory 
represents to the gamemakers as well as to the players, see Wark, Gamer Theory. Paradoxically, it 
is the satisfaction of desire in winning that leaves us at a loss. So is it the playing that is more 




player’s perspective, there is evermore—and evermore realistic—discovery to be had. 
What is more, in being framed in terms of desire, this passage calls to mind 
Schleiermacher’s account of fantasy, according to which desire particularizes the chain 
of one’s mental action. Where Schleiermacher sees the function of fantasy as contained, 
however, Stallabrass finds manufactured desires that are insatiable. It is through their 
insatiability that such desires are productive of more and more actions, which serve to 
keep the game profitably going.87  
 
IV. CONCLUSION:  
FAILED ESCAPISM, OR OVER-REFLECTION THAT IS NOT REFLECTIVE ENOUGH 
 
In this chapter, I have set out several key features of the specific MMORPG World 
of Warcraft against the backdrop of Schleiermacher’s philosophy of fantasy. While 
emphasizing the complicated relationship that holds between avatars and agency, I have 
pointed to World of Warcraft’s narrative components, its inclusion of magic, competition, 
and choice, and its potential to offer experiences that are individually immersive and yet 
productive of social ties. In what remains, I would like to suggest that fantasy-centered 
MMORPGs are inadequate as a source of freedom and escapism. To the extent that they 
are exercises in fantasy that beckon one to live in one’s mind, MMORPGs are escapist. 
And, being escapist in this way, they offer only a negative freedom—that of temporarily 
leaving the real world behind. But MMORPGs are only partially escapist. They can 
therefore confer some freedom and some benefits on the real self. MMORPGs are not 
                                                
87 In the continuation of his analysis, Stallabrass points to the problem of the inevitable 
arbitrariness of game endings: “There is a distinct problem in computer games of providing an 
adequate ending: nothing can quite fulfil the expectation of such a long task finished, especially 
because the ending so often appears in an arbitrary fashion, as the result not of some supremely 
difficult task, but as the chance consequence of just another combination of key-strokes. The 
ending is at once longed for and known in advance to be a let-down” (101). Presumably, the 
stronger a game is in its narrative capacity, the more meaning can be attributed to the concluding 




realms of complete fantasy; reality is never completely left behind. Because of the 
inclusion of aspects of reality, a degree of continuity is possible between one’s game self 
and one’s embodied self. As far as I can tell, it is this point of connection, this cord 
between reality and make-believe in one’s psyche, that accounts for the potential of 
videogames to affect one’s being in the world. Good or bad character traits may be 
carried across this pathway between the person, player, and avatar. Bringing the 
capacity of reflection to bear on these experiences of play—going beyond the mere 
exercising of over-reflection that occurs during them—may contribute to the realization 
of a more mature freedom in life.88  
Let us take each of our concluding points—on freedom, escapism, realism, and 
reflection—in turn. 
World of Warcraft and games of its ilk fall uncomfortably between fantasy and 
realism. Nevertheless, it is possible to look at their participation in fantasy and realism 
in terms of freedom and constraint. On the one hand, MMORPGs provide an expansive 
sense of freedom by allowing players to represent themselves as avatars in magical 
worlds. Players find pleasure in defining themselves however they want, recreating 
themselves when they lose or err, and identifying with their onscreen images, which 
may depict qualities such as strength and power that they admire (and desire) in real 
life. Avatars open up the possibility of players being, for a time, different from and better 
than their embodied selves. Avatars are also responsible for bringing about the social 
freedom of connecting with other players in a way that may be safer or more inviting 
than in-person interactions. Further, acting as their avatars, players break through the 
                                                
88 It may be that positive transformation in a person can come about through videogaming apart 
from reflection. The possibility of such an unconsciously arrived upon achievement, seems 
limited, though, in its unreliability. While not a guarantee in itself that playing games like WoW 
will be advantageous for one’s quest for greater selfhood, engaging with the action of avatars in a 




constraints of reality and do things they ordinarily cannot do. The imaginative quality of 
these play spheres makes normally impossible feats possible.  
On the other hand, the element of fantasy within these games is compromised in 
the ways that the games incorporate and replicate reality. Scholars including Jesper Juul, 
Julian Stallabrass, and McKenzie Wark, attest to how videogames and role-playing 
games remain tethered to the everyday. MMORPGs have “real” rules (as Juul puts it); 
necessarily rely on physical devices and human maneuvers; replicate social dynamics in 
the hierarchy that takes hold among players; reproduce instrumental mentalities 
familiar to us from our work lives; and actively seek to make game worlds more and 
more sensually recognizable in their graphics and visualization. Even as, in stirring the 
imagination, MMORPGs allow the mind to be overtaken by possibility, they fail to 
cultivate desirable traits in the self in a reliable way. In sum, this powerful form of 
postmodern play may captivate the mind without providing it the means to cope with 
real-life struggles with limitation. To this extent, they are unhelpfully or incompletely 
escapist.  
I want to try to state my view as precisely as possible here by drawing a 
distinction between games of “release” and games of “training.” There is a legitimate 
space for pastimes that are merely escape-valves from the pressures of normative life. 
Even as short-lived opportunities to find respite and relief, these experiences have worth 
and contribute to a good life. What I would object to is the over-valuing of this type of 
play. Such merely escapist play activities should not be taken as being more than they 
are. They should not be taken as sites of robust or reliable freedom. Thus, when a person 
leaves the game world of WoW (as she inevitably must) and returns to the predominant 
sphere of life, it is uncertain whether she will be any freer than when she started 
playing. This uncertainty is one of the chief factors that push us forward to the next 
chapter to investigate another way of playing.    
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In the section on avatars above, I made brief mention of cases in which people’s 
real lives where affected by their characters. There was the example of psychologically 
constructive play, supplied by Sherry Turkle, and the instance of psychologically 
destructive play, as reported by ABC. I would like to expand that discussion in a small 
way now by describing “cybertherapy,” an innovative practice that combines analysis 
with simulations. Under this guise of therapy—as opposed to gaming—avatars are tools 
for reimagining and retraining the self.89 Virtual worlds become a safe space in which to 
overcome traumas and fears. As Benedict Carey reporting for the Times writes: 
For more than a decade, a handful of therapists have been using virtual 
environments to help people work through phobias, like a fear of heights or of 
public spaces. But now advances in artificial intelligence and computer modeling 
are allowing them to take on a wider array of complex social challenges and to 
gain insight into how people are affected by interactions with virtual humans – 
or by inhabiting avatars of themselves. (“In Cybertherapy, Avatars Assist with 
Healing”)   
 
This exercise may be thought of as the computer-mediated form of the common 
psychotherapeutic technique of imagining painful or anxiety-producing experiences. In 
both cases, the mind is engaged for the sake of modifying behavior.  
For meaningful improvement of the sort sought in cybertherapy to take hold, 
reflection is necessary—not the “imaginary constructions of thought” of the 
noncommittal aesthete (or videogame enthusiast?) that “leads to nothing” (Either/Or, II, 
163, 289), but the salubrious thinking that Schleiermacher recommends in the Monologen 
when he writes: 
But when the exercise of imagination is not merely mechanical, but accompanied 
by inner reflection, as it must be wherever there is true life, and when judgment 
is the conscious issue of such reflection, then the object contemplated, though it 
be foreign to one’s experience and only imagined, shapes the spirit, as much as if 
possessed by it in reality and dealt with externally. Thus in the future as in the 
past I shall take possession of the whole world by virtue of inner activity, and I 
shall make better use of things in quiet contemplation than if I had to respond to 
every quickly passing impression with an overt act. (82-83) 
 
                                                
89 I would like to reiterate that this instrumental use of videogaming puts into question its status 




Over-reflection may be the right kind of thinking for fantasy—when one engages in pre-
tense, one wants the freedom to draw on the wildest possible combination of ideas—but 
over-reflection is not a practice of freedom within everyday living. The “over-reflection” 
of a particular type of fantasy that precludes action needs to be countered by another 
kind of reflection. Reflection may be directed to action in decision.   
As seen in the first chapter of this dissertation, the immediacy of the sensuous 
play of early childhood is developmentally good for a period. Piaget, for one, regards 
play that is symbolic—like the play of the mind in fantasy—as an advance on the earlier 
play forms of adolescents. The stage of fanciful reflection represented in this chapter by 
the MMORPG genre may itself be built upon by the engagement of a more mature form 
of playful thinking that, grounded in universal norms, leads to real-life actions and 
commitments. We are therefore poised to enter the dissertation’s second section, which 
is on ethics. In progressing from World of Warcraft to Pascal’s Wager, we will turn from 
























Rational Decisions for Christian Theism, or How Pascal Redeemed Play 
 
Legend has it that in 1654, the same year as his memorialized “night of fire”—
Dieu d’Abraham, Dieu d’Isaac, Dieu de Jacob …—Blaise Pascal experienced a terrifying but 
somewhat common seventeenth-century travel risk: the horses pulling his carriage 
began running wild and broke free. Having severed their reins and driven themselves 
into the river, they left Pascal and his traveling companions suspended on “the brink of 
the precipice” (Grimsley, 76). Not quite two centuries later in the first draft of The Book 
on Adler, Søren Kierkegaard mentions this story and on its basis includes Pascal in his 
consideration of people who, exposed to mortal danger, are “deeply moved by faith” 
(68).90 It strikes me that among other things they share—a Christian spirit, fervor in 
religious commitment, fragmentary and lyrical styles of philosophy, difficult relations 
with the reigning church powers of their time, and a precursory role to twentieth-
century existentialism—Kierkegaard and Pascal also act somewhat like Pascal’s horses 
on the day of the “accident at the Neuilly Bridge”: in their writings, they run away with 
us, leaving us on a brink and confronting us with the reality of existential danger by 
leading us to an Either/Or, Infini – Rien, all or nothing point of decision. They ask each 
reader who is now facing the precipice, What will you decide, what will you do, what 
will you believe, who will you become? Your life is on the balance: which way will you 
tip? As Judge William says in the second volume of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, written as a 
book-length letter to an aesthetic friend, “I wish only to force you to the point where the 
                                                
90 Jean Mesnard all but dismisses the story, emphasizing that it was third-hand testimony 
anonymously and belatedly relayed (60-61). Showing the life the tale nevertheless took on, 
Francis Coleman reports Voltaire’s scoffing comment to Condorcet, ‘Mon ami, ne vous lassez point 




necessity of making a choice manifests itself and thereafter to consider existence under 
ethical qualifications” (178). 
In games as in life we struggle to make wise choices in uncertain circumstances. 
We employ strategy—assessing risk, calculating probabilities, identifying values, 
planning for pleasant future outcomes—and then we let our actions emerge from our 
strategy, wanting our reasoning, desires, and behavior to accord. Gambling is a specific 
form of play that carries these features. Making wagers and living “under ethical 
qualifications” have important aspects in common, although seeing this point may 
require unconventional interpretations of both gambling and morality.91 
When he answered a request for betting advice from his gambling friend Méré 
about how to divide stakes in interrupted games, Pascal formalized a decision-making 
approach that earned him recognition as the father of “decision theory.” This 
contribution is also what makes Pascal an appropriate author to include in my analysis 
of play through the Kierkegaardian lenses of the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. 
Under the iteration of play represented here by Pascal, choice and commitment are 
paramount. Thus, we move forward from a consideration in the first two dissertation 
chapters of game forms that are typically associated with children and protracted 
adolescence to a view of play in which one’s way of life is at stake. This is the shift 
within the Kierkegaardian paradigm from the aesthetic to the ethical.   
                                                
91 Historical, theological, and literary treatments of the risk-centered play form are offered in 
Jackson Lear’s Something for Nothing: Luck in America, Kathryn Tanner’s “Grace and Gambling,” 
and Dostoevsky’s The Gambler. Tanner’s essay appears as a chapter in Alan Wolfe and Erik C. 
Owens’s Gambling: Mapping the American Moral Landscape, a collection that addresses gambling 
from sociological, political, psychological, theological, anthropological, and legal perspectives. 
Additional works of note in the gambling studies literature include Henri Lesieur’s The Chase 
(1977), Jon Elster and Ole-Jørgen Skog’s Getting Hooked: Rationality and Addiction (1999), and 
Caitlin Zaloom’s article “The Derivative World” in The Hedgehog Review (Summer 2010), which 
offers an anthropological examination of trading floors. Within the discipline of religious studies, 
the locus classicus for the subject is Clifford Geertz’s theory of deep play in The Interpretation of 




Pascal applies his work on probability to seemingly non-playful ends in offering 
an apology for the Christian faith in §418 of the Pensées.92 In taking this highly 
scrutinized and cherished four-page fragment, which is entitled not “Le Pari” (the 
wager) but “Infini rien,” as my subject matter in this chapter, I am setting out to 
accomplish three things. The first is to make the case that Pascal redeems play by 
employing the rhetorical strategy that he does. He could have made an argument for 
believing in God any number of other ways. It is significant that he chose to appeal to 
his audience through the trope of gambling. In accordance with this treatment of 
Pascal’s apology as a game is the contention that Pascal rigs it to win. That is, I shed 
light on how he structures or contrives his argument so as to ensure success. That is my 
second aim. The third, which constitutes the bulk of what follows, is to offer a close 
reading of the text according to six polarities or paradoxes. These points of tension are: 
(1) the nature of the bet on God’s existence as forced or free; (2) the impotence or 
importance of reason in the wager; (3) the gamble’s immediate or reflective quality; (4) 
the status of passion as an obstacle or an aid to the bettor; (5) the all or nothing value of 
the stakes of the wager; and (6) the uncertain or sure character of its outcome. 
Sometimes Pascal oscillates between opposing poles, at other times he brings 
contradictory stances together. This way of handling the act of gambling on God 
roughly mirrors Pascal’s redemptive treatment of play. Gambling is a sort of 
divertissement, after all, a sphere of activity for which Pascal maintains noticeable disdain 
precisely because it diverts people’s attention from the important, the true, and the 
good. In presenting un pari to his libertine reader as benign and (what is much more) as 
infinitely life-enhancing, Pascal recuperates this form of play. He swings, as it were, his 
                                                
92 The two main editions of the Pensées are those of Louis Lafuma (1951) and Philippe Sellier 
(1976). These follow different orders of presentation, based on the copy from which they draw. 
The “Infini rien” fragment (§680 in Sellier) is included in the Series “Discours de la machine” in 
Sellier’s edition. The numbering that I use in this chapter reflects the Lafuma edition. Except 




readers from one type of divertissement to another, moving them from wagers in which 
money is at stake to a singular wager on Christian theism in which the stakes are 
existential. Paradoxically, the form of the disease and the cure is the same. 
 
I. PENSÉES—CONSIDERATIONS OF STYLE, AUDIENCE, AND AIM 
 
Beyond being a mathematical genius, Pascal was a writer of substantial talent. 
Recognizing that a precise demonstration may bore rather than convince an audience, 
particularly an audience of boredom-eschewing libertines, he appreciated the power of a 
pleasing style (Force, “Pascal and Philosophical Method,” 228). His approach in §418 
may be understood in this light. To gamblers, he presented a gamble. Acknowledging 
the theory that Pascal resolves a problem by supplying a method specifically suited to it, 
Colas Duflo writes “[i]l faut imaginer Pascal apologiste essayant de convaincre un chevalier de 
Méré libertin et l’on verra combien la solution est adéquate au problème. Voilà donc un pari” 
(46). Similarly, Elster pointedly states in reference to the wager argument, the “fact that 
it is a form of gambling suggests that the intended reader is a gambler” (“Pascal and 
Decision Theory,” 54).93 Pascal’s form is cleverly adapted to his content: By framing his 
argument as a wager, he drives his interlocutor indirectly to reflection. Thus, we notice 
diversion redoubling on itself. In an unexpected twist, the act of wagering channels the 
reader-player’s attention toward matters of existential significance. What may be thought 
of as the typical, escapist purpose of play is undone. 
Even though Pascal carefully constructed his argument to bring gamblers to 
assent to the existence of God, framing it in a specifically playful rhetoric, he did not 
expect his apology to be universally effective in bringing unbelievers to trust in God. 
                                                
93 John Boitano presents the issue of audience at length in his study The Polemics of Libertine 
Conversion in Pascal’s Pensées: A Dialectic of Rational and Occult Libertine Beliefs. See in particular 




Such an aspiration would not accord with the underlying framework of his belief in the 
doctrine of grace. Regardless of how sound, rational, and convincing an apology for 
faith is, it is futile without the inspiring touch of God.94 In setting forth his pari text, then, 
Pascal was attempting to open up space for a person to seek—or be sought by—God.  
Another aim of §418 revolves around explicit intentionality. I contend that no 
matter how else the Wager may be understood, it should be seen as something like a 
forced vote. (Here we may think of the political procedure of cloture.) Through the text, 
Pascal confronts us and puts our choice—infini or rien—on record. He will try by logic, 
practice, and prayer to bring his readers to the side of infinite life. Regardless of which 
option his readers choose to follow, each one will be aware at the end of the game of 
having to make a decision. Theistic commitments will be strengthened, presumably, 
with the sense acquired over the course of the argument of their rationality and even 
probabilistic prudence. And atheism will be a little more costly for being adhered to 
consciously—seeing what is at stake and what may be lost. There are no longer any 
unknown rejections of God after undergoing Pascal’s gambling apologetic. 
With these introductory remarks dispensed, let us turn to a close reading of 
§418—the full text of which is included in English in the Appendix. 
 
II. PASCAL’S DECISIVE PLAY: POLARITIES AND PARADOXES 
 
(1) FREE AND FORCED 
 
Even if Canada Bill [1820-1877] knew the game was rigged, he could not resist. Legend 
has it that he was stranded in a somnolent Louisiana town, nearly hallucinating with 
boredom, when he finally found a faro game and began to lose relentlessly. His partner 
took him aside. “The game’s crooked,” he warned. “I know it,” Canada Bill answered, 
“but it’s the only game in town.” –Lears  
                                                
94 “That is why those to whom God has given religious faith by moving their hearts are very 
fortunate, and feel quite legitimately convinced, but to those who do not have it we can only give 
such faith through reasoning, until God gives it by moving their heart, without which faith is 





In this section I will discuss features and implications of Pascal’s claim, 
advertised in the punchy clause “vous êtes embarqué,” that participation in a wager over 
whether or not to believe in God is mandatory. I will begin by setting out the general 
tension that exists between free and forced play and conclude by considering whether 
the paradox of play that is both free and forced is evinced and resolved in the “Infini 
rien” fragment itself.   
Various definitions of play affirm its free character: it is conceived as a delimited 
activity freely chosen and knowingly entered.95 It is possible to agree with this 
description and, at the same time, acknowledge that a game has rules: breach them too 
many times or too obviously and the game dissolves. (If someone plays but deliberately 
and surreptitiously refuses to abide by one or more of the rules, she undermines the 
integrity of the game by cheating.) A person’s willingness to cede some of her freedom 
for a period—not acting in any way she wants but limiting her behavior to accord with 
the parameters of the activity—is necessary for the game to take place. It is imperative, 
however, that the player is aware that she is making this sacrifice; otherwise, a game is 
being played on her. At this level, necessity and freedom seem to co-exist 
unproblematically. Having constraints such as rules for the duration of play is not the 
same as being constrained to play, though. 
As strange as the idea of forced play may seem, it is conceivable that obligations 
to play exist and take a variety of forms. A philosopher might look to Schiller’s notion of 
the play drive and argue that, because we exercise our humanity in play, people must 
regularly seek forms of play to be human. If we stopped playing, something important 
about who we are would wither. For this reason, there is a serious need to take care to 
cultivate play in our lives. To take a less lofty case that is painful in its concreteness, one 
                                                





could consider addicted gamblers who experience almost unbreakable urges to play. 
Some struggle to end a ruinous cycle of “chasing” money to recuperate losses or pay off 
enormous debts; others take extreme measures like wearing adult diapers in order to 
stay at slot machines longer (Elster, 209; Lears, 1). They experience, in a sense, a real 
compulsion to play. 
Pascal has a lot to say about people who, out of a felt need for divertissement, seek 
it fervently, desperately. Individuals belonging to this group psychologically hooked on 
play, a class that includes gamblers but also kings and common folks, rely on one 
meaningless amusement after another as long as they refuse the sometimes lonely, 
difficult, and even dreadful reflection that is borne of boredom. 96   
This largely unconscious need to avoid confronting oneself and instead escape 
into diversions is the ailing condition from which Pascal tries to set his readers free. 
Paradoxically—or redemptively—the medicine he uses to bring about the cure is 
                                                
96 It is important to note that Pascal affirmed diversion when it was properly sought. “Thus men 
who are naturally conscious of what they are shun nothing so much as rest; they would do 
anything to be disturbed. It is wrong then to blame them; they are not wrong to want excitement 
– if they only wanted it for the sake of diversion. The trouble is that they want it as though, once they 
had the things they seek, they could not fail to be truly happy” (from §136, emphasis mine).  
Earlier in the same pensée, Pascal addresses the subject of kings and diversion. With or without 
the Sun King in mind, he writes: “That is why men are so fond of hustle and bustle; that is why 
prison is such a fearful punishment; that is why the pleasures of solitude are so 
incomprehensible. That, in fact, is the main joy of being a king, because people are continually 
trying to divert him and procure him every kind of pleasure. A king is surrounded by people 
whose only thought is to divert him and stop him thinking about himself, because, king though 
he is, he becomes unhappy as soon as he thinks about himself.” (Cf. §771, “Princes and kings 
sometimes play; they are not always on their thrones. They get bored there. Greatness needs to be 
laid aside to be appreciated, continuity in anything is tedious. It is pleasant to be cold so that one 
can get warm.”) 
I diverge from Tanner’s analysis of the Wager in this particular aspect: I take a more favorable 
view of Pascal’s use of unhappiness than she does. Tanner makes the charge that “[i]nto lives of 
apparent happiness [like the king’s], Pascal is trying to inject the anxiety of insecurity and likely 
loss …” (250) and proclaims that her modified version of the wager takes the misery out of it 
(252). I agree with Pascal’s estimation that even—or especially—very privileged people are 
troubled by vapid lives. And so I see his philosophy as responding to an already present 
unhappiness, a proclivity towards misery or melancholy that Pascal identifies. (He does not need 
to inject it into his portrait of existence.) This accords with the view I take of Pascal’s method of 
argumentation, generally. I find him to seek to remain truthful while heeding ways—such as the 
use of the trope of gambling—to make his apology successful. Presumably, if he thought some 
people like kings were or could be happy without God, he would have maintained the same 
overall stance but adapted his argument to that reality (focusing instead on sinfulness, for 




nothing other than a forced game.97 He writes to them and turns their insistence on play 
against them, in a way that is ultimately for them. You demand play? What happens when 
play is demanded of you?  
Laurent Thirouin notes that at each stage of the argument in §418 Pascal repeats 
that his unbelieving interlocutor is compelled to play (166). Thus, we find the text 
littered with “necessity” phrases: “il faut parier,” “Cela n’est pas volontaire, vous êtes 
embarqué,” “il faut nécessairement choisir,” “il faudrait jouer (puisque vous êtes dans la 
nécessité de jouer),” “vous êtes forcé à jouer,” “étant obligé à jouer,” “quand on est forcé à jouer 
…” Even toward the end of the piece, Pascal has the interlocutor say for emphasis, “On 
me force à parier, et je ne suis pas en liberté, on ne me relâche pas.” The point is clear. There 
will be no weaseling out of this game from the start.  
Therefore, when Pascal makes the point that the wager operates under stark 
conditions of constraint, he does not state that it is a game with many regulations or 
with particularly strict rules. Rather, the game is forced because everyone has to play it 
and, in fact, is already playing it.98 In this, the locus of obligation rests in the person of 
the player as opposed to within the structure of the game in the form of the game’s 
rules. Pascal detests ordinary diversion in its misapplication because it turns people 
away from the truths we most deeply need to acknowledge (like our infinitesimal place 
in an infinitely grand universe and our dependence on the God of the Bible).99 By 
                                                
97 Pascal himself uses the analogy of sickness in his argument and writes about the remedy for 
unbelief. The importance of his aim of providing a cure grows when taken in conjunction with his 
purpose of bringing about a sense of security in making a decision to adopt Christian beliefs and 
behaviors (“cure” and “security” sharing the Latin root cura).  
 
98 As will be seen shortly, the exception is those individuals who have left the game by deciding 
not to believe in God. 
 
99 One representative fragment on boredom reads: “Boredom. Man finds nothing so intolerable as 
to be in a state of complete rest, without passions, without occupation, without diversion, 
without effort. 
 Then he faces his nullity, loneliness, inadequacy, dependence, helplessness, emptiness. 
 And at once there wells up from the depths of his soul boredom, gloom, depression, 




burrowing the necessity to make a bet on the theism wager inside each person, Pascal 
removes the harmful potential of what is thought of as typical, secular diversion. Merely 
being born places a person in a betting situation, engaging him in a form of play (and a 
particularly risky one at that). This holds for everyone, not only libertines. We are all, 
existentially, gamblers. 
What does it mean, though, that few if any people think of themselves as 
wagerers, players, in this way? Setting aside the objection that religious believers are 
unlikely to describe their commitments to follow God as a game they play or even a 
strategic choice they make, we might express the worry that there is something askance 
about a view in which the human condition is hidden from so many humans. To risk 
making an obvious statement, it is not common for people to think of the decision of 
whether or not to believe in God as a necessary game in which they are ipso facto 
engaged. Pascal’s task is to show his interlocutors that they are already engaged in this 
play. In order for his position to be viable, does Pascal have to explain why people do 
not experience the forced play of wagering? Is it really the continual preoccupation with 
being preoccupied that causes (most) people to go through life without ever being aware 
of reaching a moment in which they weigh their options and resolve to stake their lives 
either on Christian theism or on atheism?100 What of people who slide into Christian and 
atheistic ways of life without making a once-and-for-all decision to adopt their 
worldviews? And what of people who change their way midcourse?  
I hold that Pascal does not repeatedly insist on the obligatory character of the 
wager in order to make a kind of empirico-psychological point—look around and you will 
realize your life is one big game—as much as to set his argument up for success—you cannot 
                                                
100 Of course, there are other choices beside Christian theism and atheism. In discussions of the 
“Many Gods Objection,” it is commonly recognized that Pascal understood himself as having 
done the work of narrowing in on these two possibilities in the rest of his apology. By the time 
the reader would encounter the wager argument, other walks of life would no longer be under 




disprove my probabilities of the four scenarios by opting out.101 In this way, he needs the game 
to be necessary. “Since you must necessarily choose, your reason is no more affronted by 
choosing one rather than the other” (§418, emphasis mine). As Thirouin highlights, it is 
only logical to risk eternity if you are forced to bet. If you are free to abstain from 
playing around with such enormous stakes, you should. He writes on the rationality of 
sitting out such a game, were it optional:   
Le pari du fragment 418 est un jeu imposé. Si l’on était libre, il faudrait être fou 
pour s’y risquer du moins sur la base de considérations mathématiques. Ce jeu 
est beaucoup trop dangereux et la prudence conseillerait de s’en écarter. 
L’espérance qu’il présente ne peut compenser pour un homme raisonnable le 
hasard qu’il fait courir. Mais il n’y a pas de liberté. « Il se joue un jeu […] où il 
arrivera croix ou pile ». Personne n’a choisi d’y prendre part ; le jeu est déjà en 
train de se dérouler. La question qui se pose à l’homme n’est plus de décider s’il 
veut jouer mais d’adopter une stratégie à l’égard de ce jeu où il est pris. Faut-il 
continuer à jouer ou non ? (155)102 
 
This passage, with Thirouin’s adept analysis, contains three points on which I would 
momentarily like to alight. The first concerns the marvelous phrase from §418, “[i]l se 
joue un jeu.” The sentence in the Wager from which it is taken reads in full “[i]l se joue un 
jeu, à l’extrémité de cette distance infinie, où il arrivera croix ou pile: que gagerez-vous?” and 
has been alternately rendered “At the far end of this infinite distance a coin is being 
spun which will come down heads or tails. How will you wager?” (Krailsheimer) and 
“A game is in play at the far end of this infinite distance, where either heads or tails will 
result. What’s your wager?” (Rennie, 272) and “At the extremity of this infinite distance, 
a game is being played in which heads or tails will turn up. How will you wager?” 
                                                
101 For this decision, the quadrants are: believing in a God who exists, believing in a God who 
does not exist, not believing in a God who exists, and not believing in a God who does not exist. 
 
102 “The wager of fragment 418 is an imposed game. If we were free, it would be crazy to risk 
ourselves at least on the basis of mathematical considerations. This game is much too dangerous 
and prudence would advise we keep our distance from it. The expectation that it presents cannot 
compensate a reasonable person for the risk that he runs. But there is no liberty. ‘A game is 
played where there are only two possible outcomes: heads or tails.’ No one chose to take part in 
it; the game is already in the process of being rolled out. The question that presents itself to a 
person is no longer one of deciding if he wants to play but of adopting a strategy in the face of 





(Ariew). To the second and third translations “a game is in play” and “a game is being 
played,” I would like to suggest the possibility, heavy-handed as it may be, “a game 
plays itself.” For Thirouin’s explanation “le jeu est déjà en train de se dérouler,” I would 
favor a similarly literally-slanted translation that nears personification in emphasizing 
that the game unrolls itself. In thinking about Jeu as that which animates the wager, I 
maintain not only that Play has agency but that this is the case at the same time that the 
burden of having to play is located within the individual person. Il se joue un jeu is lovely 
in its oddness and incomprehensibility precisely because it parallels the occasional 
moments in life in which a decision can exert itself as a force.103 As with choosing a self 
in Kierkegaard’s Either/Or and acting as a gamer and as an avatar, a paradoxical 
simultaneity is at work here. It is somehow possible for the player to play while the Play 
plays itself. 
 The second noteworthy point from this same sentence is the saying “croix ou 
pile,” corresponding to the English idiom “heads or tails” (now expressed colloquially in 
French as face ou pile). The convergence of the image and language of croix in Pascal’s 
writing on the wager is striking. Croix recalls the cross of Christ at the same time that it 
indicates a possible outcome of a coin toss. Krailsheimer provides a note that sheds light 
on the connection between the gambler’s call and the “folly of the Cross,” drawing 
attention to Pascal’s reference to 1 Corinthians 1:18 in the preceding paragraph.104 Other 
extensions of croi- may come to mind. After reading the word “croix,” one might think of 
crossroads (croisement), and even—by association of sound rather than image—belief 
                                                
103 Mark C. Taylor expresses a similar point in his discussion of play and extraordinary 
experiences of time in an article for “The Immanent Frame” (06 Feb. 2008). He writes “[i]n this 
moment [of perfect contact of bat and ball], I no longer play but something else, something other 
plays through me.” Taylor then relates this principle to Paul’s statement in Galatians 2:20 about 
Christ inhabiting and living through him. 
 
104 The Louis Segond (1910) translation of this verse reads: « Car la prédication de la croix est une 





(croyance from croire). Is belief in Jesus’ crucifixion the crossroads at which one stands in 
deciding between infini and rien? What happens—croix, heads, appears and Christ wins? 
 Thirdly, Thirouin makes a subtle point in clarifying what it is the interlocutor is 
in a place to choose. This observation, which supports the worry that the structure of le 
pari is unjust, relates to a topic that will be explored in the fifth polarity—the potential in 
wagering for loss. Thirouin shows that a person is not deciding whether to play but 
whether to continue playing. The game that is all about making a choice is itself not 
chosen. To put the point in terms of freedom, Pascal’s player is free to leave the game, 
but the game itself is forced. The game has been going on all along but the interlocutor 
can cause it, for himself, to cease by making a certain decision (the choice not to believe 
and to act as if God does not exist). Will the interlocutor in full awareness opt out of a 
game that he did not knowingly enter in the first place? And in “quitting,” will he forfeit 
the stakes that he unwittingly wagered?  
This is a point of fairness. Ordinarily, a player gives up money or goods as the 
cost of entering a game, stakes she knows she will lose if she withdraws early or 
experiences defeat. The problem in the case as Pascal sets it forward is that his wagerer 
never consents to the rules of the game (156). After Pascal brings his interlocutor to see 
that he must decide to live according to the belief that the biblical God exists or not, and 
after the interlocutor has considered, again with Pascal’s guidance, the combinations of 
the likelihood and desirability of the four scenarios, he is in the position to exercise free, 
conscious choice. Again, approached thus, freedom is seen to follow a forced state. 
But is there another liberty available to the libertine upon conversion—not 
merely the freedom to continue playing consciously but a positive freedom? For in 
making a decision for God, the libertine would forsake a life defined even nominally by 
freedom. (As the Apostle Paul might ironically characterize it, a freedom from 
righteousness (Romans 6:20).) Pascal does not include the term “freedom” among the 
goods such as faithfulness, honesty, humility, gratitude, and true friendship that are to 
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be gained in living a Christian life. In pointing the libertine interlocutor to Christianity, 
however, he points him to Christ, whom Pascal identifies elsewhere as the Liberator 
(§269). “With Christ man is free from vice and wretchedness. In him is all our virtue and 
all our happiness” (§416). The libertine, once bound (lié) in unbelief, through the process 
of the wager is set free for faith, a just way of life, and béatitude. 
At this point, it is fitting to step back and consider the place of these issues in the 
fragment from another level. In our reading, we have encountered both the oscillation 
between and the paradoxical relation of freedom and necessity. That is, we have seen 
that in a forced game a freely-made decision can lead to freedom for a religious life filled 
with virtue. Insofar as these ideas were culled from the text, they may be said to belong 
to it. But I think that it is also fair to recognize the external sources for the forced-yet-free 
paradox. First, Pascal himself does not signal in any stated way interest in the conflict or 
its resolution. Moreover, the tension between the essential freedom of play theoretically-
construed and the necessity of the wager relies on philosophical understandings of play 
developed beyond the seventeenth century. The following questions with which I will 
end this section are therefore supplied as admittedly falling outside of the text’s scope.   
What kind of game is the Pascalian wager, if forced play is not simply unplayful 
but the antithesis of play? Is his wager a grave game on account of its obliged nature or 
is the seriousness and even precariousness of existence lightened by being approached 
in the name of play, which is commonly associated with whimsy and contingency? Is it 
fair play if someone tells you that you have played and lost a game you did not know 
you were playing? Is it necessary to go through necessity in order to reach freedom or 
can the game be played by other rules? 
 
(2) REASON: IMPOTENT AND IMPORTANT  
 
It came up black. Here I no longer remember either my reckoning or the order of my 
stakes. I only remember, as in a dream, that it seems I won sixteen thousand flourins, 
then, in three unlucky turns, I blew twelve of them; then I pushed the remaining four 
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thousand onto passe (but almost feeling nothing as I did it; I only waited somehow 
mechanically, without thinking)—and won again; then I won four more times in a row.  
–Dostoevsky  
 
In this section, I will briefly attend to Pascal’s estimation of reason (in 
considering, for example, its interplay with the heart and its war with passions), 
drawing on several fragments from the Pensées. Then, I will describe the shifting place 
reason occupies within §418, demonstrating that although at the outset Pascal appears to 
cast reason to the side by denouncing its capacities, throughout his argumentation he 
actually takes great care to proceed rationally. Thirouin calls the contradictory 
movement of founding the renouncement of reason on reason glissement, a sliding (132). 
Lastly, before moving in the next section to the polar traits of immediacy and reflection 
that characterize wagering, I will ask in what way it is significant that Pascal holds both 
of these positions—reason is impotent, reason is important—at once. 
Pascal is a pithy writer and so several of his memorable sayings (referred to as 
“sentences” in French) cast an easy light over the balanced attitude he maintains with 
respect to reason. Take, for example, the single line “[t]wo excesses: to exclude reason, to 
admit nothing but reason” (§183) together with the statement “[s]ubmission and use of 
reason; that is what makes true Christianity” (§167, emphasis mine).105 Reading like 
proverbs, these fragments communicate a great deal about Pascal’s theory of reason. In 
particular, they show how the thinker of double infinity moderates extremes. He turns 
in other pensées to the faculty of the heart as a counterpoising force. By doing so, he not 
only resists the alternate temptations to glorify and demonize reason, but also provides a 
description of existing in the world that resonates with readers today. Celebrated as 
much for its lyricism as its meaning, his claim that the “heart has its reasons of which 
reason knows nothing” (§423) captures an experientially and intuitively recognizable 
                                                
105 “Submission and Use of Reason” is also one of the section headings Pascal provides for the 




truth. The mind may have desires obscure to the appetitive part of a person but the heart 
has reasons belonging to it, to which a person’s intelligence has no access.  
It would be incorrect to suggest that Pascal balances his writing about reason by 
praising passions. In fact, he blames the passions for preventing some people from 
coming to faith in Christ. Rather, in another display of psychological realism, he 
acknowledges that both factors exist and are responsible for shaping our lives. Like 
other philosophers—Plato specifically comes to mind—Pascal describes the antagonism 
between the two forces in strong terms. A fragment, which attests to the conflict, 
poetically reads: 
Civil war in man between reason and passions. 
If there were only reason without passions. 
If there were only passions without reason. 
But since he has both he cannot be free from war, for he can only be at 
peace with the one if he is at war with the other. (§621)  
 
That reason must be discussed in relation to the passions shows the insufficiency of 
reason. We cannot explain ourselves—or make a full transition into the way of faith—by 
making recourse to reason alone; there is an unavoidable role for passions to play. 
However, we should not assume that the intellectual faculty, whatever its greatness, is 
strong enough to tame our passions automatically. It is only through a struggle on the 
level of warfare that we may bring opposing factors under control. 
Additionally, there is the corrective to reason found in §131, not quite Lutheran 
in its degree of stridency—Pascal never calls reason a whore—but a harsh 
pronouncement, nonetheless. Severely, he speaks to the tool of skeptical philosophers 
and Platonists (and, we might add, mathematicians): “Be humble, impotent reason!” (Its 
sting comes across even more clearly in the French: Humiliez-vous, raison impuissante !) 
Ever the moderator, Pascal adds a command for nature, the favored child of dogmatists, 
who were the sparring partners of skeptics. “Be silent, feeble nature!” This pair of 
injunctions appears in a discussion spelled out over several pages of the dual condition 
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of human beings. Neither reason nor nature can provide an individual with a sense of 
self; Pascal insists that a person must turn to God for that. 
Besides his use of the ideas of the heart and passions, Pascal leveled reason by 
including it with habit and inspiration as a source of religious belief. As noted earlier in 
explaining religious conversion, he affords a place to proofs, which come from logic, and 
behavioral patterns, which come from culture, but cites as the essential ingredient for 
forming faith inspiration, which comes from God. In its entirety, §808 reads: 
There are three ways to believe: reason, habit, inspiration. Christianity, which 
alone has reason, does not admit as its true children those who believe without 
inspiration. It is not that it excludes reason and habit, quite the contrary, but we 
must open our mind to the proofs, confirm ourselves in it through habit, while 
offering ourselves through humiliations to inspiration, which alone can produce 
the real and salutary effect. Lest the Cross of Christ be made of none effect [1 Cor. 
1:17].  
 
In citing §§131, 167, 183, 423, and 621 above, I sought to show provisionally that Pascal 
does not overprize reason. I include this pensée less to reaffirm the point about the 
nuance of Pascal’s stance than to introduce key elements to the argument in “Infini rien.” 
For, the paragraph of §808 seems to me to encapsulate important features of the Wager. 
It illuminates the idea of the interaction among the parts of the reason-habit-inspiration 
triad, at the same time that it marks the irreplaceable, uncontrollable quality of heavenly 
grace.   
Reason and habit have roles to play in overcoming obstacles to belief, yet it is in 
inspiration that God provides the grace that makes faith, faith. As Moriarty states, “the 
rational proofs offered by Pascal cannot of themselves bring the state of conviction (not 
knowledge) that is imparted by God. But they can overcome intellectual obstacles to 
belief and prepare us to listen to the Christian message” (155). Moriarty further explains, 
“Christianity has reason on its side, but one whose belief is purely rational is no 
Christian” (157). Rather, it is the divine gift that enables belief. The posture conducive to 
receiving this gift is a humble one, which we bring about by acts and attitudes of self-
lowering. “[One must] lay oneself open to inspirations. Strikingly, Pascal associates 
  
134 
inspiration here with the experience of humiliation: when our individual will is 
thwarted, our self-love wounded, and our ordinary complacent relationship with 
ourselves shattered, we are most open to the irruption of God’s otherness – that is, to 
grace” (ibid.).  
With this preliminary understanding in place, let us turn to a discussion of the 
two sides of reason’s appearance in the Wager. The first of the two poles is the 
description of reason as impotent: “‘Either God is or he is not.’ But to which view shall 
we be inclined? Reason cannot decide this question.” It is hard to underestimate the 
significance of Pascal’s denigration of the faculty of reason and the role that such 
treatment plays in his argumentation. As Thirouin claims, “[i]gnorance et contrainte sont 
les composantes nécessaires d’un pari” (185). While Pascal, to be clear, never leaves the 
rationalist framework—unlike Kierkegaard, he is no fideist—he nevertheless bases his 
defense for believing in God on the limitations of the intellect. One of the ways that he 
rigs his argument for success is by weighing the scenarios (believing in a God who 
exists, not believing in a God who exists, believing in a God who does not exist, and not 
believing in a God who does not exist), according to a fifty percent chance that God 
exists. The way he gets to fifty-fifty odds is by insisting that the question of God’s 
existence is outside of reason’s purview. “Reason cannot make you choose either, reason 
cannot prove either wrong.” He does not attempt to provide precise calculations for 
religious matters. Instead, Pascal assigns an “either/or” probability to the God of 
Christianity—the game is played under even odds.106  
At the text’s outset, he builds the case for reason’s inadequacy for settling this 
question of whether to choose or deny God. He expends some effort providing 
conundrums that the mind is unable to resolve. For instance, we know that an infinite 
number exists and yet we also know that it is neither even nor odd. To take another 
                                                
106 His probability assignment is much criticized. As one person said, either the moon is made of 




example that he gives: every human instantiation of justice suffers from so great a 
disproportion to God’s justice that we are prevented from understanding God’s 
character. He then extends the proof that we can know a thing’s existence without 
knowing its nature, its quoddity (that-ness) but not quiddity (what-ness), applying it in 
the context of his Christian apology to the that-ness and what-ness of God. Where the 
divine is concerned, we are not even sure of the quod. Significantly, this is where 
rationality boldly reasserts itself.  
Recognizing that even a proof for God’s existence is not within reason’s power is 
in no way a turning away from rationality; it is reasonableness itself. In a deft move, 
Pascal shows that lacking such a proof is not a deficit but a point in Christianity’s favor. 
“Who then will condemn Christians for being unable to give rational grounds for their 
belief, professing as they do a religion for which they cannot give rational grounds? … It 
is by being without proof that they show they are not without sense.” With these lines 
he at once acclaims reason and preserves the sense of divine mystery, which is vital to 
the Christian faith.  
As part of this claim about the sensibility of Christianity, he alludes to “folly” 
(Latin: stultitiam, Greek: môria). This charged word is associated with 1 Corinthians 1:18 
(“For the message about the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us 
who are being saved it is the power of God”). In the following verses, the Apostle Paul 
contrasts the “folly of the Cross” with the “wisdom of the world,” inverting the values 
of wisdom and folly. Speaking “foolishly,” he continues, “[f]or God’s foolishness is 
wiser than human wisdom, and God’s weakness is stronger than human strength” (v. 
25). Paul effectively makes a rhetorical point here, however nonsensical it is literally. 
Christians know that their own wisdom does not provide the ground for their faith. The 
lowest part of God, even divine folly, is exalted above the greatest philosophical 
prowess humankind can offer. This approach resembles to a degree Pascal’s claim about 
the relative value of finitude in the light of the infinite. The idea of foolish wisdom, itself 
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an oxymoron, is paradoxical in another way, given that Pascal’s wager argument is often 
described in terms of prudence. 
Hugh Davidson draws together the elements of paradox and proof. In The 
Origins of Certainty: Means and Meanings in Pascal’s Pensées, he writes of contradiction as 
a source of strength: 
Pascal wants to show that the Christians are not inconsistent in their conviction; 
and he does so by a paradox, which supplies out of itself the force of the proof. 
On the one hand Christians have no final, rational proof for what they believe, 
nor do they make any such claim. They know that their wisdom is folly, stultitia, 
and based on faith. It is by lacking proof and by bearing witness to a superior 
source of certainty that they attain consistency. Their situation is contradictory, 
but their strength arises precisely from a grasp of that contradiction. (22)  
 
This passage reinforces the stance that living in contradiction is not problematic; rather, 
where weakness and irrationality enter is in a denial or a lack of recognition of that 
contradiction. Krailsheimer frames it in a slightly differently way, writing that the 
“paradox is that only reason can persuade reason of its own inadequacy” (xxiv). This 
understanding is also in line with Pascal’s thought, echoing as it does the statement in 
§182 that there “is nothing so consistent with reason as this denial of reason.” Reason’s 
relation to itself is slippery, and so Pascal glides.  
At the other end of this polarity is reason’s importance in the Wager. There is 
sufficient textual evidence to make clear that Pascal upholds reason. This is seen 
explicitly, in individual statements he makes, as well as tacitly, in his use of logic. 
Interspersed in the argument are four lines that point to the favorable status of reason. 
These are his inclusion of reason and knowledge among the things at stake in the bet, his 
admonition to the libertine not to renounce reason in hoarding his life, his later comment 
that all gamblers or players take certain risk for uncertain gain without affronting or 
sinning against reason (sans pécher contre la raison), and his claim toward the conclusion 
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when he makes the push towards the passions that “reason impels you to believe.”107         
The high-yet-low status of reason relates to the question of forced belief. Pascal does not 
advocate for willing oneself to believe against any evidence that reason supplies. On the 
contrary, Pascal’s point is that reason is not able to offer evidence.108 It is on this ground 
that Pascal may comfort the libertine by saying that reason is not offended by the choice 
that the potential religious believer will make. But this reassurance is linked to the 
necessity of choice: “Since you must necessarily choose, your reason is no more 
affronted by choosing one rather than the other.” 
Beyond the respect he pays to reason in these phrases, there is also a rational 
undercurrent running through the body of the fragment. What is the method of 
decision-making that he proffers in its main sections, after all, if not a clear 
representation of rationality? We will see in upcoming sections how he converts 
existential risk into numerical expressions. More than working out the following 
equations constructed on the basis of (one of three versions of) his argument  
∞ = Exp(B) = Pr(G)U(B,G) + Pr(N)U(B,N)  
and 
 – ∞ = Exp(A) = Pr(G)U(A,G) + Pr(N)U(A,N) 
it is important to note here the overall rational characteristic of Pascal’s approach.109 As 
Thirouin finds, Pascal’s mathematical demonstration gives the prestige of reasoning par 
                                                
107 This may be another instance in which Krailsheimer’s translation is stronger than the French 
warrants. Pascal writes about reason leading one to belief; the “forcing” sense of “impels” is 
missing. “Mais apprenez au moins que votre impuissance à croire, puisque la raison vous y porte …” 
 
108 I thank Wayne Proudfoot for noting the relevancy here of the insight that you cannot believe 
where reason shows you otherwise. 
 
109 To translate roughly the formalizations of the argument from dominating expected value:  
Infinite is the expected value of believing in God, which equals the (greater than zero) probability 
that God exists multiplied by the utility of believing in God in the event that God exists, plus the 
(less than one) probability that God does not exist multiplied by the utility of not believing in 
God in the case that God does not exist.  
Negative infinity is the expected value of acting as if God does not exist, which equals the 
probability that God exists multiplied by the utility of acting as if God does not exist in the case 
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excellence—geometry—to the status of the wager and its conclusion of the rightness of 
betting for God (133). And as the renowned biometrics scholar A.W.F. Edwards 
delineates, Pascal is rightly credited as the father of probability theory on the basis of his 
Traité du triangle arithmétique, which emerged from his correspondence with Fermat 
regarding games of chance—a rational accomplishment with profound scientific 
applications, indeed (40-42). 
Lastly, let us contrast the way that Pascal delimits reason from experiences of 
thoughtlessness. In some situations and for some people, the pleasure play has to offer is 
escape from thinking about personal problems.110 In an intense moment of a game that 
requires your fiercest attention, such as needing to concentrate on counting cards in a 
round of poker or ensuring that you keep your balance as you walk across a 
dangerously-high tightrope, there is no room for thinking about anything else, anything 
ordinary. In losing yourself, you lose—momentarily—your problems. As Pascal unfolds 
it, the wager does not involve an abandonment of reason or reflection in this way. 
 
(3) GAMBLING ‘IN’ TIME: IMMEDIACY AND REFLECTION 
 
However, I don’t remember what I thought about on the way; there were no thoughts.  
–Dostoevsky  
 
Suzuki quoted the Zen master Tenno Dogo, who stopped a disciple from pondering his 
advice by saying: “No reflecting whatever. When you want to see, see immediately. As 
soon as you tarry [that is, as soon as an intellectual interpretation or mediation takes 
place], the whole thing goes awry.” –Lears  
 
[I]n the ethical I am raised above the moment, I am in freedom. –Kierkegaard  
 
                                                
that God does exist, plus the probability that God does not exist multiplied by the utility of acting 
as if God does not exist in the case that God does not exist. 
Numerous sources provide explanations of Pascal’s proof and differentiate between his 
arguments from dominance, expectation, and dominating expectation. See, e.g., Ian Hacking’s 
illustrious Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic (Chapter 10, “Decision under 
Uncertainty”) from which these equations are taken, and Jeff Jordan’s Pascal’s Wager: Pragmatic 
Arguments and Belief in God.  
 




Another indication of the extraordinariness or strangeness of Pascalian gambling 
is its characterization with respect to time. This wager on one’s way of life is far from 
being an experience of immediacy such as Dostoevsky describes, not only because of the 
time required to follow or make Pascal’s calculations of probability—the tarrying of 
reflection is certainly involved in determining and then sorting through the relevant 
equations—but because of Pascal’s emphasis on the (eternal) future and not the now. In 
“Infini rien,” gambling is future-, not “flow”-, oriented. It is the conduit for deciding 
one’s eternal lot rather than a technique for losing a sense of time or living “in the now.” 
And while this decisive gambling occurs in time, “[t]o be in time is to be faced with the 
either-or of decision,” it is for the sake of the hereafter (Taylor, KPA, 7).  
Before discussing in more detail the ideas of immediacy (as spontaneity111 and 
speed) and reflection (as the wise and time-consuming determination of actions in light 
of their aftermath), I would like to make clear how I am approaching this section. First, 
the opposition between gambling in the instant and gambling on the infinity of time 
does not, in my estimation, find resolution in Pascal’s argument. Of the polarities I am 
discussing, it is one that remains. Unlike the case of reason, it is not dialectically uplifted 
or treated paradoxically. (Pascal is not asking Kierkegaard’s question in the Philosophical 
Fragments of how a historical moment can serve as the point of departure for eternal 
happiness. This is another reason to consider the play of Pascal’s Wager in conjunction 
with Kierkegaard’s category of ethics rather than aligning it with Kierkegaard’s category 
of religiousness.) Secondly, this is in no way an accusation of failure on Pascal’s part, for 
I do not think that he sets out to mediate these two very different modes of time. Rather, 
as with the tension between freedom and necessity, this is a polarity that I see my 
analysis introducing to the Wager more than identifying as internal to it. 
                                                
111 I am employing “spontaneity” in a particular sense. As will become clear, by spontaneous 
choices, I intend ungrounded choices that arise arbitrarily. This usage contrasts Kant’s treatment 
of the spontaneous will as free from determination by antecedent conditions.  
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Along the broad spectrum of contemporary forms of gambling are types of 
gambling that privilege intuition. These gambling games resist systematization and have 
no use for strategy. Instead, they urge reliance on gut feelings. They are the antithesis of 
regular work and earned wages. Whereas laborers receive predictable paychecks for 
their scheduled efforts, gamblers stand to gain surprisingly sudden payoffs on the basis 
of luck. Under this portrait of games of chance (which, again, differ from forms of 
gambling that involve quite a bit of deliberation), gambler’s choices may said to be 
spontaneous in an impromptu, instantaneous way.  
Immediacy is also seen in play’s speed. Games of gambling move fast. They are 
designed to do so, as a way of roping players into their absorbing, and costly, realm. 
There may not be time to reflect overly on which wager to make in games of chance—
hence one’s reliance on intuition—but neither is there time to think enough to stop the 
play. “The gaming industry employs the intimate experiential requirements of the zone 
to encourage gamblers to play ‘faster, longer, and more intensively’” (Zaloom, 24).112  
Pascal’s use of the trope of gambling in the context of making a choice of 
religious adherence seems exactly opposite to this, with respect to time. §418 is not 
designed to induce fervent (or fervently repeated) play at all. There is no being on a roll 
or hitting a hot streak here, insofar as repetition is missing. This relates to a recurring 
worry I have had as I have tarried with this text. It deals with the number of times the 
wager can occur and the finality of one’s choice. Is the game set up in such a way as to 
be repeatable? More pointedly, is it possible to reverse one’s bet? Is that not, in some 
way, what Pascal is asking his libertine interlocutor to do in the first place, in advocating 
conversion, i.e., beckoning him to change positions and stop staking his life on a system 
of beliefs on which he had unwittingly bet? Keeping in mind the crossroads imagery in 
                                                
112 Dostoevsky points to the incremental dimension of speed: “The next day she definitively lost 
everything. That’s how it had to happen: once that kind of person starts out on this path, then, 




Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, we might wonder whether a person who makes the wrong 
decision today can come back tomorrow and play again. What does she or he lose in 
delaying or backtracking? Is that where the real risk lies—in not knowing when your 
time is up and re-betting will be impossible? We have noted that someone discontinues 
play by deciding to act as if God does not exist, but does wagering on God’s existence 
not put an end to the game, too? For, how would a person continue playing after betting 
on theistic belief—does one “level up,” advancing to a new plane of the game after 
making the choice of ascribing to Christianity? Or is it that one reaffirms one’s “move” 
in living out the decision day to day? To condense or intensify these questions, I will ask 
lastly of the wager on God: Is this one gambling game that I do not have to play quickly 
because I play it under the starkest time constraint—not immediately, but once and for 
all? 
After drawing the comparison between casino gamblers and financial traders, 
(“[s]imilarly, traders engage with machines and frame their senses of physical and social 
space to merge with the flow the market”), Zaloom describes traders’ heightened 
awareness of the present time, the moment. She writes, “[t]raders’ techniques of self-
discipline can seem deeply ascetic, and often mystical. Under discipline’s strictures, 
traders must immerse themselves in the present; the market lives in the here and now” 
(24, 26).113,114 The 1920s and 30s New York sportswriter Damon Runyon, renown for his 
storytelling and formalism, represents the same attitude towards time in his writing on 
gamblers. “In a sense, Runyon’s gamblers inhabited an eternal present, epitomized by his 
use of the historical present tense—‘So I says to this guys, I says …’—a usage inspired 
                                                
113 It is interesting how recovery as well as play takes place for extreme gamblers as a matter of 
immediacy. Recovering addicts conquer their pangs to play not once and for all but moment by 
moment, which makes sense of the slogan “one day at a time.” Kierkegaard describes this 
principle when he writes: “imagine a person who has become addicted to gambling. Desire 
awakens in all its passion; it is as if his life would be at stake if his desire is not satisfied. If he is 
able to say to himself: At this moment I will not do it; I will not do it for an hour—then he is 
cured. This hour is the continuity that saves him” (Either/Or, II, 230). 
 




by the gamblers’ own, which Runyon faithfully transcribed. Runyonland was a world 
elsewhere, where gambling was a way of killing time” (Lears, 268, emphasis mine). 
Zaloom and Runyon’s depictions of ordinary gamblers’ experience of time and 
immediacy relate to play under the aesthetic realm.115 To make the distinction once more: 
in his discourse, Pascal does not cultivate an intense atmosphere in which speed 
overcomes reflection or in which present-tense experiences stretch into the future and 
overcome the past. This is one of the primary ways in which his gambling differs from 
other forms. And so Pascal, recognizing that “[r]eason works slowly” (§821), proceeds in 
his gambling with rational, even systematic, reflection and encourages his interlocutor to 
take heed for the future.  
The religious wager of §418 relates to wisdom in this way, wisdom (like hope) 
being directed beyond the present. In principle, it is a mark of folly to live without a 
sense of consequences whereas it is wise to do something difficult today in order to be 
pleased with the situation one finds oneself in tomorrow. This holds with regard to a 
person’s religious choices, only on a much grander scale. Deciding to follow God is a 
prudential bet because it measures the cost of present earthly sacrifices against the worth 
of future goods—the infinite good of God’s infinite and eternal presence.  
Although there is a feeling of urgency surrounding this forced bet on the basis of 
the importance of believing in God and the magnitude of the potential reward, Pascal 
never explicitly demands that his interlocutor or reader make a decision right away and 
certainly not before the work of calculation is done. The closest he comes to rushing the 
discussion (or decision) is in making the statement that, given the combination of 
                                                
115 Recall how the figure of the aesthete in Kierkegaard “kills time” too: “For the immediate 
aesthete, the unalterable flow of time means the necessary negation of the present moment of 
pleasure. The pleasurable moment in which the immediate aesthete seeks to immerse himself 
always passes. His efforts are then directed to finding another moment in which to lose himself. 
But here too the moment passes. For the reflective aesthete, the transition from the realm of 
imaginative idealities to temporal actuality involves the movement into the realm of historical 
travail in which ideas are only gradually and partially realized. … The aesthete, either through 
sensual enjoyment or through imaginative reflection, is engaged in what Kierkegaard calls 




probability and payout (a chance of winning an infinite reward countered by only a 
finite number of chances of losing), “there is no room for hesitation.” “[I]l n’y a point à 
balancer [hésiter].”116 This is in line with the other half of his observation in §821 that 
feeling differs from reason in that it “works instantly, and is always ready.” That is why 
he states that there comes a point when we must “put our faith in feeling, or it will 
always be vacillating” (ibid.). With the time of calculation and reflection having already 
been invested, and the options already weighed, there is no more need for balancing, 
wavering, oscillating, or waiting. It is time to act. Reason having decided it, passions and 
practice must be addressed.117 
 
(4) PRAGMATIC WAYS AND MECHANICAL EXERCISES FOR IN-CORPORATING BELIEF:  
PASSION AS OBSTACLE AND AID  
 
For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will [thelein] 
what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want [thelô], but the evil I do 
not want [ou thelô] is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want [ou thelô], it is no 
longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me. So I find it to be a law that when I want 
[thelonti] to do what is good, evil lies close at hand. –Apostle Paul   
 
Passion never fully subsides in the wager pensée. Even though Pascal talks in 
stringent terms of diminishing one’s passions on the road to faith, it is clear that the 
libertine interlocutor retains desires. Significantly, though, these desires have been 
retrained to have God as their object and not worldly pleasures. Such a shift is noticeable 
                                                
116 It is Sellier and Ferreyrolles who provide the note on hésiter. 
 
117 Pascal’s treatment of reason and passion’s relation to time finds a strong parallel in a passage 
in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Contrasting objective and subjective knowledge, 
Kierkegaard (or Climacus) writes “whereas objective knowledge goes along leisurely on the long 
road of approximation, itself not actuated by passion, to subjective knowledge every delay is a 
deadly peril and the decision so infinitely important that it is immediately urgent, as if the 
opportunity has already passed by unused” (200). The way that Climacus mocks the “objective 
person” who “put[s] a whole research period into finding God” resonates—in content, if not in 
tone—with Pascal’s view of reason’s willingness to take indefinite time in weighing matters. 




in the aftermath of reason’s own transformation from objecting to faith to assenting to 
the rationality of Christian belief. 
In Pascal’s thought there is a loose alignment of the heart and passion, desire, 
pleasure, sentiment, whim, fancy, and the body. At the same time, there is a correlation 
between the body and the machine, practice, habit, exercise, experience, custom, and 
action.118,119 Without being interchangeable, these ideas share a kind of categorical space 
under the rubric of “heart.” Thus, it is with a consideration of Pascal’s estimation of le 
coeur—specifically its physical character and its connection to custom—that I would like 
to begin this section on the twofold quality of passion in “Infini rien.” 
 Pascal’s appraisal of the heart’s abilities vis-à-vis reason’s limitations is 
fascinating, for he identifies the heart—and not the mind—as the seat of first principles 
(Force, “Pascal and Philosophical Method,” 220). This echoes a point made earlier in this 
chapter’s section on the second polarity. There, I noted that tension between the 
passions and reason indicates that the scope of reason is far from being all-
encompassing. Here, we see as a sign of reason’s insufficiency its dependence on the 
faculty of the sentiment for its (the sentiment’s) intuition of concepts such as time, 
number, and space. It is worth drawing out this principle of the interplay between the 
mind and body, reason and the heart, because it holds on different levels for Pascal, 
including on the plane of the formation of faith. 
Pierre Force sets forward Pascal’s view of the heart, explaining a rather 
surprising stance that Pascal holds. “For Pascal, this shortcoming [of not seeing that 
space can be divided ad infinitum] is akin to a physical disability. Indeed, when Pascal 
identifies the heart as the organ that perceives the first principles, he means that there is 
                                                
118 We might contrast this list with a set of reason’s correlates, including the mind, intellect, 
knowledge, and prudence. 
 
119 On the relation between the heart, fancy, and fantasy, see Force, “Pascal and Philosophical 




something inherently bodily and physical about this perception” (224, emphasis 
mine).120 That is why Pascal proposes (indeed, with its curative sense, prescribes) 
actions—physical, bodily actions—for the interlocutor whose passions have not yet 
succumbed to a Christian pattern of life. The turn to practical, behavioral devices (in the 
dual sense of techniques and mechanical tools) is crucial because, without being worked 
on, recalcitrant passions hinder a religious seeker’s progress. Let us continue 
approaching the important role of pragmatism in the Wager, then, by way of the 
example of discerning first principles.  
An individual who lacks intuition of matters such as time or the infinite 
divisibility of space is not doomed to ignorance. Exercise and experience, precisely in 
their physicality, can serve as a bridge to a discovery of natural truths for such a person. 
Force illuminates the role Pascal affords exercise, experience, and mechanical 
apparatuses as follows: 
[F]or those who have no natural intuition of infinite division, Pascal proposes to 
use a telescope to observe a point in the sky that looks very small to the naked 
eye. They will discover that this apparently indivisible point is in fact a huge 
chunk of space. It is thus conceivable that with an even better telescope this small 
point would seem as large as the firmament does to the naked eye, and so on 
(OC II, 165-6). What Pascal proposes here is an exercise, based on the assumption 
that our grasp of first principles resides in the body, not in the mind. It is 
therefore essential to experience something similar to infinite divisibility in order 
to have an intuition of it. (232, original emphasis) 
 
The exercise of looking through the mechanical device of a telescope helps someone 
overcome a limited sense of the concept of infinite division. Similarly, once reason has 
exhausted its ability to bring about true, inner conviction, ritual practices can serve to propel 
a wavering convert over the hurdle of indecision and into belief. As the well-known 
                                                
120 See Pensées, §110, “We know the truth not only through our reason but also through our heart. 
It is through the latter that we know first principles, and reason, which has nothing to do with it, 
tries in vain to refute them. … Principles are felt, propositions proved, and both with certainty 
though by different means” (emphasis mine). Significantly, Pascal goes on to give claims about 
humility and certainty. “… Our inability must therefore serve only to humble reason, which 




phrase reads, “taking holy water, having masses said” will organically lead, with the aid 
of God, to the full-fledged adoption of Christianity.  
It is important to emphasize the context of Pascal’s recommendation for treating 
passions by a course of action. The interlocutor has been moved to a place where he sees 
the reasonableness of faith but cannot bring himself to believe. This is evident in his 
response to Pascal’s victorious declaration at the end of the demonstration by 
probability assessment (“This is conclusive and if men are capable of any truth this is 
it”). The libertine replies by saying both “I confess it, I admit it” and “I am so made that I 
cannot believe.” Reason has reached its limit; multiplying proofs is a useless exercise 
because the rational part of the man is already in agreement with faith, but that is not 
enough for faith to take hold. This is a key observation. If the problem were still one of 
reason, then it would be appropriate to continue with argumentations and proofs 
because they belong to the rational realm. But the libertine has reached a place of 
intellectual assent. He goes on to ask Pascal “What do you want me to do then” because 
it is with doing that he has a problem.  
 The solution that Pascal offers is both mechanical and communal. A dossier 
heading that he supplies elsewhere, Le Discours de la machine, and his use within §418 of 
the verb s’abêtir (“to stupefy,” “to make docile”) attest to the fact, however appalling, 
that he treats the struggling libertine who is on the cusp of a faith commitment as a 
machine: an automaton. He beckons him to perform repeated actions in an unthinking 
way, assuring him that this will tame his passions and cure his unbelief. In addition to 
what we may infer from Pascal’s life—his own passionate disposition and his inclination 
toward “workable ideas”—we learn why he adopted this strategy from his other 
reflections.121 In particular, pensées §§816 and 821 are revealing and may make such a 
fraught approach more palpable. 
                                                
121 Of Pascal’s character Mesnard writes, “[h]e had the temperament of a man of action, a love for 
grandiose undertakings … This ardent zest for life, moreover, was often transformed in Pascal 
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 In §821 Pascal makes claims that accord with positions of his that we have 
already seen, specifically the appropriate way of argumentation and the relationship 
between the mind and body. (§821 is also the source for his view on the speed and 
difficulty of thought that was cited in the section on time.) Explaining the persuasive 
power of practice, he writes: 
[W]e are as much automaton as mind. As a result, demonstration is not the only 
instrument for convincing us. … Proofs only convince the mind; habit provides 
the strongest proofs and those that are most believed. It inclines the automaton, 
which leads the mind unconsciously along with it. … It is, then, habit that 
convinces us and makes so many Christians. It is habit that makes Turks, 
heathen, trades, soldiers, etc. … [W]e must resort to habit once the mind has seen 
where the truth lies, in order to steep and stain ourselves in that belief which 
constantly eludes us, for it is too much trouble to have the proofs always present 
before us. We must acquire an easier belief, which is that of habit. With no 
violence, art or argument it makes us believe things, and so inclines all our 
faculties to this belief that our soul falls naturally into it. … We must therefore 
make both parts of us believe: the mind by reasons, which need to be seen only 
once in a lifetime, and the automaton by habit … Incline my heart [Psalm 119:36]. 
 
Here he states quite explicitly his reasoning about the roles—and sequential order—of 
reason and habit. While the mind and heart are interconnected, habit surpasses reason in 
scope and outpaces reason in speed. For, there is an ease and efficacy in ongoing 
practice that escapes the intellect with its shortcomings in demonstration and, on the 
occasions in which reason does achieve proof, its short span of success (the single 
moment). That is why it is essential to undergo a change in heart, confirming conviction 
with custom.   
                                                
into a dominating pride. Conscious of his own supreme genius, Pascal as a scientist could brook 
no contradiction and showed himself merciless to such adversaries as Father Noël or Father 
Lalouère. Pascal the convert was never able, moreover, wholly to root out and destroy this 
natural arrogance; in a moment of anger he could terrify Singlin, whose inadequacies on the 
intellectual plane could not escape him; he humiliated Arnauld and Nicole when he made it clear 
that he thought their conduct pusillanimous. This need to dominate over other souls, though 
much purified by Pascal’s conversion, explains, no doubt, his violence and impetuosity as a 
religious apologist. But this violence and impetuosity can also be considered as a kind of passion. 
There is, in Pascal, a passion for truth in all its shapes; this is seen as clearly, in spite of the 
reservations we have occasionally thought fit to make, in Pascal’s investigations into the nature of 
a vacuum as in his controversies about the formula. Even more, there is in Pascal a passion for the 




The libertine is understandably reluctant to forgo a life of pleasure for the sake of 
a faith that still does not hold the force of certainty for him. Pascal makes clear, however, 
that he will not arrive at the point of faith unless he gives up his (noxious) pleasures. 
Pensée §816 contains his argument for this reversal. It reads in full:   
‘I should soon have given up a life of pleasure,’ they say, ‘if I had faith.’ But I tell 
you: ‘You would soon have faith if you gave up a life of pleasure. Now it is up to 
you to begin. If I could give you faith, I would. But I cannot, nor can I test the 
truth of what you say, but you can easily give up your pleasure and test whether 
I am telling the truth.’  
 
This empiricism-tinged advice is yet another display of Pascal’s realism. He does not 
entertain his desire to bestow faith on an unbelieving libertine because transferring 
belief to another person is simply not feasible. The libertine’s claim that he will 
surrender his pleasure-filled life after converting poses further problems for verification. 
The option that is possible, although probably not as easy as Pascal describes, is for the 
libertine to follow the path Pascal lays down. Returning to “Infini rien,” we see that there 
is social precedence for this course of action as well.   
On the one hand, then, Pascal’s suggestion for surmounting passions is engaging 
in “automatic” practices. On the other, it is a recommendation rooted in the community. 
This is not only because the libertine will be taking communion alongside Christians in a 
public, church setting, but also because he will be following the example of other people 
who successfully overcame the obstacles he finds himself currently facing. “You want to 
be cured of unbelief and you ask for the remedy: learn from those who were once bound 
like you and who now wager all they have. These people who know the road you wish 
to follow, who have been cured of the affliction of which you wish to be cured: follow 
the way by which they began.” The libertine who is on his way to faith is not alone—in 
his struggles or in their enacted solutions. This social component of the Wager should 
not be overlooked in part because of the ramifications it has for an understanding of 
Pascal’s philosophy broadly. That is, it would not be suitable to group Pascal among 
philosophers who focus on the individual to the detriment of the community because 
  
149 
Pascal does not isolate the libertine in causing him to come to terms with his individual 
existence and forced religious choice. Perhaps unexpectedly, the room afforded 
community in his argument also relates to descriptions of the social bonds formed 
among everyday gamblers.122  
 Having explained at some length the notion of the heart for Pascal and the 
primary expression that les passions take in the discourse, I would like to devote the 
remainder of this section to expositing a second side of desire in §418. This “flip” side 
comes from my interpretation, rather than an explicit rendering on the part of Pascal. 
That is, Pascal does not make the claim that desires undergo a reversal—or even a 
reordering à la Augustine—in the course of making and enacting the decision to follow 
Christ. He commands taming, not transforming, the passions. However, I will seek to 
show that there is a positive use of “wanting” in the path to salvation based on Pascal’s 
repeated use of the verb vouloir toward the end of the argument.123 
Earlier we noted the many “necessity” phrases appearing in the Wager. Here, it 
is desire that we find multiplying. Pascal addresses his interlocutor with these 
statements: “[v]ous voulez aller à la foi” and “[v]ous voulez vous guérir de l’infidélité,” “… ce 
sont gens qui savent ce chemin que vous voudriez suivre et guéris d’un mal dont vous voulez 
guérir.” He even has the interlocutor use starkly passionate language in his response, “‘Ô 
ce discours me transporte, me ravit’ …” While I do not want to overstate the point, I think it 
is significant that Pascal frames the remarks to and from the interlocutor in this way and 
not, for example, with colder terms or with the language of duty. He could have used an 
                                                
122 For example, William Thompson writes about several of the functions that numbers games 
served historically among African Americans in urban settings. In addition to being run by local 
people and giving another means of savings than keeping money in banks that practiced 
discrimination, the “numbers game also contributed to community solidarity, as residents would 
share dreams with each other” (88). As a way of confirming this, he shares the story of Colin 
Powell’s family who, amazingly, won the money to buy their house in Queens from playing the 
numbers game.  
 
123 Desire is implicitly present earlier, in the assignment of utilities. The libertine desires happiness 




alternate construction like Il faut croire or Il faut que vous croyiez. What might it mean that 
he chooses (if not emphasizes) the wish of the skeptic or libertine to believe?    
At the same time that Pascal instructs the reader to seek to diminish his passions 
actively, desire and pleasure spring up elsewhere—in a way oriented to faith. As Force 
says, “[t]he goal here [in directing the reader to practical steps, or ritual practices] is to 
help the reader put God rather than the objects of his passions as the first principle of his 
pleasure” (233). Desire is a hard thing to stifle altogether; it is easier to manage passions 
by redirecting them. Thus, the passages in the Wager that address behavior reveal in 
some way what happens when God is the primary object of an individual’s desire.  
In sum, passions and pragmatism conjoin in the Wager. This is because the 
Christian faith addresses itself to the whole of people’s lives. If it neglected either the 
physical or the spiritual and mental aspects of our being, it would be incomplete. As the 
religious tradition maintains itself, then, through creeds and rituals, so the process of 
coming to belief involves mind, heart, and body. Pascal recognizes this in his apology. 
Becoming a follower of Christ entails more than intellectually assenting to Christ’s 
existence. It must include in-corporating Christ, taking him into one’s body through 
communal practices, including—not incidentally—the bodily and spiritual Eucharistic 
ritual.     
After Pascal admonishes him to overcome his passions by acting in compliance 
with the Christian tradition, the libertine confesses that he is afraid. In what may be read 
as a flippant tone, Pascal replies, “What do you have to lose?” Absolutely everything, it 
seems at first.     
 
(5) GOING “ALL IN” BY STAKING NOTHING  
Nothing could stir her in any way or cure her of an underlying feeling of boredom 
constantly springing to life again, except the idea that she was putting her whole 




Yet whatever gains I had, these I have come to regard as loss because of Christ. More than 
that, I regard everything as loss because of the surpassing value of knowing Christ Jesus 
my Lord. For his sake I have suffered the loss of all things, and I regard them as rubbish, 
in order that I may gain Christ, and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my 
own that comes from the law, but one that comes through faith in Christ, the 
righteousness from God based on Christ. –Apostle Paul 
 
Thus far in the Wager we have encountered polarities and paradoxes—observing 
oscillation between opposing sides (as with immediacy and desire) and the holding of 
contradictory views at the same time (the paradox of free constraint and the rational 
suspension of reason). Now we come to the two remaining reversals, the remarkable 
movement from valuing the stakes one puts in the game as everything to regarding 
them as nothing, on the one hand, and the shift from feeling risk to certainty, on the 
other. Pascal advertises explicitly that undergoing the course of salvation brings about 
these bouleversements—“overturnings”—when he addresses his imagined interlocutor 
and says, “[y]ou will know at the end that you have wagered on something certain and 
infinite for which you paid nothing” (emphasis mine). Though these aspects of totality 
and risk are linked, I will address them individually, beginning in this section with the 
changing valuation of what is being staked in betting on God. 
A close reading of §418 will show a particular undoing of totality. It is not the 
case, in the end, that in deciding to follow God a person does not put in her all; anything 
less than her all and she forfeits the game. Rather, it is that her all is not worth “all.” 
Explication of Pascal’s argument will lead, moreover, to the view that a person’s all is 
nothing! That is why, according to him, a saved libertine who has received everything 
for nothing looks back and, like the Apostle Paul in his letter to the Philippians (3:7-9), 
declares the worthlessness of what had been his everything.124 From where one now 
stands as a saved person, one evaluates former treasures as rubbish. Only trash! 
                                                
124 The tendency to minimize what one gives up in this godly gamble relates indirectly to an 
interesting finding about (regular, i.e., non-Pascalian) gamblers’ psychology, which Elster 
includes in his essay “Gambling and Addiction” for the anthology Getting Hooked. Gamblers can 
be surprisingly accurate in predicting their losses. Often, when people bet, they clearheadedly 
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How does one get from rien to infini? Interest in the infinitely-all/nothing 
dichotomy is persistent in Pascal’s writings. He worked extensively on the scientific 
problem of the vacuum, giving a great deal of thought to the notions of emptiness and 
spatial void, and theorized in several places about double infinity. Did he supply 
“Infinity nothing” as the heading to this groundbreaking thought experiment to 
emphasize the extent of the difference between the divine and human sides of the 
wager, giving priority to the truth of this discrepancy instead of highlighting the motif 
of gambling, with its associations of risk and play? Does “Infinity nothing” direct 
readers’ attention to the vast distance between God and ourselves, and the magnitude of 
the division between God’s role and ours in bringing about salvation? In short, does it 
point us to grace? The possibility that Pascal’s provisional title works to remind us of the 
gap between the payout and the stakes in this game echoes Lears’s premise in his study 
that gambling, like grace, is the exchange of nothing for something. Radical divine 
generosity effaces whatever contribution is made on the part of human beings: in the 
light of infinity, finitude’s offerings are nothing but nothingness. 
As he enters his discussion of probabilities, Pascal divides the elements he 
wishes to consider into three categories. These are the things a bettor stands to lose (“the 
true and the good”), the things a bettor stakes (reason and knowledge, will and 
happiness), and things that a bettor should seek to avoid (error and wretchedness). 
Curiously, as he sets up the division of his analysis, he refrains from making “rewards” 
a fourth group, folding instead those things that a bettor might win into his thoughts on 
the stake—mise—of happiness. With respect to happiness, Pascal’s choice of terminology 
is noteworthy. In referring to it, he does not use bonheur but the religiously-charged 
word béatitude (found, famously, in the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5).  
                                                
realize that they will lose, even great amounts. What they are poor in predicting is their reaction 
to those losses—under the sway, perhaps, of the thrill of play, they underestimate the emotional 




It is also significant that he does not immediately state that the wagerer’s life or 
self is at stake, but rather points initially to the reason and will, and their relative 
complements, knowledge and happiness. Later, though, he does make use of a phrase 
about risking life and so it becomes clear that a person hazards her very existence in this 
wager.125 Perhaps this is a taunt to libertines. He offers them the most thrilling game of 
their lives, an experience of play that takes them farther from boredom than any 
ordinary diversion or pastime ever could.  
As noted, Pascal was confident of the rationality of wagering on religion. And so, 
sure that he had dispensed with the concern that one would lose the stake of reason 
(“[t]hat is one point cleared up”), he swiftly moves to consider the other element 
pledged in playing the wager: happiness.126 Relying on an implicit relation between 
happiness and rewards (and, I suppose, between unhappiness and penalties), he 
assesses the gains and losses of one of two possible scenarios, focusing exclusively on the 
case of calling heads, croix, God exists. He does not give voice to the choice of calling 
tails, pile, in the possibility of God’s non-existence. If you bet on God and win, he says, 
you win everything. If you bet on God and lose, you lose nothing. The dichotomy 
between everything and nothing (tout/rien) is established, but how does Pascal arrive at 
infinity? 
His description in broad, all-or-nothing strokes is not enough for the imagined 
interlocutor, who registers his concern in replying, “[y]es, I must wager, but perhaps I 
am wagering too much.” In other words, is it possible to hedge my bets, choosing God 
but keeping something in reserve for myself in case God does not exist or does not 
lavishly reward belief? It is not difficult to comprehend a person’s inclination to hold 
                                                
125 Cf. §150. 
 
126 Is it possible to view Pascal—alongside ethicists such as Plato and Aristotle—as a eudaimonist 
on the basis of this part of the Pensées and the argument he builds in §148 around the simple and 
strong statements “All men seek happiness. There are no exceptions. … The will never takes the 




back, as it is possible to see the appeal of the aesthetic lifestyle in Kierkegaard’s 
Either/Or. Why is it wrong to “hoard” one’s life in making a decision to live without 
God?127 How would that choice against God lead to unhappiness, especially given our 
palpable sense of the certainty of earthly life and the unknown existence and nature of 
the hereafter?  
Here as Pascal refines his argument, he introduces artificial, even puzzling, 
calculations—comparing, measuring, and weighing the stakes against the rewards. He 
appeals to the desirability of a good exchange and the commonsense willingness to 
sacrifice a thing of some worth for the sake of receiving a greater thing. The life that is 
on the balance—your life—is, it is true, your only life on earth. It is, to that extent, your 
everything. This being the case, though, it bears only a finite utility. The totality of 
anything finite is still finite, regardless of the increase that totality represents over 
partiality of the same thing.  
What is on the other side, then—that of the prize—which makes putting in all 
that you have and are a good bet? Pascal eventually assigns infinite value to the eternal 
reward for belief; however, at the start he tests his argument with concrete but 
hypothetical number values. (Keep in mind that each of his proffered scenarios is 
predicated on “even odds” as well as the necessity of playing in the first place.) He 
suggests that his interlocutor determine a course of action by balancing the costs of 
                                                
127 Whether or not Krailsheimer’s decision to translate garder with the strong-sounding word 
“hoard” is justified, it raises an interesting possible connection between the figure of the religious 
believer who displays a willingness to lose her life in coming to believe in God and generic 
gamblers’ prodigality, even their refusal to hoard money. Lears writes: “The gambler’s attraction 
to loss, even to self-destruction, was part of the aura of danger that made gambling sublime. But 
there was more than a titillating frisson at work in gambling’s appeal: the figure of ‘the loser’ 
became an oddly powerful specter in a society that deified winning and denied defeat. Incurably 
prodigal, the gambler refused to hoard money; instead he kept ‘throwing it away,’ seeking a kind 
of grace through what the theologian Paul Tillich called ‘holy waste.’ As Tillich said, ‘Without the 
abundance of the heart nothing great can happen’—without ‘accepting the waste of an 
uncalculated surrender’ or ‘wasting ourselves beyond the limits of law and rationality’ [The New 
Being, New York 1955, p. 47]” (270, emphasis mine). While noting this comparison, I would like 
to stipulate that there is a tension between Pascal’s approach to living as a Christian, a path he 
paves with rationalistic calculation of probabilities, and Tillich’s description, which Lears relays, 




continuing play against the promise of receiving two and then three additional lives for 
choosing belief in God. The oddity and even incongruity of these quantifications 
(heaven in its eternity and infinity reduced, even heuristically, to two or three extra 
lives?) raises a core difficulty with game theory, calling into question the helpfulness of 
utilities on the basis of the subjectivity of their determination. (Pascal did not distinguish 
between objective and subjective values, however.) A further objection might stem from 
the nature of experiences or situations, which seem inherently qualitative and unfit to 
lend themselves to being captured numerically. Nevertheless, thinking of gaining two or 
three lives serves an important purpose in illustrating Pascal’s strategy. It is a bridge to 
his attribution of “an infinity of infinitely happy life” to eternity, its own sort of double 
infinity. Given a probability of fifty percent of winning, it is logically permissible for a 
person to risk his one life in order to gain two lives. (Someone who is risk-averse could 
sensibly choose to refrain from that bet.) Increase the rewards, however, and what 
rationality dictates changes. If there remains an equivalent chance of winning and 
losing, Pascal’s strategy reveals that it becomes illogical not to risk one life in order to 
win three. Proving this serves as a way to convince the libertine what to do when there is 
an infinity of life at stake. If happiness awaits a person who hazards on this scale, one 
life for three, how much more so given that “there is an eternity of life and happiness.” 
After some maneuvering around further considerations (revolving around finite and 
infinite chances of winning), he concludes summarily, “[t]hus our argument carries 
infinite weight, when the stakes are finite in a game where there are even chances of 
winning and losing and an infinite prize to be won.” 
 
(6) SECURING CERTAINTY, OR HOW RATIONALIZED RISK CAN BECOME DECIDED FATE 
 
Yes, sometimes the wildest thought, the seemingly most impossible thought, gets so 
firmly settled in your head that you finally take it for something feasible … Moreover, if 
the idea is combined with a strong, passionate desire, you might one day take it, finally, 
for something fatal, inevitable, predestined, for something that can no longer not be and 
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not happen! Maybe there’s also something else, some combination of presentiments, some 
extraordinary effort or will, a self-intoxication by your own fantasy, or whatever else—I 
don’t know; but on that evening (which I will never forget as long as I live) a miraculous 
event took place. Though it is perfectly justified arithmetically, nonetheless for me it is 
still miraculous. And why, why did this certainty lodge itself so deeply and firmly in me 
then, and now so long ago? I surely must have thought of it, I repeat to you, not as an 
event that might happen among others (and therefore also might not happen), but as 
something that simply could not fail to happen! –Dostoevsky  
 
 Decision and uncertainty are the two aspects that make a gamble a gamble. Life 
is precisely such a game insofar as it routinely, even essentially, involves the translation 
of risk into action (Thirouin, 159). This may seem like a banal point. Nevertheless, it is 
affirmed in various literary and philosophical studies on risk as well as in the secondary 
scholarship on Pascal. David Jenkins, writing as the Bishop of Durham, claims “risk is of 
the essence of the whole operation” of doing theology (5), whereas Tanner, addressing 
gambling with respect to the modern climate of economic risk, writes: 
It is unlikely, however, in today’s economy that the primary point of gambling is 
to contest any of these things—labor discipline; the need for hard work to get 
ahead; the patience required for slow-paced economic advancement through 
methodical, monotonous routine—or the premium placed on production of real 
goods and services, which lies behind them all. … Rather than holding out an 
alternative to the way things usually work, and therefore some hope of escape 
from it, gambling becomes simply a metaphor for everyday life. (241, emphasis mine) 
 
To the narrator of Ralph Ellison’s novel Invisible Man, life does not involve risk as much 
as certain defeat. Contrasting chance from control, he proclaims, “[i]t’s ‘winner takes 
nothing’ that is the great truth of our country or of any country. Life is to be lived, not 
controlled, and humanity is won by continuing to play in the face of certain defeat” (577, 
quoted in Lears, 318-319). According to Heidegger, living amidst venture is distinctively 
human to the extent that human beings are “beings-thrown.” “Being lets beings loose 
into the daring venture. This release, flinging them loose, is the real daring. … Being is 
venture pure and simple. It ventures us, us humans. … The Being of beings is the 
venture” (Poetry, Language, Thought, 99). Pascal himself maintains the risk of religion and 
the totality of uncertainty in life, writing, “[i]f we must never take any chances we ought 
not do anything for religion, for it is not certain. But how many chances we do take: sea 
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voyages, battles. Therefore, I say, we should have to do nothing at all, for nothing is 
certain. And there is more certainty in religion than that we shall live to see tomorrow” 
(§577). Additionally, in “Wagering and the Evidence,” Thomas V. Morris’s contribution 
to a volume on Pascal’s pari argument, the thoroughgoing insecurity we face in our life-
projects is clearly but succinctly presented.   
Life is risk. Nothing we do that is of any importance carries with it a guarantee of 
success. Nothing we can do is absolutely sure to secure even our own personal 
safety or well-being from one hour to the next. Yet, we are constantly faced with 
choices. Lots of decisions; no guarantees. (47) 
 
Morris continues in this introductory passage by pointing out our tendency not to detect 
the risk that is so pervasive in our lives. “[W]e are used to the risk. We are accustomed 
to living without many true certainties, to the extent that we ordinarily forget that life is 
risk” (ibid.). On account of its extent, insecurity is like a curtain, forming the invisible 
background of our human experience. We see it when we seek to see it with care, 
otherwise we ignore it. Pascal is an author who does not allow us to ignore it.  
I will address in this sixth section the reversal that occurs from one end of the 
wager argument to the other with respect to certainty—as action-generating assurance 
on the decision-maker’s part replaces the almost paralyzing fear of risk, which had ruled 
in him before. In doing so, I will first devote attention to the idea of risk generally, 
outside of Pascal’s text. After providing a reading of a passage from Heidegger’s “What 
Are Poets For?” on the ideas of risk and being “thrown”—the image of thrown-ness 
relating in marvelous ways to the whirling of roulette wheels and the colloquialism for a 
“spinning mind”128—I will turn to the source of certainty for Pascal. What 
                                                
128 I have found a confluence between the existential riskiness and contingency of being thrown in 
Heidegger’s sense and the metaphor for experiencing chaotic life situations—such as literal 
gambling—as “spinning out of control.” Lears, for one, points to this in quoting the early 
twentieth-century literary critic William Rose Benét. “‘We [Americans] regard life as a faro 
layout. We have roulette wheels spinning in our brains, and anything is likely to turn up’” (243). 
Dostoevsky’s short novel The Gambler leads to more sustained thought about how a person’s life 
can be sent whirling like a roulette wheel (and because of a roulette wheel). Consider, for example, 
the passage: “I’m sitting in this dreary little town (oh, how dreary little German towns are!), and 
instead of thinking over the next step, I live under the influence of feelings just past, under the 
influence of fresh memories, under the influence of all this recent whirl, which drew me into the 
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philosophically and theologically enables him to refute uncertainty and conflate fides 
with confidence? How does he reach this declaration about faith, which he makes in the 
conclusion of his address, “at every step you take along this road you will see that your 
gain is so certain and your risk so negligible that in the end you will realize that you 
have wagered on something certain and infinite for which you have paid nothing”? For, 
in this statement he not only conveys his own attitude of assurance but makes a promise 
of certainty to the burgeoning believer. The wager, once defined by risk, proves at the 
end to be as decided and settled a thing as fate—or, for Pascal, faith. 
It is worth entering a general discussion on risk by way of definition. Thus far, I 
have been using the terms “risk,” “uncertainty,” and “insecurity” somewhat 
synonymously. Along with the word “chance,” they do share a register of meaning, yet 
it is still instructive to consider the difference of their linguistic roots. The vocabulary of 
“risk” (rizikon, risicum, le risque, and das Risiko in Greek, Latin, French, and German 
respectively) emerged in a commercial context. It was used to refer to the possibility of 
damage or loss of merchandise. More broadly, it carries the sense of any hazardous 
action or dangerous venture.  
An understanding of “uncertainty” comes from the negation of the adjective 
“certain,” which derives from the Latin certus. What is certus is determined, settled, sure: 
decided. The relationship between certainty and decision, while unclear experientially 
                                                
turbulence then, and threw me out of it again somewhere. It still seems to me at times that I’m 
spinning in the same whirl, and that the storm is about to rush upon me, snatch me up with its 
wing in passing, and I will again break out of all order and sense of measure and spin, spin, spin 
…” (277). And: “My life was breaking in two, but since the previous day I had become 
accustomed to staking all I had. Maybe it was really true that the money was too much for me 
and got me into a whirl” (307). These associations are only sweetened by Pascal’s own scientific 
work on the roulette curve, which Mesnard reports. “Towards the middle of 1658, in rather 
curious circumstances, Pascal became once again rather more directly involved with science. … 
One evening Pascal had gone to bed with a raging toothache. To forget his pain, he set himself to 
reflect on a difficult problem not completely solved even to-day, that of the curve then called in 
France the ‘roulette’ and later more generally known as the cycloid. It is a curve traced by a point 
on the radius of a circle within, on, or outside its circumference, as the circle rolls along a straight 





(we make plenty of uncertain decisions), is clear etymologically, given that certus is the 
past participle of cernere, the infinitive commonly rendered “to decide.”  
“Insecurity,” another word connoting danger, may be thought of as a double 
negative, “in” being attached as a negating prefix to “security,” which itself stems from 
the Latin securus, “without care.” To be secure is to be safe, without care or concern for 
danger; a secure person or thing is protected, even “bound” in the sense of being 
(whether comfortably or firmly) hemmed in or wrapped up. Lovingly held in a person’s 
arms, a baby may be described as secure, but a crime scene may be spoken of in the 
same way, hence the order, “secure the perimeter!” Insecurity involves the drive to care 
for and attend to one’s vulnerabilities. 
The etymology of “chance” is a gift to philosophy, suffused as it is with the idea 
of motion, specifically that of falling. A literal translation of the root word of chance, 
cadentia, is “the falling out or happening of events.”129,130 This is seen, too, in the German 
synonym for accident and chance, Zufall. The association with falling not only recalls the 
representation of chance in the rolling, tossing, and throwing of dice. It also relates to the 
accidental nature of happiness, to which the phrase “happy-go-lucky” points. That 
people often find the attainment of happiness to be chancy and unpredictable is further 
borne by the cognates of happiness and happenstance, and in the equivocality of the 
German word Glück, which may be translated either as “happiness” or “luck” (Lears, 
38).131 In sum, among the traits and conditions implied by the definitions of “risk,” 
                                                
129 Cadentia is a late Latin form that comes from cadere, “to fall.” 
 
130 Like the personification of fortune as Lady Luck, chance is feminine in French and German: la 
chance and die Chance. It is curious that the French word risque underwent a change in gender, 
switching from a feminine to a masculine noun between 1578 and 1633 (OED). 
 
131 Linking happiness to gambling and salvation, Tanner writes: “According to him [Pascal], the 
uncertainty of happiness in this life is behind the penchant to gamble: because happiness is a bad 
bet, one tries to gamble one’s cares away. The better response to the odds against happiness, 
Pascal suggests, is the gamble of faith—more precisely, the gamble of the conduct appropriate to 
faith—for the chance of salvation or lasting happiness” (228). In making his argument in this 




“uncertainty,” “insecurity,” and “chance” are—along with the senses of danger and 
potential loss—the states of being unsettled, in motion, and out of control.  
Historically, besides Pascal, the philosophy of risk has found discussants in the 
figures of William James and Martin Heidegger. Heidegger in his later thought wrote a 
thorough meditation on the noun die Wage (now spelled Waage), the German word for 
the balancing apparatus and a cognate of the English term “wager.” At length, he writes: 
As ventured, those who are not protected are nevertheless not abandoned. If 
they were, they would be just as little ventured as if they were protected. 
Surrendered only to annihilation, they would no longer hang in the balance. In 
the Middle Ages the word for balance, die Wage, still means about as much as 
hazard or risk [Gefahr]. This is the situation in which matters may turn out one 
way or the other. That is why the apparatus which moves by tipping one way or 
the other is called die Wage. It plays and balances out [Sie spielt und spielt sich ein]. 
The word Wage, in the sense of risk and as name of the apparatus, comes from 
wägen, wegen, to make a way, that is, to go, to be in motion. Be-wägen means to 
cause to be on the way [auf den Weg] and so to bring into motion: to shake or 
rock, wiegen. What rocks is said to do so because it is able to bring the balance, 
Wage, into the play of movement [ins Spiel der Bewegung zu bringen], this way or 
that. What rocks the balance weighs down; it has weight. To weigh or throw in 
the balance, as in the sense of wager, means to bring into the movement of the 
game [in den Gang des Spieles bringen], to throw into the scales, to release into risk. 
What is so ventured [das Gewagte] is, of course, unprotected; but because it hangs 
[liegt] in the balance, it is retained in the venture. It is upheld. Its ground keeps it 
safely within it. What is ventured, as something that is, is something that is 
willed; retained within the will, it itself remains in the mode of will, and ventures 
itself [und wagt sich]. What is ventured is thus careless [sorg-los], sine cura, 
securum—secure, safe [sicher]. What is ventured can follow the venture, follow it 
into the unprotectedness of the ventured, only if it rests securely in the venture. 
The unprotectedness of what is ventured not only does not exclude, it necessarily 
includes, its being secure in its ground. What is ventured goes along with the 
venture [Das Gewagte geht mit dem Wagnis mit]. (100-101) 
 
This passage, with its own concluding turn to security, appears in Heidegger’s essay 
“What Are Poets For?” It offers the continuation of a discussion of the idea of being 
ventured, which emerges from a reading of Rainer Maria Rilke’s poem “improvised 
verses.” In the paragraph preceding the one cited here, Heidegger (again, following 
Rilke) contrasts being ventured with the state of being shielded. Being shielded is being 
dear.132 To be ventured, though, is to be released into risk, thrown in the balance. 
                                                
132 “Nature ventures living beings, and ‘grants none special cover.’ Likewise, we men who have 
been ventured are ‘no dearer’ to the daring that ventures us. … To dare is to risk the game.  … 
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Importantly, this differs from being abandoned or annihilated. Being ventured, 
therefore, is a neither/nor occurrence: “being thrown in the balance” is itself balanced 
between the protection of being shielded and the annihilation of abandonment. This is 
curious because a set of scales, like a seesaw in a playground, could serve as a 
representation of the notion of dichotomy. Either a side is up or it is weighed down. The 
possibility of equilibrium presents itself, however, as a third option: a level state of rest 
in which neither side moves.    
 Movement, though, at least in Heidegger’s analysis, seems to be the point. To 
hang (or lie) in the balance as a ventured thing is to be on the way. It is to be in the 
process of tipping, about to fall or rise. Only plants and animals repose securely as they 
are in the balance (132). Whether or not we can hear an echo of Pascal’s “you are 
embarked” in it,133 this text’s phrase “on the way” (auf den Weg) is significant to my 
investigation because of the link it has to play. For Heidegger, play provides an 
expression for the movement of balancing out, as evinced in the statements “[i]t plays 
and balances out” ([s]ie spielt und spielt sich ein) and “[t]o weigh or throw in the balance, 
as in the sense of wager, means to bring into the movement of the game” (Wagen heißt: in 
den Gang des Spieles bringen). While he does not analyze Spiel (“game,” “gamble,” or 
“play”) to support his view, he does provide evidence for the etymological relation 
between Wage and the infinitives wegen, wiegen, and Be-wägen (related to Bewegung). The 
closeness of these terms reflects the role of motion in the function of scales. Balancing 
apparatuses (Wage) are made in such a way as to respond to the weight of what is placed 
                                                
What is shielded is entrusted to the protector, the shielder. Our older and richer language would 
have used words like verlaubt, verlobt—held dear” (100). 
 
133 Or, in a different context, one might recall Franz Rosenzweig’s description in The Star of 




upon them by moving (wegen), that is, by “rocking” or “shaking” (wiegen).134 This is also 
why with wagers you speak of weighing your options.  
Movement away from equilibrium into a decisive position is Pascal’s aim in the 
wager argument, too—at the start, he presents his interlocutor as stuck between the 
equally weighted possibilities of God existing or not. In one sense (the literal one), 
decision—any decision—brings about certainty simply by settling an unsure matter 
(again, because the Latin root certus signifies “decided”). At some point it is necessary to 
turn to passions, practice, and the will to interrupt the ruminating of reason, which 
could go on endlessly taking things into account.135 There is another sense at work, 
though. For, which decision the libertine makes is of utmost importance to Pascal. He in 
no way would want to say that it is possible for the libertine to arrive at a peaceful state 
by deciding against God. Rather, in the course of reasoning with him, Pascal is 
dedicated to incline him in a particular direction—toward faith. It is this move that I am 
analyzing here as a “tip” from risk to certainty.  
To Davidson’s identification of the quest for certainty as one of the main themes 
in Pascal’s thought (34), I add the contention that Pascal finds certainty in two sources: 
the Bible and mathematical logic. He has a biblical warrant for assimilating faith and 
certainty in Hebrews 11:1, “[n]ow faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the 
conviction of things not seen.” And, indeed, he displays such a use of “faith” at the 
beginning of “Infini rien” when he writes “by faith we know [God’s] existence, through 
glory we shall know his nature” (emphasis mine). Despite his statement in §577 that 
                                                
134 The English verb “weigh” is related to the Old High German wegan and the Middle High 
German wegen (to move, shake, weigh), as well as the modern German transitive and intransitive 
verbs wägen and wiegen (to weigh and to be of a certain weight). By virtue of its Germanic root, 
“weigh” is linked to a range of words, including “way,” “wagon,” and even—with their 
connection to the notion of “pledge”—the terms “wed,” “wage(s),” and “wager” (OED). 
    
135 This is evident in the conclusion of fragment §821, which reads: “Reason works slowly, 
looking so often at so many principles, which must always be present, that it is constantly 
nodding or straying because all its principles are not present. Feeling does not work like that, but 





religion is not certain, in §131 he attributes certainty to faith with respect to human 
beings’ purposeful creation and our awareness of our conscious—and not dreaming—
state.  
Apart from theological grounds of assurance, there is comfort in the logic of the 
numerical analysis in the wager, quantification serving as a possible mechanism of 
control. As several critics and scholars maintain, Pascal’s logic throughout the Wager is 
sound. This is not insignificant, but it is not the whole story. The argument works with 
the probabilities he assigns—his conclusion follows from his premises—but the 
probabilities themselves are highly questionable. 
The large role that Pascal affords to reason in his argument is significant because, 
in proceeding with his discussion of gambling probabilistically, Pascal is calling the 
libertine to make a calculated surrender. Note how distinct Pascal’s use of wagering is 
from the association of (some forms of) ordinary gambling with unthinking spontaneity, 
wasteful squandering, and an ir-/anti-rational refusal of systematic analysis. While 
Pascal points to chance, he does not celebrate it or surrender himself to it. He controls it 
by measuring it. This quantification, with a sense of God’s grace, leads to certainty. If 
Pascal did not retain a strong sense of God’s grace, he would be apt to fall into the 
category of “evangelical rationalists,” which Lears describes. 
The dichotomy between cultures of chance and cultures of control is one Lears 
raises in his chapter “Confidence Games.” He points to the growing emphasis among 
nineteenth-century American Christians on the role of human will in choosing God over 
the unpredictability of God’s grace in electing them. It is in this context that Lears writes 
of the move to assimilate the mysteries of grace to “evangelical rationality” (135). 
Although the role of God’s grace is not diminished in Pascal’s thought, his approach—
with its heavy reliance on reason—betrays an affinity much more with the side of those 
seeking control than the (often creative) people inclined towards celebrations of chance. 
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In part because of his use of reason, then, he reaches certainty in the end. And, on the 
same basis, the Pascalian bettor never loses control in playing. 
In §418, gambling paradoxically provides security for the libertine whose 
happiness otherwise rests on precarious grounds. In being ventured, that is, in 
venturing himself, he comes to experience safety in God—a religious parallel to 
Heidegger’s claim at the end of the passage that I cited from “What Are Poets For?” 
There is a spinning out of control but it turns out that there is also a special form of 
control induced by radical spinning. Thus, we may be confident that wagering is the 
way forward—it is the Weg, the path of extreme movement, the sure Spiel. As Pascal sets 




 To recapitulate the findings from the previous six sections on contrasting and 
contradictory elements of Pascal’s gambling-based Christian apology in Pensées §418, we 
may say that Pascal issues a call for divertissement-loving libertines to a radical form of 
play. The object of this gamble is nothing other than deciding one’s self and one’s future. 
This is (1) a free decision that emerges from a paradoxically forced play situation. This is 
(2) a rational decision that is made by going beyond reason. This is (3) a “timely” 
decision that affects one’s community, one’s course of life, and one’s eternal lot. This is 
(4) a decision that derives from the interplay of reason and the passions. Because it stems 
not only from the mind but also from the heart, it has bodily consequences—it is enacted 
physically in religious customs. This is (5) a costly-yet-prudential decision. One stands to 
gain so much from making it that the stakes are reduced in the end to seemingly 
infinitesimal proportions. In this manner, gambling on God reveals its relation to grace. 
As Lears so convincingly presents in his study, gambling, like gifts and grace, operates 
on the principle of receiving something in exchange for nothing. Lastly, this is (6) a 
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decision that melds the radical movement of risk with the peaceful assurance of 
certainty. Reading Pascal on this subject in conjunction with Søren Kierkegaard provides 
the view of play as a mechanism for bringing about maturity rather than seeing play as a 
symbol merely of childhood. Together, Pascal and Kierkegaard bring us to a brink of 
decision and commitment, leaving the content of our choice in our hands. It’s either 
infinity or nothing.     
Thousands of years before Pascal almost died crossing the Seine, there was a 
myth about another life-deciding crossing, the crossing of the River of Forgetfulness. 
Plato relayed it at the end of the Republic (Partenie, “Plato’s Myths”). The famous 
Armenian myth of Er is framed as a story of a hero who dies in battle but comes back to 
life to report what he found in the afterlife. As part of his narrative, Er tells of Lachesis, 
the daughter of Necessity. Lachesis instructs mortals that they are to choose their lives 
from a wide assortment of possible conditions before they are born into a new cycle of 
existence. The order in which they choose is determined by lot, but the mortals are 
responsible for their decisions. Some are hasty in selecting their selves and statuses, 
swayed by vanity and pleasures. Others are reactive, not wanting certain forms of life 
based on past experiences. Those who choose well and with care are imbued with the 
virtue that is available freely and plentifully. Once they have all chosen, but before they 
are collectively reborn, the souls are obliged to drink from the river of unmindfulness. 
This brings about deep forgetfulness, except on the part of Er, who neither had to choose 
a soul nor partake of the special water. Thus, the concluding page of the Republic reads: 
And so, Glaucon, his story wasn’t lost but preserved, and it would save us, if we 
were persuaded by it, for we would then make a good crossing of the River of 
Forgetfulness, and our souls wouldn’t be defiled. But if we are persuaded by me, 
we’ll believe that the soul is immortal and able to endure every evil and every 
good, and we’ll always hold to the upward path, practicing justice with reason in 
every way. That way we’ll be friends both to ourselves and to the gods while we 
remain here on earth and afterwards—like victors in the games who go around 
collecting their prizes—we’ll receive our rewards. Hence, both in this life and on 





It is to Plato’s treatment of play in his last dialogue, the Laws, that we will turn in 























Strange Puppets: The Lowliness of Divine Playthings in Plato’s Laws 
 
 
Several scholars have addressed the theme of play in Plato’s writings under 
various guises. After contributions concerning play’s relation to seriousness 
(Emmanuelle Jouët-Pastré); sovereignty (Aikaterini Lefka); power (Mihai Spariosu); 
freedom (Christopher Bobonich, André Laks); and, of course, education (R.G. Bury, John 
Cleary, Werner Jaeger, Arthur Krentz), I would like to attempt a study of play that 
concentrates on in its relation to lowliness (or tapeinôtes in ancient Greek), focusing on 
the image of living beings as divine puppets, which Plato supplies in Books I and VII of 
his Laws.136 Because of the strange playfulness of the image, to speak of tapeinôtes entails 
a discussion of serious worth, too. For, in short, Plato simultaneously lowers and lifts us 
by imagining human beings as stringed toys of god.137,138 He ridicules us, giving us a 
reason to think that we have a relatively low standing in the universe. And yet he also 
allows us to see ourselves as deserving of a relatively high position in the universe. We 
                                                
136 As in English, the Greek term for “lowliness,” tapeinôtes, can refer to lowness of place and 
lowness of stature. Liddell and Scott list “brought down” and “humbled” as possible translations 
for the adjective tapeinos. To temper possible Christian overtones of “humility”—which is 
presumably less Christian-sounding than “meekness”—I will alternate between referring to 
“lowliness” as “humility” and “modesty.” An additional point may offer further clarification. 
Although the idea of lowliness runs counter to the idea of pride, tapeinôtes does not seem to be 
the precise antonym for hybris linguistically. For, the arrogance of hybris is conveyed as 
riotousness more than exaltedness. Hybris calls to mind an excessiveness that is opposed to 
“moderation,” sophrosynê. Lastly, I should raise the issue of considering humility and pride on the 
part of human beings relative to god. One of the points that I will raise in this chapter is the 
impossibility of divine pride. In a related manner, the potential failure on the part of human 
beings is to see ourselves as too much like god. This relates tangentially to Kierkegaard’s interest 
in assumed immortality at the stage of Religiousness A.  
     
137 To reiterate, I will use “god” in the singular, lower-case form for the most part in the 
discussion of Plato and play, as a way of accommodating the different views of the divine in 
Plato’s corpus.  
 
138 This raising and lowering recalls the moderate view of human nature, which Pascal holds. “Il 
est dangereux de trop faire voir à l’homme combien il est égal aux bêtes, sans lui montrer sa grandeur. Et il 
est encore dangereux de lui trop faire voir sa grandeur sans sa bassesse. Il est encore plus dangereux de lui 




may be artifacts of god, but at least god finds it worthwhile to play with us.139 Plato’s up-
and-down movement mirrors the actions of a puppeteer. It also accords closely with 
other philosophers’ understandings of play as something (intrinsically, unendingly) 
oscillatory.140  
In what follows, I will give close readings of three passages from the Laws (715e-
716d, 644d-645c, and 803a-804c), which address human nature and the intersection of 
play, virtue, happiness, and education. Besides seeking to demonstrate how they contain 
this joint element of humble-highness, in analyzing the selected texts I will argue that 
three levels of play are at work/in play in them: the divine, human, and Platonic.  
First, we see god as a player and legislator, the possessor of toys who provides 
the condition for the game of life by setting rules (standards, limitations) for right living. 
While Plato is reluctant to set forward much by way of positive detail concerning the 
playful nature of god—for example, he states that it is impossible to know whether god 
made us as playthings or for a serious purpose—he is clear that god is the measure of all 
things, beginning, middle, and end. God is the standard bearer, and we live well when 
we follow god. Plato shows that the proper response on the part of human beings to our 
identity as divine puppets is to play along; too much seriousness on our parts toward 
ourselves or even toward the best, most important things in our human realm is not 
                                                
139 I am grateful to Katja Vogt for supplying this point, and for her comments on an earlier 
version of this chapter. 
 
140 Thus, Gadamer writes: “If we examine how the word ‘play’ is used and concentrate on its so-
called metaphorical senses, we find talk of the play of light, the play of the waves, the play of 
gears or parts of machinery, the interplay of limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats, even a 
play on words. In each case what is intended is to-and-fro movement that is not tied to any goal 
that would bring it to an end. Correlatively, the word ‘Spiel’ originally meant ‘dance,’ and is still 
found in many word forms (e.g., in Spielmann, jongleur). The movement of playing has no goal 
that brings it to an end; rather, it renews itself in constant repetition. The movement backward 
and forward is obviously so central to the definition of play that it makes no difference who or 
what performs this movement. The movement of play as such has, at it were, no substrate. It is 
the game that is played—it is irrelevant whether or not there is a subject who plays it. The play is 
the occurrence of the movement as such. Thus we speak of the play of colors and do not mean 
only that one color plays against another, but that there is one process or sight displaying a 




befitting our toy nature. Unexpectedly, though, we are allowed to treat the serious 
things of religion as play. This is a strange mixing. Bewildering, it invites careful but not 
too earnest reflection.  
Play is enacted on what I am calling the second, human level in specifically 
recommended and prescribed forms, which may themselves be subclassified. On the one 
hand, human beings respond to the divine players by singing, dancing, and sacrificing 
in measured, rule-bound ways—because we are limited. This is our joyful humbling. On 
the other hand, we also engage in the play of education and legislation—because we are 
free. And this is our sober elevation. Whereas joyful humbling accompanies our 
participation in activities oriented toward god, sober elevation marks our human-
directed play. This difference may be expressed as playing with and playing like.  
Human beings play with god, observing our limits, obeying god’s rules, and 
passing time with god—spending our pastime—in religious rituals.141 In doing so, we 
try to “win” prizes from god, like god’s favor during war. We need god’s help to attain 
victory in all sorts of battles, yet we must remember the directionality of play. We may 
make choices that are in line with divine justice, and this is to our great benefit, but it 
strongly behooves us to keep in view our inability to sway or manipulate god’s ways. 
Mindful of our measure, we play with god under strict constraints.  
We discover our own elevation and the grandness of our freedom, however, 
when we imitate god. For, we play like god when we lay down political rules for our 
cities. This must be undertaken with soberness and care. Education (paideia) is another 
form of our play (paidia), which strengthens the best in us, guiding us as we engage in 
                                                
141 In some languages and schools of thought, the words and ideas of pastime, leisure, and play are 
synonymous or deeply related, even if distinguishable. Thus, in their standard Greek-English 
Lexicon, Liddell and Scott offer “pastime” in addition to “game” and “childish play” as possible 
definitions for paidia. Scholê, from which the English words “school” and “scholastic” derive, 




the noblest competition—the (self-agonistic?) contest for virtue. In this educational and 
moral dimension, play is treated as highly purposive, even dutiful.  
Thirdly, I would like to suggest that there is a level at which Plato is at play with 
us, his readers, in the dialogue, in the form his philosophy takes and in his choice of 
words. Beyond word games, Plato engages in fanciful feats of myth-telling and 
imagination, which typically count as instances of play. To illustrate the height of 
human dignity and freedom, Plato uses an image that I find is hard to take seriously: a 
divine puppet.142 Could there be a seemingly less-fitting figure to convey autonomy than 
a marionette? Is Plato being deliberately ridiculous in taking such a counterintuitive 
approach? In supplying this particular image, is Plato merely pulling our strings—and 
(how) should we play back? Given that the first level of divine play had implications for 
second level human players—keeping a strict player/toy boundary in tact: while we 
might be called to play with god, god never becomes our toy—I wonder whether Plato’s 
third level of play encourages or more strongly calls for a particularly playful response 
from us as readers. Does it beckon us to imitate him? Are we allowed to make sport of 
him in return, and what would that mean? At the very least, Plato’s playful philosophy 
seems to merit a “fitting” interpretation, that is, our refusal to read with a straight tone 
what he sets forth slanted. 
 
I. INTRODUCING THE LAWS 
 
Before turning to the above-mentioned “measure” passage (715e-716d) and the 
two marionette texts (644d-645c and 803a-804c), I would like to offer a few introductory 
                                                
142 I find the image of the puppet to be suggestive of play, but there are at least two reasons to 
treat it seriously. One is that the image may cause us to think of human beings as artifacts made 
by the gods. A second, related point concerns the reasons human beings would be created by the 
gods. Would it not be demeaning in Plato’s eyes to regard god as in need of entertainment? 
Presumably, a self-sufficient god would not have to have or treat the world as a toy. Again, I 




remarks on the Laws, particularly concerning the connection between play and 
education.143  
The Laws, Plato’s longest and last dialogue, is marked as strange (atopos) in a 
number of respects, not least of all by Socrates’ absence in it. Rather than by Socrates, the 
role of the leading locutor is inhabited by the “Athenian Stranger,” who sets out on a 
conversation with Cleinias (a Cretan) and Megillus (a Spartan) about legislation and the 
founding of a utopian city (“Magnesia”).144 The exchange takes place outside of Athens, 
where most of the other dialogues occur and from where Plato himself comes (hence the 
Athenian’s foreign or “strange” status in the work). That it is a religious conversation is 
indicated by its beginning, setting, and content. Plato introduces the religious 
framework by opening the dialogue with the word theos. He secures the religious 
framework on the other end by making Zeus’ temple the destination toward which the 
three older men journey. Along their course, the (semi-)divine origin of the laws is 
stressed. Theological discussions receive specific treatment in Book X. In addition to a 
defense for the existence of the gods, that book offers the two claims (and mandated 
beliefs for citizens) that the gods care for the world and are impervious to persuasion 
through prayer. A further point of religious interest is the stipulation in Book VII that 
village temples should serve as the sites where children “congregate” and “assemble” to 
play (794a), turning holy ground into playgrounds.   
                                                
143 In addition to such regularly recognized treatments of the Laws as Glenn Morrow’s Plato’s 
Cretan City (1960) and R.F. Stalley’s Introduction to Plato’s Laws (1983), more recent attention to the 
dialogue includes Christopher Bobonich’s book Utopia Recast (2002), the sixth symposium of the 
International Plato Society, which was dedicated to the dialogue in 2001, as well as Plato’s “Laws”: 
A Critical Guide (2010, edited by Bobonich), Plato’s Laws: Force and Truth in Politics (2013, edited 
by Gregory Recco and Eric Sanday), and Mark Lutz’s Divine Law and Political Philosophy in Plato’s 
Laws (2012).  
 
144 There is an etymological link underlying the ideas of strangeness and an ideally perfect but 
imaginary land. Whereas a-topos (“unusual,” “strange”) literally means “out of place,” utopia 
comes from the phrase ou topos, meaning “not a place.” If “utopia” is taken (even incorrectly) to 




A side point of interest for this chapter is the difference between the Republic and 
the Laws with respect to psychic and civic partition. In the Republic, justice comes about 
when the function principle is followed, that is, when each of the three parts of the soul 
(reason, spirit, and appetite) and each of the three classes of the city (the philosophers, 
warriors, and artisans) does its own work or minds its own business. In the Laws, such 
tripartite division is missing. As we will see, it has been replaced by bipartition instead: 
the rational and everything else.145 My question is whether one can recognize a shift 
from an emphasis on work in the Republic to an interest in play in the Laws as correlative 
to a shift from the threefold to the twofold. If there is a link between bipartite division 
and play, could play then be understood as supplying itself as some third, mediating 
thing? 
An investigation into a work-tripartition link and a play-bipartition link, as I 
conceive it, would also involve consideration of unique callings. That is, Plato argues for 
specific vocations based on specific natures and classes in the Republic. In the view 
proffered there, a person in whom reason rules is not meant to work as a soldier or a 
cobbler. That much is clear. How could there be specific play callings within a bipartite 
scheme, though? Is there a type of play, which, proper to legislators, differs from play 
for everyone else—namely legislating? In what way does the activity of setting down 
rules count as play? On a theoretical level, it seems entirely feasible to separate the 
identity of a “game master” (a person who creates a game) and a player.  In addition, the 
Stranger states in 643b that, from childhood, a person should play at her intended 
occupation. What within the Laws’ account of the city and psychê would determine the 
form a child’s play (and work) should take? According to the logic of the Laws, is there 
another plane on which bipartition allows for an openness toward play, a freedom for 
                                                
145 I accept that bipartition is characteristic of the Laws, however it is a matter in dispute. Along 
with Helen North (Sophrosyne, 187), D.A. Rees recognizes a twofold division (“Bipartition of the 
Soul in the Early Academy”), whereas T.J. Saunders upholds a tripartite view in his article “The 




the rational and the irrational to play the same games—namely the religious games of 
offering sacrifices? Or is an irrational person impious, and therefore a bad player in the 
games of religion? These are a few questions that an inquiry into a “play principle” in 
the Laws might involve. Seeking to answer them could also serve to illuminate the 
nature of coordination and the means of its achievement. How would a play principle 
differ from the function principle in bringing about harmony between parts? For, 
regardless of the number of parts, Plato’s goal of harmony is continuous across the two 
dialogues.   
 The word pais (child) leads naturally to paidia (play), which easily expands to 
paideia (upbringing or education). It is not difficult to see the relation between these 
terms or how their ideas develop, building on each other. I would like to suggest that 
the connection between the ideas of childhood and play find an additional expression 
through the word for pedagogy, which combines pai and agôgê. Agôgê (“training,” 
“education,” “force,” “a carrying away”) is a fascinating term on account of its closeness 
to the word agôn. Agôn signifies both a gathering and a contest for a prize at the games. 
(Therefore, a “synagogue” is a place where people gather together but “agonistic” 
implies competition.) The teaching of children is a leading not unrelated to contests and 
the assemblies of religious and legislative bodies. We might get carried away with 
passions but education trains us to follow the right leadings. Tether ropes—or puppet 
strings—begin to suggest themselves as pertinent images. 
Plato writes of play in a way that differs from, or contests, definitions that have 
found rather broad acceptance today. When Plato treats play as something that is 
deliberately and dutifully sought for its utility, on the one hand, and as something that 
encompasses the whole of life, on the other, he counters a range of modern thinkers 
whether in sociology, psychology, or theology, who theorize play as an end in itself, 
which is expressed in times and places separated from ordinary life. These thinkers 
might acknowledge the potential rewards of play, but they insist on the secondary status 
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of the benefits as unintended “by-products.” Play, as Plato conceives it in the Laws, 
however, is a worthwhile activity when it is approached as an instrument serving noble 
ends—a tool for cultivating virtue (in the case of children) or exercising rationality in 
legislating and piety in offering sacrifices (in the case of adults).146 It is linked both to 
work and to seriousness.147 
The relationship between play and seriousness (spoudê) in Plato’s thought is not 
straightforward—perhaps it shifts—and so scholars in their various interpretations 
capture the two ideas in different moments of their interplay. In one estimation, which 
uplifts a statement from Plato’s Sixth Letter, play and seriousness are essentially 
linked.148 Representative of this position is Gavin Ardley, who writes of a “conjunction 
even to the point of assimilation” (226) and states quite strongly that Plato “waged a life-
long war against the dichotomy” between play and seriousness (231).149 Seth Benardete 
takes another approach. The analysis he offers of the oscillation of the Stranger’s 
speeches in the Laws makes clear that Benardete retains a dichotomous view of the two 
                                                
146 Freydberg adopts a different perspective and maintains that Plato holds a view of play as 
intrinsically valuable. Drawing attention to the definition offered in the Laws 667e (where the 
Stranger says “it is precisely this that I call ‘play’, when it has no particular good or bad effect 
that deserves serious attention”), Freydberg writes, “[h]ere, play is given simply as gracefulness 
for its own sake, and as antecedent to the more philosophically serious determinations of play-in-
service-to-lawfulness or play-in-service-to-truth” (17). The following chapter in this third, 
“religious” section of the dissertation will consider play in relation to grace.  
 
147 The Stranger asserts that leisure neither corresponds nor leads to luxurious laxity. In other 
words, the playful are not lazy. “Now, do such leisured circumstances leave them no pressing 
work to do, no genuinely appropriate occupation? … No … we must insist that there is 
something left to do in a life of leisure, and it’s only fair that the task imposed, far from being a 
light or trivial one, should be the most demanding of all. … To follow this regimen and to get the 
maximum benefit from it, the whole day and the whole night is scarcely time enough. In view of 
this, every gentleman must have a timetable prescribing what he is to do every minute of his life, 
which he should follow at all times from the dawn of one day until the sun comes up at the dawn 
of the next” (807a-d). In response to such a description, one may ask: Is Plato serious? 
 
148 “Adopt it [this letter] as a just and binding law and covenant, taking a solemn oath—in 
gentlemanly earnest, but with the playfulness that is the sister of solemnity—in the name of the 
divine letter of all things present and to come …” (323c-d). 
 
149 This interpretation is consonant with the dialectical description in the Laws 816e: “Now anyone 
who means to acquire a discerning judgement will find it impossible to understand the serious 
side of things in isolation from their ridiculous aspect, or indeed appreciate anything at all except 




qualities. Referring to the speech in 803c, he writes of a change in the Stranger’s focus 
and states, “[h]e is [now] concerned only with the beginning. At the beginning is play or 
paidia. His proposal to consecrate play turned play into its contrary. He was compelled 
to be serious (spoudazein) and eliminate play (paizein). Now he takes it all back” (207).150 
In his book The Play of the Platonic Dialogues, Bernard Freydberg adds another layer to 
these considerations of the play-seriousness dynamic when he looks at the Republic and 
proposes that “calling imitation ‘playful and not serious’ can also be heard playfully” 
(156). Freydberg uses the application of play at this meta-level as a way to praise 
imitation, rather than denigrate it. Refusing to nail down or settle on a single, firm view, 
I will accept the indeterminacy of the changing relationship between play and 
seriousness. Such a tack accords with a broad approach to understanding the definition 
of “games” amidst their disparate manifestations. Some occurrences of play are 
undertaken with the concentration warranted by a fierce and dire fight. These could 
count as much as instances of play as those “frivolous” pursuits among light-hearted 
people among whom nothing ultimate is at stake.   
Instantiations of play in the Laws are numerous. The variety of its forms among 
human beings may be seen in the different types of games proper to children and adults, 
boys and girls, and the enslaved and free. The play that initially arises among children 
spontaneously (autophuês, by self-nature) becomes strictly governed by external forces, 
once it is turned over to the stable control of non-changing rules (794a, 797b). In fact, the 
primary purpose of children’s play becomes training in heteronomy (rather than an 
autotelic—self-motivating and self-pleasing—exercise). Grown men revert to their 
childish selves in drinking symposia (645e-646a), which the Stranger offers as positive 
examples of efficient “examination by recreation” (650a); legislation, however, is a sober 
                                                
150 Benardete’s line “At the beginning is paidia” offers a striking third alternate to the Gospel 
statement “In the beginning was the word [logos]” (John 1:1) and Freud’s quotation of Goethe, “In 




game for old men (685a).151 Girls may acquire the same skills as boys (for example in 
handling weapons) but the play lessons should be attended separately after the age of 
six (794c-d). In music, it is shameful to mix tunes and rhythms distinctly suited to men 
and women, and enslaved and free persons (669c-670d). In the discussion of comedy 
and tragedy, the Stranger leaves the mimicry of ridiculous buffoonery to “slaves and 
hired aliens,” warning both male and female citizens never to be caught learning it 
(816e).    
While play falls under classifications of age, gender, and civil standing in the 
Laws, it is also categorized under three aspects of movement: the physical, vocal, and 
psychic. Therefore, one finds play in the movement of bodies in gymnastics, hunting, 
and dancing; in choruses, that is, the movement of singing voices, which may be 
accompanied by dancing; and in the movement of souls and heavenly bodies. This 
understanding of play—not only in terms of motion but also as motion—is central to 
later play theories. What is interesting in the more immediate context is the appearance 
of this idea (of play as motion) in the example of the manipulation of the marionette; 
jerky movements indicate rigidity, the tyranny of passion, and even perhaps seriousness 
and constraint.   
 
II. UPHOLDING THE DIVINE STANDARD: A MEASURED RESPONSE 
(TEXT: 4.715E-716D) 
 
After reviewing the Cretan and Spartan legal codes in Books I and II, and 
considering lessons from the history of government in Book III, Plato turns to the 
construction of the city of Magnesia and the rules governing its way of life in Book IV. 
There, in a discussion of justice and happiness in which he makes stark religious claims, 
                                                
151 Feasts of the god “who made us the gift of wine” afford the only occasion for appropriate 
drunkenness (775b). Much of the scholarship of Mihai Spariosu addressed to the figure and spirit 
of Dionysus would prove helpful in filling out this angle of play.   
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he demonstrates the relatively low stature and role belonging to human beings. In this 
portion of the text, Plato appraises the gods by affirming that they are the measure of all 
things. Recognizing that ultimate preeminence belongs to the gods and not humanity, he 
gives them their due reverence. Although this is the second of the three passages 
directing this chapter, I will begin with it. For, establishing an understanding of its 
claims will aid in our attempt to clarify Plato’s (earlier and later) use of the puppet 
image in 1.644d-645c and 7.803a-804c.   
Plato offers his assessment of how the divine nature should determine human 
nature and activity in a speech within a speech. Referring to an ancient story, the 
Stranger suggests what message to give to future colonists upon their arrival in the 
utopian city. Informing the content of the hypothetical address is the expression from 
the sophist Protagoras, “Man is the measure of all things.”152  
The lines of 715-716, whatever the complexity or maze of their deliverance, also 
carry multiple themes, including the themes of moderation and obedience. These may 
be thought through according to their theological and ethical dimensions. On the 
theological side, there is the not unparadoxical view of god to explore: in what way is 
god a being simultaneously all-encompassing in measure and yet moderate? In seeking 
to provide an answer, we may ask what standards, limits, or rules the divine nature sets. 
Another piece of a response to the seeming contradiction at the heart of the being of god 
is an analysis of moderation (sophrosynê); how is this virtue theorized in its connection to 
the traits, ideas, or terms modesty, measure, proportion, and self-mastery—but foremost, 
how is moderation an instantiation of lowliness? Also on the ethical side are the notions 
of friendly imitation and lowly, or humble, obedience. Raising the question of what it 
means for (divine) moderation to call for (human) moderation—for like to “follow” 
like—will lead into a consideration of the consequence(s) of religious sacrifice. Briefly, 
                                                




the consequence of god’s measure is the play of sacrifice; the consequence of sacrifice, 
piously offered, is successful living.153  
According to the Stranger’s counsel, colonists would be greeted in Magnesia 
with these words:  
[ATHENIAN:] “Men, according to the ancient story [ho palaios logos], there is a 
god who holds in his hands the beginning and end and middle [archên te kai 
teleutên kai mesa] of all things, and straight he marches in the cycle of nature. 
Justice, who takes vengeance on those who abandon the divine law, never leaves 
his side. The man who means to live in happiness latches on to her and follows 
her with meekness [tapeinos] and humility [orderly behavior, kekosmêmenos]. But 
he who bursts with pride, elated by wealth or honours or by physical beauty 
when young and foolish, whose soul is afire with the arrogant belief that so far 
from needing someone to control and lead him, he can play the leader to others – 
there’s a man whom God has deserted. … What action, then, should a sensible 
[emphrona] man take, and what should his outlook be? What must he avoid doing 
or thinking?” 
CLEINIAS: This much is obvious: every man must resolve to belong to those 
who follow in the company of God. 
ATHENIAN: “So what conduct recommends itself to God and reflects his 
wishes? There is only one sort, epitomized in the old saying ‘like approves of 
like’ (excess [ametra] apart, which is both its own enemy and that of due 
proportion [emmêtrios]). In our view it is God who is pre-eminently the ‘measure 
[metron] of all things’, much more so than any ‘man’, as they say. So if you want 
to recommend yourself to someone of this character, you must do your level best 
to make your own character reflect his, and on this principle [logon] the moderate 
man [ho … sophron] is God’s friend, being like him, whereas the immoderate and 
                                                
153 Drawing on Plato’s Laws (by way of Johan Huizinga), Robert Bellah defines play as autotelic 
and conjectures that religion emerged from mammalian play. In Religion and Evolution, Bellah 
writes of the connection between ritual and play as follows: “So, with Plato, I have returned to 
the central theme of this chapter—the emergence of religion from mammalian play. I have gone 
deep into our evolutionary past to discover the origin of parental care and of play many millions 
of years ago, in the leaping and jumping of ‘young things,’ as Plato said. Play is so important to 
me because long before Homo sapiens, probably long before primates, play had already emerged 
in the evolution of mammals as a sphere sheltered to some degree from selectionist pressures, 
having its end internal to its practice, however much it may have proved adaptive in secondary 
and tertiary forms. Language and culture have given play the possibility of enormous creative 
elaboration, and, with the constant help of Johan Huizinga and with the passages in Plato that 
Huizinga pointed out, I have found ritual and religion emerging from play. Here, too, we find 
practices whose good, first of all, is internal to the practices, though they may have adaptive or 
maladaptive consequences as they reflect back on the world of daily life. But if ritual comes from 
play, many other spheres of life develop out of ritual and its cultural implications. I have tried 
above to indicate what a complex historical process this has been” (111-112). While he draws on 
Plato, Bellah inverts Plato’s ludic argument. Plato appears to give religion priority, encouraging 
“living beings” to play at sacrifice and other activities because we belong to a playful god. Bellah 
by contrast places play at the beginning, attributing the rise of religion to animal practices 
protected from the pressures of selection. Going forward, it is worth considering what is at stake 
in arguing that ritual derives from play—rather than in simply associating ritual with play, as 




unjust man is not like him and is his enemy; and the same reasoning applies to 
the other vices too.” (715e-716d, original emphasis) 
 
The beginning, end, and middle correspond to the domain of god. The fullness of 
god’s measure is the entirety of the archê, teleutê, and mesê. Nothing is excluded from 
“the All” of god’s possession. Such a message probably originated as an Orphic 
proclamation concerning the reach of Zeus (hence the use of the singular here, ho 
theos).154 Plato’s citation of it represents his refutation of the formula stemming from 
Protagoras that human beings have the measure of life within ourselves. Under the 
Protagorean view we could rule ourselves—with nothing beside ourselves, who or what 
would impinge upon us and prevent us from self-governance?—but an 
acknowledgement of god as the standard-bearer of life sets (potentially severe) limits on 
human beings, confining us to acts of obedience. This is reflected linguistically in that 
the word for measure, metron, can equally indicate “measuring-rod” or “measuring-
line.” In holding the ultimate measure of beginning, end, and middle within god’s self, 
god sets the boundaries, lines, and rules for us—making the world (kosmos) orderly 
(kosmoumena).  
Rules confine. This constricting function is positive, even necessary, for games. 
By producing order through constraint, keeping chaos at bay, rules provide the 
condition for the possibility of play. Similarly, observing religious rituals is a form of 
acknowledging the constraining and external power of god. Freydberg relates divine 
measure to the human limitation displayed in religious acts of play. In a way that 
highlights the language of rule, he writes, “[sacrificing, singing, and dancing] involve 
the introduction of measure, involve giving oneself over to a certain kind of rule. In 
sacrificing, one clearly admits one’s non-divinity; the offering of something of value to the 
                                                
154 It also corresponds nicely with a number of biblical descriptions of God. In the Hebrew Bible, 
one finds the characterization of God as the first and last in Isaiah 41:4, 44:6, and 48:12. Similarly, 
in the New Testament, Revelation 1:8, 21:6, and 22:13 supply the view of Christ as “Alpha and 
Omega,” “the beginning and the end” (he archê kai to telos), as well as “the first and the last” (ho 




gods acknowledges that one does not have one’s measure entirely within oneself. As to singing 
and dancing, both are arts which require measure and rule of both body and soul. For 
Plato, play is associated with rule and measure: this is why it is both fundamental and 
final” (20-21, emphasis mine). God’s preeminent powerfulness gives us reasons to 
adhere to forms of limitation, including the limitation of rules that ensure orderliness, 
whether in song, dance, or sacrifice. When we participate in these rule-governed 
activities as a way of honoring god, we show that we know our lowly human measure 
relative to god’s greatness. In following orders, we bring about order and display 
orderly-living.  
There is nothing shameful or demeaning for us in carrying out our duty to obey 
god; on the contrary, obedience is our “salvation.” When we obey god, we “follow” god; 
we come to attain perfection through the imitation of god’s ways. The dividing line 
begins to blur between following god through imitation and following god through 
obedience. Following god by imitating god paradoxically entails ruling ourselves as we 
take on the role of legislators, allowing us the same Protagorean end but without the 
(sophistic/sophisticated, self-serious) arrogance.155 
God is all-encompassing; god is also moderate in character. Thinking of god as 
unable to struggle morally, it is hard to conceive of there being divine virtues (like 
moderation). To say that god is moderate is to mean something different from human 
moderation, therefore. But what would divine moderation be? One way to countenance 
the notion of divine moderation is to link it to measure, insisting that god is moderate 
only insofar as god is measure.156 Plato himself says little, only attributing this quality to 
god indirectly, by means of his imitation principle. He states: “the moderate man is 
                                                
155 As Garciela E. Marcos de Pinotti writes, “Le législateur des Lois représente, no moins que le 
philosophe de la République, une instance qui n’est pas simplement humaine mais divine ; et en 
s’assujetissant à celle-ci, confie Platon, l’homme atteint la perfection, en s’assimilant au dieu dans la 
mesure où sa nature le lui permet” (Scolnicov, 118). 
 




God’s friend, being like him.” Again, it makes sense to claim that it is unseemly for 
human beings to exhibit the trait of excess, but is excess not appropriate to god qua 
immortal being? In the case of (human response to) god, could excess be “friendly” and 
(therefore) imitable? Ardley suggests that it is fitting when he writes, “[m]easure, the 
mean, is the proper rule for conducting the game of life. But our devotion to God breaks 
through the rules of human play; in devotion to God alone there is no mean” (236). By 
contrast, must we accept the Stranger’s statement “excess … is both its own enemy and 
that of due proportion” to mean that on all levels and for all beings, even god and the 
sub-gods, excess is always and only inimical? Let us trace Plato’s path into the subject of 
divine moderation, approaching it first through a consideration of imitation and 
likeness.  
Likeness or sameness was a defining aspect of friendship that carried some 
intellectual currency in the ancient Greek world. Philos denoted a friend, a person “dear” 
to one, even someone who was “one’s own.” In contrast to the peaceful, mutual, and 
harmonious relating of friends who in some sense “belonged” to each other, the 
relationship of enemies was marked (in general) by foreignness, otherness, difference, 
and strife. It is not difficult to see on which sides moderation and excess would fall in 
the friendship/enmity (likeness/difference, peace/war) dichotomy.  
In this passage, Plato presents the grand, ethical project of shaping oneself to be 
like a superior being (here, god), although without using the (playful, theatrical) term 
mimesis. Taking the Homeric proverb “like to like” (homoio to homoion) to be true, he 
states that one should embrace or bring about behavior in one’s own life that is similar 
to the esteemed conduct or manner of god.157 As Saunders translates it, a person does 
                                                
157 Injunctions to be like God appear in the Bible, most clearly in Leviticus 11:44-45, 19:2, and 20:7, 
in statements, which concern God’s holiness. It is noteworthy, though, that it says that it is the 
LORD who makes holy (20:7). This contrasts the apparent self-reliance in seeking moral 




this in order to “recommend” herself to god (prosphilê genesomenon, literally to become 
endeared or beloved). Such an undertaking is not only ethical but also friendly and 
modest.158 Because of the connection between likeness and friendship, it is behooving to 
make god the object of one’s imitation as one pursues divine favor and a happy life. 
Moreover, an attempt of this sort of divine mimicry is a gesture born of lowliness insofar 
as it makes its goal the exhibition of the pattern or stamp of god’s character on one’s life. 
It does not involve any sort of disrespectful mocking. Such arrogance (as is typically 
associated with mockery and the “mimicking” side of the sense of mimicry) is found 
instead in the refusal of divine imitation.159  
Plato’s indirect affirmation of god’s moderate character continues through the 
Stranger’s dismissal of excess. Following the Stranger’s declaration concerning the all-
encompassing measure of god and the clear expression of his stance against Protagoras, 
one might expect a depiction of god as exceeding in greatness. Instead of treating the 
ideas of excess and the totality of the divine measure as corollary, however, the Stranger 
                                                
Elizabeth Castelli critically addresses the discourses of mimesis in the Apostle Paul in her book 
Imitating Paul, using this very Laws passage as an example of the hierarchy and privileged 
sameness that mark ancient notions of “copying.”    
 
158 Helen North addresses the variance in estimations of the humility or pride bound up in the 
idea of imitating God in moderation. “The imitation of God, which is the aim of Plato’s 
legislation, is actually a contradiction of those traditional warnings against likening oneself to 
God which were among the earliest themes of sophrosyne. The conflict between hybris and 
sophrosyne, which had provided tragedy with one of its most fruitful subjects, has now largely 
lost its meaning, but a different conception of sophrosyne has developed and is in the process of 
becoming an essential part of the Platonic notion of [homoiosis theo]. This new conception results 
from the belief that God Himself is sôphrôn—an idea that scarcely occurs in tragedy. The 
problems inherent in this notion are among the favorite subjects of Hellenistic philosophy and 
the Church Fathers” (194). 
 
159 Again, parallels may be found in the Hebrew Scriptures in their portrayal of God as humble on 
the one hand, and as a friend to the humble, on the other hand. On the first point, instances of 
statements on the self-lowering of God include Psalm 18:9 (“He bowed the heavens, and came 
down …”) and Hosea 11:4 (“I led them with cords of human kindness, with bands of love. I was 
to them like those who lift infants to their cheeks. I bent down to them and fed them”—note the 
inclusion of cord and band imagery, which recalls the strings of the puppets Plato discusses). 
Second, Moses (whom Numbers 12:3 describes as “very humble, more so than anyone else on the 
face of the earth”) receives the special honor of being treated as a friend of God (Exodus 33:11). In 
the New Testament, when Jesus invites people to take his (light) yoke, he describes himself as 




discusses immoderation in terms of vice. To conceive of god as so great as to be beyond 
measure (that is, to be ametron) is not proper. Alongside the impious traits of pride and 
arrogance, excess is ungodly. 
 The person who demonstrates immoderation errs in two ways. She reveals a lack 
of understanding of her position relative to god by failing to abide by divine-set 
standards; that is, she exceeds her limits. Pride and immoderation, therefore, are shown 
to go together. At the same time, she neglects her duty of acting like god and following 
god’s virtuous example. Perhaps this seems like a double charge, saying little more than 
that her immoderation is immoderate, but it does highlight what is particularly vicious 
about vice—its loop of self-reinforcement. Importantly, the delusion of immoderation is 
conveyed in this passage through the image of leading. Whereas the dispositions of 
humility, meekness, and an intentional orientation to happiness are all said to have the 
willingness to follow Justice’s lead and to latch on to her, the person who has cut ties with 
god is ill-equipped to lead a successful life. Nevertheless, in her folly, she thinks that she 
can both adhere to the right path and tread it for others. While not exactly in the same 
way, the senses of “leading,” “following,” and “latching on” will be recalled in the 
discussion of the puppet’s efforts to aid in the pulling of the correct cords or strings in 
644d-645c. 
Much later in the Laws, in a fascinating passage in Book X, Plato does provide a 
direct statement of divine moderation. There, speaking (in the plural) of the gods, the 
Stranger offers the third of his religious defenses. In arguing for the gods’ 
imperviousness to bribes, he links the issues of justice and moderation clearly. First, he 
draws the connection between divinity and rule:  
Come now, in the name of these gods themselves I ask—in what way would they 
come to be seduced by us, if seduced they were? Being what in their essence and 
character? Necessarily they must be rulers [archontas], if they are to be in 




Echoing, perhaps faintly, in these lines is the “measure of all things” saying, with its 
incumbent sense of the beginning (or first, archê), end (or last, teleutê), and middle 
(mesê)—the term for “ruler” in ancient Greek (archon) being closely bound to the notion 
of “beginning” (archê), and the root tel- (whether in a noun like teleutê or an adjective 
such as entelês) carrying the significance of completion, fullness, and end.   
The argumentation of the Stranger concerning the moderation of the gods 
proceeds as he makes use of warfare imagery. He describes the conflict between good 
and bad things in life as an undying battle that requires “a wondrous watchfulness,” 
and he uses the language of salvation to indicate the force of virtue. In this struggle, he 
says, the gods and spirits (daemons) are both the allies and possessors of human beings. 
With these assertions in place, he is able to continue, stating: 
[W]hat destroys us is iniquity and insolence combined with folly, what saves us, 
justice and temperance combined with wisdom [sophrosynê meta phronêseos], 
which dwell in the animate powers of the gods, and of which some small trace may be 
clearly seen here also residing in us. (906a-b, Bury translation, emphasis mine) 
 
Here is the explicit statement of the temperate, or moderate, nature of the gods: 
sophrosynê dwells in their animate powers. Plato raises the stature of the quality of 
sophrosynê by associating it with justice and by attaching the phrase “with wisdom” to it. 
This later qualification serves to distinguish divine sophrosynê from the ordinary 
moderation of the non-philosophical (North, 189). In addition to being divine, justice 
and wisdom-infused temperance are saving traits that exist in a special way in our own 
nature—they exist merely as micro-traces, but mightily as signs of the divine.   
Finally, the Stranger concludes his argument with several representations of the 
destruction of excess, showing that immoderation brings harm in whatever realm it is 
found. Such a view of vice as damaging is sensible in light of the saving power of the 
virtues of justice and moderation. After drawing two other analogies, the Stranger 
points to the immoderation that is civil injustice. He states: 
[W]e assert that the sin now mentioned, of profiteering or “over-gaining,” is 
what is called in the case of fleshly bodies “disease,” in that of seasons and years 
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“pestilence,” and in that of States and polities, by a verbal change, this same sin 
is called “injustice.” (906c, Bury translation) 
 
The gods, themselves rulers, abide by a spirit of orderliness or rule. In their justice, 
therefore, they are not tempted by the excess of bribery, which prideful people produce 
as an attempt to further their own over-gain. Combining these lines from Book X with 
the primary measure passage of Book IV illuminates fairly strongly Plato’s sense of the 
trait of divine moderation and its instantiation in virtuous persons.  
It has been noted, then, that Plato recommends that we become like god in 
moderation and humility for the sake of befriending god and having happiness in life. 
These are the who, what, how, and why of imitation. There is one more aspect of 
imitation to analyze here and that is its extent. Given that god holds the beginning, end, 
and middle of all things, our project of following god (in respectfully playful imitation 
and obedience) equally stretches across the whole of our lives. Freydberg points to this 
life-encompassing range of play when he writes:  
Recall that the supposedly serious and rational Socrates practices music on his 
final day, writing (among other things) a hymn to Apollo in verse. Death is 
nothing serious, or rather death receives its proper seriousness when it is 
confronted playfully. And the Stranger’s playful passage from the Laws recollects 
the lawful play at the heart of all things: relation to the gods, music, gymnastic, 
even warfare. From initiation through death, humankind dwells playfully. (21) 
 
This commentary, coupled with the measure passage under consideration, forms an 
important part of my argument about human play: unlike the principle governing our 
work, our play callings as individual human beings are not determined by any part of 
our own natures but come instead as a response to god’s nature. The measure and 
moderation of god has universal implications, or applicability. We would all do well to 
play at the game of life by participating in sacrifices, songs, and dances because that is 
fitting to the singular nature of god. 
Having traipsed a long way to arrive at these conceptions of god as all-
encompassing yet moderate, and having tried to maintain the tension that results from 
the difference between the two traits, we may now find it necessary to bring them 
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together. Rather than asking how measure and moderation separate from each other as 
ideas, let us inquire into the closeness of their relation, focusing in particular on the 
manner in which moderation is identifiable with the (lowly) measure of humility. To 
some degree, this will involve a shift in attention from divine to human measure.  
Helen North writes about moderation, or temperance, devoting her 1966 book 
Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature to a study of the virtue’s 
development from Homeric poetry through the early Christian writings of the fourth 
century C.E. She defines sophrosynê as “the harmonious product of intense passion under 
perfect control” (x), and proposes that it stands in polar opposition to the active 
principle (to drastêrion) and the trait of manliness (andreia) (ix). This accords with a 
statement the Stranger makes in 802e, namely that “an elevated manner and courageous 
instincts must be regarded as characteristic of the male, while a tendency to modesty 
and restraint must be presented – in theory and law alike – as a peculiarly feminine 
trait.” Interestingly however, moderation is treated at the same time as a quality 
belonging to the gods and as characteristic of older men—like the figures of the Laws 
and the aging Plato who wrote them (North, 191-192). 
Plato puts the term and idea of sophrosynê to dynamic use in his dialogues, 
which, in their earliest stage, elevate Socrates as the exemplar of the virtue (152). As 
prominent themes of the late dialogues North identifies “moderation, proportion, the 
Mean, symmetry, and harmony,” remarking that they are all analogues to sophrosynê 
(188). When discussing appearances of sophrosynê in the Laws specifically, she notes that 
it is upheld there as the quality without which the other goods are not good, even 
though it is never afforded priority where listings of the four virtues occur (187).160 With 
respect to its status vis-à-vis the virtue of justice, she writes that moderation receives the 
greater emphasis in the Laws on account of Plato’s particularly strong interest in the 
                                                




training of the irrational soul. Nevertheless, she affirms that “at the highest level” 
sophrosynê—“the power of self-mastery … instilled by education in conformity with the 
laws”—and justice are identical (189).  
As noted at the outset, tapeinôtes, which I have occasionally referred to as 
“humility,” is a manner of lowliness. The lowness of this character trait is apparent in its 
connection to the verb for to lower (tapeinein), which forms the root of the word for carpet 
(tapês, which becomes tapis in French) and frequently carries the pejorative sense of 
abasement. Perhaps it is this positional description of what it is to be moderate that 
allows for an understanding of the sense of following that is inherent in obedience. That 
is, obedience is predicated on meekness because it entails compliance. The person who 
obeys does not play a leading role. Taking a common view of pride as an antonym of 
humility, one can say that the prideful person, insofar as she thinks too highly of herself, 
is unrulable. She doesn’t play well with others. The moderate person by contrast exhibits 
humility in her willing submission to the rules and (or of) authorities. She places herself 
under the limits of god. This positional aspect of virtue takes on an interesting relevance 
when applied to Plato’s use of the puppet image. Citing R.A. Higgins, Rankin writes of 
the construction of dangling, “dancing dolls” of antiquity, observing that the strings 
came out of their heads (130). Because the strings are pulled from above (by the Most 
High?), to be led is to be low.161,162 
                                                
161 John Russon points to the suggestions in the Laws, Book II that the figure of the child is “easy 
to lead and teach” (65).  
 
162 Dorothea Frede’s reading of the matter of being led by the god differs in a striking way from 
my interpretation of what Plato takes it to mean to be a divine toything. She states: “Although 
thauma is commonly translated as ‘puppet,’ this translation is misleading if it suggests that 
humans are mere marionettes whose strings are pulled by the gods. For, as the further 
descriptions show, the ‘puppet’s’ behavior is not determined by the higher powers; it depends, 
rather, on the workings of its own strings. Hence, Plato seems to have in mind wind-up toys that 
move by themselves, rather than marionettes” (116). In addition to the curiosity of the hybrid toy 
that Frede envisions (of a wind-up doll with strings instead of an easier to imagine marionette), it 
is worth nothing that Frede refers in this passage to the gods as the higher powers, which is also 




A modest person seeks to live within the limits of her own measure, which she 
sees as fixed in some way by the place of god and by others. An unjust person, however, 
presents a very different picture. Unlike the self-containment of the humble person, she 
is full of herself to the point of bursting forth with pride (hybris). This excess of self  
is both chaotic and chaos-producing. The improper over-fullness of greediness 
(pleonexia) reflects a lack of order in the internal realm—it is damaging to the self, to be 
sure—but it is also deeply problematic for the social, political world. By trying to attend 
to more than her “fair share,” the immoderate person interferes with the fulfillment of 
roles belonging to other individuals, and so she disrupts the harmonious balance of 
parts. Such self-seeking (idiopragia) North describes as antithetical to sophrosynê and 
justice (193). It is also related, I think, to rule by self-inferior parts. 
 
III. THE PLAY OF THE ROPE AND THE (COM)PLIABILITY OF REASON:  
THE GENTLE SLACKNESS OF THE PUPPET’S GOLDEN CORD 
(TEXT: 1.644D-645C) 
 
Shifting now in our analysis, let us take a step backward to enter into the 
discourse at the moment in Book I in which the Stranger introduces the bold and 
initially not-inoffensive comparison between human beings and divine toys. In doing so, 
we will discover the quality of pliability that adheres in reason; the connection pliability 
and rationality have to “teachability”; and the implication this rational pliability holds 
for a citizen’s ability to be compliant in the political sphere. While education feeds 
rationality and nourishes its growth, being reasonable also enables a person to be 
responsive to education, which furthers civic justice. The docility wrapped up in this 
capacity of being teachable is not unrelated to the characteristic of gentleness noted in 
moderation; it also appears in the understanding of justice as knowing “how to rule and 
be ruled” (643e).   
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The Stranger’s statements, which introduce the puppet figure, read: 
I suggest we look at the problem in this way: let’s imagine [conceive, 
dianoêthômen] that each of us living beings [zôôn] is a puppet [thauma] of the gods. 
Whether we have been constructed to serve as their plaything [paignion], or for 
some serious [spoudê] reason, is something beyond our ken, but what we 
certainly do know is this: we have those emotions [pathê] in us, which act like 
cords or strings [neura ê mêrinthoi] and tug us about; they work in opposition, 
and tug against each other to make us perform actions that are opposed 
correspondingly; back and forth we go across the boundary line where vice and 
virtue meet. One of these dragging forces [helzeôn zunepomenon], according to our 
argument [logos], demands our constant obedience, and this is the one we have to 
hang on to, come what may; the pull of the other cords we must resist. This cord, 
which is golden and holy, transmits the power of ‘calculation’ [logismos], a power 
which in a state is called the public law; being golden, it is pliant, while the 
others, whose composition resembles a variety of other substances, are tough 
and inflexible. The force [agôgê] exerted by law is excellent, and one should 
always co-operate [zullambanein] with it, because although ‘calculation’ is a noble 
thing, it is gentle [praou], not violent [forceful, biaioui], and its efforts [its leading 
(string), agôgên] need assistants, so that the gold in us may prevail over the other 
substances. If we do give our help, the moral point of this fable [mythos], in 
which we appear as puppets [thaumatôn], will have been well and truly made; 
the meaning of the terms ‘self-superior’ and ‘self-inferior’ will somehow become 
clearer, and the duties of state and individual will be better appreciated. The 
latter must digest the truth about these forces [helzeôn] that pull him, and act on it 
in his life; the state must get an account of it either from one of the gods or from 
the human expert we’ve mentioned, and incorporate it in the form of a law to 
govern both its internal affairs and its relations with other states. A further result 
will be a clearer distinction between virtue and vice; the light cast on that 
problem will perhaps in turn help to clarify the subject of education and the 
various other practices, particularly the business of drinking parties. It may well 
be thought that this is a triviality [phaulou] on which a great deal too much has 
been said, but equally it may turn out that the topic really does deserve this 
extended discussion. (644d-645c) 
 
Plato has a message to convey about the value of logos and its relation to the 
passions; this message is a trope running across many of his dialogues. In the Republic, 
reason is seen in its representation as the supreme faculty governing the lesser parts of 
courage and desire in the souls of the philosophers. The philosophers are raised to serve 
as the vicars of Reason in the polis, holding control over the other classes of soldiers and 
artisans. Reigns turn into reins when Plato writes the Phaedrus, presenting the battle 
within the soul there as an agony-filled fight for control over warring winged-horses 
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(246a-ff).163 Of the pair, one horse is obedient and does not need a whip; the other horse 
is undisciplined and does not readily heed the whip’s blows. The successful charioteer is 
the one who aims her vision after the intelligible, logos-infused truths of heaven. She is 
only able to tame the unruly horse after repeated and severe punishments—but when 
she prevails she arrives at happiness.164  
To this collection of symbols, Plato adds his illustration in the Laws of human 
beings as puppets and divine toys. Rankin articulates this choice in rather negative 
cultural terms, writing, “This kind of toy is a by no means inept symbol of Fourth 
Century B.C. Greek man, disoriented, randomly impulsive, and individualist. His 
spasmodic movements, imagined as those of a [paignion] perhaps represent yet another 
reply to [pantôn metron anthrôpos, man, measure of all things]” (129). Here, the cords 
used by the charioteer to rein in out-of-control forces morph into the slack and stiff cords 
engaged in a struggle in marionettes for the determination of their movement. The way 
that Plato seeks to recommend the faculty of reason to Cleinias and Megillus and 
eventually the new polis Magnesia—recalling the significance of the aim of self-superiority 
to the individual and city’s vitality and peace—is by depicting the victory of the single, 
golden cord over the disorderly pull of the many lesser, toughened strings in the 
puppet. A well-pulled puppet exhibits graceful movement, gliding along, and thus 
offers a picture of the beautiful regulation that is predicated on the gentleness and 
modesty of the ability to follow and obey. Freedom here would appear as something like 
the absence of jerky movements. Notably, it would be tied to obedience. 
                                                
163 Paul Plass’s insightful article “‘Play’ and Philosophic Detachment in Plato” focuses on the 
Phaedrus, treating play as a bridge between the rational and sensuous spheres (343). 
 
164 Remarkably similar language as is found in the discussion of ethics, play, and education in the 
Laws marks this passage from the Phaedrus: “Now if the victory goes to the better elements in 
both their minds, which lead them to follow the assigned regimen of philosophy, their life here 
below is one of bliss and shared understanding. They are modest and fully in control of 
themselves now that they have enslaved the part that brought trouble into the soul and set free 
the part that gave it virtue. After death, when they have grown wings and become weightless, 
they have won the first of three rounds in these, the true Olympic Contests. There is no greater 




Along with the discussion of pliability mentioned above, this section of the paper 
will be addressed to some of the connotations of these strings, and the advantages and 
ambiguities of the larger play image to which they belong. It proceeds first by 
considering how the Stranger invokes play at this moment in the argument and why he 
might choose to present his philosophy in such a seriously non-serious domain. 
A funny person is funnier for her subtlety but forfeits some or all of her humor 
when she has to announce, “I am joking now!” Similarly, it would be terribly unplayful 
for the Stranger to advertise his play directly. Rather, he signals his paidistic intentions— 
preparing the playful way—through his careful choice of language (“educational” 
vocabulary); his willingness to employ analogy and make-believe at all (myth); and the 
specific images that end up in his speech (puppets and toys). Before entering a discourse 
of play with puppetry, he tunes his listeners’ ears by using the close-sounding words of 
education. Thus, the speeches leading into this section are dominated by references to 
noble or proper paideia: he is only an epsilon away from play now. A second way to 
propose that the Stranger marks his intention to play is to illumine his decision to depart 
from literal forms of speech. He includes myth in his comments—and here he does make 
his reliance on myth explicit, saying “the moral point of this fable [mythos] …” In 
making room for the analogous and make-believe, he distances himself from, and 
lightens, a heavy account (logos). Lastly, the Stranger indicates the ludic direction of his 
thought through the particular image he supplies. Rather than the boring ideas of a city 
or a horse, he uses puppets because puppets almost reflexively invoke a sense of play 
and playfulness. What if we approached this from a serious perspective, though, 
keeping in mind the serious context of the puppetry reference in the Republic? Is there 
special significance to puppets appearing on the scene in order to announce spoudê?165  
                                                
165 On the natural association between puppetry, children, and play, Rankin writes: 
“Furthermore, the puppet is associated with childhood. Its movements at the end of its string can 
be called [paidia]. But there is also [paideia]. The equivocation [paidia/paideia], schooling (through) 
play can help to make the victory of the string of [logismos] more certain. The association between 
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 Two words in ancient Greek, which signify “puppet” are neurospastos and 
thauma; added to these is the term paignion, which bears the pai- of play (paidia, paizein), 
and means “toy,” “plaything,” or even “playmate.” The first two words correspond 
roughly to the French une marionette, while the third might find translation as un jouet.166 
Emmanuelle Jouët-Pastré sheds light on important differences in the range of the 
meaning of these words or the register of their applicability in ancient Greek. Relative to 
the word thauma, neurospastos is an ordinary term, which denotes something mechanical 
(50). Neurospastos comes from the noun used for “sinew” or “cord made of sinew” 
(neuron) and the verb for “to draw.” This accords with an understanding of a puppet as 
a thing mechanically drawn by strings. In quite another domain—perhaps a miraculous 
one—thauma denotes an object of wonder or a marvel. It can also be taken as a “puppet,” 
however, and in the plural it can refer to a puppet show or toy theater. We are able to 
glimpse, therefore, the possible grandness implied in the description of human beings as 
thauma and divine paignion. Rather than being mechanical “dummies” (neurospasta), in 
our belonging to the gods, we are wondrous.167    
Wavering himself between serious and trivial evaluations of the topics at hand, 
the Stranger makes a pretty serious push in this passage toward the playful: but, why? 
Why does he bring together things that normally should be kept apart, combining for 
                                                
education through play with toys and the puppet analogy was close for Plato when he wrote the 
Laws. The two notions are linked (they are spatially close in the text, Laws 643-644), by the idea of 
the jointed clay doll” (130). 
 
166 Additionally, the word korê—primarily translated as “girl”—can mean “doll” or “puppet.” 
Plato does not seem to use it in this dialogue in that manner, though. A more interesting 
connection might be found between korê and choros—“chorus”—in the chorus of girls in 12.947b, 
for example. Plass points out the derivation of choros from chara (delight), which, in turn, is 
related to the term Christians celebrate as “gift” or “grace”—charis (363). The closeness in the 
senses of music and delight is reflected again in the words ôdai (songs) and epôdai (charms), 
which Plato puns in 653b. 
 
167 It is interesting that the Septuagint employs forms of thauma twice in its rendering of Psalm 
138:14, ezomologêsomai soi hoti phoberôs ethaumastôthên thaumasia ta erga sou kai hê psychê mou 
ginôskei sphodra (“I praise you, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made. Wonderful are your works; 
that I know very well”).  
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example the logical and mythical? What is he trying to accomplish in presenting a 
mythos with(in) a logos—a fable with a purpose in a rational account—injecting the 
make-believe into the really real, only to weigh the mythic story down by attaching an 
important moral to it? After all, a lot is riding on this toy-based analogy—including the 
meaning of the term “self-superior” and an understanding of civic and personal duties, 
but also the illumination of virtue and vice! After having announced the topic of “true” 
education in which the hardly frivolous matters of virtue and justice are at stake (643e-
644a), the Stranger mentions moveable dolls, transforming puppets into the 
representatives of ethics. Is there intentionality behind all of these confusing moves, 
governing and directing them?  
I would like to suggest that in his bizarre mixing of the weighty significance of 
education and ethics with the lightness and frivolousness typically—but not 
universally—associated with play and puppets, the Stranger is offering an enactment of 
temperance. He demonstrates what it is to moderate the high (paideia) by the low (paidia) 
and the low by the high—to arrive at middle ground by alternating between extreme 
sides. In obedience, humility finds itself Reason’s partner. Or as Ardley astutely writes, 
Plato uses “a little absurdity to humble a greater absurdity” (243). In this case, I am 
arguing that the image or myth of human beings as puppets stands for the little 
absurdity while the Protagorean view of humanity as the measure of all things 
represents the greater—and more dangerous—absurdity that threatens the genuine 
good of education and ethics. Human beings may not be puppets with free will but, in 
truth, neither are we the supreme arch-beings of the universe that Protagoras makes us 
out to be. Having seen that excess is not appropriate even for god, we can now accept 
that it is certainly not warranted for education. To treat education too seriously, to lift it 
too high, is immoderate and therefore destructive. To trivialize play is debasing and 
unnecessary. To use play to moderate education is just right. Plato swings the 
philosophical pendulum, then, watching over it until it strikes upon the good balance of 
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the middle ground. Or, along the lines of the Stranger’s advice to nurses for how to 
handle babies suffering from Corybantic—Bacchanalian, frenzied—conditions, he 
shakes troubled ideas up for the sake of settling them down (790c-e). 
In thinking why Plato figures out (or en-figures) features of human nature and 
activity through puppets, we confront the simultaneous advantages and limitations his 
analogy presents. It excels in conveying the ideas of unity and coordination of parts. 
Where it breaks down is in offering a sensible depiction of free motion and free will. 
Does it not rather lend itself to conveying a message of determinism? In addition to its 
advantages and limitations, there are a number of ambiguities in the image and its 
presentation. Let us take these areas and the interests they include in turn, starting with 
the “positive” use of the puppet image by a consideration of strings and reason. Then, 
we will return to the weakness of the puppet image for the expression of who we are as 
human beings, pointing out several of the ways in which it lacks clarity.   
 On account of the movement achieved through the simultaneous pulling of 
numerous and different strings, the figure of a stringed-puppet is well suited to 
explaining coordination. It also illustrates the importance of the free, unhindered 
movement of the strings. If you are walking on a tightrope, you desperately want the 
cord to be taut, but a degree of slackness becomes desirable in the cords that serve as 
puppet strings. Such play of a rope enables a puppeteer to bring about graceful 
movements in the marionette figure, pulling here, lifting there, raising up and letting 
down again—all through coordinated and well-timed gestures and not a little skill. 
Here, slackness is not the laziness of slacking off (in the sense of Proverbs 18:9, “[o]ne 
who is slack in work is kin to a vandal!”), but is the condition for the possibility of 
something quite great—the smooth movement of different parts. The wonder of the play 
of this rope is the douceur of reason. 
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 The Stranger represents the cord of reason, which is the conductor of calculation 
[logismos], as single and golden.168 In this it is distinct from the other strings, which are 
many in number and composition. Reason’s one string is also one in purity, untainted 
by any non-gold elements. On account of this simplicity, when taken on its own and 
apart from its fraught association with the passions’ group of strings, reason may be 
thought of as forming a whole unit—peaceful because unmarked by division. That is, 
whereas clashes exist among the passions in their multiplicity, and while there is strife 
between reason and passion, reason in itself is free from internal war and the tyranny of 
desire.  
The goldenness of reason carries other connotations. Not only a sign of reason’s 
nobility and worth—or perhaps as a sign of reason’s nobility and worth—it implies the 
quality of gentleness, too. Contrary to expectations, this trait is its excellence. What is 
strong may give the impression of being stable, enduring, and independent but in the 
Stranger’s speech such “strength” is viewed and rejected as rigidity that hinders graceful 
movement.169 Thus, gentleness-as-pliability is valuable precisely in its contradistinction 
to the hard and coercive tugs of the other cords. This opposition between gentleness and 
force seems to carry over to their corresponding qualifications. That is, the contrast 
between the two ideas is reflected in the general sense that there is a refinement, 
nobility, and genteelness to gentleness that is lacking from force.170 Conceived as being 
to some extent undignified, force is left simply to be called brute. Despite impressions of 
being weak because easily swayed, then, what is gentle proves its worth in that very 
                                                
168 What does calculation calculate? Does it ascertain human limits and measure? 
 
169 This description—particularly in terms of movement—raises potential connections between 
seriousness, rigidity, and dualism, on the one hand, and play, thirdness, and flexibility, on the 
other hand, that I would like to explore. Is there a fluidity to trichotomous ways of thinking that 
is impossible in binary (“either/or”) schemas? If strict bifurcations are marked by inertia, are 
trinities always on the move? And, how could I maintain a spirit of “thirdness” in approaching 
these (apparently dichotomous) connections?   
 
170 By way of Greek etymology (genos, “race”), there is a strange equivocation in the French 
adjective gentil, which can mean both “Gentile” and “nice” or “gentle.” 
    
  
197 
attribute of movability. Or, in the words of the speech we will consider from Book VII, it 
is “a great point in its favor.”  
In addition to usefully absurd features of the puppet image, there are a number 
of ambiguities in its content and delivery. The first unclarity I would like to discuss 
concerns who or what counts as a puppet. Because of the terminology he uses, it seems 
that the Stranger leaves room for the consideration of animals as divine puppets too. In 
setting out his analogy, he uses the term “zôôn," which is indicative of living beings 
generally, encompassing more than human beings. Would such an estimation counteract 
the point the illustration is seeking to make regarding the importance of reason and 
calculation in humankind? Would it elevate the stature of animals by linking them along 
with us—even as toys—to the divine? The Stranger does not pursue the discussion of 
animal-puppets here, but the question remains why in presenting these toys he chooses 
the term for “living being” instead of the narrower designation of anthropos. 
Furthermore, toward the end of the passage, given the Stranger’s political remarks and 
the parallels he draws between reason and law, there could be speculation about the 
identity of the state as a puppet, its legislators being the puppet masters—giving new (or 
rather old) meaning to the term “puppet government.”171  
Of course, part of what makes the puppet illustration so odd is the 
indeterminacy of agency in it: who or what is at work pulling the strings? Any direct 
reference to the gods as manipulating the marionettes’ actions is missing. In having the 
gods drop out of view in this way, the Stranger both avoids depicting the world in a 
deterministic fashion and absolves the gods from any responsibility for evil. Instead of 
being at the mercy of divine players, the puppet show appears to be self-running. The 
                                                
171 Shortly before this passage, the Stranger identifies the State with the individual and living 
beings in the area of temperance, drawing a link between them in the statements: “Pleasure and 
pain, you see, flow like two springs released by nature. If a man draws the right amount from the 
right one at the right time, he lives a happy life; but if he draws unintelligently at the wrong time, 
his life will be rather different. State and individual and every living being are on the same 




emotions pull themselves. This turns the thaumata into atypical toys indeed and it lends 
a greater air of nonsensicality to the fable, but it preserves for Plato the possibility of 
making a point about the willfulness and drive of the passions. Furthermore, on account 
of these two sets of strings, the Stranger’s story is able to provide an explanation of the 
obedience that comes about when conflicting parts heed the internally superior element. 
The question becomes, however, whether this need to represent the strings as self-
tugging dissolves the image. It is easy to imagine figures being yanked back and forth 
by opposing forces, but would they still be puppets? 
Then there are the multiple layers of interpretation opened by the uncertainty of 
the phrase, “[w]hether we have been constructed to serve as their [the gods’] plaything, 
or for some serious reason, is something beyond our ken.” Is the Stranger calling into 
question here whether we are puppets of the gods, or whether we are puppets of the gods? 
In other words, should we consider the gods to be toymakers? What are the implications 
of the view of human beings as toy artifacts constructed by the gods? Should we make 
toys, too? Would it make the gods children or childish, if we were their toys? In what 
way would we lose standing if we were created for a purpose apart from play, and 
would that purpose also be apart from god? Being unsure about our playful or 
purposive standing, the Stranger (prefiguring Kant) espouses the one certainty, which is 
that the moral life is marked by internal conflict. 
 
IV. MARVELOUS LIVING: RELIGION, PEACE, HAPPINESS, AND EDUCATION  
(TEXT: 7.803A-804C) 
 
 A lot transpires philosophically between the first and seventh books, with only 
one intervening puppet reference, which comes in 2.658c in the discussion of judging 
competitions. There, at one end of the agon-and-age hierarchy, little kids are said to 
prefer puppet shows; up the line go older children (who have a taste for comedies) and 
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the majority of the people (who enjoy tragedy), until old men are found with their 
penchant for poetry at the apex. When the Stranger next invokes the toy symbol 
alongside the claim that it represents us, he shocks or amazes Megillus. Speaking of 
weighty matters and employing stock phrases that signal ethics—“the right way to live,” 
“the best and noblest conduct”—Plato through the Stranger makes recourse to the play 
of the puppet myth. As soon as it looks as if things are becoming too serious, he 
announces that it is time to play—or insists that he is only playing. This is analogous to 
the signs dogs give when they engage in play that is threatening in becoming too 
extreme. (I am confident that Plato would not be offended at this comparison; he 
regarded dogs as the most philosophical animal.) The contemporary journalist Robin 
Henig describes dogs as having “a particular body posture called the ‘play bow’ — 
forelegs extended, rump in the air — that they use as both invitation and punctuation. A 
dog will perform a play bow at the beginning of a bout, and he will crouch back into it if 
he accidentally nips too hard and wants to assure the other dog: ‘Don’t worry! Still 
playing!’” Plato embodies this posture philosophically, assuaging any concern among 
his playmates that the conversation is in danger of becoming too earnest, self-important, 
or boring. This is all just a game. Still playing!  
The Stranger’s ludic(rous) style matches his subject matter because education 
and moral training are equally play. That is, he talks about our way of life playfully 
because ethics is no more than a game. Furthermore, life-as-play bears a relation to both 
war and peace. It is like war in that it is a struggle one wages with the weapon of 
honor.172 This is its agonistic side. However, life and play are more deeply bound up 
                                                
172 Along with the “missile” targeted at piety, the weapon of honor is presented in 717a (the 
continuation of the “measure passage” presented above). This section of the text contains several 
significant statements, which accord with the description of the consequences (or “rewards”) of 
good, playful conduct in the current lines of interest from 803-804. The Stranger says: “Let’s be 
clear that the consequence of all this is the following doctrine (which is, I think, of all doctrines 
the finest and truest): If a good man sacrifices to the gods and keeps them constant company in 
prayers and offerings and every kind of worship he can give them, this will be the best and 
noblest policy he can follow; it is the conduct that fits his character as nothing else can, and it is 
his most effective way of achieving a happy life. But if the wicked man does it, the results are 
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with peace—in excellence and practicality. First, unlike war, peace is sought for its own 
sake. This merits the preeminence of play in our thought; we should be foremost 
oriented toward it and not war. Second, play requires the “free” time that peace 
provides. (Does this imply a relation between work and war?) Only under certain 
conditions do we have the means to sacrifice, sing, and dance. In times of extreme 
duress and hardship, when play is perhaps the most needed, does it feel the least 
possible. In these associations with education, ethics, and peace, the concept of play 
widens, swelling to the point of encompassing the highest, most important aspects of 
life.  
Reformulated simply, the argument of this second puppet speech is that because 
we are the playthings of the gods, we should ourselves play. Upon reflection, however, 
this makes little sense. Recalling the slip between the activities of legislating and 
playing—the one who provides the rules for a game is not necessarily a member of it—
we now wonder how toys, which are objects of play, are to count as players. This is the 
strange logic, which the Stranger employs. He presents the conclusion that every human 
being should play well in the pastime, playtime, or peacetime of life after he makes these 
four assertions: 1) serious matters deserve serious attention, 2) god is the object worthy 
of serious effort, 3) human beings are toys for god, and 4) our best feature as human 
beings is our divine toy-identity.  
 Here are his comments, at length: 
 
Now to deal with how this doctrine should be taught and handed on. What 
method of instruction should we use? Who should be taught, and when should 
the lessons take place? Well, you know that when a shipwright is starting to 
build a boat, the first thing he does is to lay down the keel as a foundation and as 
a general indication of the shape. I have a feeling my own procedure now is 
                                                
bound to be just the opposite. … So this is the target at which we should aim – but what ‘missiles’ 
are we to use to hit it, and what ‘bow’ is best carried to shoot them? Can we name these 
‘weapons’? The first weapon in our armoury will be to honour the gods of the underworld next 
after those of Olympus, the patron-gods of the state … That’s the best way a man can hit his 
target, piety. … If we do that, and live in accordance with these rules, each of us will get the 
reward we deserve from the gods and such beings as are superior to ourselves, and live in a spirit 




exactly analogous. I’m trying to distinguish for you the various ways in which 
our character shapes the kind of life we live; I really am trying to ‘lay down the 
keel’, because I’m giving proper consideration to the way we should try to live—
to the ‘character-keel’ we need to lay if we are going to sail through this voyage 
of life successfully. Not that human affairs are worth taking very seriously 
[spoudês]—but take them seriously [spoudazein] is just what we are forced to do, 
alas. Still, perhaps it will be realistic to recognize the position we’re in and direct 
our serious efforts to some suitable purpose. My meaning?—yes, you’d certainly 
be right to take me up on that. 
CLINIAS: Exactly. 
ATHENIAN: I maintain that serious matters [to … spoudaion] deserve our serious 
attention [spoudazein], but trivialities do not [to … mê spoudaion mê]; that all men 
of good will should put God at the center of their thoughts [phusei de einai theon 
men pasês makariou spoudês azion – the object really worthy of all serious and 
blessed effort is God173]; that man, as we said before [644d ff.], has been created 
as a toy for God [theou ti paignion einai memêxanêmenon]; and that this is the great 
point [beltiston] in his favour. So every man and every woman should play this 
part and order their whole life accordingly, engaging in the best possible 
pastimes [paizonta hoti kallistas paidias – playing at the noblest of pastimes]—in a 
quite different frame of mind to their present one. 
CLINIAS: How do you mean? 
ATHENIAN: The usual view nowadays, I fancy, is that the purpose of serious 
[tas spoudas] activity is leisure [paidiôn – play] —that war, for instance, is an 
important business [spoudaia – serious work] and needs to be waged efficiently 
for the sake of peace. But in cold fact neither the immediate result nor the 
eventual consequences of warfare ever turn out to be real leisure [paidia – play]  
or an education [paideia] that really deserves the name [aziologos]—and education 
is in our view just about the most important [spoudaiotaton – most serious] 
activity of all. So each of us should spend the greater part of his life at peace, and 
that will be the best use of this time. What, then, will be the right way to live? A 
man should spend his whole life at ‘play’ [paizonta … tinas … paidias – we should 
live our lives playing at certain pastimes]—sacrificing, singing, dancing—so that 
he can win the favor of the gods and protect himself from his enemies and 
conquer them in battle. He’ll achieve both these aims if he sings and dances in 
the way we’ve outlined; his path, so to speak, has been marked out for him and 
he must go on his way confident that the poet’s words are true. 
  Some things, Telemachus, your native wit will tell you, 
  And Heaven will prompt the rest. The very gods, I’m sure,  
  Have smiled upon your birth and helped to bring you up. 
And those we bring up, too, must proceed in the same spirit. They must expect 
that although our advice is sound as far as it goes, their guardian deity will make 
them further suggestions about sacrifices and dancing—telling them the various 
divinities in whose honour they should hold their various games [prospaizontes], 
and on what occasions, so as to win the gods’ good will and live the life that their 
own nature demands, puppets [thaumata] that they are, mostly, and hardly real 
at all [smikra de alêtheias atta metexontes – yet share occasionally in the truth].  
MEGILLUS: That, sir, is to give the human race a very low rating [diaphaulizeis] 
indeed. 
                                                





ATHENIAN: Don’t be taken aback [mê thaumasês], Megillus. You must make 
allowances for me. I said that with my thoughts on God, and was quite carried 
away [pros gar ton theon apidôn kai pathôn eipon hoper eirêka nun – For when I spoke 
thus, I had my mind set on God, and was feeling the emotion to which I gave 
utterance]. So, if you like, let’s take it that our species is not worthless [mê 
phaulon], but rather something rather important [spoudês de tinos azion – but 
worthy of serious attention]. (803a-804c, original emphasis in italics, underlined 
emphasis mine) 
 
This passage repeats a number of the themes and ideas encountered in the two 
previous texts—including word play (to paraphrase the Stranger, “Don’t marvel that we 
are marvelous (puppets), Megillus”); the strategic use of ambiguity (that is, the 
uncertainty concerning whether human beings are real or not, and the silence over the 
issue—not at all obvious—of why we are forced to take ourselves seriously); the 
exhortation to follow a path of justice that we did not determine ourselves; the 
incorporation of the serious into play and of the playful into the serious; the moderation 
of extremes; and the (surprising) description of the Stranger as himself having the 
experience of being in passion’s grip and getting carried away (perhaps being caught in 
a response to the divine marked with excess). Rather than go through these elements in 
detail again, I would like to focus on the remarkable claim that religious sacrifices may 
be defined as forms of play. Seeking a different approach to this third reading, I am 
choosing to analyze it through the lens of the philosophy of the Jewish scholar Jerome 
Gellman.  
Gellman, like the Stranger, exhibits strange combinatorial powers. This is evident 
in his book Abraham! Abraham! where he provides a stirring and paradoxical view of 
religious sacrifice. He approaches the most sober story of Genesis 22, in all its 
incomprehensibility and capacity to disturb, by applying a funny fable to it. In his 
chapter “The Akedah as Divine Comedy,” he looks to the Hasidic tale of Reb Nachman of 
Breslav in order to interpret Abraham’s willingness to offer as a burnt sacrifice his 
miraculous and most precious son Isaac through whom God’s promise of blessing was 
to be fulfilled. This unconventional way of reading the text may be recognized—or 
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rescued—as biblical in light of Genesis 21:3. There Sarah, in response to her own 
laughter at the divine (in chapter 18), names her child “he laughs.” In doing so, she 
seems to acknowledge that God played a gracious joke on her. Perhaps the language of 
laughter announces comedy, preparing for the further understanding of the 
commandment to consume Isaac as “nothing but a joke.” Still playing!   
The story Reb Nachman tells goes something like this: There once was a king 
who commanded a wise person to travel to a distant land in order to obtain a picture of 
that country’s king, who was truthful, humble, and hidden. The wise person goes. When 
he arrives he tries to discern truths about the new culture from its jokes. All he finds, 
however, is deceit and bribery. Finally he reaches the king himself, and speaks to him 
across the curtain that keeps his holiness separate. He tells him that he knows that he is 
truthful because he stands aloof from his people’s lies. “He started praising the king 
very much. The king was very humble, and his greatness lay in his humility. And this is 
the way of the humble person: the more one praises and exalts him, the smaller and 
humbler he becomes. Because of the greatness of the praise with which the wise man 
praised and exalted the king, the king became very humble and small, till he became 
nothing at all” (quoted in Gellman, 15). The wise person brings back a blank portrait. 
As Gellman lifts out, the point of the story is an expression of the utter otherness 
of God (16). God’s absolute transcendence relates to—or, more strongly, determines—
human powerlessness to know God’s nature through our actions. We honor this 
unapproachable greatness in the simple recognition of our rituals as inadequate jokes 
(17). On its own, all of this is quite interesting and radical, yet Gellman goes further. It is 
in this additional push that his thought has the most light to shine on the paradox of 
play in Plato. He writes:  
I want to point out that the comic aspect of a religious act does not imply a lack 
of seriousness in its performance. On the contrary. The more seriously one 
performs the ritual knowing it is all a comedy, the more one attests to the 
greatness of God. This is because one proclaims, as it were, that no matter what 
one does, no matter how seriously and meticulously one performs all of the 
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minute details of the ritual, it is still a comedy! It is a comedy because it is done so 
seriously. Hence, the more serious the greater the comedy! (18, original 
emphasis) 
 
In a positive way that (for me) stretches the limits of conceivability, Gellman suggests 
how one can maintain the tension between the playful comedy and the tragic 
seriousness of religious sacrifice. Knowing that ritual practices are jokes actually gives a 
religious believer—or, following Plato, a religious player—reasons to engage in religion 
more seriously. But this seriousness is moderated by the modest measure of humankind. 
That is, on account of our human nature and the nature of God, we face the limitations 
of our seriousness. The solemnity with which we perform religious acts cannot make 
them effective. It does not have the power. Rather, God sets the measuring line, and it is 
a funny one. Attempts to grow close to God are less funny (and less honoring) if they are 
less earnest, and so, with temperance, we continue and even increase in seriousness. If 
we can keep both angles in view, we successfully trace the dialectical circle or careen 
along the playful moebius strip. Or, to evoke an earlier image, we may say that the 
pendulum strikes the spot in which the playful and the serious—the modest and the 
magnanimous—merge. Returning to Plato’s serious fable, we may see a puppet that is 






Strenuous but Unstriving: 
Christianity, Improvisation, and the Liberated Effort of Graceful Play 
 
In this chapter, I argue that improvisation is a theologically instructive form of 
play that approximates grace in three respects: first, as the power to move easily within 
an otherwise uncomfortable set of constraints—an ability, it is important to note, that 
emerges from rigorous training; second, as the assurance of redemption in the face of 
failures; and third, as a peculiar kind of working, which produces something distinct 
from “works”—a result that may be expressed in the Christian parlance of “free works.” 
Furthermore, it is my contention that freedom is exhibited under each of these iterations 
of improvisatory grace. In the first sense of moving gracefully within tight spaces, there 
is the freedom of actively appropriating—even embracing—boundaries and rules. Here, 
limitations are transformed into means of liberty. In the second sense of grace as 
guaranteed redeemability, there is the freedom to fail. This attitude towards failure frees 
one from being bogged down by or in the past; thus, it serves improvisers’ proclivity to 
move on and keep the play going. In the third sense of grace as the basis for working-
sans-works, there is the freedom from instrumentality. The peculiar “works” of 
improvisation and faith are free because they are performed for the sake of pleasure 
rather than any external purpose; they have intrinsic finality.  
After introducing some general yet essential aspects of improvisation, I will 
unfold my argument that improvisation exemplifies freedom and grace in three sections, 
each devoted to one aspect of their conjunction. In doing so, I will bring to bear the 
recent scholarship of Danielle Goldman and Gary Peters. Goldman supplies 
indispensable insight into the nature of improvisation as a practice of freedom in 
movement (corresponding to the first iteration of grace as inward rigor and outward 
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ease), whereas Peters addresses the remaining two views of grace with respect to failure 
and works.  
Keeping with the inspiration for this dissertation, there will be Kierkegaardian 
layers to these sections. Unlike the earlier chapters, however, these will be engaged 
explicitly in the body of the chapter. Along with presenting the graceful freedom of 
movement in Section A, it is apt to discuss Kierkegaard’s illustration from Fear and 
Trembling of the knight of faith as a supremely gifted dancer who leaps from the realm 
of infinity into finitude in a seamless movement. This representation points to absurdity 
as a necessary source of strength and the ground of paradoxical possibilities for faith 
such as living contentedly in an unhappy world. Kierkegaard’s stringent philosophical 
theology in Practice in Christianity (PC) informs Sections B and C of this chapter. There, 
we will see how Kierkegaard’s insistence that authentic Christian life is shaped by 
double grace—the response to God’s grace with grace—parallels the interplay of 
redeemability and intrinsically-valued activity (the latter, significantly, following the 
former as human follows divine grace). The willingness to invest effort in a project 
without turning it into a solidified “work”—to be strenuous in play and yet refrain from 
striving in it—is determined in part by a prior understanding of failure as fodder for 
creative destruction as well as a divesting of self. Whatever I do or fail to do is less 
important than the play itself. This may be expressed in more theological terms: 
Receiving salvation from God “for free” (gratis) grants a person the security to live 
amidst the difficult circumstances of life with both a tolerance for taking risks and the 
relative aplomb of inner peace. What Kierkegaard aspires to and the improvisatory 
version of play demonstrates is the joy of effort that is neither fully mandated nor 







I. INTRODUCING IMPROVISATION 
 
A preliminary understanding of improvisation may be formed according to 
where it is said to take place. Indeed, for many, improvisation refers chiefly to the sphere 
of jazz. The possibility may be recognized that other areas such as comedy, acting, or 
dance are associated with improvisation but only in a way secondary to the connection 
shared with spontaneously created music. When improvisation is thought of, however, 
as a set of skills—a style—it is applicable to a wider range of fields.  
A number of characterizations of the what of improvisation reappear across its 
specialized literature, not only in technical “how-to” guides and training manuals but 
also in theoretical investigations. Among these traits are freedom and spontaneity, 
which are frequently said to exist alongside or, more starkly, within formal structure 
and constraints; the notion of practice in the two-fold sense of discipline and ongoing 
exercise—an unfinished process that is therefore able to resist commodification; the 
method of doing (ordinary) things and accepting (all) offerings; the exercise of novelty 
and repetition; risk and responsibility; decision-making without delay; “relaxed 
awareness,” captured by the French term la disponibilité; attentiveness; the careful 
listening and negotiation of power which accompany antiphony, or patterns of call and 
response; losses of (layers of) self and time;174 and the ability to be surprised by 
accomplishing or experiencing things unknown or previously thought impossible. 
Various combinations of a variety of these aspects make up the improvisatory style not 
of a single arena but of an infinite domain.   
                                                
174 The qualification about losing layers of self is one made by the musician Vijay Iyer. 
Furthermore, Janet Walton makes the fine distinction between losing oneself and giving oneself 




This view, which focuses on improvisation as a style, accords with a movement 
within improvisation studies that assesses it in the widest possible terms. Representative 
of this trend are Columbia’s Professor of music George Lewis and the “Hadotian” expert 
at the University of Chicago Arnold Davidson. For them, life is the purview of 
improvisation. This goes some way in explaining how seemingly distinct areas such as 
couture and cooking may also be depicted easily as improvisational.175 For my purposes, 
it is illustrative of the possibility of applying the values and characteristics of 
improvisation to different forms of play. 
The standard texts on the practice and theory of improvisation appear to belong 
incontestably to Derek Bailey and Keith Johnstone. Instead of returning to the 
foundation that they laid, I will look to the work of figures from the second generation 
of improvisation scholars who have absorbed and engaged Bailey and Johnstone’s ideas, 
specifically Danielle Goldman’s I Want to Be Ready: Improvised Dance as a Practice of 
Freedom (2010) and Gary Peters’s The Philosophy of Improvisation (2009).  
To begin, then, in the upcoming section I will consider beautiful actions in 
movement—their conditions (such as disciplined training) and outcomes (which are 
sometimes paradoxical in nature). What Goldman contributes to this first exploration of 
grace are the issues of practice and power, readiness and responsiveness, and 
constraints and paradox, as they are exercised in the play of contact improvisation. 
Kierkegaard informs this discussion insofar as he portrays the knight of faith as a dancer 
                                                
175 Consider these commentaries with their prescient references to improvisation and dialectical 
opposition from a recent exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum. “Referring to his early training 
on Savile Row in London, he [Alexander McQueen] said, ‘Everything I do is based on tailoring.’ 
McQueen’s approach to fashion, however, combined the precision and traditions of tailoring and 
patternmaking with the spontaneity and improvisations of draping and dressmaking—an approach that 
became more refined after his tenure as creative director of Givenchy in Paris from 1996 to 2001. 
It is this approach, at once rigorous and impulsive, disciplined and unconstrained, that underlies 
McQueen’s singularity and inimitability.” Further, the curator writes: “Like the Victorian Gothic, 
which combines elements of horror and romance, McQueen’s collections often reflect opposites 
such as life and death, lightness and darkness. Indeed, the emotional intensity of his runway 
presentations was frequently the consequence of the interplay between dialectical oppositions. The 
relationship between victim and aggressor was especially apparent, particularly in his 




of unrivaled skill. Drawing on the strength of the absurd when he leaps into life, the 
knight of faith is in a position to accept, paradoxically and freely, what he had 
renounced. This is the trait that distinguishes him from the knight of infinite resignation. 
Taken together, the analysis and philosophy of Goldman and Kierkegaard lead to an 
idea of grace that bestows freedom relative to struggle and suffering. 
 
 II.A. IMPROVISATION CAN EMBODY THE GRACE OF OUTWARD EASE AND INWARD RIGOR 
 
It is intuitive to rank the following two feats differently. The first to be 
considered is this: to perform something amazing—a sport’s move, a gesture of 
forgiveness, an academic requirement, a videogame maneuver—all the while conveying 
(perhaps through one’s body language or attitude) the difficulty of the difficult task. 
One senses the strain in the performer’s clenched teeth—in her stumbling, in her 
complaints, in her sweat. The second form of accomplishment is to carry out a demand 
of equal proportion but in such a way that the performer, instead of revealing the rigor 
that the act requires, makes it look easy. At no time is the observer’s attention diverted 
to thoughts of the hardness of the agent’s task. No; when watching her, the possibility of 
the feat is simply taken for granted. And this it seems is part of the enjoyment of 
beholding her as she unleashes her skill. The audience does not have to worry about 
whether she will pull off the joke or make the point or finish the piece or remember the 
notes or clear the jump. The audience is given the sheer pleasure of seeing her make her 
movements and do what she is supremely gifted to do. The difference between these 
two achievements is something like the difference between the knight of infinite 
resignation and the knight of faith in Fear and Trembling.176 The concealment of difficulty 
                                                
176 This distinction is starker in moral cases. It is less than magnanimous—less than gracious—to 
remind a person repeatedly of the effort of the act of kindness or forgiveness that one is 
undertaking. Showcasing instead of swallowing the difficulty of a sacrifice cancels some of its 
merit. There could be numerous examples of this but for one instance, picture a person who 
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in the latter knight’s action is a mark of grace.177 Let us therefore enter into a 
consideration of the two figures, according to those terms of conjoined rigor and ease.  
Who is the knight of faith and what is his place, generally, in Fear and Trembling? 
Fear and Trembling is a sustained reflection on a life of complete faith in which 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writer Johannes de Silentio shares his admiration for the 
biblical patriarch Abraham, repeatedly declaring wonderment and even bemusement 
over his greatness. In his meditation, de Silentio looks not only to Abraham’s life 
(though of course the father of faith is de Silentio’s starting point) but also to the way of 
life of the idealized knight of faith figure. The knight of faith takes pleasure in 
everything, is a “participator”—taking part in everything, but the invisible mark of who 
he is, his signature characteristic, is his reliance on the strength of the absurd in all he 
does (39-40). The strength of the absurd is the “how” of his faith.178  
A case for the greatness of this faith is built in part on a contrast with a lesser 
individual, the knight of infinite resignation, whose life displays the gap between reality 
and the ideal—if not quite in awkwardness, in difference and recognizability (38).179 
Without taking himself to be the best, the knight of infinite resignation does distance 
himself from the world and, above all, from the rank of the bourgeois philistine (ibid.). 
                                                
makes her begrudging feelings known. This is the person who does not simply forgive—or 
help—others but who tells them in so many words, “I am forgiving you or helping you even 
though you don’t deserve it and it is causing me difficulty.” This contrasts the case of someone 
who does not want to make others feel beholden to her and so graciously “hides her help” in the 
manner Kierkegaard describes in Works of Love. 
 
177 It may also be linked to the knight of faith’s incognito, degrees of concealment interrelating. 
 
178 “[F]or the movement of faith must continually be made by virtue of the absurd …” (37). 
References are to the Hongs’ translation of Fear and Trembling, unless otherwise noted.  
 
179 To clarify, there are three camps of people represented in Fear and Trembling. The first group 
may be thought of as the masses, among whom there is neither striving nor resignation. The 
second group is made up of knights of infinite resignation. They represent an advance over the 
masses in that they “make an upward movement.” But they are not able to reconcile infinity with 
finitude. And so this first class of knights is surpassed by the knights of faith, the third and 
greatest group. Such figures of faith embody the highest calling of existence in living before the 
Absolute in such a way that does not cancel their everyday being. Questionably, parallels hold 
between these different sets of people (the masses, the knights of infinite resignation, and the 




Further, the knight of infinite resignation deals in escapism—in order to cope with his 
resignation, he flees to the realm of infinity and makes sure to scorn what he has left 
behind—whereas the knight of faith moves seamlessly between the two worlds. The 
knight of faith goes beyond resignation by making a second movement, the “movement 
of infinity.” It is precisely this movement that allows Abraham to receive Isaac back with 
joy after the call to sacrifice him on Mount Moriah. And so de Silentio claims that the 
knight of faith makes the movement of infinity successfully by returning to the world in 
a particular way. He belongs to the Absolute but blends in with the everyday. On one 
level then, i.e., in the sense of outwardly fitting in with the crowd, he may even be said 
to go with the flow. Most importantly, whatever his relation with the infinity of the 
Absolute, he “does not lose the finite but gains it whole and intact” (37).  
Wherever else the language of grace and graciousness may be thought to apply, 
movement is the special purview of the adjective “graceful.” Movement moreover holds 
a significant place in de Silentio’s account as his choice for expressing different ways of 
being in the world. Conceiving of faith as a double movement leads him to employ 
dance imagery. The knights, representative of the paradigms of effort and ease, 
metamorphose into ballet dancers of uneven skill in this “leap into life” passage:   
It is supposed to be the most difficult feat for a ballet dancer to leap into a 
specific posture in such a way that he never once strains for the posture but in 
the very leap assumes the posture. Perhaps there is no ballet dancer who can do 
it—but this knight does it. Most people live completely absorbed in worldly joys 
and sorrows; they are benchwarmers who do not take part in the dance. The 
knights of infinity are ballet dancers and have elevation. They make the upward 
movement and come down again, and this, too, is not an unhappy diversion and 
is not unlovely to see. But every time they come down, they are unable to assume 
the posture immediately, they waver for a moment, and this wavering shows 
that they are aliens in the world. It is more or less conspicuous according to their 
skill, but even the most skillful of these knights cannot hide this wavering. One 
does not need to see them in the air; one needs only to see them the instant they 
touch and have touched the earth—and then one recognizes them. But to be able 
to come down in such a way that instantaneously one seems to stand and to 
walk, to change the leap into life into walking, absolutely to express the sublime 





The difference between the two kinds of knights is reflected in time. Unlike the knights 
of infinite resignation who do not assume the posture immediately, knights of faith walk 
instantaneously upon landing. It is the gap in time as much as the wavering of motion in 
their descent that betrays the identity of knights of infinite resignation. A close reading 
of this account may yield the surprising realization that the performances of the knights 
of infinite resignation are nevertheless admired as “not unlovely.” De Silentio’s 
concession to their skill does not erase the fact of their strain, however. In privileging the 
pedestrian (walking doubling as ordinariness), de Silentio retrains readers’ focus from 
the beauty of the leap itself to the marvel of the fact that it is a leap into life. That knights 
of faith are connected to reality is evinced therefore in their touching the ground. There 
is grace in finding the sublime within the everyday, which is manifested by the absence 
of any vacillation in the higher knights’ lowering movement. 
 What, aside from their differing relations with the absurd, accounts for the 
discrepancy in their landings? There is a brief but illuminative reference to training in a 
passage on the virtues and traits of the knight of faith. After describing a number of the 
ways that the knight of faith treads the line between seriousness and levity—he is 
“[c]arefree as a devil-may-care-good-for-nothing, he hasn’t a worry in the world, and yet 
he purchases every moment that he lives, ‘redeeming the seasonable time’ at the dearest 
price,” etc.—de Silentio explains the basis for the faithful person’s ability to live 
paradoxically. He is able to enjoy living in the finite realm even after the pain of 
renouncing finitude  
for his remaining in the finite bore no trace of a stunted, anxious training, and still he 
has this sense of being secure to take pleasure in it, as though it were the most 
certain thing of all. … He resigned everything infinitely, and then took 
everything back on the strength of the absurd. He is continually making the 
movement of infinity, but he makes it with such accuracy and poise that he is 
continually getting finitude out of it, and not for a second would one suspect 
anything else. (Hannay, 69-70, emphasis mine) 
 
Carefree and yet going about the business of redeeming time. Draining in deep sorrow 
and yet experiencing bliss. Renouncing the earthly and yet remaining in finitude. How 
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can the person of faith live in a state of simultaneous security and suspension? More 
than shedding light on the key to the knight of faith’s paradoxical way of life, de 
Silentio’s claim that there is no hint of stunted, anxious training underlying his movement 
reveals the source of the faithful knight’s poise. De Silentio does not—cannot180—
elaborate on the knight of faith’s preparation. Nevertheless, this statement (in which he 
gestures toward the type of training) alone seems to offer significant clues to the knight 
of faith’s superior movement. For one, it implies that stunted preparation leads to 
awkward performance, which further suggests that if there is no grace going in to his 
groundwork, there is no grace coming out of his play.  
This pattern relates in striking ways to the dynamic of preparation and 
responsiveness in the art of contact (dance) improvisation. In addition to the practice of 
improvisation itself, which is a growing source of expertise for them, improvising 
dancers rely on a history of strenuous discipline in order to move well together in the 
course of performing. That affords them the readiness to respond in appropriate and 
inspiring ways to the shifting constraints they encounter onstage. In other words, it is 
how they become prepared to be unprepared. Graceful movement is not possible, 
therefore, without rigorous training (including the rigorous training of the time of play 
itself). As the ability to handle something difficult with poise, grace is also a power, a 
“practice of freedom.” Paradoxically, such graceful power may be displayed in acts of 
surrender. This holds true in religion and politics as much as in the realm of aesthetic 
movement. Thus, instead of a protestor or dancer seeking to express control through 
vertical positions or motions that approximate flying, improvisation might call for 
willfully falling down. These are among the claims borne out by Danielle Goldman in I 
Want to Be Ready, a selection of ideas that we will now examine in full.  
                                                
180 That is why de Silentio continually marvels at this figure; at most, he is able to describe the 
movements of faith but he can neither perform those movements nor supply a formula for how to 




A professional dancer and assistant professor of dance at The New School, 
Goldman moves comfortably between philosophical, political, and kinesthetic sources. 
Announcing the cross-sections of these fields in the introduction to her book, Goldman 
claims that recognizing—rather than denying—the role of constraints in improvisation 
allows one to see improvisation’s “most significant power as a full-bodied critical 
engagement with the world, characterized by both flexibility and perpetual readiness” 
(5). Improvised dance is powerful as a practice that prepares one to make choices in 
response to constraints. Significantly, this includes constraints belonging to spheres 
apart from but addressable by dance, which is what allows Goldman to claim that 
improvisation is “critical engagement with the world.”181  
Rules and regulations are the most obvious form of constraint in play—they are 
the framing function of games, which demark them from everyday reality. Occasionally, 
a group of improvisers might set out to play within particular, known confines, giving 
themselves rules in advance (e.g., agreeing to play only certain chords during a jazz 
piece or to limit themselves to a certain tempo). But, in general, improvisational play 
operates by a shifting set of rules. Unlike the established confines of a pre-existing game, 
constraints in improvisation are liable to change as the conditions of a performance 
develop. Here, constraints might be the ever-building decisions of the other players or 
the atmosphere of the event. As Goldman acknowledges: “Acts of beholding can create 
the tightest kinds of spaces, and one would be remiss not to consider the contexts in 
which dancing occurs and the effects that different modes of spectatorship have upon 
one’s ability to improvise” (88). Thus, beyond observers and their setting, interpretation 
of dance affects the possibilities of performance.   
                                                
181 This is supported by Bill T. Jones’s statement “It was in an improvisation class taught by 
Richard Bull that I discovered that dance wasn’t only about pointing my feet or making lines in 




Additionally, there are three different ways of viewing constraint that I wish to 
suggest. Briefly, they are the constraints of self, society, and sin. First, if a player comes 
to a performance with only slight training, she may feel unable to improvise adequately. 
It is as if having learned fewer rules, she has less to break, or that without much practice 
(experience), she is at a loss for what to practice (enact). This underdeveloped inner state 
would limit the number of choices available to her during the piece. Secondly, 
constraints might not be ludic or aesthetic but political and social. Bill T. Jones’s story as 
a black, gay choreographer conveys this demonstrably. Lastly, harkening back to the 
religious and specifically Christian focus of this chapter, it is worth mentioning that sin 
might be experienced as a constraining element—something that cuts one off 
existentially from God and others. A valuable technê, then, for “remedying” constraints 
of ranging type and consequence is readiness. 
Like a solo from Alvin Ailey’s signature piece, Revelations, Goldman names her 
work after the black spiritual with the haunting but simple lyrics “I want to be ready, I 
want to be ready, Lord, ready to put on my long white robe.” It may not be immediately 
clear to what the readiness in the song refers. A strong point is nevertheless being made. 
Whether for baptism, death, judgement day, heaven, or some other encounter with God, 
preparation is needed—and life ought to be lived differently in light of this need. One 
garners a sense of the inspiration that Ailey’s dance holds for Goldman not only in terms 
of readiness but also relative to practice and paradoxical descent (or “controlled fall”) 
through her exposition: 
Although Revelations’ falls are always followed by recovery, [the piece] “I Want 
to Be Ready” suggests the need to be prepared, not just for salvation but also for 
a range of social and historical constraints. In this austere solo, with everything 
seemingly at stake, dance emerges as a practice of making oneself ready. Long-limbed 
and dressed entirely in white, the soloist begins seated in fourth position, hands 
planted firmly on the floor, gazing upward. A series of stretches and contractions 
ensues, danced in keeping with the slow cadences of the spiritual … Several 
times, the man in white rises from the floor with arms outstretched, only to find 
the floor again in a controlled, expressive fall. The dance’s final descent ends as 





This downward turn is the provisional, not final, end. The dance progresses; the next 
and final section of Revelations culminates in the starkly celebrative movements of the 
entire ensemble dancing, clad in bright yellow costumes. Ailey’s piece concludes on a 
triumphant note, suggesting that the preparation undergone in the second section was 
worthwhile, successful. The message seems to be that falls can indeed lead to uplift or 
victory. More immediately pertinent is Goldman’s contention that dancing (in general) is 
a practice of readying oneself. 
 Such an interpretation of the specific dance piece Revelations points to a form of 
dance more broadly, one that relies on—while further cultivating—the art of perpetual 
readiness, what I earlier referred to as the preparation for being unprepared.182 In contact 
improvisation—a way of dancing traced back in America to the 1970s in which physical 
contact between dance partners provides a certain “communication” that then informs 
choices of movement, leading especially to acts of lowering like rolling and falling—
dancers are responsive and responsible. They are responsible in that they owe each other 
something in the spur of the moment choices they make as they respond to one another. 
In other words, in their playful interactions, there is a mutual answerability. Such 
accountability is a daunting objective. Having no time for reflection during the course of 
improvisatory play, a dancer is forced to rely on attentiveness and her reserve of skills 
from training to “rise” to its challenge. 
 To ascertain what responsiveness in improvisation entails, one may begin by 
explaining what being prepared is not. According to Vijay Iyer, doing something 
memorized or pre-planned is criticized as giving a lie. Slightly less offensive but still 
significantly out of line with the spirit of improvising are the following gestures: on the 
one hand, thinking of one’s next action in the midst of a fellow player’s “offering” and 
                                                
182 “At its core, contact improvisation is a practice of making oneself ready for a range of shifting 




on the other, waiting for someone to finish solely so one can do what one wants to do. 
These false modes of preparation bring about a sort of absence and rudeness, which take 
a player out of the moment. While they may yield a reaction, they take one out of the 
current—out of the flow, out of the now—demonstrating how reactivity “falls short” of 
authentic responsiveness.183 Ultimately, these strategies hinder the desired spontaneity 
of improvisation and block the freedom of the kind of exchange being sought.  
The preparation that frees one to act from a place of the fresh and unplanned 
goes hand in hand with proper responsiveness. Such an accomplishment requires 
attentive listening—listening that is intuitive, bodily, and of an almost total sort.184 When 
dancers let this way of listening determine their actions, they not only honor each other, 
demonstrating dutiful responsibility, they also create an atmosphere of relaxed 
awareness. “Relaxed awareness” is one translation for disponibilité, a notion used by 
Jacques Lecoq in training improvisers (Wells, 80). The virtue of disponibilité may also be 
explained in terms of availability, openness, and even trust. Great improvisation arises 
out of the willingness of the players to test possibilities, follow each other into and out of 
risks, and be comfortable enough to keep the play going after producing phrases in 
movement or music that do not “work out.” In other words, successful improvisation 
depends on a responsiveness that results from awareness.  
Note that the difficulty of this demand does not lead to rigidity but relaxation. 
Amidst focused attention, there is also dispersion. Where one expects to find tension, 
there is easing up. This coincidence of opposite or contradictory states occurs at a 
number of levels. Until this point, we have only noted the discrepancy between the 
exterior and the interior—grace disguising grit. Now we are led to see the unlikely 
                                                
183 This description is somewhat in tension with Gary Peters’s origin-focused account of 
improvisation, which will be introduced shortly. 
 
184 On account of this skill, improvisers might be likened to other “professional listeners” such as 
psychotherapists. See also Mark Fuller’s short interview on “The Improv Approach to Listening” 




distance between easy outward appearance and difficult effect—passivity covering up 
power. The motion of falling makes this second level of paradox clear. 
We have encountered the notion of falling vis-à-vis play in references to 
Heidegger’s philosophy in which human beings, dropped into the world, exist as 
“thrown,” and indirectly in Caillois’s fourth play category of radical movement, ilinx. I 
do not know if there are theologians in the play movement who consider the Fall of 
humankind into sin in terms of play, although Robert E. Neale in “The Crucifixion as 
Play” does joke about the divine adventure, describing the incarnation as the result of a 
trip (Moltmann, Theology of Play, 80). In Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, a leap becomes 
valuable when it is most like walking. Rather than striving to remain in the realm of 
infinity and difference, re-inhabiting the ordinary is what counts as extraordinary. And 
while this is not falling per se, it does occur when one’s feet alight upon the ground. In 
other words, the important feature of the faithful person’s leap concerns the downward-
focused portion of his movement.  
Falling arises again in Goldman’s examination of the link between contact 
improvisation and political resistance. She pairs the seemingly different spheres of 
dance and the U.S. civil rights movement, informed as it was by Gandhi’s peaceful 
revolution in India, on the basis of her understanding of improvisation as “the intimate 
awareness of constraints and the choices of how to respond to them” (Goldman, Union 
Theological Seminary presentation). Because political constraints call for improvisation, 
too, falling may be a social and spiritual exercise beyond a strategy in contact-driven, 
combinatorial movement. It may be a creative-yet-trained response to the unpredictable 
and physically fraught atmosphere of protests. Or, as the liturgical expert Janet Walton 
stated, falling may count in a particular context as an action but “really it’s a stance in 
life” (U.T.S. course discussion). In what follows, I will briefly explore this paradoxical 
stance, first in the context of dance performances and then in the context of the struggle 
for civil rights. 
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The impetus to fall—to partner with gravity in moving downward rather than 
attempt to defy it by propelling oneself up in the air—is at odds with what one might 
call the kinesthetic values of classical ballet. Challenges to the tautness and verticality of 
that dance form came from a number of sources, including the modern choreography of 
the Nietzsche-inspired Doris Humphrey. And yet, as the transformation in value was 
taking place, falling was still being contrasted with “recovery,” the former 
representative of submission, the latter, control. During the development of contact 
improvisation, which is captured in the documentary Fall after Newton, falling is seen to 
provide safety—even survival (Goldman, 101-106). It is as if freely accepting constraints 
is necessary to purchase freedom from them.185 
The link between freedom, power (and control), paradox, and falling becomes 
clearer in the analysis of the cultural critic and music professor Jason King. King writes, 
“Black performance moves toward the co-presence of mobility and immobility, control 
and freedom. … Blackness is ambivalent direction, finding the fall in ascent, and the 
ascent in the fall. This is survival” (“Which Way is Down? Improvisations on Black 
Mobility,” 42; Goldman, 100). This quotation suggests not only that freedom and control 
can coexist. It gestures towards the fruitfulness of locating freedom in paradox, whether 
that be the co-presence of mobility and stillness or of falling and ascent. In short, 
responses of paradox offer survival.186 Civil rights activists tested this principle, putting 
their own bodies on the line.  
The Freedom Riders deal explicitly in their training material, A Manual for Direct 
Action, not only with the action of standing up and looking their attackers in the eye but 
                                                
185 On this point, consider the implications of the fortitude of the slave Harriet Jacobs, who 
survived for seven years in an attic space seven feet wide, nine feet long, and no more than three 
feet tall. Receiving freedom by being bought did not represent escape for her. As Goldman, 
referring to a contemporary scholar, writes, “According to Moten, if Jacob’s freedom could only 
come by way of exchange, she would need to escape from freedom too” (Goldman, 4). 
 
186 Lears’s writing proves relevant once more for how it sheds light on the relation between 
paradox and survival. Lears points out that black Christians’ perception of reconciling grace was 




also with the purposeful and protective value of stillness, immobility, and lying on the 
ground (Goldman, 97-98). Here Goldman’s discussion is deft in that it treads the line of a 
certain ambivalence and recognizes the danger of “aestheticizing passivity.” 
Improvisation involves negotiation between people, whether dancers, musicians, or 
teammates. In addition, it requires negotiation of meaning—in this case, whether to 
challenge, as Jason King does, the traditional associations of verticality with activism on 
the one hand, and of horizontality with apathy, on the other. He questions if there is 
dignity in standing up but shame in falling down. What if these old correlations are 
wrong and dignity could be found in forms of lowliness? (But would standing up ever 
be identified with shame?) What if “narratives of racial uplift” end in exhaustion? 
Instead might we, with King and Goldman, look at the informed activism of the 
Freedom Riders as experimentations that “recuperate ‘falling’ as having value in political 
struggle”? (Goldman, 100) Here I would argue that falling might even be viewed as an 
assertive act, a power play. Grace gives way not simply to survival but to force.187 
Having seen that grace is the power one acquires through demanding training to 
respond in beautiful, seamless ways to unknown constraints, even or especially in 
paradoxical movements, let us pivot to the relation between grace, failure, destruction, 
and redeemability, elements that roughly correspond to the first half of “double grace.” 
 
                                                
187 The underlying resistance to grace—in favor of force—in some instances of contact 
improvisation should not be overlooked. Nancy Stark Smith, one of contact improvisation’s 
founders, expresses this in memorable language, stating that she finds herself “playing against 
the forces … insisting instead of yielding, adding fierce to gentle, no to yes” (Stark Smith, 91; 
Goldman, 107). This may be surprising because (at least for the untrained observer) contact 
improvisation can carry a rather smooth and graceful appearance with all of its relaxed limbs, 
flowing movement, and seeming weightlessness. Especially in the beginning stages of the dance 
form’s development, however, resistance came in aggressive, “clunky collisions” between 
dancers (Goldman, 106). Such “jarring moments,” which may still be caught in performances, are 
indicative of the negotiations underlying the practice. As Goldman explains, “These breaks in flow 
constitute the often ignored, but crucial, grit of contact improvisation. They serve as visible 
reminders, for those not actually dancing, that negotiations are taking place, even when the fall 
appears smooth and full of grace or when the bodies seem dangerously passive” (107, emphasis 
mine). Goldman exercises valuable nuance in analyzing improvisation. In short, her challenge to 




II.B. THE FIRST, RECEPTIVE PART OF DOUBLE GRACE CONCERNS THE GIVENNESS OF 
REDEMPTION AND THE FREEDOM TO FAIL 
 
 As indicated, the remaining sections of this chapter are oriented around the 
notion of double grace, or a person’s application of grace in the acceptance of God’s grace. 
I would posit that, conceived in this way, grace results in an attitude and posture similar to 
playfulness in being neither wholly of work nor wholly of rest. On the one hand, grace 
involves an active receptivity that is simultaneously grateful and sacrificial. On the other 
hand, grace requires an almost passive productivity in movements of reciprocation that 
are driven by sincerity and a lack of self-importance. In the remaining sections, I will 
explain these two senses of grace by drawing cursorily from Luther’s Reformation 
theology alongside Kierkegaard’s stance in PC. A description of the (1) receptive and (2) 
reciprocal aspects of grace (in addition to Peters’s philosophical analysis of 
improvisation, of course) will provide the groundwork for understanding the 
productive capacity of failure. This, in turn, will lead to the culminating point of this 
chapter: an appreciation of the freedom of working-without-works. Improvisation and 
the Christian faith converge there, in that peculiarly ludic, in-between place.  
Note how the ease-and-rigor thematic of Part II.A remains relevant here. Those 
conjoined values appear again in Parts II.B and II.C—theologically, in the acceptance of 
divine forgiveness and the exercise of difficult, “costly” obedience—as well as playfully, 
in the willingness to build improvisation on broken, salvaged things and the refusal to 
produce solidified, sellable works. Insofar as the productivity of creative destruction does 
not lead to products but to free works, the sense of paradox also recurs.  
To begin, then: What does the first movement of grace—God towards us—entail 
and what does it allow? According to the New Testament, God gives people salvation as 
a gift, not on the basis of any good attribute we possess or any virtuous action we 
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perform but according to our need.188 Grace in this sense springs from God’s loving 
kindness through the person of Jesus Christ, offering the benefit not only of an eternal 
future of blessedness but also of a psychic liberty here on earth. It is only after 
appreciating the justifying mercy of this gesture that Christians are able to live and 
“work” appropriately, their motivations having been radically transformed and freed. 
The first movement makes possible the second, a pattern that parallels, however 
imprecisely, the resignation and reappropriation (or crucifixion and resurrection) steps 
of the double movement in Fear and Trembling. 
Marked by a strong sentiment of the receptivity of grace, Lutheran theology rests 
on the dialectical interplay of faith and free works, while opposing belief and “works of 
the flesh.” Works of the flesh—or acts that a Christian believer does in her own strength 
for her own sake—may be said to be non-working works. Let us be clear to separate the 
idea of non-working works from the working-without-works that Peters describes. The 
self-motivated behaviors and deeds that Luther decries are not effective for bringing 
about salvation;189 as he himself experienced before relying on scripture and the record 
of Christ, those works fail to produce the ease of grace and result in torment instead. 
When there was no grace going into his groundwork, there was no grace coming out of 
his play. 
Rather than in any outer works, then, Luther locates the justification of 
Christians in their inner spirit of faith. It is faith that connects them to Christ, Christ’s 
righteousness, the power of the word of God, and only then to outer works of a 
reformed kind. Accordingly, he writes in “The Freedom of a Christian,” “[t]hat which is 
impossible for you to accomplish by trying to fulfill all the works of the law—many and 
useless as they all are—you will accomplish quickly and easily through faith” 
                                                
188 See, for example, Romans 3:24-26, 5:1-ff, and Titus 3:5. 
 
189 For example, Luther states, “Though you were nothing but good works from the soles of your 




(Hillerbrand, 38). Significantly, Luther only reached the ease of faith after going through 
the immense difficulty of trying to carry out the law by himself as he strained to be a 
perfect monk.190 Thus, while justification by faith does not result from striving, it may 
arrive after striving. And for those who have attempted to make atonement for 
themselves, there is a special liberation to be had in comprehending the efficacy of 
divine grace alone. That there is assurance of rightness with God is surprising and 
transformative. That, because of the richness of God’s character, it comes for free is 
beyond marvel and a source of unending joy. 
Luther conveys the receptive nature of this process famously through the phrase 
“passive righteousness.” Thus, in his “Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the 
Galatians” he states “the righteousness of faith, which God imputes to us through Christ 
without works … is a merely passive righteousness … For here we work nothing, render 
nothing to God; we receive and permit someone else to work in us, namely, God” 
(Hillerbrand, 125). The emotional relief and inner comfort that this brings is enormous. 
Without preventing a believer from ever failing, it frees her from feeling the 
condemnation of failure. Grace becomes a place where “one notices no sin and feels no 
terror or remorse of conscience” (129). It is not that failure does not matter in the 
Christian life but rather that God in Christ has created the conditions for failure to be 
treated differently, for sin to be countered by God’s own perfect righteousness. Not 
incidentally, this ensures a perpetual indebtedness on the part of the Christian. Because 
salvation cannot be purchased with a person’s good works, no one will ever be in the 
position to make a claim on God as owing her something. As will be discussed in Part 
II.C, Kierkegaard focuses on this other half of the story, that of the nature of the effort of 
responding to the gracious work of God.  
                                                
190 Such a tack is doomed to failure and is insulting to God. “Trying to merit grace by preceding 
works, therefore, is trying to placate God with sins, which is nothing but heaping sins upon sins, 
making fun of God, and provoking His wrath” (Hillerbrand, 134-135). 
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 Thus far, I have been arguing that Luther’s theology provides an understanding 
of grace as a resource for handling failure. Grace is the God-given, future-directed gift 
that enables us to live beyond sin and into eternal blessedness. In what follows, I will 
present some ways in which failure is encountered and remedied in the realm of 
improvisation, in particular by looking at how failure relates positively to the issues of 
origin, destruction, and renovation. Broaching failure in this way will allow us to see 
grace differently—as the liberation of self, for play.  
Gary Peters, professor of critical and cultural theory at York St. John University, 
orients his superb study The Philosophy of Improvisation around the notion of origin. This 
is a significant departure from the ordinary association of improvisation with “flow.” 
Consciously following Paul Klee’s angel and Walter Benjamin’s storm of progress, 
Peters looks backward. Rather than glorifying the immediacy of “now-time” or making 
an ode to some future hope, he locates his task in the past and focuses on the import of 
origins and their relation to freedom. These are the terms in which he describes his 
book’s resistance, its push to “re-novation,” in discussing what others often 
sentimentalize. Therefore, although it is “situated on this edge between the absence and 
the presence of the work,” his theoretical writing on improvisation is offered “not, it 
should be emphasized, in order to take up residence in the now, the ‘being in the 
moment’ so celebrated by improvisors, but as a way of bringing into view the prehistory 
of the work, thought in terms of its origin and the aesthetic process of origination” (1, 
original emphasis). A major concern for Peters, then, is the tragedy of creation—how to 
respond to the destruction that accompanies experiences of improvisation while seeking 
to preserve the freedom of the beginning (3).191  
                                                
191 Peters elaborates: “Improvisors too rush forward into the future with their faces turned to the 
rubbish heap of the past, but the difference—the existential tragedy—is that they feel compelled 
to gather up this past and carry it into the future as a work of art. Free-improvisation gathers the 
past as an otherness not to be imitated but as the originary site of an aesthetic freedom to be 
sensed and followed. Weighed down by the scrap heap of history, by dead styles and wrecked 
idioms, free-improvisors are happy to contribute to this ongoing destruction through an active 
forgetfulness that clears the site for the beginning of new work out of nowhere” (48). 
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The potential of improvisation for “creative destruction” is so strong that it 
applies to literal garbage: even the destroyed and ruined materials of trash heaps may be 
redeemed, as Peters illustrates in “Scrap Yard Challenge—Junkyard Wars.” The 
chapter’s title refers to British and American television programs that take place at 
garbage sites in which competing teams are challenged to use only the discarded things 
there in order to produce an odd array of working artifacts (10). Peters acknowledges 
the severe material constraints of the pieces of junk. Insisting that such decay not be 
transcended in being treated improvisatorially, he takes the view that improvisation 
requires the players to inhabit the decay in a revivifying way. Thus, he arrives at an 
estimation of improvisation as re-novation by considering it “a productive process of 
reappropriation that promotes improvisation more as a means of salvation and 
redemption than of creation” (18). I want to suggest that this reappropriation—this 
salvaging—is of a kind with the redemptive activity of God in the world.192 Redeeming 
mistakes and fallen lives reveals a special ability, a power, similar to the power of grace 
that appears among dancers who practice contact improvisation in challenging times 
and constraining spaces. 
What happens, though, when improvisers face offerings of unknown quality, 
when the exchanges improvisers make occur not in a setting of clearly identified junk 
but in an atmosphere of emerging context? There (in a musical performance, e.g.), 
redemption may appear as the strengthening of an already good invention but it is more 
likely to bring about the positive transformation of a neutral creation. It would relate to 
what I think of as the “accidental value” component of spontaneity-driven play, an idea 
that may be broached in conjunction with the procedure of “overaccepting” familiar to 
many improvisers. 
                                                
 





We have already discussed the heightened state of readiness that improvisers 
embody in being prepared to be unprepared. Equipped to do many things but not 
knowing what exact thing she will make or do, a player is open to both chance and 
accident when she steps into an improvisational framework. This accounts for the 
necessarily contingent value of initial play offerings. If specific preparation were 
allowed, players would arrive with beautiful, well-crafted compositions in hand but 
then the improvisational character of the event would itself be destroyed.  
Therefore, a commitment to accident (rather than the accident itself) is what is 
partially determinative of the excellence of improvisatory acts. It is not so much the 
quality manifested by the initial offering itself that matters but what is done with it—
whether the offering is committed to. This “commitment” may be described in the 
language of improv 101 as the practice of overaccepting (the “Yes … and” technique), 
which includes integrating mistakes into an unfolding work. Overaccepting is 
distinguished from ordinary accepting in its active character. Rather than passively 
taking something entirely on someone else’s terms, a player who practices overaccepting 
exerts power by shaping the other’s offering as she receives it. Forward movement is 
stalled if a choice (whether good, bad, or neutral) is ignored or rejected in an outright 
fashion. “Blocking” offerings would bring play to a halt, leading to a series of stunted, 
short segments. Not giving each other enough time to explore and develop 
improvisatory lines would prevent great moments from emerging. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, accepting some merely-okay thing by following through on it may prove 
redemptive. This holds in improvisational art forms and, to a degree, in life.193  
To give an example: in a blues song with the typical AAB line structure, the first 
line “A” that someone spontaneously throws out into the improvisatory arena may be 
                                                
193 There is an important but obvious ethical qualification to be made here. Creatively working 
around poor life decisions may transform them into something of surprising value, but this does 





quite weak on its own. Alternately, it may be considered as something of a merely 
neutral quality until it is engaged—insofar as it is what follows that determines its merit 
or significance. That is, the line can become impressive and gain artistic meaning simply 
by being committed to. Repetition is a sign of this acceptance and a means of improving. 
In playing the less than stellar line a second time, the players announce a willingness to 
build their play around that accidental choice and to strengthen it by investing further 
creativity in it. All of a sudden, it gains in aesthetic value. The confirmation of the line 
“A” lays the path for further surprises, enabling additional turns, which are potentially 
deeply gratifying, to emerge. This is how it links to novelty, how it even opens up the 
path to difference. When an alternate line (line “B”) is grafted onto it (the “A-A” string), 
the song begins to take shape. Other layers are weaved around the initial offering as the 
play continues. More choices are made, taken up, and repeated.  
Repetition does not allow for sentimentalism, however. When a group of players 
(such as actors, musicians, dancers, or comedians) reach a collective place of excellence, 
when they have a moment of achievement, they must resist the temptation to recreate it. 
They must be relentless in moving forward to producing new things, allowing to emerge 
acts or sounds or interactions that build on the direction of the current energy of the 
performance and, thus, that are “true” or appropriate to the new moment. 
Improvisational offerings, even excellent ones, are not safe from the spirit of creative 
destruction on which Peters focuses. Thus, in improvisation, there are contradictory 
impulses towards and away from repetition. On the one hand, repetition is resisted 
insofar as it is in tension with novelty, energy-bestowing risk, and the value that 
improvisers place on authentic responsiveness. On the other hand, repetition solidifies 
and even “makes good on” first offerings. Repetition can be a tool for the determination 
of accidental value.194   
                                                
194 Repetition is a vital notion to this dissertation, at least indirectly by virtue of its relation to 
mimesis (a category in Roger Caillois’s four-fold schematization of play). With respect to this 
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Despite idealized portraits, playing is not all acceptance, all the time. As Peters 
makes clear, there is a spectrum of combativeness and interpersonal care along which 
performances of improvisation occur. There is challenging, posturing, and assertion (51, 
53).195 At the end, after chaos and coherence have mixed, there may be peace—a 
freedom-infused moment of stillness before the new round is taken up—but along the 
way there is struggle (36). Improvisation is a practice of contestation.196  
This combativeness relates in crucial but not immediately apparent ways to 
“good failure” and the grace that allows play to continue. The push and pull between 
                                                
chapter, its importance appears doubly, in improvisational and liturgical contexts. In a different 
project, it would be stimulating to undertake the presentation of philosophical concepts of 
repetition by way of repetition’s role in improvisation. For example, one might choose to consider 
the notion’s recurrence in the writings of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Freud, Derrida, and Deleuze, 
where it is found in the ideas of the distinction between religious repetition and poetic 
reproduction; eternal recurrence; the pleasure of repetition and its usefulness for attaining 
mastery over the painful; iterability; and the interplay between repetition and difference. What 
might be gained by reading their philosophies in light of improvisational understandings of 
repetition? One might wish to bring to bear the experience of “being in the groove,” which refers 
to the way that the “dominant feel of a piece” comes about by repeating a rhythm pattern (“Jazz 
Glossary,” http://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/jazzglossary/).  
 
195 “There is an idealism in improvisation that is heart-warming but misguided. The terminology 
that inhabits and informs the hegemonic dialogical language of care, enabling, sharing, and 
participation is only aesthetically productive to the extent that it confronts the far from ideal 
reality of the work, where the necessity of singularity plays havoc with any dreams of universal 
consensus” (Peters, 50). 
 
196 There are interior challenges to improvisation, features of improvisatory play that undercut the 
extent or undermine the actuality of improvisation within the performance, too. Stabilization 
counts as one such problem. While much may be “up for grabs” in jazz, a certain underlying 
structure has come to be known, expected, secure, safe. Thus, Adorno—seen as a foe of popular 
art forms, including jazz—uses the “standardization of the framework” of jazz to criticize its 
pseudo-individualization (Peters, 78). Similar to the early and fast codification of movement in 
contact improvisation (Goldman, 106), the normalization of schemes in jazz bespeaks a threat to 
intrinsic spontaneity—spontaneity that goes “all the way down”—from within. How, then, can 
improvisation in practice resist the temptation to rigidify through practice? Put differently, as 
improvisation continues, how can it continue to be improvisation? Keith Johnstone offers one 
solution in an argument for the rigorous incorporation of destabilization into it, what he refers to, 
wonderfully, as “tilting.” Peters presents this idea at length, as follows: “Johnstone devotes much 
time and space to the art of tilting, that is, of tilting the balance that is ever in danger of being 
achieved in an improvisation, by introducing destabilizing material into the emergent dialogue, 
thereby ‘demolishing’ or ‘devastating’ it [Impro for Storytellers, 94]. Tilting is a highly competitive 
sport, pitting one performer against another in a struggle for power that results in winners and 
losers, success and failure, but as is clear throughout, Johnstone is not interested in personalities, 
only in the work” (Peters, 59, original emphasis). The destabilizing effect of tilting is noteworthy 
for how it accords with Peters’s interests in destruction and power negotiation, all of which exist 




power and freedom introduces a significant dynamism into improvisation, a 
competitive destabilization that takes the focus off of the individual players and, 
according to Peters, redirects their interests to the origin of their work of art. In addition 
to being a site of destruction out of which novelty may be coaxed, then, failure is a 
crucial element of improvisation because it provides improvisers the opportunity to 
value play above themselves. 
Peters develops these claims by drawing on and engaging the techniques of 
Keith Johnstone, the founder of Theatresports and author of Impro: Improvisation and the 
Theatre. In his work training improvisers and putting on shows of improvisational 
competition, Johnstone depersonalizes the players’ experiences of fear, power loss, and 
success. “It is the shifting of the balance of power that is crucial, not who has it. It is the 
possibility of failure or success that gives improvisation its edge rather than who 
succeeds or fails,” to quote Peters’s analysis (59). By valuing “the happening of the 
artwork” more than any one person or personality, the improvisation expert and troupe 
leader spurs on a form of play that is both gracious and anticipatory. Referring to and 
building on Johnstone’s writing, which contains the language of grace, Peters states: 
To fail “gracefully” is to fail successfully. It is to recognize that such failure is 
necessary for the work to continue. Such failure is liberatory in two ways but also 
tragic on account of this very dualism. The sacrifice of performers is a necessary 
part of the work’s happening (for Johnstone, the avoidance of boredom), but this 
failure liberates the artist from the task of trying to gather and hold together both 
the origin and the event or performance of the work within the temporality of 
aesthetic production: the duality of creation and preservation. And the artist 
needs to be liberated from this task in order to fully recognize its impossibility 
and, thus, its significance. In this sense such liberation might be best understood 
as an emancipation from the illusions of success that, in their foregrounding of 
the artist, obscure and trivialize the origin of the work of art. The liberation of the 
artist releases, in turn, the artwork from the gathering grasp of the singular artist, 
allowing it to return to its origin, which continues to happen as the singularity of 
production ebbs and flows. It is the liberation of the artwork from the cramped 
intentionality of the singular artist that ensures the continuing presence of the 
origin in the unfolding of the work, and it is the graceful failure of the artist that 
is required to keep this origin in play. To fail without grace is to lose sight of the 





If for Johnstone the highest commitment is to keeping the play going, the preeminent 
consideration for Peters as these lines evince is the continuing presence of the origin as 
the work of improvisation unfolds. Everything seems to flow for Peters from the 
distinction between the concealment and the presencing of the origin (the Heideggerean 
references being explicit for him). Under the negative or undesirable side of the 
dichotomy (i.e., the side related to concealment) would fall the individual artist along 
with intentionality and what I will refer to as “plain success” (versus Peters’s version of 
the success of failure). Their venerable contrasts, which are indicative of the ongoing 
presencing of the origin, include the following: not artwork tout simple but artwork-and-
artist-in-coemergence; the impossibility of the dual performance of creativity and 
preservation; and successful failure—i.e., graceful failure. 
 Failure and success might get tangled in an interpretation of this passage, so it is 
important to be clear. Failure, not plain success, is the friend of play. This is because 
success hinders the proper continuing of play by drawing attention to the player (“the 
singular artist”) over and above the origin. Failure rises above plain success in Peters’s 
estimation because failure denies the illusion that the artist could ever hold the origin 
and the ongoing event of art together. But there are two, fundamentally different kinds 
of failure, failure that is graceful and not. Not surprisingly, the relation to origin is 
determinative of this status. Peters privileges graceful failure because it “keeps [the] 
origin in play.” It does this by releasing the artwork—not the artist—from being 
“cramped” (it is the artist, after all, who is failing). This is the manner in which Peters, 
by way of Johnstone, introduces grace to improvisation.197 
 In sum, therefore, I have sought in Part II.B to illuminate how grace is the 
religious principle of the givenness of redemption, which finds expression in 
improvisation in players’ prizing of play over product, that is, in their affirmation that 
                                                
197 This account of failure that is successful and graceful may parallel the mystics’ winning 




“the play’s the thing.” It is not that all improvisation has a graceful sheen; very often, the 
discomfort (and thrill) that one senses in watching an improvised performance is the 
keen awareness that the players might not “pull it off.” What they do is hard. Routinely 
that difficulty is not disguised, cases of contact improvising aside. I would wager to say 
that where grace appears in improvisation in general is in the attitude towards risk. In 
short, there is freedom to fail. The assurance of redemption, salvability, is the ground of 
this freedom. An overall sense of security paradoxically spurs dangerous choices and 
chanciness. These issues not only relate to freedom but also extend to work in the 
following, colloquial manner. 
During improvisation, attempts at creativity might not “work out.” In addition 
to being thoroughly permissible and expected, this is even necessary for novelty. 
Knowing ahead of time that any improvisatory line or offering can be saved (in the 
sense of being salvaged, not preserved) does not lead to laziness. Instead, it allows the 
players to keep the play going long enough to benefit from their risks and failures. 
Paradoxically, it is this order of value—play over product—that enables the creation of 
groundbreaking art. This pattern parallels what I understand Kierkegaard and other 
Christian theological thinkers to have maintained about Christianity as a strenuous but 
unstriving faith. Christ’s once-and-for-all success—which came, not incidentally, 
through loss—provides the believer’s model for existence, while at the same time 
covering all past and future failures.198 Rather than having the goal of accomplishing any 
one thing, the Christian’s overriding commitment is to remaining in Christ and 
continuing the journey towards conformity to him—keeping the freely productive play 
of faith going (John 15:4-10; Romans 8:29).  
                                                
198 Johannes Climacus goes so far as to say that God “in his resolution” is “now obliged to 
continue” in his venture, as if a player no less than God is committed to keeping the play going 
(Philosophical Fragments, 55). Climacus’s remark has implications, additionally, for the 




In Part II.A of this chapter, we examined grace as strenuous but poised 
movement. Here in Part II.B, another picture has emerged in which the receptivity of 
grace foreshadows its responsive moment. Having broached the first “receptive” 
element of grace as the gift God bestows in redeeming mortal failure, and the corollary 
attitudes toward failure in improvisation that led to a privileging of play over product, 
let us now turn to Part II.C. There we will consider the sequentially second, 
“responsive” half of double grace, i.e., the identification of grace as free works. The 
theological conception of grace as free works finds a parallel in the definition of 
improvisation as “working without a work.” Both exhibit freedom by pointing to the 
pleasure of intrinsically-motivated actions.  
 
II.C. THE SECOND, RESPONSIVE PART OF DOUBLE GRACE CONCERNS THE FREEDOM OF PLAY 
THAT TAKES PLACE ON THE BORDER OF WORK 
 
With hints of perhaps characteristic cantankerousness, Kierkegaard rails against 
the misuse of grace under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus in Practice in Christianity. In 
that book, which one ought to note Kierkegaard considered “the most perfect and truest 
thing” he wrote, there are few direct references to grace, keeping perhaps with his intent 
focus on restoring the difficulty of Christianity to Christendom (Hong, PC, xviii). The 
first appearance of the word in the Editor’s Preface takes on particular, if not 
unquestionable, significance.199 On the book’s opening page—signed with the 
transparent initials “S.K.”—there are these lines:    
In this book, originating in the year 1848, the requirement for being a 
Christian is forced up by the pseudonymous author to a supreme ideality. 
Yet the requirement should indeed be stated, presented, and heard. From 
the Christian point of view, there ought to be no scaling down of the 
                                                





requirement, nor suppression of it—instead of a personal admission and 
confession. 
The requirement should be heard—and I understand what is said as 
spoken to me alone—so that I might learn not only to resort to grace but to resort 
to it in relation to the use of grace. (7, original emphasis)  
 
This editorial note orients readers of PC to expect a book on rigor and ideality from the 
start. Rather than be scaled down in any way, the requirement of what it means to lead a 
Christian life is raised—“forced up … to a supreme ideality.” Recourse to God’s grace 
provides no way out from the difficulty—and voluntary suffering—of a truly Christian 
existence. In his pure, idealized Christianity, Kierkegaard bars ho-hum “all is grace, all is 
forgiven” attitudes. Such escape hatches from Christian discipline, decision, and self-
denial tarnish faith, cancelling its authenticity. 
Counterbalancing Luther’s emphasis on the passivity of righteousness is the 
conviction that God’s grace does not preclude human works. While not dependent on 
good works, salvation nevertheless involves working, but working of a peculiar sort and 
timing. This is what it means to respond to God’s grace with grace: to refuse to take 
God’s work for granted by living a spiritually lazy and morally-lax life, and, at the same 
time, to spurn the opposite inclination toward a life of overwork with its accompanying 
mentality of “works-righteousness” and boasting. Double grace is therefore a middle 
way. Having an attitude of grace towards God’s grace leads to a rigorous way of being 
in which one’s actions are regarded as tremendously important but nevertheless non-
salvific. They are meaningful actions but they are free because they do not proceed from 
the necessity of attaining salvation for oneself. Failure is possible because success in the 
most important things is assured, having already been secured externally by God. As 
much as an improviser’s, then, an authentic Christian’s deeds are non-working works. 
Restated, having an attitude of grace towards God’s grace is the twofold realization that 
in the economy of salvation, it is only God’s work that matters, and that in respecting 
God’s “major,” salvific work, one is called to a life of good, “minor” works that are free 
in their relative smallness.   
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Such a view of double grace accords with the dual claims of the Apostle Paul in 
Ephesians 2:8-10. There, he states clearly that salvation is the gift of God (theou to dôron), 
that salvation is not of works (ouk ek ergôn), and that followers of God are God’s 
workmanship (poiêma, obliquely related to “poetry”). In repairing humanity and 
shaping individuals’ character, God shows up as a worker as much as God appears in 
Genesis as a gardener and in Matthew and Mark as a carpenter. Additionally, Paul 
says—as if in the same breath—that good works (ergois agathois) are the “for the sake of 
which” of this salvation. God works not so that we do not have to but so that our (moral 
and spiritual) works are performed differently, oriented towards goodness instead of 
boastful and ill-conceived attempts at self-reliance. It is God’s work alone that is 
necessary and sufficient for opening eternal blessedness to sinful, despairing human 
beings.  
A seeming inevitability in offering a theory of play is grappling with the status of 
play vis-à-vis work—not only the extent to which play involves work or feels like work, 
but also the possibility that play is work (which means, not incidentally, that work might 
be play). This becomes somewhat clearer against the backdrop of the idea of rest. For, 
even though play involves relaxation and relates to “leisure,” common language usage 
shows that “rest” connotes a passiveness generally unknown to play. In its best forms, 
play might prove to be restorative, but it is nevertheless active.  
 When it comes to the arts, there is a similar uncertainty surrounding the 
boundary lines that would separate the work world from the domain of play. One plays 
an instrument or puts on a play in the theater, but one also creates artworks. Peters 
indirectly points to this problematic delineation between the two spheres when he 
discusses the fear that is wrapped up in the practice of improvisation and the discomfort 
that is found in audiences where improvisation is performed. His suggestion is that 
consumers of art unconsciously take comfort in the settled nature of pieces deemed 
“great works.” Such masterpieces are missing, as if by definition, from the arena of free-
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improvisation (the exemplary form for him). This is not to say that splendid beauty is 
not produced in free-improvisation. Rather, it indicates that free-improvisation 
deliberately refrains from generating stable products. Thus, Peters writes of the threats 
of contingency and disappearance: 
Instead of art simply being there, improvisation renders it questionable, insecure, 
contingent, and endangered. Representing, along with the performers, the 
‘standpoint of the other’ necessary for an improvisation to attain the intensity 
necessary to begin, the audience is here denied the all-too-familiar pleasures of 
the known and forced instead to witness close up not only the contingency of the 
artwork’s occurrence but also the uncertainty of its continuance, the contestation 
of its identity, and its eventual destruction at the hands of the improvisors. (45) 
 
It is noteworthy that the terminology of play is absent from Peters’s analysis. A sense of 
effort reigns here—the improvisers’ effort to harness the intensity needed to begin, the 
audience’s effort to face up to the insecurity of art-in-process. The question, I suppose, is 
whether a spirit of work prevails wherever there is so much effort. Are the two (work 
and effort) linked by definition? Or, conversely, can we account for play that is effortful 
but nevertheless not laborious, strenuous but unstriving? Does the same go for faith? 
What keeps the work of believing (à la the Gospel of John) out of the territory of works 
righteousness?200     
There is a third position, an in-between option introduced by Kant’s theory of 
inner-teleology, which allows improvisation both to involve tremendous amounts of 
work and to remain distinct from work at once. Peters refers to the famed idea from 
Kant’s Critique of Judgement explicitly. He builds upon it, innovatively twisting its 
terminology to fit his discursive context of the spontaneous and insecure art form that 
improvisation is. He writes: “The peculiarity of free-improvisation is that it does not 
produce works. To echo Kant’s description of art as ‘purposiveness without a purpose,’ 
it is a working without a work; indeed, in certain respects it might be considered a 
                                                
200 John 6:28-29 introduces the possibility that in place of striving is the work of belief: “Then they 
said to him, ‘What must we do to perform the works of God?’ Jesus answered them, ‘This is the 
work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent.’” However, many Christians look to 




working to avoid works” (44-45, original emphasis). This prescient quotation raises a 
number of points that ought to be included in a theory of the essence of play as well as 
in an analysis of improvisation as a powerful style of play. Among the matters for 
discussion are (1) the distinction between work and works; (2) the relation between 
work and purpose (an added layer to the understanding of the relation between work 
and effort, already cited); and (3) consideration of the market value of enduring pieces of 
art (the great masterpieces that can be bought and sold, and can hang on museum walls) 
in contrast to the way that art that fades away before a live audience can be 
commoditized (the play that players themselves dissolve in the course of improvisation).   
Let us begin, then, with the different implications of the verb “work” (as in “The 
artists work”) and the noun “work” or “works” (as in “The artists produce works of 
art”). Peters relies on this separation, allowing improvisation to count as work while 
denying that works belong to improvisation as an outcome. One way to explore the 
viability of this verb-noun splitting is to test the substitutability of the words “work” 
and “play.” Are these formulas feasible: “The artists play and that results in the creation 
of works” and “The artists work and that results in the creation of play”? If Peters is 
right that it is possible to work in such a way as to produce play in place of works, the 
latter example holds. If he is wrong and the activity of working cannot turn out the 
object of play, if there is a sort of purity of categories where play only leads to play and 
work only leads to work, then neither of the statements is sensible. Rather than belabor 
the point, I will move to the next issue at hand, the interplay of work and purpose. 
Secondly, it is necessary to ask about the role of purpose in parsing out the 
distinction between work and play. As soon as play is purposeful, does it transmute into 
work? And is it purpose itself that makes the difference or does the type of purpose—
internal or external—matter? For, play is not without purpose. Rather, it is its own 
purpose. As Kant says of beauty, it has a formal purposiveness. Otherwise, it is 
disinterested and non-useful, hence without purpose. So perhaps the way to tackle the 
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issue of the relation of play, work, and purpose is not to ask whether purpose turns play 
into work but whether it is ever possible for work to be inner-teleological and still be 
work: Does a lack of outward-directedness cause work to become play? It seems there 
are people who find their professions so aligned with their passions that they would 
perform them with or without compensation. Perhaps this is what “vocation” in a strong 
sense would mean. 
The third point of consideration here deals with the market value of 
improvisation and the bearing that has for its nature as playful or not. When 
improvisation takes place before a paying audience, has it turned into a commoditized 
object? In short, can play transcend payment? Interestingly, the very claim that Peters is 
wanting to make—that improvisers work in such a way as to refrain from producing 
works—does not preclude the possibility of earning wages for improvisation. It is oddly 
consistent that an improviser should be able to produce a non-work (a creation 
accompanied by destruction, a fleeting experience), and still get paid. That is, the 
instability of the art in no way interferes with its monetization. The question being 
considered is whether a spirit of play can still survive—and in its strongest, “purest” 
form—in a monetized atmosphere. So, to be redundant or clarifying, the issue we are 
investigating is not the relation between an unstable expression of art and payment but 
the connection between payment and play. 
Payment for improvisation is consistent with the financial transactions 
surrounding the transmission of art in other contexts, such as museums and theaters, 
which exist in support of (relatively) stable masterpieces. A person may spend an 
afternoon at the Metropolitan and see enduring pieces of art or attend a performance of 
classical theater, celebrated for its lines composed (centuries) in advance, but in both 
cases—as with improvisation—she does not leave with a tangible object but with the 
memory of an experience. The crucial difference, of course, is that what takes place in 
the theater can be scripted and the objects for viewing in museums are mostly “finished” 
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prior to the exhibition, which is precisely what improvisation in its multitude of forms 
resists.  
According to Peters’s comments, it seems clear that improvisation is firmly 
planted in the category of work even in the absence of works. And so for Peters there is 
no contradiction when it comes to payment because work entitles one to wages. Is there 
a way, though, for play to prevail amongst work? Peters has led us to the question but in 
order that we may consider it more fruitfully, it behooves us to turn to texts that take 
religion—not improvisation—as their subject matter. Theology splices itself into our 
discussion. 
Particularly helpful insight on riding the edge between play and work is offered 
by Walter Ong, the Jesuit thinker eventually known for his scholarship on orality. In his 
preface to Hugo Rahner’s Man at Play, he suggests a way to understand the paradox of 
professional play. Ong points out that a dichotomy between play and work exists, but 
only up to a point.  
This is the way it is [that work is not play and play is not work] until you arrive at 
a peak situation, when suddenly everything is reversed: the best players in any game 
turn out to be the professionals, those for whom the game is in fact work, a 
means of livelihood, and the best workers in any field are those for whom their 
work is a kind of play—the mechanic whose job serves his desire to ‘tinker’ with 
machines, the basic research engineer who is ‘playing around’ with various 
possibilities for a huge industrial complex, the financier who ‘plays the market,’ 
the philosopher who likes to ‘play’ with ideas. (x, emphasis mine)201 
 
The dialectical reversal, which Ong describes here, is of enormous import and connects 
precisely to the juncture of work and non-work that Peters presents in The Philosophy of 
Improvisation. For, it explains the possibility of working as a player and, conversely, 
playing as a worker. While I would like to bring Ong’s notion of the coinciding of play 
and work “at the peak” into conversation with the “from below” perspective of the 
contemporary Christian writer Joerg Rieger’s work on economic justice, I will begin by 
                                                




seeking to draw out Ong’s insight alone. I will do this by focusing on two phrases from 
the above quotation: “means of livelihood” and, two clauses later, “serves his desire.” 
 Part of the odd reversal that one finds at the upper echelons of play and work is 
that play becomes a means and work becomes, if not an end in itself, intricately tied to 
what is inherently meaningful. Ong affords us insight into this transformation by 
indicating that once the best players get paid, their play turns into their means of 
livelihood. What is fascinating is that at this point of transition into playing-as-
profession, play is still not quite extrinsically purposeful. Rather, the payment comes as 
a kind of tribute to excellence. The players—or, keeping Peters in mind, improvisers—
have reached such a level of skill from which others benefit that it becomes necessary to 
recognize their talent as deserving of reward. Nowadays, the most common form for 
that recognition is monetary compensation, which is why fans and audience members 
pay money to attend sporting events or live concerts. But for the players, during the 
beginning of their professionalization, play remains “without why.” However, I would 
like to add that their play is very much in danger of becoming purposeful and slipping 
out of the spirit of play the longer it serves as a source of income for them. Over time, it 
is more likely to take on the burden of work, of duty. This seems somewhat intuitive. 
Children do not begin playing—an instrument, a sport—as a career move. They do it for 
the love it, which sustains them over the difficulties of discipline and training. When the 
prize money comes, it is simply there, but if it lingers it is susceptible to becoming 
inseparable from the play and finally, perhaps, desirable apart from the play. I do not 
know how hard it is to maintain that love for the game when it becomes associated over 
greater lengths of time with paychecks. There is no prescribed way to deal with the 
“means of livelihood” phenomenon—short of giving away the money? Or not accepting 
it to begin with?202—but the world would be a poorer place if the risk of drowning out 
                                                
202 Bill Cunningham expresses his views on this (paid play) conundrum in a comment captured in 
the documentary on his fashion photography. He says, “You see, if you don’t take money, they 
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the spirit of play in professionalism deterred the exceptionally talented from taking on 
their passions in play-based careers. 
As Ong’s comments switch from play to work, the direction of the reversal 
between means and ends changes, too. Rather than play counting as a means (for pay) as 
in the first case, jobs take on the role of serving a person’s play interest. It is unusual for 
this instrumentality to appear so directly. It would seem that the majority of the Western 
workforce experiences their work as a means to receiving a salary, the source of the 
money that will be parsed out in support of their needs including, eventually, their play 
needs. Some of the people who find themselves employed in jobs that they do not enjoy 
continue in them because their income covers the costs of their leisure or “true 
vocation”—those things they genuinely want to spend their time doing, the fun and 
meaningful activities they pursue away from their “just-a-job”-work. This is why the 
aspiring actor who is also a waiter is a recognizable stereotype. 
But Ong is presenting another scenario, something better—in fact, what he 
presents is the best. The mechanic, research engineer, financier, and philosopher whom 
he discusses are, after all, the greatest in their fields. It is as if their entire careers exist for 
the sake of supporting nothing more than their kens to tinker with machines, play 
around with industrial complex possibilities, and so on. They are happy in their work 
because their passions are at home there. What Ong provides as an insight—This is what 
the apex looks like—Joerg Rieger broaches as a matter of justice—Is it right for this blessed 
confluence to hold only for a select few at the top? In the conclusion of his book No Rising 
Tide: Theology, Economics, and the Future, Rieger addresses in passing whether we dare 
                                                
can’t tell you what to do, kid. ... Money’s the cheapest thing. Liberty, freedom is the most 
expensive” (Bill Cunningham New York). It dawns on me that if any modern-day figure should 




imagine entitlement for “work-play” as a swath of rights broad enough to encompass all 
workers.203  
There are non-profit organizations and global, political institutions devoted to 
the protection of play and work as independent, distinct goods. For example, the NGO 
Right to Play seeks to establish play as a right for the world’s children. In this, it combats 
unfair labor practices and dire living conditions that deprive the young of childhood 
amusement. In addition, the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights lists entitlement to work as its twenty-third article. What, though, of the right to 
play at work? Does such a right exist and, if so, to what extent—that is, for whom does it 
hold? Is it the purview of the élite few? What is its ground, what does it entail, and what 
is necessary to sustain it? Here I am not thinking of the sinister gestures of multinational 
corporations that turn their offices into funhouses as a strategy for extricating more 
hours and productivity from their already very-worked workers.204 Instead, I have in 
mind the ability, referenced above, to broach one’s professional life as the fulfillment of 
one’s personal play calling or inner play-drive. Could each person achieve this? 
In the same way that there is no set formula for protecting play from the effects 
of professionalization, there is no obvious method for universally generating the 
experience of play in work. Yet Rieger is interested in the possibility of exactly such a 
move. He does not share Ong’s top-down perspective. Rather than look at (or from) the 
peak, Rieger makes a point of proceeding from the underside, seeing as one below (No 
Rising Tide, 19). In advancing his picture not only of common rights but also of the 
common good, he writes:  
Do all people have the opportunity to develop and employ their creativity for the 
common good? The opportunity to employ one’s creativity is usually seen as one 
                                                
203 Such a concept might seem fantastic enough to please Harvey Cox or ancient enough to pass as 
Plato’s function principle in the Republic (353a, 443c, etc.).  
 





of the privileges of those who occupy higher-level jobs in politics, industry, or 
intellectual production through the academy and other outlets. But the notion of 
the common good reminds us that this is not enough, and that no one should be 
deprived of the opportunity to labor creatively, so as not to stifle the creativity of 
work as a whole. (157, emphasis mine)  
 
In this quotation, Rieger affirms Ong’s observation about the fortunately creative, while 
also challenging its fairness. This accords with Rieger’s call to respond at a structural 
level to the systemic failures of capitalism. A new economic arrangement would surely 
seem to be required to elevate everybody’s potential to thrive playfully at work. Or 
would it? 
Having tread out the path of Peters’s description of “working without a work” 
and its implications for a while, how far afield are we now from improvisation? Peters’s 
use of the notion creative destruction is nearby (many kinds of jobs would have to be 
eliminated in the process of making way for new labor of the transcendentally fulfilling, 
life-expanding sort that Rieger advocates). But it is the Lewis-Davidson position that all 
of life is improvisation, which rescues this theologically-minded discussion of Ong and 
Rieger from being misplaced or unnecessary. For, if we agree with Lewis and 
Davidson’s identification of all people as routine improvisers, and if our understanding 
of Peters’s account is correct that improvisation in its working-without-a-work nature 
shows the line between work and play to be razor thin, then Rieger’s vision may be 
realized even before a revolution. It is as if, rather than waiting for an economic miracle 
to lift the tide, an ordinary worker could go some way toward buoying the play status of 
his employment himself by working improvisatorially—exercising and negotiating 




This chapter has provided me with the opportunity to discuss grace in 
conjunction with freedom against the backdrop of improvisation in three ways. What 
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remains to be explained is the implication of the choice to place improvisation last: Why 
is this specific play form suited to occupy the final position in this study? This question 
carries particular weight given that I have chosen in this dissertation to trace a play 
dialectic along Kierkegaard’s teleological trajectory of existence. By matching the subject 
of improvisation with Kierkegaard’s notion of Religiousness B or Christianity, I have 
made an intuitive yet difficult value judgement. Improvisation deserves to be the goal 
toward which a life of play aims because of the model that improvisation provides, 
above all, of freedom within constraint. There will always be rules to a game; that 
structure is essential to play and to good play. Similarly, in the Christian walk, the Law 
never goes away. Grace is the power of this dual recognition. It grows when preparation 







In “Free to Play: An Analysis in Aesthetic, Ethical, and Religious Movements,” 
we have progressed—not existentially, of course, but discursively—through each of the 
spheres and substrata in Kierkegaard’s philosophy as they find representation in the 
works of Either/Or and Fear and Trembling in particular. To recapitulate, sensuous 
immediacy, the first moment of the aesthetic, was met in chapter 1 with an analysis of 
children’s play, which was informed by the theories of Erik Erikson and other twentieth-
century psychologists. Issues of escapism and the free play of the imagination as they 
relate to over-reflection, the second moment of the aesthetic, were engaged in chapter 2 
through a consideration of a new form of fantasy play to arise with Internet technology: 
Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games. In conjunction with the specific 
MMORPG World of Warcraft, features of Schleiermacher’s notion of Phantasie were 
presented.  
As children we are free when we play, having more openness and opportunity to 
enjoy activities for their own sake than at perhaps any other period of life. This freedom 
is conditioned by the playfulness of those surrounding us and is circumscribed by our 
circumstances. The disposition of nearby adults and fellow children may hinder or help 
us to experience play, even as the contingencies of our physical settings determine what 
types of activities are possible for us. With the development of cognitive capacities and 
sheer physical growth, children take on new play forms. For example, our play becomes 
more social and more scheduled as we age. Playing in more formalized ways teaches us 
to respect restrictions. Repression increases; it becomes less socially sanctioned (both 
during our play and in the times outside of playing) to follow our whims, live in the 
moment, and think of ourselves as occupying the center or the whole of our environs. 
We acquire finer and finer distinctions between self and other. At the same time, it 
  
245 
becomes possible to enjoy more complicated games, including games based in language 
and symbolism. This of course opens up enormous ludic possibilities, including the 
creation of sophisticated fantasies.  
In adolescence but also in adulthood, we have chances to play in an imaginative 
fashion, exercising our mind in powerful ways as we leave behind the restrictions of the 
framework of reality. Playing thus, we find the freedom of combining ideas that do not 
normally belong together. Under states of fantasy we are open not only to the new but 
also to the bizarre. It may not be appropriate to conduct ourselves in the shared (non-
play, workaday) world according to our fantasies, but it is nevertheless psychologically 
beneficial to have some avenues for release and escape.  
Computer technologies allow us now to engage in fantasy in specific ways. The 
Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game phenomenon grew out of offline role-
playing games, chiefly Dungeons & Dragons. And so while play that is centered in the act 
of fantasy may exhibit certain general tendencies toward expansiveness (of mind) and 
constraint (of action), it takes on particular limitations and liberties under the guise of 
MMORPGs. One example of such a shift concerns the enforcement of rules. Conduct or 
play behavior is more regulated in electronic games in that rules that are etched in 
computer coding are harder to break than the non-programmed rules of analog games. 
This type of restriction is less concerning perhaps than the way that players may come to 
be “bound” to their fantasy lives. It is not only that the freedom experienced within 
fantasy may not translate to or propitiously inform one’s way of everyday living. The 
allure of possibility of pretend worlds may prove addictive and therefore debilitating.  
The entirety of the ethical stage, which highlights the willingness to cede some 
measure of “freedom” in order to actualize particular possibilities in the world and so to 
become more truly free, hinges on the notion of choice. Thus, in chapter 3 I examined 
how the call to maturity comes through decision-making by way of game theory in 
Pascal’s “Infini – Rien” pensée. This wager plays off of notions of play as a free activity; 
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being forced to gamble on God’s existence is paradoxical. Once one realizes that one has to 
make a choice, one can leverage the power of the mind to make a reasonable, weighted 
decision. The impersonal, universally valid rules of probability dictate how we should 
wager. Only then is the body engaged: one carries out the choice to follow God by 
physically enacting rituals. Worship practices cultivate positive traits like friendship, 
gratitude, and sincerity in the libertine convert, who in his conversion sacrifices the 
“liberties” of his former way of life. It is interesting that in the scenario that Pascal paints 
the libertine has only assented to Christian belief intellectually. He has further to go, it 
seems, to appropriate faith in the subjective way that Kierkegaard would laud.  
The third sphere contains the move from pagan and pre-Christian forms of 
religiosity to a way of life grounded in the absolute paradox of Jesus Christ in whom 
(absurdly, incomprehensibly) the eternal and temporal meet. To that end, implications 
of the ludic status of humanity were engaged in chapter 4. The claim in Plato’s Laws that 
human beings are the puppets, or even toy artifacts, of god has consequences for how 
we act. Being tethered to god by the golden cord of reason gives us reason to think well 
of ourselves and to think of ourselves as occupying a low position insofar as the cord is 
pulled from above. These elements moderate each other and lead us to live playfully 
even in the face of serious matters.  
The transition from the propaedeutic to Christianity to Christianity itself is a 
movement from guilt-consciousness to sin-consciousness. In a manner reminiscent of the 
journey of Geist in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the situation worsens before it 
improves. In short, one must go through feelings of guilt to recognize sin, and one must 
pass through awareness of one’s sin in order to realize “eternal blessedness.” One 
relinquishes the despair of sin through faith in the paradox of Christ. Faith, then, 
becomes the key to full-fledged freedom, a freedom that is not destroyed in the face of 
boundaries. Improvisation was matched in chapter 5 to Kierkegaard’s celebration of 
Christianity as a way of life predicated on joy as well as terror, jest in addition to 
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earnestness. This form of play was taken to model a rigorous spontaneity that accords 
with the power of grace as the ability to respond to unexpected—and difficult—situations 
with the appearance of ease. For, improvisation requires all the skill of hard discipline 
even as it involves reliance on and responsiveness to others. Improvisation, like agapê 
love, never fails in that failure never puts it to an end.205  
Having retraced these steps, let us think of how the path of this investigation 
may be extended.  
 
The Continuance of Virtue Ethics 
 
 What might the broader significance be of this investigation into play as the 
dialectical conjoining of freedom and constraint? How might this dissertation not only 
fit into the literature on Kierkegaard and stretch the field of play studies but also further 
our understanding of virtue ethics? In what remains, I would like to reiterate the 
distinction between the activity of play and the attitude of playfulness, and gesture 
towards reasons why playfulness should be included in character-based accounts of the 
good life.   
 I have made a concerted effort in the preceding chapters to link the activity of 
play (whether that of free play or the play of games with rules) to freedom. In a variety 
of ways, I repeated the claim that play is predicated on freedom and that play, in turn, 
can serve as the grounding condition for freedom. A measure of freedom is required in 
order for play to occur, and in experiencing play people may experience a larger, fuller 
freedom. They may feel the pleasure of knowing that they can unhinge themselves from 
necessity: they are free because they are in the position to do something unnecessary, 
unproductive, and frivolous. Players might also find freedom in mastery, that is, in 
                                                
205 “It [love, agapê] bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Love 




having an outlet to demonstrate (and refine) their skillfulness. The possibility to 
discover or act out of new or seldom-accessed parts of one’s personality is another form 
of freedom that play may offer.  
  But freedom is not the sole basis for which play and playfulness—its sometimes 
animating force or accompanying disposition—merit attention in the contemporary 
discourse on ethics. What is special about play is how play reveals the link between 
liberty and limitation. The proposition that I would like to consider here and in future 
research is that playfulness is the attitude by which a player negotiates the relationship between 
liberty and limitation. By playfulness, a player manages the interplay of freedom and 
constraint, the unnecessary and the obligatory, the escape from certain types of 
restrictions into other forms of rules.206  
It is worth thinking about what might constitute limitation in this domain. 
Constraints may take the form of rules that guide player behavior—as moral laws set 
restrictions on human actions, and as grammatical conventions regulate language use—
or they may appear in less formally structured ways. Constrictions still belong to open-
ended activities that do not have a clear “win, lose, or draw” result. In those non-game 
cases of play, factors of constraint may be the decisions of one’s playmates, the 
atmosphere generated by an audience, or the review of a critic. A child engaged in 
pretense with other children must be responsive to the other children’s wishes and 
actions. No matter how free he otherwise is during this time of free play, he must abide 
within the socially determined sphere of play in order for the play to go on and for it to 
go well. And—notably—he helps set the parameters of play for his playmates in turn. 
Were a child engaged in “free play” to fail to respect his playmates’ boundaries (for 
                                                
206 In his chapter “Rhetorics of the Imaginary,” Brian Sutton-Smith has a short section on play and 
the playful. There, he contrasts the terms in a different way than I do, taking play to be what 
contravenes our expectations of the everyday, and what is playful to be metaplay—the challenge 
of normal expectations of play itself. See The Ambiguity of Play, pp. 147-148. Other than this, the 




example, by acting out of the spirit of the play), or were they to violate his unstated rules 
(for example, by rejecting or ignoring his play offerings), the play would suffer. It might 
even dissolve. A similar case could be made for the limitations that audiences place on 
performers, and the ways that one’s co-performers’ choices determine what is possible 
for one’s own play experience. The atmosphere of a performance space and the decisions 
of one’s fellow players open up and close down avenues for expression. All of this is to 
say that even “free play” is not entirely free. It is simply that the rules are less obvious 
than the rules that structure games. Like occurrences of absolute possibility, instances of 
totally free play are impossible to identify. We know that free play has boundaries in 
part because we are capable of recognizing free play as separate from other phenomena 
like work and rest—and games.207 
Improvisation is a particularly compelling, even beautiful, model of play that 
draws on the disposition of playfulness in negotiating boundaries. In different cases of 
improvisation—from the dance stage to the comedy club to the jazz performance—a 
specific attitude is on view. The mindset of a playful person is strong but not 
overserious. It is not that such a player is unconcerned for the quality of her 
performance. Through her playfulness, a player may be extremely focused. What is 
remarkable about playfulness, however, is that it is relentlessly playful. Playfulness and 
resilience go hand in hand. Being ruled by a spirit of playfulness, improvisation does not 
get bogged down in failure. The improviser knows how to manage disappointments and 
overcome mistakes. Reacting to “unknowns” is difficult; it requires skillfulness. But 
having skills is not enough. Prowess must be supplemented with a disposition, the 
peculiar and joyful willingness to proceed no matter what. When a spirit of playfulness 
animates one’s play, consequences do not determine one’s affect or one’s willingness to 
                                                
207 Sutton-Smith gives voice to a similar sentiment in analyzing a (single) jester before a public 
crowd of non-jesters. “We ‘frame’ him as a ‘comedian’ and he can play with material that most of 
us do not play with in the same irreverent way, but he is nevertheless confined by the rules of 
public presentation. That is, he may be playful as a comedian, but to be a comedian is to be ‘in 
play,’ that is, to be in a known, rule-bound play context” (The Ambiguity of Play, 150). 
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continue playing. A playful player has moved beyond the boundaries of 
instrumentality. She is not controlled by the results that ensue. Rather, she is in control. At 
this stage, a player is free.  
In making this suggestion, I am claiming that playfulness is not automatically 
present amidst all experiences of play. It is possible to play un-playfully, which is 
related to Kierkegaard’s idea that one can be a Christian un-Christianly and to 
Aristotle’s idea that one can perform an action without having the corresponding virtue. 
What would it look like to play unplayfully? It is wrong, I think, to say that a serious 
attitude makes play unplayful. Play partakes in seriousness and frivolity in much the 
same way that it involves work and rest. The non-dualistic nature of play—the inability 
to locate an antonym to play, either in what is serious or in other ideas such as reason 
and sense—makes the essence of playfulness difficult to stipulate. That is, play does not 
lend itself to dichotomous treatment the way that work and rest do; play does not 
present an apposite term in the immediate way that work suggests a binary with rest. 
This trait, this nuanced “thirdness” (recognizable in Schiller’s treatment of the play 
impulse as cutting between the formal and the material) is what makes play a 
compelling concept and an intellectually fertile topic.  
Above, I imply that the capacity of play to include seriousness has repercussions 
for how playfulness is to be comprehended. Let me gesture here to the necessity in 
developing the distinction between the activity of play and the attitude of playfulness of 
inquiring into the relationship between play and playfulness. A deeper account of the 
virtue of playfulness will need to shed light on which defines which. Does playfulness 
arise from play or play from playfulness, or does the influence hold to some degree in 
both directions? To anticipate our discussion of virtue ethics, the relation between ludic 
activities and attitudes matters because of the dedication within that moral framework 
to ethical training: It is valuable to know whether to turn to play or to other practices for 
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proper habituation in the spirit of gracefully managing constraints, if playfulness is 
indeed to be a virtue worth cultivating.  
Another qualification is in order. I have been keen to draw a connection between 
playfulness, improvisation, and the free(ing) negotiation of boundaries. It is not that the 
trait of playfulness is entirely lacking from or completely implicit within the phases of 
play considered in the earlier chapters. Playfulness may belong to and be evinced in 
children, videogamers, gamblers seeking infinity, and people who broach life by 
regarding themselves as toys of cosmic significance. But it does seem to me that 
playfulness is developed to its greatest extent in the free play of improvisation.208  
If, following my definition, we take playfulness to be the disposition that enables 
players to negotiate the tension between freedom and constraint, to enact that dialectic 
successfully, it still stands to be seen why playfulness should be considered a virtue. 
What makes a virtue (aretê, “excellence”) a virtue? A further, more basic challenge is 
developing an account of the desirability of playfulness, so conceived. How might we 
stipulate the precise goodness of the excellence of being able to respond to limitations 
(constraints, boundaries, constrictions, rules, laws) freely, without the diminishment of 
freedom?   
Stretching back to Aristotle, virtue ethics is an approach to moral philosophy that 
is centered on character rather than conduct. It is teleological in having an aim, and 
eudaimonistic in aiming at happiness. “The virtues are precisely those qualities the 
possession of which will enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia and the lack of 
which will frustrate his movement toward that telos” (MacIntyre, 148). The other streams 
predominant in moral philosophy—deontology and utilitarianism—ask whether a 
particular act is right or wrong. To determine whether to perform a given deed, 
                                                
208 I am happy to consider alternate examples. What are fields of play beside improvisation that 
evoke such playfulness? Would worship, for instance, count or, as James Carse may have us see 




Immanuel Kant, the figure most commonly associated with deontology, considers 
whether it would accord with and stem from the moral law, happiness aside. He 
maintains that the deed of telling a lie, for example, can never be sanctioned because a 
rational person could never will it to be universal. It is not the consequence of lying that 
makes it wrong; rather, it is the inner-contradictory, essentially irrational nature of lying 
that disqualifies it from having any possible moral worth. “That will is absolutely good 
which cannot be evil, hence whose maxim, if made a universal law, can never conflict 
with itself” (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4:437, original emphasis). Kant 
emphatically declares the importance of the will in the opening lines of the Groundwork, 
where he states that nothing is so good as a good will (4:393). One has a duty not only to 
act rationally in a manner that stands up to the test of the categorical imperative; one’s 
actions must also be motivated by a pure will, that is from total respect for the moral 
law. This is the difference between acting in accordance with the moral law and acting 
from the moral law. Even with the prominence afforded the will, Kantian deontology 
remains action-driven. This is evinced by the fact that the will is regarded as “nothing 
other than practical reason” (4:412).  
By contrast, the philosopher John Stuart Mill offers a consequentialist approach 
to assigning moral worth under the theory of utilitarianism. From this alternate 
perspective, the salient factor is the outcome or consequence of an act. A moral agent 
could be motivated to do something out of awe for the moral law but what really counts 
is maximizing happiness and minimizing pain. When considering what to do, then, the 
utilitarian poses the question of whether the act would increase total happiness. Even 
still, moral agents’ character matters because virtue is related to happiness. As Mill 
writes, “if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier 
for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the 
world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only gain 
its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were 
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only benefited by the nobleness of others …” (142). The foregoing has been an extremely 
simplified account of the deontological and utilitarian schools of thought, which are 
represented by modern scholars such as Christine Korsgaard and Peter Singer, 
respectively. However, I hope that it has sufficiently set the grounds for a discussion of 
playfulness in terms of virtue ethics.  
It is hard but not impossible to imagine having obligations to play in discrete 
circumstances under deontological and utilitarian ethical systems. Within the rubric of 
virtue ethics, however, there seems to be truer capaciousness for the consideration of the 
moral worth of engaging in play and approaching game and non-game situations with a 
playful disposition. 
 Virtue ethics differs from duty- and consequence-grounded approaches to ethics 
in being concerned with the total character of a person over and above particular points 
of conduct. A virtue ethicist imagines how to live and responds to moral quandaries first 
by conceiving what kind of person to be and then by thinking of how actions emerge 
from virtues. As Roger Crisp and Michael Slote explain, “the real reason why I should 
not lie to you is not that it is against the moral law, nor that it is likely not to maximize 
well-being, but because it is dishonest. The notions of virtue, then, are more basic than the 
notions at the heart of utilitarian and Kantian theory” (“Introduction,” Virtue Ethics, 3, 
original emphasis). The guiding question “What qualities or virtues belong to a good 
person?” translates, whether quickly or eventually, into the question “How are these 
virtues cultivated?” Once the desired areas of character have been identified or 
deliberately affirmed, the project of habituation commences—ethical training is a crucial 
task and a continual undertaking within this Aristotle-inspired framework. 
Traditionally, one turned to the cardinal virtues in response to the question of which 
traits to pursue. It was maintained that one should seek to cultivate justice, wisdom, 
courage, and moderation in oneself. Because the quest to be a person of good character 
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entails concern for disposition, a further type of question that a virtue ethicist faces is: 
What does it mean to do acts of justice justly in the right times and circumstances?209 
Even though the unity of the virtues is presumed, it is necessary to have 
discernment to know when to exercise one virtue instead of another, to act courageously 
rather than moderately, for example. If—to put it basically (but also, surely, unfairly)—
the weak point of deontology is knowing how to formulate one’s maxim (i.e., the 
subjective principle for guiding action), and if the flaw of utilitarianism lies in the 
challenge of assigning utility values (identifying but also quantifying the results of an 
action), the trouble here with virtue ethics concerns the ranking of virtues. How do I 
know when one virtue is called for instead of another? And what do I need to know in 
order to make that judgement? 
 The set of virtues receiving close attention (justice, wisdom, courage, and 
moderation) remained static for a remarkably long period of time. When, through the 
work of Elizabeth Anscombe in the late 1950s, virtue ethics began to undergo a revival, 
it became possible to propose new virtues to the register of moral goods. Now, as the 
conversation continues in works like How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues (edited 
by Roger Crisp, 1996) and Virtue Ethics, Here and Now (edited by Stephen M. Gardiner, 
2005), the classical list is being expanded to include “contemporary” traits.   
It is my contention that playfulness merits attention alongside the “loftier” 
ideals, whether ancient or recently proposed, such as justice and dignity. In thinking 
that playfulness belongs on these lists, I am not assuming the stance that playfulness is 
peculiar to the contemporary world. Rather, I maintain that playfulness is an evergreen 
virtue. (In addition to the recommendation of playful living analyzed in chapter 4, recall 
Aristotle’s recognition of the quality of eutrapelia, or wittiness, in the Nicomachean Ethics. 
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Taken literally, eutrapelos refers to a well-spinning man. Such a person strikes the right 
balance between being a bore and being a fool. The link between nimbleness and 
playfulness is suggestive.) When drawing the portrait of a good person or thinking of a 
life of well-being, playfulness should not be overlooked. I might convey this sentiment 
more strongly by stating that accounts of virtue that ignore playfulness are incomplete. 
They are lacking an essential ingredient to the good life as it might be conceived under 
generally positive, favorable conditions whether in antiquity or postmodernity.  
What is more, such accounts fail to address challenges that people commonly 
face in contemporary culture, with our society’s struggle with underemployment on the 
one hand, and rampant “professionalism” (work obligations that stretch far beyond 
forty-hour-a-week bounds, identifying too strongly with one’s job, engaging in 
meaningless labor in order “to get ahead”), on the other. These problems for our 
collective way of life do not simply concern practices of work, rest, and play. They are 
tied up with failures of attitude, too. In addition to structural flaws on the societal level, 
one finds imbalance among the dispositions of diligence, peacefulness, and playfulness 
in individuals. How does a good person live in the light of these constraints?   
I see two ways in which my project could help to fill in the lacunae in current 
conversations within virtue ethics. First, “Free to Play” can strengthen the consideration 
of eudaimonia by showing how playfulness is intrinsically and instrumentally valuable. 
The trait of playfulness is worth pursuing on its own, for its own sake. The intrinsic 
worth of playfulness does not preclude playfulness from carrying positive effects, 
however. As a way of handling binds, the inner capacity to play proves to be an asset for 
life. It enables one to respond powerfully and freely to any number of the constraints—
and failures—that one inevitably encounters and embodies as a human being. 
There is a second way in which my study may add a needed perspective to the 
field. It may do so by supplying details of play’s relation to other desirable traits like 
humility, perseverance, creativity, and—the sine qua non of improvisation discussed in 
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chapter 5—la disponibilité (relaxed awareness or openness). The need for a theory of play 
that gives an account of play as an abstract concept, while also taking into consideration 
its intersection with morality, is plain: One only has to read the news, catch a glimpse of 
the way subway riders individually en masse kill time, or look to one’s students (and 
hear about their pastimes) to realize that we have arrived at a moment in which our 
relation as a culture to play is changing.210 Being able to respond in a deliberative way 
now, in the twenty-first century, to this radical transformation in entertainment, and the 
concurrent truths about how we experience work and rest, depends on thinking through 
the nature of play, the conditions for its possibility, and the benefits and dangers it 
entails. Do people have the inner, moral resources to respond to these realities, of having 
too much time outside of work and not enough? Are people able to evaluate the new 
games being lobbed up by the entertainment industry? It is not that playfulness is a 
magic bullet that will resolve moral dilemmas but playfulness is a powerful and 
empowering component of navigating the complexities of our current moral situation.  
Even if we were not being submerged under this tidal wave of change in 
amusements, we would still have good cause to study play and playfulness. For, 
playfulness is a virtue that intertwines with other, traditionally esteemed traits like 
humility and perseverance, as well as the much praised and sought after good of 
creativity. A player exhibits humility in taking on roles that may be beneath her 
ordinary persona or in “being a good sport” when she accepts defeat. Play teaches 
perseverance under pleasant circumstances. In addition to the playfulness of a child 
                                                
210 This sweeping change is represented by Zynga, which the New York Times reports as having a 
market capitalization of $2.69 billion 
(http://dealbook.on.nytimes.com/public/overview?symbol=ZNGA, accessed 03/25/2013)! 
Zynga is well known as the game company that spawned the oddly popular game FarmVille. 
According to its website, it has more than 240 million monthly active users playing its social 
games (http://company.zynga.com/about, accessed 03/25/2013). The ascension of new play 
forms is captured as well by the “game layer” enthusiast Seth Priebatsch. For an introduction to 






mastering a move, think of the inner state of a musician who works hard to play a 
complicated phrase well. The mixture of frustration and joy in playful repetition is not 
unrelated to the moral good of patient resolve. One may locate humility in the need to 
play again insofar as it is failure that calls for repetition—challenging play humbles—
although it may be hard to ascertain whether it is sheer pleasure or technical difficulty 
that calls for someone to “play it again.” So there are connections between play, 
humility, and perseverance. Mostly, though, what I find venerable about playfulness is 
its relation to disponibilité. If we seek to cultivate the discernment to undertake the right 
ludic activities at the right times, to attain the balance between looseness and tautness, 
relaxation and tension (or attention)—in short, to know how to play playfully—we will 
not only open ourselves to freeing constraints; we will make ourselves available to 
freedom. “Between us two, only freedom’s own game will prevail” (Kierkegaard, 
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§418 of Pascal’s Pensées  
 
(A.J. Krailsheimer’s Translation)  
  
 
Infinity – nothing. Our soul is cast into the body where it finds number, time, dimensions;  
it reasons about these things and calls them natural, or necessary, and can believe 
nothing else. 
Unity added to infinity does not increase it at all, any more than a foot added to 
an infinite measurement: the finite is annihilated in the presence of the infinite and 
becomes pure nothingness. So it is with our mind before God, with our justice before 
divine justice. There is not so great a disproportion between our justice and God’s as 
between unity and infinity.  
God’s justice must be as vast as his mercy. Now his justice towards the damned 
is less vast and ought to be less startling to us than his mercy towards the elect. 
We know that the infinite exists without knowing its nature, just as we know that 
it is untrue that numbers are finite. Thus it is true that there is an infinite number, but we 
do not know what it is. It is untrue that it is even, untrue that it is odd, for by adding a 
unit it does not change its nature. Yet it is a number, and every number is even or odd. 
(It is true that this applies to every finite number.) 
Therefore we may well know that God exists without knowing what he is. 
Is there no substantial truth, seeing that there are so many true things which are 
not truth itself? 
Thus we know the existence and nature of the finite because we too are finite and 
extended in space. 
We know the existence of the infinite without knowing its nature, because it too 
has extension but unlike us no limits.  
But we do not know either the existence or the nature of God, because he has 
neither extension nor limits.  
But by faith we know his existence, through glory we shall know his nature.  
 Now I have already proved that it is quite possible to know that something exists 
without knowing its nature.  
 Let us speak now according to our natural lights.  
 If there is a God, he is infinitely beyond our comprehension, since, being 
indivisible and without limits, he bears no relation to us. We are therefore incapable of 
knowing either what he is or whether he is. That being so, who would dare to attempt 
an answer to the question? Certainly not we, who bear no relation to him. 
 Who then will condemn Christians for being unable to give rational grounds for 
their belief, professing as they do a religion for which they cannot give rational grounds? 
They declare that it is a folly, stultitiam, in expounding it to the world, and then you 
complain that they do not prove it. If they did prove it they would not be keeping their 
word. It is by being without proof that they show they are not without sense. ‘Yes, but 
although that excuses those who offer their religion as such, and absolves them from the 
criticism of producing it without rational grounds, it does not absolve those who accept 
it.’ Let us then examine this point, and let us say: ‘Either God is or he is not.’ But to 
which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot decide this question. Infinite chaos 
separates us. At the far end of this infinite distance a coin is being spun which will come 
down heads or tails. How will you wager? Reason cannot make you choose either, 
reason cannot prove either wrong.  
 Do not condemn as wrong those who have made a choice, for you know nothing 
about it. ‘No, but I will condemn them not for having made this particular choice, but 
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any choice, for, although the one who calls heads and the other one are equally at fault, 
the fact is that they are both at fault: the right thing is not to wager at all.’ 
 Yes, but you must wager. There is no choice, you are already committed. Which 
will you choose then? Let us see: since a choice must be made, let us see which offers 
you the least interest. You have two things to lose: the true and the good, and two things 
to stake: your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your 
nature has two things to avoid: error and wretchedness. Since you must necessarily 
choose, your reason is no more affronted by choosing one rather than the other. That is 
one point cleared up. But your happiness? Let us weigh up the gain and loss involved in 
calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you win you win everything, 
if you lose you lose nothing. Do not hesitate then; wager that he does exist. ‘That is 
wonderful. Yes, I must wager, but perhaps I am wagering too much.’ Let us see: since 
there is an equal chance of gain and loss, if you stood to win only two lives for one you 
could still wager, but supposing you stood to win three?  
 You would have to play (since you must necessarily play) and it would be 
unwise of you, once you are obliged to play, not to risk your life in order to win three 
lives at a game in which there is an equal chance of losing and winning. But there is an 
eternity of life and happiness. That being so, even though there were an infinite number 
of chances, of which only one were in your favour, you would still be right to wager one 
in order to win two; and you would be acting wrongly, being obliged to play, in refusing 
to stake one life against three in a game, where out of an infinite number of chances 
there is one in your favour, if there were an infinity of infinitely happy life to be won, 
one chance of winning against a finite number of chances of losing, and what you are 
staking is finite. That leaves no choice; wherever there is infinity, and where there are 
not infinite chances of losing against that of winning, there is no room for hesitation, you 
must give everything. And thus, since you are obliged to play, you must be renouncing 
reason if you hoard your life rather than risk it for an infinite gain, just as likely to occur 
as a loss amounting to nothing. 
For it is no good saying that it is uncertain whether you will win, that it is certain 
that you are taking a risk, and that the infinite distance between the certainty of what 
you are risking and the uncertainty of what you may gain makes the finite good you are 
certainly risking equal to the infinite good that you are not certain to gain. This is not the 
case. Every gambler takes a certain risk for an uncertain gain without sinning against 
reason. Here there is no infinite distance between the certain risk and the uncertain gain: 
that is not true. There is, indeed, an infinite distance between the certainty of winning 
and the certainty of losing, but the proportion between the uncertainty of winning and 
the certainty of what is being risked is in proportion to the chances of winning or losing. 
And hence if there are as many chances on one side as on the other you are playing for 
even odds. And in that case the certainty of what you are risking is equal to the 
uncertainty of what you may win; it is by no means infinitely distant from it. Thus our 
argument carries infinite weight, when the stakes are finite in a game where there are 
even chances of winning and losing and an infinite prize to be won. 
This is conclusive and if men are capable of any truth this is it.  
‘I confess, I admit it, but is there really no way of seeing what the cards are?’ – 
‘Yes. Scripture and the rest, etc.’ – ‘Yes, but my hands are tied and my lips are sealed; I 
am being forced to wager and I am not free; I am being held fast and I am so made that I 
cannot believe. What do you want me to do then?’ ‘That is true, but at least get it into 
your head that, if you are unable to believe, it is because of your passions, since reason 
impels you to believe and yet you cannot do so. Concentrate then not on convincing 
yourself by multiplying proofs of God’s existence but by diminishing your passions. 
You want to find faith and you do not know the road. You want to be cured of unbelief 
and you ask for the remedy: learn from those who were once bound like you and who 
now wager all they have. These people who know the road you wish to follow, who 
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have been cured of the affliction of which you wish to be cured: follow the way by 
which they began. They behaved just as if they did believe, taking holy water, having 
masses said, and so on. That will make you believe quite naturally, and will make you 
more docile [abêtira].’ – ‘But that is what I am afraid of.’ – ‘But why? What have you to 
lose? But to show you that this is the way, the fact is that this diminishes the passions 
which are your great obstacles …’ 
 
End of this address 
‘Now what harm will come to you from choosing this course? You will be 
faithful, honest, humble, grateful, full of good works, a sincere, true friend … It is true 
you will not enjoy noxious pleasures, glory and good living, but will you not have 
others? 
‘I tell you that you will gain even in this life, and that at every step you take 
along this road you will see that your gain is so certain and your risk so negligible that 
in the end you will realize that you have wagered on something certain and infinite for 
which you have paid nothing.’    
‘How these words fill me with rapture and delight!—’ 
‘If my words please you and seem cogent, you must know that they come from a 
man who went down upon his knees before and after to pray this infinite and indivisible 
being, to whom he submits his own, that he might bring your being also to submit to 
him for your own good and for his glory: and that strength might thus be reconciled 
with lowliness.’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
